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I 
Operations in Fiscal Year 2004 
A.  Summary 
The National Labor Relations Board, an independent Federal agency, 
initiates no cases: it acts only on those cases brought before it.  All 
proceedings originate from filings by the major segment of the public 
covered by the National Labor Relations Act—employees, labor unions, 
and private employers who are engaged in interstate commerce.  During 
fiscal year 2004, 31,787 cases were received by the Board. 
The public filed 26,890 charges alleging that business firms or labor 
organizations, or both, committed unfair labor practices, prohibited by 
the statute, which adversely affected employees.  The NLRB during the 
year also received 4715 petitions to conduct secret-ballot elections in 
which workers in appropriate groups select or reject unions to represent 
them in collective bargaining with their employers.  Also, the public filed 
182 amendment to certification and unit clarification cases.  
After the initial influx of charges and petitions, the flow narrows 
because the great majority of the newly filed cases are resolved in 
NLRB’s national network of field offices by dismissals, withdrawals, 
agreements, and settlements. 
During fiscal year 2004, the five-member Board was composed of 
Chairman Robert J. Battista and Members Wilma B. Liebman, Peter C. 
Schaumber, Dennis P. Walsh, and Ronald Meisburg.  Arthur F. Rosenfeld 
served as General Counsel. 
Statistical highlights of NLRB’s casehandling activities in fiscal 2004 
include: 
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• The NLRB conducted 2719 conclusive representation elections 
among some 160,424 employee voters, with workers choosing labor 
unions as their bargaining agents in 53.2 percent of the elections. 
• Although the Agency closed 34,851 cases, 19,056 cases were 
pending in all stages of processing at the end of the fiscal year.  The 
closings included 29,954 cases involving unfair labor practice charges 
and 4605 cases affecting employee representation and 292 related cases. 
• Settlements, avoiding formal litigation while achieving the goal 
of equitable remedies in unfair labor practice situations, numbered 
10,632. 
• The amount of $207,129,282 in reimbursement to employees 
illegally discharged or otherwise discriminated against in violation of 
their organizational rights was obtained by the NLRB from employers 
and unions.  This total was for lost earnings, fees, dues, and fines.  The 
NLRB obtained 3496 offers of job reinstatements, with 2790 
acceptances. 
• Acting on the results of professional staff investigations, which 
produced a reasonable cause to believe unfair labor practices had been 
committed, Regional Offices of the NLRB issued 1840 complaints, 
setting the cases for hearing. 
• NLRB’s corps of administrative law judges issued 345 
decisions. 
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NLRB Administration 
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency 
created in 1935 by Congress to administer the basic law governing 
relations between labor unions and business enterprises engaged in 
interstate commerce.  This statute, the National Labor Relations Act, 
came into being at a time when labor disputes could and did threaten the 
Nation’s economy. 
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Declared constitutional by the Supreme Court in 1937, the Act was 
substantially amended in 1947, 1959, and 1974, each amendment 
increasing the scope of the NLRB’s regulatory powers. 
The purpose of the Nation’s primary labor relations law is to serve the 
public interest by reducing interruptions in commerce caused by 
industrial strife.  It seeks to do this by providing orderly processes for 
protecting and implementing the respective rights of employees, 
employers, and unions in their relations with one another.  The overall 
job of the NLRB is to achieve this goal through administration, 
interpretation, and enforcement of the Act. 
In its statutory assignment, the NLRB has two principal functions: (1) 
to determine and implement, through secret-ballot elections, the free 
democratic choice by employees as to whether they wish to be 
represented by a union in dealing with their employers and, if so, by 
which union; and (2) to prevent and remedy unlawful acts, called unfair 
labor practices, by either employers or unions or both. 
The NLRB does not act on its own motion in either function.  It 
processes only those charges of unfair labor practices and petitions for 
employee elections which are filed in the NLRB’s Regional, 
Subregional, and Resident Offices, which numbered 52 during fiscal year 
2004. 
The Act’s unfair labor practice provisions place certain restrictions on 
actions of employers and labor organizations in their relations with 
employees, as well as with each other.  Its election provisions provide 
mechanics for conducting and certifying results of representation 
elections to determine collective-bargaining wishes of employees, 
including balloting to determine whether a union shall continue to have 
the right to make a union-shop contract with an employer. 
In handling unfair labor practices and election petitions, the NLRB is 
concerned with the adjustment of labor disputes either by way of 
settlements or through its quasi-judicial proceedings, or by way of secret-
ballot employee elections. 
The NLRB has no independent statutory power of enforcement of its 
decisions and orders.  It may, however, seek enforcement in the U.S. 
courts of appeals, and parties to its cases also may seek judicial review. 
NLRB authority is divided by law and by delegation.  The five-
member Board primarily acts as a quasi-judicial body in deciding cases 
on formal records.  The General Counsel, who, like each Member of the 
Board, is appointed by the President, is responsible for the issuance and 
prosecution of formal complaints in cases leading to Board decision, and 
has general supervision of the NLRB’s nationwide network of offices. 
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For the conduct of its formal hearings in unfair labor practice cases, 
the NLRB employs administrative law judges who hear and decide cases. 
Administrative law judges’ decisions may be appealed to the Board by 
the filing of exceptions.  If no exceptions are taken, the administrative 
law judges’ orders become orders of the Board. 
All cases coming to the NLRB begin their processing in the Regional 
Offices.  Regional Directors, in addition to processing unfair labor 
practice cases in the initial stages, also have the authority to investigate 
representation petitions, to determine units of employees appropriate for 
collective-bargaining purposes, to conduct elections, and to pass on 
objections to conduct of elections.  There are provisions for appeal of 
representation and election questions to the Board. 
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Chart 3
Disposition Pattern for Unfair Labor Practice Cases
(Based on Cases Closed)
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B.  Operational Highlights 
1.  Unfair Labor Practices 
Charges that business firms, labor organizations, or both have 
committed unfair labor practices are filed with the National Labor 
Relations Board at its field offices nationwide by employees, unions, and 
employers.  These cases provide a major segment of the NLRB 
workload. 
Following their filing, charges are investigated by the Regional 
professional staff to determine whether there is reasonable cause to 
believe that the Act has been violated.  If such cause is not found, the 
Regional Director dismisses the charge or it is withdrawn by the 
charging party.  If the charge has merit, the Regional Director seeks 
voluntary settlement or adjustment by the parties to the case to remedy 
the apparent violation; however, if settlement efforts fail, the case goes to 
hearing before an NLRB administrative law judge and, lacking 
settlement at later stages, on to decision by the five-member Board. 
In fiscal year 2004, 26,890 unfair labor practice charges were filed 
with the NLRB, a decrease of 7 percent from the 28,781 filed in fiscal 
year 2003.  In situations in which related charges are counted as a single 
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unit, there was a decrease of 7 percent from the preceding fiscal year.  
(Chart 2.) 
Alleged violations of the Act by employers were filed in 19,946 cases, 
a decrease of 8 percent from the 21,765 of 2003.  Charges against unions 
decreased about 1 percent to 6917 from 6989 in 2003. 
There were 29 charges of violation of Section 8(e) of the Act, which 
bans hot-cargo agreements.  (Tables 1A and 2.) 
The majority of all charges against employers alleged illegal 
discharge or other discrimination against employees.  There were 9294 
such charges in 50 percent of the total charges that employers committed 
violations. 
Refusal to bargain was the second largest category of allegations 
against employers, comprising 9130 charges, in about 50 percent of the 
total charges.  (Table 2.) 
Of charges against unions, the majority (5796) alleged illegal restraint 
and coercion of employees, 81 percent.  There were 612 charges against 
unions for illegal secondary boycotts and jurisdictional disputes, a 
decrease of about 9 percent from the 687 of 2003. 
There were 608 charges (about 9 percent) of illegal union 
discrimination against employees, an increase of about 6 percent from 
the 575 of 2003.  There were 104 charges that unions picketed illegally 
for recognition or for organizational purposes, compared with 106 
charges in 2003.  (Table 2.) 
In charges filed against employers, unions led with 74 percent of the 
total. Unions filed 14,795 charges and individuals filed 5103. 
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Chart 3A
Disposition Pattern for Meritorious Unfair Labor Practices Cases 
(Based on Cases Closed)
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Chart 3B
Disposition Pattern for Unfair Labor Practice Cases After Trial
(Based on Cases Closed)
 Fiscal Year 2004)
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Concerning charges against unions, 5584 were filed by individuals, or 
80 percent of the total of 6918.  Employers filed 1281 and other unions 
filed the 116 remaining charges. 
In fiscal year 2004, 29,954 unfair labor practice cases were closed. 
Some 96 percent were closed by NLRB Regional Offices, about the same 
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as the previous year.  During the fiscal year, 35.8 percent of the cases 
were settled or adjusted before issuance of administrative law judges’ 
decisions, 29.0 percent were withdrawn before complaint, and 30.8 
percent were administratively dismissed. 
In evaluation of the Regional workload, the number of unfair labor 
practice charges found to have merit is important—the higher the merit 
factor the more litigation required.  In fiscal year 2004, 39.1 percent of 
the unfair labor practice cases were found to have merit. 
When the Regional Offices determine that charges alleging unfair 
labor practices have merit, attempts at voluntary resolution are stressed—
to improve labor-management relations and to reduce NLRB litigation 
and related casehandling.  Settlement efforts have been successful to a 
substantial degree.  In fiscal year 2004, precomplaint settlements and 
adjustments were achieved in 8494 cases, or 29.0 percent of the charges.  
In 2003, the percentage was 29.9.  (Chart 5.) 
 
Chart 4
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Cases of merit not settled by the Regional Offices produce formal 
complaints, issued on behalf of the General Counsel.  This action 
schedules hearings before administrative law judges.  During 2004, 1840 
complaints were issued, compared with 2067 in the preceding fiscal year.  
(Chart 6A.) 
Of complaints issued, 88.5 percent were against employers and 9.7 
percent against unions. 
NLRB Regional Offices processed cases from filing of charges to 
issuance of complaints in a median of 87 days.  The 87 days included 15 
days in which parties had the opportunity to adjust charges and remedy 
violations without resorting to formal NLRB processes.  (Chart 6B.) 
Additional settlements occur before, during, and after hearings before 
administrative law judges.  The judges issued 345 decisions in 745 cases 
during 2004.  They conducted 294 initial hearings, and 16 additional 
hearings in supplemental matters.  (Chart 8 and Table 3A.) 
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By filing exceptions to judges’ findings and recommended rulings, 
parties may bring unfair labor practice cases to the Board for final NLRB 
decision. 
In fiscal year 2004, the Board issued 381 decisions in unfair labor 
practice cases contested as to the law or the facts—330 initial decisions, 
14 backpay decisions, 8 determinations in jurisdictional work dispute 
cases, and 29 decisions on supplemental matters.  Of the 330 initial 
decision cases, 309 involved charges filed against employers and 21 had 
union respondents. 
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Chart 6A
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Chart 6B
Median Days from Filing to Complaint
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For the year, the NLRB awarded backpay of $205.7 million.  (Chart 
9.)  Reimbursement for unlawfully exacted fees, dues, and fines added 
about another $1,415,985.  Backpay is lost wages caused by unlawful 
discharge and other discriminatory action detrimental to employees, 
offset by earnings elsewhere after the discrimination.  About 3496 
employees were offered reinstatement, and 80 percent accepted. 
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At the end of fiscal 2004, there were 17,449 unfair labor practice 
cases being processed at all stages by the NLRB, compared to 20,513 
cases pending at the beginning of the year. 
2.  Representation Cases  
The NLRB received 4897 representation and related case petitions in 
fiscal 2004, compared to 4934 such petitions a year earlier. 
The 2004 total consisted of 3749 petitions that the NLRB conducted 
secret-ballot elections where workers select or reject unions to represent 
them in collective bargaining; 839 petitions to decertify existing 
bargaining agents; 127 deauthorization petitions for referendums on 
rescinding a union’s authority to enter into union-shop contracts; and 165 
petitions for unit clarification to determine whether certain classifications 
of employees should be included in or excluded from existing bargaining 
units.  Additionally, 17 amendment of certification petitions were filed. 
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Chart 7
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During the year, 4897 representation and related cases were closed, 
compared to 5148 in fiscal 2003.  Cases closed included 3752 collective-
bargaining election petitions; 853 decertification election petitions; 125 
requests for deauthorization polls; and 167 petitions for unit clarification 
and amendment of certification.  (Chart 14 and Tables 1 and 1B.) 
The overwhelming majority of elections conducted by the NLRB 
resulted from some form of agreement by the parties on when, where, 
and among whom the voting should occur.  Such agreements are 
encouraged by the Agency.  In 9.3 percent of representation cases closed 
by elections, balloting was ordered by NLRB Regional Directors 
following hearing on points in issue.  There were 159 cases where the 
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Board directed an election after transfer of a case from the Regional 
Office. (Table 10.)  There was one case that resulted in expedited 
elections pursuant to the Act’s 8(b)(7)(C) provisions pertaining to 
picketing. 
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3.  Elections  
The NLRB conducted 2719 conclusive representation elections in 
cases closed in fiscal 2004, compared to the 2937 such elections a year 
earlier. Of 191,964 employees eligible to vote, 160,424 cast ballots, 
virtually 8 of every 10 eligible. 
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Unions won 1447 representation elections, or 53.2 percent. In 
winning majority designation, labor organizations earned bargaining 
rights or continued as employee representatives for 94,565 workers. The 
employee vote over the course of the year was 84,138 for union 
representation and 76,286 against. 
The representation elections were in two categories—the 2299 
collective-bargaining elections in which workers chose or voted down 
labor organizations as their bargaining agents, plus the 420 
decertification elections determining whether incumbent unions would 
continue to represent employees. 
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There were 2565 select-or-reject-bargaining-rights (one union on 
ballot) elections, of which unions won 1327, or 51.7 percent.  In these 
elections, 73,733 workers voted to have unions as their agents, while 
74,103 employees voted for no representation.  In appropriate bargaining 
units of employees, the election results provided union agents for 81,664 
workers.  In NLRB elections the majority decides the representational 
status for the entire unit. 
There were 154 multiunion elections, in which two or more labor 
organizations were on the ballot, as well as a choice for no 
representation.  Employees voted to continue or to commence 
representation by one of the unions in 120 elections, or 77.9 percent. 
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Chart 10
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As in previous years, labor organization results brought continued 
representation by unions in 146 elections, or 34.8 percent, covering 
14,849 employees.  Unions lost representation rights for 13,636 
employees in 274 elections, or 65.2 percent.  Unions won in bargaining 
units averaging 102 employees, and lost in units averaging 50 
employees.  (Table 13.) 
Besides the conclusive elections, there were 125 inconclusive 
representation elections during fiscal year 2004 which resulted in 
withdrawal or dismissal of petitions before certification, or required a 
rerun or runoff election. 
In deauthorization polls, labor organizations lost the right to make 
union-shop agreements in 30 referendums, or 44.8 percent, while they 
maintained the right in the other 37 polls which covered 3666 employees.  
(Table 12.) 
For all types of elections in 2004, the average number of employees 
voting, per establishment, was 59, compared to 57 in 2003.  About 71 
percent of the collective bargaining and decertification elections involved 
59 or fewer employees.  (Tables 11 and 17.) 
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4.  Decisions Issued  
a.  The Board 
Dealing effectively with the remaining cases reaching it from 
nationwide filings after dismissals, settlements, and adjustments in 
earlier processing stages, the Board handed down 826 decisions 
concerning allegations of unfair labor practices and questions relating to 
employee representation.  This total compared to the 865 decisions 
rendered during fiscal year 2003. 
A breakdown of Board decisions follows: 
 
Total Board decisions....................................................................     826
 
Contested decisions .......................................................................    586 
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   Unfair labor practice decisions .......................................   381 
   Initial (includes those based on 
stipulated record)..……………….330 
Supplemental ..................................29 
Backpay..................................….....14 
Determinations in jurisdictional 
     disputes………………………….8 
   Representation decisions .........................................…..   197 
After transfer by Regional Directors 
     for initial decision                         3 
After review of Regional Director 
     decisions ....................................52 
On objections and/or challenges ...142 
   Other decisions .......................……….............................    8 
Clarification of bargaining unit.........5 
Amendment to certification ..............2 
Union-deauthorization ......................1 
   Noncontested decisions.....................................................….    240
Unfair labor practice .....................140 
Representation ................................96 
Other .................................................4 
 
The majority (71 percent) of Board decisions resulted from cases 
contested by the parties as to the facts and/or application of the law.  
(Tables 3A, 3B, and 3C.) 
In fiscal 2004, about 6.0 percent of all meritorious charges and 54.1 
percent of all cases in which a hearing was conducted reached the Board 
for decision. (Charts 3A and 3B.)  Generally, unfair labor practice cases 
take about twice the time to process than representation cases. 
b.  Regional Directors 
NLRB Regional Directors issued 675 decisions in fiscal 2004, 
compared to 802 in 2003.  (Chart 13 and Tables 3B and 3C.) 
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c.  Administrative Law Judges 
Administrative law judges issued 345 decisions and conducted 310 
hearings.  (Chart 8 and Table 3A.) 
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5.  Court Litigation 
a.  Appellate Courts 
In fiscal year 2004, 62 cases involving the NLRB were decided by the 
United States courts of appeals compared to 120 in fiscal year 2003. Of 
these, 79.0 percent were won by NLRB in whole or in part compared to 
85.8 percent in fiscal year 2003; 4.8 percent were remanded entirely 
compared to 7.5 percent in fiscal year 2003; and 16.1 percent were entire 
losses compared to 6.7 percent in fiscal year 2003. 
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b.  The Supreme Court 
In fiscal 2004, the Supreme Court did not decide any Board cases.  
The Board did not participate as amicus in any cases in fiscal 2004. 
c.  Contempt Actions 
In fiscal 2004, 445 cases were referred to the Contempt Litigation and 
Compliance Branch for consideration of contempt or other compliance 
actions.  Twelve civil contempt or equivalent proceedings were instituted 
and 29 ancillary proceedings were instituted in Federal District Courts or 
Bankruptcy Courts. Seven civil contempt or equivalent adjudications 
were awarded in favor of the Board during the fiscal year.  The Branch 
also obtained 2 protective restraining orders and 32 other substantive 
orders in ancillary proceedings.  There were four cases in which the court 
directed compliance without adjudication; and there were four cases in 
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which the courts either denied the Board’s petition or the proceedings 
were discontinued at the CLCB’s request. 
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d.  Miscellaneous Litigation 
There were 12 additional cases involving miscellaneous litigation 
decided by appellate, district, and bankruptcy courts.  The NLRB’s 
position was upheld in 9 cases.  (Table 21.) 
e.  Injunction Activity 
The NLRB sought injunctions pursuant to Sections 10(j) and 10(l) in 
17 petitions filed with the U.S. district courts, compared to 20 in fiscal 
year 2003. (Table 20.) Injunctions were granted in 12, or 86 percent, of 
the 14 cases litigated to final order. 
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NLRB injunction activity in district courts in 2004: 
 
Granted…………………………………………………………….... 12 
Denied………………………………………………………………. 2 
Withdrawn…………………………………………………………... 1 
Settled or placed on court’s inactive lists……………….………...... 5 
Awaiting action at end of fiscal year..….………………..…………. 1 
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C.  Decisional Highlights 
 In the course of the Board’s administration of the Act during the 
report period, it was required to consider and resolve complex problems 
arising from the great variety of factual patterns in the many cases 
reaching it.  In some cases, new developments in industrial relations, as 
presented by the factual situation, required the Board’s accommodation 
of established principles to those developments.  Chapter II on “NLRB 
Jurisdiction,” Chapter III on “Board Procedure,” Chapter IV on 
“Representation Proceedings,” and Chapter V on “Unfair Labor 
Practices” discuss some of the more significant decisions of the Board 
during the report period.  The following summarizes briefly some of the 
decisions establishing or reexamining basic principles in significant 
areas. 
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1.  Indian Owned and Operated Commercial Enterprises Including 
Enterprises Operated on Indian Reservations 
 In San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino,1 the Board majority reversed 
precedent and asserted jurisdiction over a casino owned by an Indian 
tribe and located on its reservation, establishing a new standard for 
determining the circumstances under which the Board will assert 
jurisdiction over a commercial enterprise that is wholly owned and 
operated by an Indian tribe.  The majority abandoned the premise 
established in Fort Apache Timber Co.,2 and Southern Indian,3 that 
location of the enterprise—whether on a reservation or not—is the 
determinative factor in assessing whether a tribal enterprise is excluded 
from the Act’s jurisdiction. 
Instead, the Board will look to whether or not Federal Indian policy 
requires that the Board decline to assert jurisdiction.  It will first apply 
the test articulated in Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm,4 which 
was derived from the Supreme Court’s decision in Federal Power 
Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation.5  Finally, the Board will assess 
whether an assertion of jurisdiction furthers the purpose of the Act.  
The majority first found that the respondent was an employer 
pursuant to Section 2(2) of the Act, since Section 2(2) does not expressly 
exclude Indian tribes from the Act’s jurisdiction.  Then, applying the 
Tuscarora-Coeur d’Alene analysis to determine whether, under Federal 
Indian policy, the assertion of Board jurisdiction is permitted, the 
majority found that none of the Tuscarora-Coeur d’Alene exceptions 
applied.  Thus, the majority concluded that it was not precluded from 
asserting jurisdiction. 
The majority then considered “whether policy considerations militate 
in favor of or against the assertion of the Board’s discretionary 
jurisdiction,” in order “to balance the Board’s interest in effectuating the 
policies of the Act with its desire to accommodate the unique status of 
Indians in our society and legal culture.”6  The majority concluded that 
policy considerations favored the assertion of the Board’s jurisdiction, 
relying on the fact that the casino is a typical commercial enterprise, 
employing and catering to non-Indians; that the Act would not unduly 
interfere with the tribe’s autonomy because the Act would not broadly 
and completely define the relationship between the respondent and its 
1 341 NLRB No. 138 (Chairman Battista and Members Liebman and Walsh; Member Schaumber 
dissenting). 
2 226 NLRB 503 (1976). 
3 290 NLRB 436 (1988). 
4 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985). 
5 362 U.S. 99 (1960). 
6 341 NLRB No. 138, slip op. at 8. 
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employees; and that the Act’s effects would not extend to intramural 
matters. 
Member Schaumber, dissenting, argued that Congress had not 
authorized the Board to assert jurisdiction over tribal enterprises located 
on reservations.  He disputed the majority’s interpretation of the 
Supreme Court’s Tuscarora decision, alleging that the majority was 
relying on distinguishable dicta, which the Court has subsequently 
abandoned.  Thus, he concluded that absent express Congressional 
authorization or a clear Supreme Court mandate, the Board may not 
interfere with the sovereignty of Indian tribes. 
In a companion case, Yukon Kuskokwim Health Corp.,7 the Board 
declined to assert jurisdiction over a tribally owned and operated health 
services program for Native Alaskans.  Applying the new standard set 
forth in San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino, the Board concluded that 
policy considerations weighed against the Board asserting its 
discretionary jurisdiction. 
2.  Bars to an Election: Alleged Employer Unfair Labor Practices 
In Saint Gobain Abrasives, Inc.,8 the Board majority concluded that a 
hearing must be held to determine if there is a causal connection between 
alleged unfair labor practices and employee disaffection with a union, 
overruling Priority One Services.9  The Regional Director had dismissed 
a decertification petition, concluding, without a hearing, that the alleged 
unilateral change in health insurance caused employees to reject the 
union.  The majority concluded that such a factual determination of 
causal nexus should not be made without an evidentiary hearing.  The 
majority noted that under Master Slack,10 the Board resolves “the issue 
of causation” under a multifactor test.  Here, those factors would include, 
at a minimum, such issues as: how many employees incurred an increase 
in the cost of health care; how much was the increase; how many 
employees enrolled in different plans as a result of the alleged unilateral 
change; how many employees switched care givers as a result of the 
change; and how many employees expressed dissatisfaction with the 
union prior to the change. 
The majority noted that the alleged unfair labor practice was a single 
unilateral change on a single subject and that there were significant 
factual issues as to the impact of that change.  In such circumstances, the 
7 341 NLRB No. 139 (Chairman Battista and Members Liebman and Walsh; Member Schaumber 
concurring). 
8 342 NLRB No. 39 (Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and Meisburg; Members Liebman 
and Walsh dissenting). 
9 331 NLRB 1527 (2000). 
10 271 NLRB 78 (1984). 
Sixty-Ninth Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board 26 
 
                                                          
majority concluded that it was not appropriate to speculate, without facts 
established in a hearing, that there was a causal relationship between the 
conduct and the disaffection.  To so speculate, the majority held, would 
be to deny employees their Section 7 rights. 
Members Liebman and Walsh, dissenting, agreed with the Regional 
Director that the employer’s alleged unilateral change was of the type that 
would tend to cause employee disaffection with the union by undermining 
the union’s perceived authority as the employees’ bargaining 
representative, and to interfere with the employees’ free choice in an 
election.  They concluded that due to the inherent tendency of such a 
change to undercut the union’s support, a hearing was unnecessary.  The 
dissenters further noted that a hearing might be unnecessary here because 
an administrative law judge had dismissed the allegation that the alleged 
unilateral change was unlawful, and, if the Board upheld this finding, the 
decertification petition would be reinstated. 
3.  Employee Status of Graduate Student Assistants 
In Brown University,11 the Board majority overruled New York 
University,12 and found that graduate student assistants are not 
“employees” within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act.  In 
overruling NYU, the majority returned to the pre-NYU principle of 
Leland Stanford University,13 that graduate student assistants are not 
statutory employees because they are “primarily students and have a 
primarily educational, not economic, relationship with their university.”14  
The majority found that Leland Stanford was “wholly consistent with the 
overall purpose and aim of the Act,” which “is designed to cover 
economic relationships,”15 and interpreted Section 2(3) in light of this 
“underlying fundamental premise of the Act.”16  The majority concluded: 
“The Board’s longstanding rule that it will not assert jurisdiction over 
relationships that are ‘primarily educational’ is consistent with these 
principles.”17  The majority also found that even if the graduate student 
assistants were statutory employees, there are policy reasons for 
declining to extend collective-bargaining rights to such persons, stating 
that: “Imposing collective bargaining would have a deleterious impact on 
overall educational decisions by the Brown faculty and administration.”18
11 342 NLRB No. 42 (Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and Meisburg; Members Liebman 
and Walsh dissenting). 
12 332 NLRB 1205 (2000). 
13 214 NLRB 621 (1974). 
14 342 NLRB No. 42, slip op. at 5. 
15 Id., slip op. at 5–6. 
16 Id., slip op. at 6. 
17 Id. 
18 Id., slip op. at 8. 
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The majority expressed no opinion regarding the Board’s decision in 
Boston Medical Center,19 relied on heavily in the NYU decision, in which 
a Board majority found that interns, residents, and house staff at teaching 
hospitals are employees within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act. 
Members Liebman and Walsh, dissenting, stated that they would 
adhere to the Board’s decision in NYU.  Emphasizing the broad 
definition of “employee’ under Section 2(3) of the Act, they stated that 
the Board is not free to create an exclusion from the Act’s coverage 
absent compelling indications of Congressional intent.  In addition, they 
characterized the majority’s approach as “woefully out of touch with 
contemporary academic reality” and based on an image of the university 
that “was already outdated” when Leland Stanford was issued in the 
1970s.20  They asserted that today, the university “is also a workplace for 
many graduate students, and disputes over work-related issues are 
common.  As a result, the policies of the Act . . . apply in the university 
context.”21
4.  Employee Status of Disabled Workers 
In Brevard Achievement Center, Inc.,22 the Board majority concluded 
that disabled workers who are in a primarily rehabilitative relationship 
with their putative employer are not statutory employees within the 
meaning of the Act.  Consistent with its recent decision in Brown 
University,23 the majority again set forth its interpretation of Section 2(3) 
of the Act, concluding that the Act was intended by Congress to cover 
primarily economic relationships between employer and employee.  
Finding the Board’s longstanding rule that it will not assert jurisdiction 
over relationships that are “primarily rehabilitative” to be consistent with 
this statutory interpretation, the majority reaffirmed the “primarily 
rehabilitative” standard as the test for assessing the “employee” status of 
disabled workers in rehabilitative programs. 
The majority then applied the primarily rehabilitative standard to the 
facts of this case: 
 
Although the disabled clients work the same hours, receive the 
same wages and benefits, and perform the same tasks under the 
same supervision as the nondisabled employees, they work at 
19 330 NLRB 152 (1999) (Chairman Truesdale and Members Fox and Liebman; Members Hurtgen 
and Brame dissenting). 
20 342 NLRB No. 42, slip op. at 12. 
21 Id., slip op. at 15. 
22 342 NLRB No. 101 (Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and Meisburg; Members 
Liebman and Walsh dissenting). 
23 342 NLRB No. 42 (finding that graduate student assistants are not statutory employees because 
their relationship with their employer is “primarily educational”). 
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their own pace, and performance problems are dealt with through 
additional training rather than discipline.  These policies support 
a determination that the relationship between BAC and its clients 
is primarily rehabilitative, not motivated principally by economic 
considerations.24
 
Noting the factual similarities between this case and the Board’s prior 
decisions in Goodwill Industries of Tidewater25 and Goodwill Industries 
of Denver,26 the majority concluded that BAC’s disabled workers are not 
statutory employees.  The majority voiced its concern that the imposition 
of collective bargaining on a primarily rehabilitative relationship would 
run the risk of interfering with the rehabilitative process.  The majority 
also noted that Congress has not deemed it appropriate to change the 
Board’s longstanding doctrine to refrain from exercising jurisdiction over 
those relationships. 
Members Liebman and Walsh, dissenting, observed that this case 
“presents the Board with the perfect opportunity to revisit longstanding 
precedent governing disabled workers in light of a legal and policy 
landscape that has evolved dramatically in the last 15 years,”27 and stated 
that they would abandon doctrines which were based on outdated notions 
about the place of the disabled in society.  In their view, the majority’s 
decision relegates disabled workers “to the economic sidelines, making 
them second-class citizens both in society and in their own 
workplaces.”28
The dissent contended that disabled workers are statutory employees, 
as they come within the common-law meaning of the term “employee” 
and are not specifically exempted from the Act’s coverage.  Contrary to 
the majority’s position that the employment relationship must be 
primarily economic, the dissent asserted that “economic activity need not 
be the sole, or even dominant, purpose of a cognizable employment 
relationship.”29
5.  Weingarten Rights 
In IBM Corp.,30 the Board majority concluded that employees who 
work in a nonunion workplace are not entitled, under Section 7 of the 
Act, to have a coworker accompany them to an interview with their 
24 342 NLRB No. 101, slip op. at 6. 
25 304 NLRB 767 (1991). 
26 304 NLRB 764 (1991). 
27 342 NLRB No. 101, slip op. at 8–9. 
28 Id., slip op. at 15. 
29 Id., slip op. at 11. 
30 341 NLRB No. 148 (Chairman Battista and Member Meisburg; Member Schaumber concurring; 
Members Walsh and Liebman dissenting). 
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employer, even if the affected employee reasonably believes that the 
interview might result in discipline.  The majority overruled Epilepsy 
Foundation of Northeast Ohio,31 which extended to unrepresented 
employees a right to have a coworker present during investigatory 
interviews, and returned to pre-Epilepsy Board precedent holding that 
Weingarten32 rights apply only to unionized employees. 
 The majority stated that policy considerations favored overruling 
Epilepsy, noting that in recent years there has been a rise in the need for 
investigatory interviews, both in response to new statutes governing the 
workplace, and in response to new security concerns raised by terrorism 
and workplace violence.  The majority asserted that in a nonunion 
workplace, coworkers do not represent the interests of the entire work 
force; coworkers have no official status as does a union representative, 
and thus cannot redress the imbalance of power between employers and 
employees; coworkers do not have the same skills as a union 
representative and thus are not as effective in facilitating workplace 
interviews; and the presence of a coworker, instead of a union 
representative, may compromise the confidentiality of a workplace 
investigation.  For these reasons, the majority concluded that a nonunion 
employer has the right to conduct prompt, efficient, thorough, and 
confidential workplace investigations without the presence of a 
coworker. 
Member Schaumber, concurring, would find that the right to the 
presence of a witness in a predisciplinary investigatory interview is 
unique to a workplace in which employees are represented by a union 
and is distinctly derived from the statute, and that the language of the 
statute does not provide such a right to nonrepresented employees. 
Members Liebman and Walsh, dissenting, find no persuasive basis for 
the majority’s “abruptly overruling” Epilepsy, a decision upheld on 
appeal as “both clear and reasonable.”33  Members Liebman and Walsh 
concluded that a statutory foundation for coworker representation exists 
under Section 7 even in the absence of a union, and that due process 
considerations supported such representation.  They asserted that the 
majority has neither demonstrated that Epilepsy is contrary to the Act, 
nor offered compelling policy reasons for failing to follow precedent. 
D.  Financial Statement 
The obligations and expenditures of the National Labor Relations 
Board for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2004, are as follows: 
 
31 331 NLRB 676 (2000). 
32 NLRB v. J. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251 (1975).  
33 Epilepsy Foundation of Northeast Ohio v. NLRB, 268 F.3d 1095, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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Personnel compensation $154,875,528
Personnel benefits 34,244,999
Benefits for former personnel 38,211
Travel and transportation of persons 1,770,712
Transportation of things 169,783
Rent, communications, and utilities 31,429,543
Printing and reproduction 209,366
Other services 15,689,854
Supplies and materials 2,140,644
Equipment 1,471,601
Insurance claims and indemnities 486,160
Total obligations $242,526,401
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II 
NLRB Jurisdiction 
The Board’s jurisdiction under the Act, regarding both representation 
proceedings and unfair labor practices, extends to all enterprises whose 
operations “affect” interstate or foreign commerce.1  However, Congress 
and the courts2 have recognized the Board’s discretion to limit the 
exercise of its broad statutory jurisdiction to enterprises whose effect on 
commerce is, in the Board’s opinion, substantial-such discretion being 
subject only to the statutory limitation3 that jurisdiction may not be 
declined when it would have been asserted under the Board’s self-
imposed jurisdictional standards prevailing on August 1, 1959.4  
Accordingly, before the Board takes cognizance of a case, it must first be 
established that it had legal or statutory jurisdiction, i.e., that the business 
operations involved “affect” commerce within the meaning of the Act.  It 
must also appear that the business operations meet the Board’s applicable 
jurisdictional standards.5
                                                 
1 See Secs. 9(c) and 10(a) of the Act and also the definitions of “commerce” and “affecting 
commerce” set forth in Sec. 2(6) and (7), respectively.  Under Sec. 2(2) the term “employer” does 
not include the United States or any wholly owned Government corporation, any Federal Reserve 
Bank, any State or political subdivision, any person subject to the Railway Labor Act, or any 
labor organization other than when acting as an employer.  The exclusion of nonprofit hospitals 
from the definition of employer was deleted by the health care amendments to the Act (Pub. L. 
93–360, 88 Stat. 395, effective Aug. 25, 1974).  Nonprofit hospitals, as well as convalescent 
hospitals, health maintenance organizations, health clinics, nursing homes, extended care 
facilities, and other institutions “devoted to the care of sick, infirm, or aged person[s],” are now 
included in the definition of “health care institutions” under the new Sec. 2(14) of the Act.  
“Agricultural laborers” and others excluded from the term “employee” as defined by Sec. 2(3) of 
the Act are discussed, inter alia, at 29 NLRB Ann. Rep. 52–55 (1964), and 31 NLRB Ann. Rep. 
36 (1966). 
2 See 25 NLRB Ann. Rep. 18 (1960). 
3 See Sec. 14(c)(1) of the Act. 
4 These self-imposed standards are primarily expressed in terms of the gross dollar volume of 
business in question: 23 NLRB Ann. Rep. 18 (1958).  See also Floridan Hotel of Tampa, 124 
NLRB 261 (1959), for hotel and motel standards. 
5 Although a mere showing that the Board’s gross dollar volume standards are met is ordinarily 
insufficient to establish legal or statutory jurisdiction, no further proof of legal or statutory 
jurisdiction is necessary when it is shown that the Board’s “outflow-inflow” standards are met. 25 
NLRB Ann. Rep. 19–20 (1960).  But see Sioux Valley Empire Electric Assn., 122 NLRB 92 
(1958), concerning the treatment of local public utilities. 
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A.  Indian Owned and Operated Commercial Enterprises 
Including Enterprises Operated on Indian Reservations 
In San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino,6 the Board reversed 
precedent and asserted jurisdiction over a casino owned by an Indian 
tribe and located on its reservation.  The Board majority of Chairman 
Battista and Members Liebman and Walsh established a new standard for 
determining the circumstances under which the Board will assert 
jurisdiction over a commercial enterprise that is wholly owned and 
operated by an Indian tribe.  The Board abandoned the premise it 
established in Fort Apache Timber Co.,7 and Southern Indian,8 that 
location of the enterprise—whether on a reservation or not—is the 
determinative factor in assessing whether a tribal enterprise is excluded 
from the Act’s jurisdiction. 
Instead, the Board held that it will look to whether or not Federal 
Indian policy requires that the Board decline to assert jurisdiction.  It will 
first apply the test articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Donovan v. Coeur 
d’Alene Tribal Farm,9 which was derived from the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation.10 
Then, Board will assess whether an assertion of jurisdiction furthers the 
purpose of the Act. 
The respondent operates a casino on its reservation in San Bernardino, 
California.  Most of the casino’s employees are not Indians and the 
casino caters to patrons from outside the reservation.  The Hotel 
Employees & Restaurant Employees International (HERE) filed an 
unfair labor practice charge, alleging that the respondent rendered 
assistance and support to the Communications Workers International 
Union by allowing its agents access to the respondent’s facility for 
organizing activities, while denying HERE organizers the same access.   
The respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, contending that 
it was not subject to the Board’s jurisdiction. 
The Board dismissed the motion, finding that the respondent was an 
employer pursuant to Section 2(2).  First, the Board noted that Section 
2(2) does not expressly exclude Indian tribes from the Act’s jurisdiction.  
Citing a number of decisions in which Federal courts of appeals have 
applied the Tuscarora-Coeur d’Alene analysis, the majority adopted that 
analysis to determine whether, under Federal Indian policy, the assertion 
 
6 341 NLRB No. 138 (Chairman Battista and Members Liebman and Walsh; Member Schaumber 
dissenting). 
7 226 NLRB 503 (1976). 
8 290 NLRB 436 (1988). 
9 751 F.2d 1113 (1985). 
10 362 U.S. 99 (1960). 
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of Board jurisdiction is permitted.  Here, the Board found that none of 
the Tuscarora-Coeur d’Alene exceptions applied.  Thus, the Board 
concluded that it was not precluded from asserting jurisdiction. 
The majority established that the final step in the Board’s new 
approach to its jurisdiction over tribal enterprises was to determine 
“whether policy considerations militate in favor of or against the 
assertion of the Board’s discretionary jurisdiction.”  The purpose of this 
last step, the majority asserted, was “to balance the Board’s interest in 
effectuating the policies of the Act with its desire to accommodate the 
unique status of Indians in our society and legal culture.”  The Board 
concluded that policy considerations favored the assertion of the Board’s 
jurisdiction.  In so concluding, the Board relied upon the fact that the 
casino is a typical commercial enterprise, employing and catering to non-
Indians; that the Act would not unduly interfere with the tribe’s 
autonomy because “the Act would not broadly and completely define the 
relationship between the Respondent and its employees;” and that the 
Act’s effects would not extend to intramural matters. 
Dissenting, Member Schaumber argued that Congress had not 
authorized the Board to assert jurisdiction over tribal enterprises located 
on reservations.  He disputed the majority’s interpretation of the 
Supreme Court’s Tuscarora decision, alleging that the majority was 
relying on distinguishable dicta, which the Court has subsequently 
abandoned.  Thus, Member Schaumber concluded that absent express 
Congressional authorization or a clear Supreme Court mandate, the 
Board may not interfere with the sovereignty of Indian tribes. 
In Yukon Kuskokwim Health Corp.,11 the Board overruled its previous 
decision and declined to assert jurisdiction over a tribally owned and 
operated health services program for Native Alaskans.  The Board 
reconsidered its previous decision in light of its decision in San Manuel 
Indian Bingo and Casino, which it issued as a companion to this case.  In 
San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino, the Board established a new 
standard for determining the circumstances under which it will assert 
jurisdiction over a commercial enterprise owned and operated by an 
Indian tribe.  Applying the new standard, the Board concluded that 
policy considerations weighed against the Board asserting its 
discretionary jurisdiction. 
The respondent is a regional nonprofit corporation that provides a 
comprehensive health services program for Native Alaskans in 
Southwestern Alaska.  The management of the program is made up 
 
11 341 NLRB No. 139 (Chairman Battista and Members Liebman and Walsh; Member Schaumber 
concurring). 
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entirely of members of the 58 Alaskan Native tribes located in the area.  
Although only 1–2 members of the proposed bargaining unit are Native 
Alaskans, 95 percent of the program’s patients are Native Alaskans.  The 
program is funded pursuant to the Indian Self-Determination Act (ISDA) 
and provides its services free of charge to Native Alaskans.  In 1999, 
following Southern Indian Health Council,12 the Board asserted its 
jurisdiction and found that the respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the 
Act by refusing to recognize and bargain with the union, which had won 
a Board election.  On December 19, 2000, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia denied enforcement of the Board’s order and 
remanded the case to the Board for further consideration of the 
respondent’s argument that it was entitled to exemption from the Act’s 
jurisdiction because the ISDA authorizes it to act as an arm of the 
Federal government. 
The Board decided on remand that the respondent was not exempt 
under the Section 2(2) exemption for the Federal government.  The 
Board noted that the most recent amendments to the ISDA emphasize the 
government-to-government relationship between the tribes and the 
Federal government. The Board found that such an emphasis 
demonstrates that the tribes operating under the ISDA are separate from 
the Federal government. 
For reasons set forth in San Manuel Bingo and Casino, the Board 
majority of Chairman Battista and Members Liebman and Walsh 
concluded that the Board was not precluded from asserting jurisdiction 
over the respondent.  The Board majority reasserted that the Act does not 
expressly exclude Indian tribes, including Native Alaskan tribes.  In 
addition, the Board majority found that the respondent did not meet any 
of the Tuscarora-Coeur d’Alene exceptions. 
Finally, the Board majority found “policy considerations weigh 
against the Board asserting its discretionary jurisdiction.”  The Board 
majority relied upon the fact that the respondent was fulfilling the 
Federal government’s trust responsibility to provide free health care to 
Indians; that the respondent’s impact on interstate commerce is minimal; 
and the respondent does not compete with other hospitals within the 
purview of the Act.  Thus, the Board concluded that “the character of the 
respondent’s enterprise and its principal patient base militate against the 
Board’s assertion of jurisdiction.” 
Member Schaumber concurred in the Board’s dismissal of the 
complaint.  Because he did not agree with the majority’s rationale, he 
wrote separately.  Applying the analysis set forth in his dissent in San 
 
12 290 NLRB 436 (1988). 
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Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino, Member Schaumber concluded that 
the Board is precluded from asserting jurisdiction over the respondent 
because it lacks clear authority to do so from Congress or the Supreme 
Court. 
B.  Employer Providing Fueling Services to Air Carriers 
In Aircraft Service International,13 the Board found that the employer 
was engaged in interstate air common carriage so as to bring it within the 
jurisdiction of the National Mediation Board pursuant to Section 201 of 
Title II of the Railway Labor Act, and thus not within the jurisdiction of 
the NLRB.  Accordingly, the Board dismissed a petition seeking an 
amendment of a certification of representative previously issued to 
A.S.I.G. Employees Association, to reflect a vote by the bargaining unit 
to affiliate with Operating Engineers Local 324.  
The employer provides fueling services at Detroit Metropolitan 
Airport for Northwest Airlines and its affiliated carriers.  Most of the unit 
employees are fuelers. The rest are mechanics and quality control 
employees. The parties stipulated that the work done by ASIG 
employees is the type of work traditionally performed by employees of 
air carriers. 
On December 10, 2003, the Board requested that the National 
Mediation Board (NMB) study the record and determine the applicability 
of the Railway Labor Act to the employer.  The NMB issued an opinion 
stating its view that the employer and its Detroit employees are subject to 
the Railway Labor Act.  The NMB uses a two-pronged jurisdictional 
analysis: (1) whether the work is traditionally performed by employees 
of air and rail carriers; and (2) whether a common carrier exercises direct 
or indirect ownership or control.  Both prongs of the test must be met, 
and the NMB concluded that they were in this case. 
As noted above, the parties stipulated that the work done by ASIG 
employees is the type of work traditionally performed by employees of 
air carriers.  With respect to the ownership or control issue, the record 
showed, inter alia, that: the carriers, with which the employer has a cost-
plus contract, are the employer’s only customers in Detroit; they own 
almost all of the equipment used by the employer, whom they reimburse 
for the rental costs of its Detroit facilities; the carriers’ schedules dictate 
the staffing levels and hours for the employer’s employees; and, that 
carrier personnel direct unit employees. 
 
13 342 NLRB No. 99 (Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and Meisburg). 
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The Board (NLRB), having considered the facts of the case in light of 
the opinion issued by the NMB, agreed that the employer is within the 
NMB’s jurisdiction and dismissed the petition. 
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III 
Board Procedure 
A.  Failure to Produce Subpoenaed Documents 
In McAllister Towing & Transportation Co.,1 the Board: (1) held that 
the administrative law judge did not abuse her discretion in imposing 
limited sanctions against the respondent for failing to timely produce 
subpoenaed documents; and (2) announced that allegations of 
misconduct by a party or attorney should be submitted directly to the 
investigating officer pursuant to Section 102.177 of the Board’s Rules 
and Regulations. 
The case arose out of the respondent’s alleged unfair labor practices 
during an organizing campaign among its tugboat workers.  Prior to the 
hearing, the General Counsel timely served the respondent with 
subpoenas seeking documents related to the complaint allegations.  The 
respondent petitioned to revoke the subpoenas, arguing, among other 
things, that the subpoenas were burdensome and sought irrelevant 
documents. 
The day before the hearing, the judge advised the respondent’s 
counsel that she would rule on the respondent’s petition the following 
morning.  The respondent had not yet supplied the General Counsel with 
any of the subpoenaed documents.  The judge instructed counsel that the 
respondent should be ready to “substantially comply” the following 
morning.  The judge specifically rejected counsel’s argument that the 
respondent was not obliged to gather and produce subpoenaed 
documents until the judge ruled on its petition to revoke, and that the 
respondent then would be entitled to a “reasonable time” to comply. 
On the morning of the hearing, the judge granted in part and denied in 
part the respondent’s petition to revoke.  She then expressly ordered the 
respondent to comply.  Counsel said he would “consult” with his client 
and would advise the judge how promptly the respondent would comply.  
Counsel did not offer any documents, offer any assurances that the 
respondent had begun collecting any documents, or give any specific 
timetable about when the respondent would produce the subpoenaed 
documents. 
On motion by the General Counsel, and after hearing argument from 
all the parties, the judge imposed limited sanctions against the 
                                                 
1 341 NLRB No. 48 (Members Liebman and Walsh; Member Schaumber dissenting in part). 
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respondent under Bannon Mills.2  The judge granted the General 
Counsel’s request to prove by secondary evidence those matters where 
there was noncompliance with the subpoenas, and she precluded the 
respondent from rebutting that evidence.  The judge, however, denied the 
General Counsel’s request to limit the respondent’s right of cross-
examination.  The judge also refused to automatically draw adverse 
inferences on the relevant issues, explaining that she would draw such 
inferences only where otherwise appropriate. 
On review, the Board majority of Members Liebman and Walsh 
found no merit in the respondent’s exceptions to the judge’s imposition 
of sanctions.  The majority declared that the applicable standard of 
review was the “abuse of discretion” standard, and found that the judge 
did not abuse her discretion. 
The majority explained, “a party who simply ignores a subpoena 
pending a ruling on a petition to revoke does so at his or her peril.”  The 
issue was whether the record established, with sufficient clarity, that this 
is what the respondent did.  The majority found that the judge reasonably 
concluded, on the record before her, that Bannon Mills sanctions were 
indeed warranted. 
The majority found it significant that: (1) the respondent did not 
comply with the subpoenas upon receiving them, even with respect to 
items that clearly were relevant and available; and (2) the respondent did 
not begin compliance upon the judge’s disposition of its petitions to 
revoke, despite the judge’s express instructions the prior day and despite 
the judge’s express order.  The majority found insufficient counsel-for-
the-respondent’s answer that he would “consult” with the respondent and 
his vague assurance that he would advise the parties how promptly the 
respondent would comply. 
The majority also relied on the fact that the respondent’s 
noncompliance was likely to prejudice the General Counsel’s case and 
the overall proceeding.  The majority observed that the General Counsel 
likely would have been forced to alter, or even delay, the presentation of 
her case over the ensuing hearing dates depending on the respondent’s 
conception of a “reasonable time” and what documents the respondent 
happened to produce or not produce.  The majority noted that the 
situation was exacerbated by the difficulty the parties already were 
experiencing in getting subpoenaed witnesses to appear when scheduled 
because they were aboard vessels at various times.  The respondent’s 
failure to timely produce subpoenaed documents could have meant that 
the General Counsel would have been forced to recall previously 
 
2 146 NLRB 611 (1964). 
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examined witnesses, as well, which would have further disrupted and 
prolonged the hearing. 
For these reasons, the majority found that the judge did not abuse her 
discretion in imposing limited sanctions against the respondent. 
Member Schaumber dissented on the Bannon Mills sanctions because, 
in his view, the record did not establish that the respondent’s failure to 
timely produce the subpoenaed documents constituted deliberate 
defiance or abuse of the Board’s subpoena procedures sufficient to 
impugn the integrity of the hearing process. Specifically, Member 
Schaumber argued that the judge erred by imposing sanctions without 
making specific findings as to the scope of the respondent’s prehearing 
compliance efforts and without attempting to ascertain how long it would 
take for respondent to comply fully with her rulings on the petition to 
revoke. 
Last, the judge had recommended that the Board warn counsel based 
on his allegedly frivolous answer to the complaint, and other incidents 
arising during the hearing.  The Board did not pass on the 
recommendation.  The Board announced that allegations of misconduct 
must be submitted to the investigating officer under Section 102.177 of 
the Board’s Rules and Regulations.  The Board reasoned that Section 
102.177(e) ensures that “[a]ll allegations of misconduct” will be handled 
according to established procedures with appropriate due process 
safeguards.  Accordingly, the Board transmitted the judge’s 
recommendation to the investigating officer. 
B.  Limitation of Section 10(b) 
In Broadway Volkswagen,3 the Board reversed the administrative law 
judge’s finding that the allegations of unlawful unilateral wage increases 
(excluding one employee’s wage increase), promotions, and direct 
dealing were time barred, and found that the respondent violated the Act 
as alleged. In addition, the Board reversed the judge’s findings that the 
respondent lawfully withdrew recognition from the union and failed to 
provide relevant information.  Finally, the Board found that an 
affirmative bargaining order was warranted as a remedy for the 
respondent’s unlawful withdrawal of recognition. 
The respondent sells and services new and used cars. The union was 
certified as the collective-bargaining representative of the respondent’s 
16 service and parts employees in December of 1997. The parties met for 
negotiations on several occasions between January of 1998 and 
November of 1999 but did not reach agreement on a contract. The 
 
3 342 NLRB No. 128 (Members Liebman, Walsh, and Meisburg). 
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respondent unilaterally granted wage increases to six employees and 
promoted five of them during the period of April through January of 
1999. The respondent never informed the union about any of the 
promotions or wage increases. 
Although the respondent called five of the employees as witnesses, 
none of them testified about their specific job duties either before or after 
their wage increases and promotions. One of respondent’s owners, Mike 
Murphy, testified that he, himself, had not been aware of the wage 
increases received by three of the employees until the respondent 
received the union’s unfair labor practice charges, and that lower-level 
supervisors had made the decisions to grant the increases. Murphy also 
testified that the respondent did not have official job titles or job 
descriptions.  After the November bargaining session, the parties 
suspended bargaining until after the holidays. 
In February of 1999, the respondent received a petition signed by 11 
of the 16 unit employees stating that they no longer wanted to be 
represented by the union. Thereafter, the respondent informed the union 
that it was withdrawing its recognition. A few months later, the union 
requested that the respondent furnish it with information, including a list 
of current employees and their classifications. The respondent did not 
furnish this information to the union. 
The judge found that the respondent unlawfully unilaterally granted a 
wage increase, promoted and created a new job classification with 
respect to one of the employees, but dismissed the remaining complaint 
allegations. With regard to the unilateral change allegations involving 
four of the employees and the direct dealing allegation as to one of those 
employees, the judge found that the charges were time barred, because 
they were filed more than 6 months after the union knew or should have 
known about those changes. The judge further found that the respondent 
did not violate the Act by withdrawing recognition from the union and 
refusing to provide information requested by the union. 
In reversing the judge, the Board reasoned that there was no evidence 
that the union had actual notice with regard to the changes affecting the 
four employees. The Board further observed that it would not impute 
constructive knowledge to the union because, contrary to the judge’s 
finding, the respondent’s implementation of the changes, and the 
circumstances in which they were implemented, did not provide the 
union with clear and unequivocal notice. With regard to the wage 
increases, the Board explained that there was no evidence of any open or 
obvious action, indication, or sign of the changes. As to the promotions, 
it noted that the respondent presented little or no record evidence 
describing the duties of the employees either before or after the 
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promotions. Thus, the Board reasoned that there was no basis for finding 
that the union was on notice that the employees’ duties had changed. The 
Board also found that the record did not support the judge’s finding that 
the union failed to exercise due diligence with respect to investigating 
any other possible wage increase or change in working conditions, noting 
that the union maintained contact with employees and actively 
represented them in bargaining. 
In addition, the Board found that the respondent unlawfully withdrew 
recognition from the union. Relying on Penn Tank Lines, Inc.,4 it 
explained that the respondent’s unfair labor practices resulted in a 
sufficient number of tainted signatures on the employee petition, so that 
the respondent could not properly rely on the petition to support a good-
faith doubt of majority support for the union. Because the Board found 
that the respondent unlawfully withdrew recognition, it found that the 
respondent’s refusal to provide the requested relevant information was 
also unlawful. Finally, for the reasons set forth in Caterair 
International,5 the Board found that an affirmative bargaining order was 
warranted as a remedy for the respondent’s unlawful withdrawal of 
recognition. 
C.  Referral to the Contractual Grievance-Arbitration 
Procedure 
In Wonder Bread,6 the Board panel deferred, pending arbitration, an 
allegation that an employer had failed and refused to bargain with a 
union before unilaterally requiring its Route Sales Representatives 
(RSRs) to submit to physical examinations, including possible drug 
testing, pursuant to regulations of the United States Department of 
Transportation (DOT).  
The parties’ contract contained a multistep grievance and arbitration 
process which provided for final and binding arbitration of “any 
difference [ ] between the Company and the Union as to the 
interpretation or application of any provision of this Agreement.” The 
contract also contained a provision governing the employer’s rights as to 
“the management of the plant, the methods of operation, and the 
direction of the workforce” 
The Board panel stated that, under United Technologies Corp.,7 
deferral was appropriate because the parties had a bargaining relationship 
dating back several decades, the employer expressed a willingness to 
 
4 336 NLRB 1066, 1067 (2001). 
5 322 NLRB 64 (1996). 
6 343 NLRB No. 14 (Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and Walsh). 
7 268 NLRB 557, 558 (1984). 
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utilize the grievance-arbitration process to resolve the instant dispute, 
and the union, by filing a grievance, indicated that the subject of the 
grievance is amenable to the grievance-arbitration process. See E. I. du 
Pont & Co.8 Moreover, there was no contention that the employer had 
been hostile to the exercise of its employees’ protected statutory rights.  
The Board panel rejected the General Counsel’s contention that the 
matter was not appropriate for deferral because the issue of whether the 
employer’s conduct violated its statutory obligation to bargain did not 
turn on a dispute over an interpretation of the agreement’s terms, and 
therefore the dispute was not cognizable under the contract’s grievance-
arbitration provision. Observing that the question of the reasonable 
interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement was one for the 
arbitrator, the Board panel found that the contract’s grievance-arbitration 
provision was extremely broad, in that a grievance could be filed with 
respect “to any difference [ ] between the Company and the Union as to 
the interpretation” of the agreement and any grievance could be brought 
to arbitration. Where the interpretation of the agreement has been 
implicated, and the subject matter of grievances that could be filed and 
pursued to arbitration has not been restricted, the Board will defer. See, 
e.g., Roy Robinson Chevrolet.9 Thus, the Board panel observed that 
Collyer10 prearbitral deferral of unfair labor practice charges challenging 
unilateral changes is appropriate even where no specific contractual 
provision’s meaning is in dispute.11 Here, however, the employer’s 
reliance on the management-rights clause created a dispute as to the 
interpretation of the agreement. Under such circumstances, deferral was 
appropriate regardless of whether the Board would interpret the 
management-rights clause as justifying the unilateral change at issue. See 
generally Roy Robinson, supra. Because the Board retained jurisdiction 
pending issuance of the arbitrator’s decision, which had not yet been 
rendered, the Board panel concluded that the Board’s processes could 
always be reinvoked if the arbitral award was not susceptible to an 
 
8 293 NLRB 896, 897 (1989). 
9 228 NLRB 828, 830 (1977) (quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 
U.S. 574, 582–583 (1960)). 
10 Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837 (1971). 
11 See, e.g., Inland Container Corp., 298 NLRB 715 (1990) (unilateral imposition of drug-testing 
program); E. I. du Pont & Co., 275 NLRB 693 (1985) (unilateral changes in certain work schedules); 
Standard Oil Co. (Ohio), 254 NLRB 32, 34 (1981) (fact that examination “is not pinpointed in the 
agreements as a conceded management prerogative is not medical reason enough for disregarding 
the proof, if there be any, that the parties did intend to permit [employer] to give such tests when 
appropriate”). 
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interpretation consistent with the Act or if it was inconsistent with the 
standards of Spielberg Mfg. Co.12 
 
 
12 112 NLRB 1080 (1955).  Contrary to the General Counsel’s position, the Board has deferred to 
arbitrators’ decisions finding that language in a general management-rights clause authorizes an 
employer’s unilateral changes in terms and conditions of employment.  See, e.g., Hoover Co., 307 
NLRB 524 (1992); Dennison National Co., 296 NLRB 169 (1989). 
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IV 
Representation Proceedings 
The Act requires that an employer bargain with the representative 
designated by a majority of its employees in a unit appropriate for 
collective bargaining.  But it does not require that the representative be 
designated by any particular procedure as long as the representative is 
clearly the choice of a majority of the employees.  As one method for 
employees to select a majority representative, the Act authorizes the 
Board to conduct representation elections.  The Board may conduct such 
an election after a petition has been filed by or on behalf of a group of 
employees or by an employer confronted with a claim for recognition 
from an individual or a labor organization. 
Incident to its authority to conduct elections, the Board has the power 
to determine the unit of employees appropriate for collective bargaining 
and to formally certify a collective-bargaining representative on the basis 
of the results of the election.  Once certified by the Board, the bargaining 
agent is the exclusive representative of all employees in the appropriate 
unit for collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours 
of employment, and other conditions of employment. 
The Act also empowers the Board to conduct elections to decertify 
incumbent bargaining agents that have been previously certified or that 
are being currently recognized by the employer.  Decertification petitions 
may be filed by employees, by individuals other than management 
representatives, or by labor organizations acting on behalf of employees. 
This chapter concerns some of the Board’s decisions during the past 
fiscal year in which the general rules governing the determination of 
bargaining representative were adapted to novel situations or reexamined 
in the light of changed circumstances. 
A.  Bars to an Election 
Alleged Employer Unfair Labor Practices 
In Saint Gobain Abrasives, Inc.,1 a Board majority concluded that a 
hearing must be held to determine if there is a causal connection between 
alleged unfair labor practices and employee disaffection with a union, 
overruling Priority One Services.2  The union had filed unfair labor 
                                                 
1 342 NLRB No. 39 (Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and Meisburg; Members Liebman 
and Walsh dissenting). 
2 331 NLRB 1527 (2000). 
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practice charges against the employer, alleging that the employer refused 
to bargain in good faith by unilaterally implementing an interim health 
insurance program.  The Regional Director subsequently issued a 
complaint in the case.  The petitioner then filed the petition, seeking to 
decertify the union. 
The Regional Director dismissed the petition, concluding that the 
alleged unilateral change caused employees to reject the union.  The 
Regional Director’s finding of causal nexus was made without a hearing.  
The Board majority concluded that such a factual determination of causal 
nexus should not be made without an evidentiary hearing.  The majority 
noted that under Master Slack,3 the Board resolves “the issue of 
causation” under a multifactor test.  Here, those factors would include, at 
a minimum, such issues as: how many employees incurred an increase in 
the cost of health care; how much was the increase; how many 
employees enrolled in different plans as a result of the alleged unilateral 
change; how many employees switched care givers as a result of the 
change; and how many employees expressed dissatisfaction with the 
union prior to the change. 
The majority noted that the alleged unfair labor practice was a single 
unilateral change on a single subject and that there were significant 
factual issues as to the impact of that change.  In such circumstances, the 
majority concluded that it was not appropriate to speculate, without facts 
established in a hearing, that there was a causal relationship between the 
conduct and the disaffection.  To so speculate, the majority held, would 
be to deny employees their Section 7 rights. 
In dissent, Members Liebman and Walsh agreed with the Regional 
Director that the employer’s alleged unilateral change was of the type that 
would tend to cause employee disaffection with the union by undermining 
the union’s perceived authority as the employees’ bargaining 
representative and to interfere with the employees’ free choice in an 
election.  They concluded that due to the inherent tendency of such a 
change to undercut the union’s support, a hearing was unnecessary.  The 
dissenters further noted that a hearing might otherwise be unnecessary 
because an administrative law judge had dismissed the allegation that the 
health insurance change at issue violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.  The 
dissent noted that if the Board upheld this finding, the decertification 
petition would be reinstated.  Thus, the dissenters argued that expeditious 
action on the unfair labor practice case by the Board could make a 
hearing in the representation case unnecessary. 
 
3 271 NLRB 78 (1984). 
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B.  Appropriate Unit Issues 
1.  Multifacility Unit 
In Laboratory Corporation of America4 the Board found the 
petitioned-for multifacility unit to be an inappropriate unit.  Food & 
Commercial Workers Local 1358 petitioned for a unit of employees 
employed by the employer at seven Patient Service Centers (PSCs), 
located in southeastern New Jersey under the supervision of 
Phlebotomist Supervisor Lana Gray, contending that these employees 
shared a separate and identifiable community of interest and therefore 
constituted an appropriate unit.  The employer, on the other hand, 
contended that the petitioned-for unit was inappropriate and that the unit 
must include the other 22 PSCs comprising its Southern New Jersey 
Region.  The Regional Director found the petitioned-for unit to be an 
appropriate unit. 
The Board disagreed.  Applying the traditional community-of-interest 
analysis, the Board noted that the seven PSCs do not comport with any of 
the employer’s administrative divisional or regional groupings and that 
the supervisory responsibility of Gray was not stable enough to form the 
basis of a finding that the 7–PSC unit was appropriate.  Additionally, the 
Board found that management of all of the Southern New Jersey PSCs 
was relatively centralized and that there were limitations on Gray’s 
supervisory authority.  Finally, the Board found that there was regular 
interchange between the petitioned-for PSCs and the excluded 
Hammonton PSC.  It was undisputed that the employees at the 29 
southern New Jersey PSCs had identical skills, duties, and functions and 
worked under identical terms and conditions of employment.  The Board 
concluded that: “Although it is clear that the employees in the petitioned-
for unit share a community of interest, we find that the evidence fails to 
establish that it is separate and distinct from the community of interest 
they share with other employees of the Employer’s Southern New Jersey 
Region.” 
2.  Geographic Residual Units in Construction Industry 
In Premier Plastering, Inc.,5 the Board held that the petitioned-for 
five county unit of the employer’s plasterers was inappropriate and found 
that the only appropriate unit would be a geographic residual unit 
excluding only those areas covered by current Section 9(a) agreements. 
This case was yet another in a long line of cases arising from the 
unique and long-running dispute between the Bricklayers and the 
 
4 341 NLRB No. 140 (Chairman Battista and Members Walsh and Meisburg). 
5 342 NLRB No. 111 (Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and Walsh). 
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Operative Plasterers unions.  Here, the petitioner (Operative Plasterers 
Local 80) sought to represent a unit of the employer’s plasterers working 
in five counties in northeastern Ohio.  The employer and the petitioner 
were parties to an 8(f) agreement covering Cuyahoga County.  The 
employer and the intervening Bricklayers Local 16 were parties to a 9(a) 
agreement covering bricklaying and cement masonry work in Ashtabula, 
Lake, and Geauga Counties.  The employer was also party to two other 
collective-bargaining agreements with other Operative Plasterers locals 
covering limited geographic areas in Ohio—an 8(f) agreement covering 
Carroll, Holmes, Medina, Portage, Stark, Summit, Tuscarawas, and 
Wayne Counties and a 9(a) agreement covering Trumbull, Mahoning, 
and Columbiana Counties.  The Regional Director found the petitioned-
for five county unit appropriate. 
The Board reversed the Regional Director’s finding and found that the 
geographically limited five-county unit was inappropriate because there 
was no evidence that the plasterers performing work in those five 
counties had a community of interest different from when they 
performed work in other areas.  Instead, the Board followed its recent 
decision in G.L. Milliken Plastering,6 and directed the Regional Director 
to craft a residual unit excluding only those areas covered by the current 
9(a) agreement. 
3.  RNs Employed in Off-Campus Facilities 
In Stormont-Vail Healthcare, Inc.,7 the Regional Director found that a 
unit of approximately 700 registered nurses (RNs) employed by the 
employer at its hospital complex and at about seven other buildings 
located within six blocks of the hospital complex (the main campus) in 
Topeka, Kansas, was appropriate for bargaining.  Pursuant to the 
stipulation of the parties, the Regional Director also included about 11 
RNs that worked for LifeStar, a helicopter ambulance service owned and 
operated by the employer, based in three locations outside of the main 
campus (10 miles, 25 to 30 miles, and 70 miles away).  The Regional 
Director excluded other non-main campus RNs employed by the 
employer in Topeka and in surrounding towns, especially those RNs at 
the Stormont-Vail psychiatric facility, outlying clinics, and community 
nursing centers.  Contrary to the Regional Director, the Board concluded 
that RNs in the employer’s off-campus psychiatric facility, outlying 
clinics, and two community nursing centers must be included in the 
otherwise employer-wide multifacility unit found appropriate. 
 
6 340 NLRB No. 138 (2003). 
7 340 NLRB No. 143 (Members Liebman, Schaumber, and Walsh). 
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In about February 2001, the employer moved its inpatient acute care 
psychiatric department from the hospital complex to a facility about two 
miles from the main campus called Stormont-Vail West, and continued 
to provide inpatient psychiatric services at the senior diagnostic unit, 
which remained in the hospital complex.  The Stormont-Vail West 
facility operated one unit for adults and another for adolescents and 
children, while the older, “fragile” patients were placed in the senior 
diagnostic unit. 
The Board found that the RNs at the Stormont-Vail West psychiatric 
facility did not have a distinct community of interest from the psychiatric 
RNs at the senior diagnostic unit or other RNs included in the unit found 
appropriate.  The RNs at Stormont-Vail West worked at the hospital 
complex prior to the relocation of the inpatient acute care psychiatric 
department.  The Board relied on evidence of some interchange between 
the RNs at Stormont-Vail West and the senior diagnostic unit, and the 
similarity of the work performed by the RNs in both of these inpatient 
operations.  The Board also noted the supervisory/managerial 
interchange between Stormont-Vail West and the senior diagnostic unit.  
Finally, the RNs at Stormont-Vail West used the cafeteria and fitness 
center located at the main campus, and attended common meetings, 
classes, and social events with included RNs. 
In 1995, the employer acquired a group of physicians’ clinics, located 
in about 17 locations in Topeka and surrounding towns, with distances 
ranging from 3 to 60 miles away from the main campus.  In including 
these clinics, the Board reasoned that the skills and functions of the RNs 
in the outlying clinics were similar to those of RNs included in the unit.  
Further, the geographic proximity of the outlying clinics to the hospital 
complex and main campus was similar to other included locations.  
Moreover, the unit included RNs who worked at clinics that were located 
in the hospital complex and main campus, and some of these groupings 
were part of the same administrative grouping as the outlying clinics and 
shared common oversight.  Further, the outlying clinics were well-
integrated with the rest of the employer’s centralized system. 
Finally, the Board found that the exclusion of the RNs in the 
community nursing centers from the unit found appropriate was 
arbitrary.  The Board reasoned that the clinics were geographically 
proximate to the included locations, with one clinic located only six 
blocks from the hospital complex, and the other located in a suburb of 
Topeka.  Further, these centers shared a common administrative 
grouping with other included clinics, and were well-integrated with the 
rest of the employer’s centralized system. 
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4.  Employee Status of Graduate Student Assistants 
In Brown University,8 the Board majority overruled New York 
University,9 and found that graduate student assistants are not 
“employees” within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act.  The 
petitioner sought a unit of teaching assistants, research assistants, and 
proctors.  Relying on NYU, the Regional Director found that the 
petitioned-for individuals are statutory employees. In NYU, the Board 
found that graduate student assistants were statutory employees because 
they met the test establishing a conventional master-servant relationship 
with the university.10  The Board granted the employer’s request for 
review of the Regional Director’s Decision.   
In overruling NYU, the Board majority returned to the pre-NYU 
principle of Leland Stanford University,11 that graduate student assistants 
are not statutory employees because they are “primarily students and 
have a primarily educational, not economic, relationship with their 
university.”12  The Board found that Leland Stanford was “wholly 
consistent with the overall purpose and aim of the Act,” which “is 
designed to cover economic relationships.”13 The Board majority 
interpreted Section 2(3) in light of this “underlying fundamental premise 
of the Act.”14  The Board therefore concluded: “The Board’s 
longstanding rule that it will not assert jurisdiction over relationships that 
are ‘primarily educational’ is consistent with these principles.”15
The Board majority also found that even if the graduate student 
assistants were statutory employees, there are policy reasons for 
declining to extend collective-bargaining rights to such persons.  The 
majority stated: “Imposing collective bargaining would have a 
deleterious impact on overall educational decisions by the Brown faculty 
and administration.”16  The majority concluded that “it simply does not 
effectuate national labor policy to accord [such persons] collective 
bargaining rights because they are primarily students.”17
The Board majority expressed no opinion regarding the Board’s 
decision in Boston Medical Center,18 relied on heavily in the NYU 
 
8 342 NLRB No. 42 (Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and Meisburg; Members Liebman 
and Walsh dissenting).   
9 332 NLRB 1205 (2000).  
10 332 NLRB at 1206. 
11 214 NLRB 621 (1974) 
12 342 NLRB No. 42, slip op. at 5. 
13 342 NLRB No. 42, slip op. at 5–6. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id., slip op. at 8. 
17 Id., slip op. at 10. 
18 330 NLRB 152 (1999). 
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decision, in which a Board majority found that interns, residents, and 
house staff at teaching hospitals are employees within the meaning of 
Section 2(3) of the Act.19
Members Liebman and Walsh dissented, stating: “We would adhere 
to the Board’s decision in NYU and thus affirm the Regional Director’s 
decision.”20  Emphasizing the broad definition of “employee” under 
Section 2(3) of the Act, they pointed out that the Board is not free to 
create an exclusion from the Act’s coverage absent compelling 
indications of Congressional intent.21  In addition, they characterized the 
majority’s approach as “woefully out of touch with contemporary 
academic reality” and based on an image of the university that “was 
already outdated” when Leland Stanford was issued in the 1970s.22  They 
pointed out that today, the university “is also a workplace for many 
graduate students, and disputes over work-related issues are common.  
As a result, the policies of the Act . . . apply in the university context.”23
5.  Employee Status of Disabled Workers 
In Brevard Achievement Center, Inc.,24 Chairman Battista and 
Members Schaumber and Meisburg concluded that disabled workers who 
are in a primarily rehabilitative relationship with their putative employer 
are not statutory employees within the meaning of the National Labor 
Relations Act. The majority emphasized that the Board has never 
asserted jurisdiction over relationships that are primarily rehabilitative in 
nature. Members Liebman and Walsh dissented. 
Consistent with its recent decision in Brown University,25 (finding that 
graduate student assistants are not statutory employees because their 
relationship with their employer is “primarily educational”), the Board 
again set forth its interpretation of Section 2(3) of the Act. Reading that 
section in context with the other sections of the statute, the Board 
concluded that the Act was intended by Congress to cover primarily 
economic relationships between employer and employee. “The 
imposition of collective bargaining on relationships that are not primarily 
economic does not further the policies of the Act,” it stated. Finding its 
longstanding rule that it will not assert jurisdiction over relationships that 
are “primarily rehabilitative” to be consistent with this statutory 
 
19 Id., slip op. at 1 fn. 4. 
20 342 NLRB No. 42, slip op. at 12. 
21 Id., slip op. at 14. 
22 Id., slip op. at 12. 
23 Id., slip op. at 15. 
24 342 NLRB No. 101 (Chairman Battista and members Schaumber and Meisburg; Members 
Liebman and Walsh dissented). 
25 342 NLRB No. 42. 
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interpretation, the Board reaffirmed its “primarily rehabilitative” 
standard as the test for assessing the “employee” status of disabled 
workers in rehabilitative programs. 
The Board thereafter applied the primarily rehabilitative standard to 
the facts of the case: 
 
Although the disabled clients work the same hours, receive the 
same wages and benefits, and perform the same tasks under the 
same supervision as the nondisabled employees, they work at their 
own pace, and performance problems are dealt with through 
additional training rather than discipline.  These policies support a 
determination that the relationship between BAC and its clients is 
primarily rehabilitative, not motivated principally by economic 
considerations. 
 
Noting the factual similarities between the case and the Board’s prior 
decisions in Goodwill Industries of Tidewater,26 and Goodwill Industries 
of Denver,27 the Board concluded that Brevard’s disabled workers are not 
statutory employees. 
The majority voiced its concern that the imposition of collective 
bargaining on a primarily rehabilitative relationship would run the risk of 
interfering with the rehabilitative process.  The majority also noted that 
Congress has not deemed it appropriate to change the Board’s 
longstanding doctrine to refrain from exercising jurisdiction over those 
relationships. 
In dissent, Members Liebman and Walsh observed that this case 
“presents the Board with the perfect opportunity to revisit longstanding 
precedent governing disabled workers in light of a legal and policy 
landscape that has evolved dramatically in the last 15 years.”  They 
stated that they would abandon doctrines which, they argued, were based 
on outdated notions about the place of the disabled in society. 
In the dissent’s view, the disabled workers are statutory employees, as 
they come within the common-law meaning of the term “employee” and 
they are not specifically exempted from the Act’s coverage. Contrary to 
the majority’s position that the employment relationship must be 
primarily economic, the dissent concluded, “economic activity need not 
be the sole, or even dominant, purpose of a cognizable employment 
relationship.” 
The dissenting Members asserted that the majority’s decision “ignores 
the plain language of the Act, invades the legislative arena, and 
contravenes contemporary federal policy.” They contended the majority 
 
26 304 NLRB 767 (1991). 
27 304 NLRB 764 (1991). 
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“relegates the Employer’s disabled janitors and all similarly-situated 
workers to the economic sidelines, making them second-class citizens 
both in society and in their own workplaces.” 
6.  Public Utility Presumption 
In Verizon Wireless,28 the Board held that the preference for system-
wide units in the public utility industry does not apply to retail 
employees working in a utility’s retail stores because retail store 
employees “are so divorced from the operation of the Employer’s 
wireless network.” 
The union petitioned for a unit of sales representatives and assistant-
sales representatives working at three retail facilities in Bakersfield, 
California.  The employer argued that as a wireless telephone service 
provider it was a “public utility” and, accordingly, only a system-wide 
unit consisting of either 69 retail outlets in its Northern 
California/Nevada Region or 311 retail outlets in its West area was 
appropriate. 
The Board rejected the employer’s arguments and found the 
petitioned-for unit to be an appropriate unit.  First, the Board explained 
that the system-wide presumption represents a balance of “employees’ 
Section 7 rights to bargain collectively through representatives of their 
own choosing against the public’s interest in the unbroken provision of 
necessary services.”  Assuming arguendo that a wireless telephone 
company is a public utility, the Board balanced “the negligible potential 
for an interruption in the provision of services of a public utility against 
the employees’ right to freely organize” and found that the system-wide 
presumption did not apply to retail store employees.  Applying its 
traditional community-of-interest test, the Board found that the 
petitioned-for three-facility unit was an appropriate unit for bargaining. 
7.  Employee Relative of Nonowner Manager 
In Peirce-Phelps, Inc.,29 the Board majority overruled a challenge to 
the ballot of 16-year-old employee Michael Panara Jr., rejecting the 
union’s contention that Panara Jr. should be excluded from the stipulated 
bargaining unit based on his family relationship to a supervisor of unit 
employees.  The majority reasoned that because Panara Jr. enjoyed no 
special status by virtue of his family relationship with the supervisor, 
there was no basis to exclude him from the unit.  In dissent, Member 
Walsh stated that the evidence supported a finding of special status.  He 
 
28 341 NLRB No. 63 (Members Schaumber, Walsh, and Meisburg). 
29 341 NLRB No. 78 (Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber; Member Walsh dissenting in 
part). 
Sixty-Ninth Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board 54 
 
                                                
also noted that the majority’s implicit limitation of special status to 
“special status on the job” did not follow from Board precedent. 
In August 2003, a representation election was held, pursuant to a 
Stipulated Election Agreement, among all full-time and seasonal 
warehousemen at the employer’s Decatur Road facility.  At that time, 
Panara Jr. was a seasonal warehouseman at Decatur Road.  Panara Jr. 
had worked for the employer from the age of 14, during various breaks in 
his high school academic year, but mainly over the summer.  He served 
under the supervision of his father, Michael Panara Sr., who was the 
Decatur Road warehouse manager.  Panara Sr. had no ownership interest 
in the employer. 
Under applicable state law, Panara Jr. was not of age to operate heavy 
lifting equipment within the warehouse.  He was, however, able to 
perform other warehousing functions.  Panara Sr. created a schedule for 
Panara Jr. from week-to-week to ensure that he was occupied with these 
other warehousing functions and was not in the warehouse when the 
work required the operation of heavy lifting equipment. 
Citing Bell Convalescent Hospital30 and McFarling Foods,31 the 
majority stated that it would give effect to the parties’ intent, as reflected 
in the Stipulated Election Agreement, to include seasonal warehousemen 
such as Panara Jr. in the proposed bargaining unit, unless a statutory 
provision or Board policy counseled otherwise.  The majority stated, 
moreover, that relevant Board policy counsels exclusion of an employee 
who is related to a nonowner manager only if the employee enjoys 
“specific special privileges or benefits” by virtue of his or her 
relationship with the nonowner manager. 
The majority found that Panara Jr. enjoyed no such special privileges 
or benefits by virtue of his relationship to Panara Sr.  According to the 
majority, Panara Jr. worked under the same conditions and the same 
policies as other seasonal warehousemen, performing similar tasks and 
earning a comparable wage.  Where his duties differed from those of the 
other warehousemen, the difference was mandated by state law and did 
not follow from Panara Jr.’s relationship to Panara Sr.  Similarly, the 
majority stated, fluctuations in Panara Jr.’s schedule were a consequence 
of his “legal impediment” (i.e., his inability to operate heavy lifting 
equipment) and not a special benefit flowing from his relationship with 
Panara Sr. 
Responding to the dissent’s argument that Panara Jr. would not have 
been hired at the early age of 14 but for his relationship to Panara Sr., the 
 
30 337 NLRB 191 (2001). 
31 336 NLRB 1140 (2001). 
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majority stressed that regardless of the circumstances surrounding Panara 
Jr.’s hiring, he enjoyed no special treatment “on the job,” citing 
Cumberland Farms.32  Contrary to the dissent, the majority also asserted 
that the fact that Panara Jr. lives with and is financially dependent on 
Panara Sr. is irrelevant given the absence of other indicia of special 
status. 
Member Walsh, in dissent, maintained that Panara Jr. received special 
treatment with regard to his schedule, which was tailored to 
accommodate his school commitments and his legal incapacity to 
perform important job functions (i.e., those involving heavy lifting 
equipment).  Member Walsh also noted that Panara Jr. was hired at an 
exceptionally early age, despite the legal incapacity noted above.  
Contrary to the majority, Member Walsh asserted that the circumstances 
of Panara Jr.’s hiring are probative of special status even though they do 
not relate strictly to conditions “on the job.”  The majority’s narrow 
focus on Panara Jr.’s status “on the job,” he said, was not compelled by 
Cumberland Farms.  “In Cumberland Farms, the Board held that being 
related to and living with a nonowner supervisor, without more, is 
insufficient to exclude the employee-relative from the unit.  From this 
holding, it does not follow that where there is something more, the Board 
is precluded from considering all relevant circumstances in determining 
special status.”33  Noting the presence of “much more” in this case (e.g., 
the special treatment in scheduling), Member Walsh concluded that the 
circumstances of Panara Jr.’s hiring are relevant to the finding of special 
status. 
C.  Objections to Conduct Affecting the Election 
1.  Union’s Use of Employee Photographs and Quotations in 
Campaign Materials 
In BFI Waste Service, LLC,34 the Board adopted the hearing officer’s 
findings that the petitioner’s use of employee photographs and quotations 
in its campaign materials was not objectionable because it obtained 
consent for such use and because its use of those pictures or quotes was 
not misrepresentation warranting overturning the election under Midland 
National Life Insurance Co.,35 or Van Dorn Plastic Machinery, Inc. v. 
NLRB.36
 
32 272 NLRB 336 fn. 2 (1984). 
33 341 NLRB No. 78, slip op. at 4 (internal citation omitted). 
34 343 NLRB No. 35 (Chairman Battista and Member Liebman; Member Meisburg concurring). 
35 263 NLRB 127 (1982). 
36 736 F.2d 343, 348 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 1208 (1985). 
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In March 2004, agents of the petitioner conducted meetings during 
which employees were asked to sign release forms allowing the 
petitioner to use the employees’ likenesses and names in its campaign 
publications.  Pictures were taken of employees signing release forms.  
In addition, employees were asked for statements in support of the union, 
for use in campaign literature.  Employees who did not make statements 
were told that the petitioner’s organizing department might develop 
statements that would be attributed to them.  Employee photographs and 
statements (or attributed statements) were included in a flyer entitled “A 
Shop for Change” and a poster entitled “We’re Voting Teamsters Yes!” 
The employer objected, and later argued in exceptions, that the 
petitioner did not obtain informed employee consent to include their 
pictures in its campaign materials.  It also argued that the petitioner 
painted a false portrait of employee support through its inclusion in the 
poster entitled “We’re Voting Teamsters Yes!” of the likenesses of 
employees who either did not vote or did not vote “yes.”  It also argues 
that the petitioner misrepresented employee sentiments through its 
attribution of statements in support of the union to employees in that 
poster and the “A Shop for Change” flyer. 
Finding no merit to those exceptions, and adopting the hearing 
officer’s findings, the Board found “under the circumstances of this case, 
that the Petitioner’s conduct does not warrant overturning the election.”  
Although the Board warned that it does not “condone the creation and 
attribution of quotes to employees, at least where the union makes no 
pre-publication effort to verify that the quotes fairly represent the views 
of the quoted employees,” the Board reasoned that the alleged 
misrepresentations in this case were neither “pervasive” nor “artfully 
deceptive” under Midland National Life and Van Dorn.  The Board 
found that the alleged misrepresentations were not “pervasive” because 
“at most, the views of only two employees were arguably 
misrepresented.”  It also rejected that the “artful deception” of employees 
had occurred because “the employees directly involved were told that a 
quote would be prepared for them, and the accuracy of those quotations 
could have been verified by other employees.” 
2.  Employer’s Use of Ride-Alongs 
In Frito Lay, Inc.,37 the Board found that the employer’s use of ride-
alongs with its truckdrivers as a campaign tactic did not constitute 
objectionable conduct. 
During the decertification campaign, the employer used “ride-alongs,” 
in which management accompanied the unit truckdrivers on their routes, 
 
37 341 NLRB No. 65 (Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber; Member Liebman concurring). 
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as an opportunity to answer any questions the drivers had concerning the 
election. The routes averaged 10 to 12 hours, and most drivers had about 
three ride-alongs during the 6-week campaign. 
The Regional Director examined the factors considered by the Board 
in related contexts, such as seat-of-power interviews and employer home 
visits, and concluded that, based on the circumstances, the ride-alongs 
were an oppressive and unfair tactic that tainted the legitimacy of the 
election. Consequently, the Regional Director set aside the 
decertification election and ordered a new election. 
Citing Noah’s New York Bagels,38 the Board reversed the Regional 
Director, set aside the second election, and certified the results of the first 
election. 
The Board majority held that the use of ride-alongs to communicate 
an employer’s position on union representation to its truckdrivers is not, 
in itself, coercive. Rather, an employer’s use of ride-alongs to 
communicate with its employees during an election campaign is only 
objectionable if, under all of the circumstances, the use of ride-alongs 
interferes with the employees’ right to freely choose a bargaining 
representative. The majority listed the following factors to be considered 
in deciding whether an employer’s use of ride-alongs amounts to 
objectionable conduct: (1) whether the use and conduct of ride-alongs is 
reasonably tailored to meet the employer’s need to communicate with its 
employees in light of the availability and effectiveness of alternate means 
of communication; (2) the atmosphere prevalent during the ride-alongs 
and the tenor of the conversation between the drivers and the employer’s 
representatives; (3) whether the employer effectively permitted the 
employees to decline ride-alongs; (4) the frequency of the ride-alongs, 
both during and prior to the election campaign; (5) the positions held by 
the ride-along guests; (6) whether the ride-alongs were scheduled in a 
discriminatory manner; and (7) whether the ride-alongs took place in a 
context otherwise free of objectionable conduct. 
Applying these factors in the instant case, the Board majority found 
that the employer’s use of ride-alongs was not coercive.  The majority 
noted that the employer had a limited opportunity to meet with the 
drivers on company time, and the ride-alongs permitted relaxed meetings 
on company time without interfering with the drivers’ work schedules. 
There was no indication that the employer intentionally made the ride-
alongs unnecessarily burdensome and unpleasant for the truckdrivers; the 
length of the trips was dictated by the length of the drivers’ routes.  The 
tenor of the conversations during the ride-alongs was casual, amicable, 
 
38 324 NLRB 266 (1997). 
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and nonthreatening, and there was no pressure from management to 
discuss the election.  The drivers were free to decline ride-alongs and 
there was no pressure placed on the drivers to accept ride-alongs.  Ride-
alongs for other purposes were not uncommon before the election 
campaign, and the employer did not schedule excessive preelection ride-
alongs for each driver.  Many of the ride-along guests were fellow 
drivers from other facilities.  Finally, the majority found that the ride-
alongs were not used in a discriminatory manner and took place in the 
context of a campaign free from coercive or objectionable conduct. 
Member Liebman concurred with the result, finding it compelled by 
the Board’s decision in Noah’s New York Bagels.  However, Member 
Liebman noted that there are good reasons to reconsider the multifactor 
approach of Noah’s New York Bagels and consider adopting a bright-line 
rule prohibiting campaign-related ride-alongs altogether. 
3.  Collection of Mail Ballots 
In Fessler & Bowman, Inc.,39 the Board held that a party engages in 
objectionable conduct when it collects or otherwise handles an 
employee’s mail ballot.  The Board also held that a party does not engage 
in objectionable conduct when it solicits employees’ mail ballots. 
Fessler & Bowman, Inc., involved a mail ballot runoff election 
between two unions.  During the ballot period, the incumbent union 
asked employees to give their mail ballots to union agents who would 
forward them to the Board.  The union actually collected two employees’ 
mail ballots.  A tally of the ballots showed that the union defeated the 
petitioner by four votes.  The petitioner filed objections alleging that the 
union tainted the election by both soliciting and collecting employees’ 
mail ballots. 
The Board first noted the fundamental importance of maintaining the 
secrecy and integrity of its election processes.  The Board found that a 
party “casts doubt on the integrity of the election process and undermines 
election secrecy” when it collects employees’ mail ballots.  Therefore, 
the Board held that mail-ballot collection is objectionable.  The Board 
members disagreed, however, whether it was per se objectionable if 
timely objections were filed.  Members Liebman and Walsh found that 
the collection of the ballots would be a basis for setting aside an election 
where a determinative number of ballots were affected.  Chairman 
Battista and Member Schaumber would find that such a collection 
warrants a new election, if objections are filed, even if it could not be 
shown that this objectionable conduct was outcome determinative.  In 
 
39 341 NLRB No. 122 (Members Liebman and Walsh; Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber 
concurring in part and dissenting in part.  Member Meisburg was recused.) 
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their view, a bright-line rule that elections be set aside if such collections 
occur is necessary to restore the integrity of the balloting process. 
Members Liebman and Walsh, on the other hand, found that soliciting 
employees’ mail ballots is not objectionable because solicitation “d[oes] 
not create an opportunity for ballot tampering or for a breach of secrecy.”  
Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber disagreed.  They would find 
that ballot solicitation is objectionable because it forces an employee to 
either accede to the request or decline the request and be viewed as a 
dissenter.  They additionally found that prohibiting solicitation would 
help to uncover otherwise undetectable ballot collection.  However, in 
the absence of a Board majority to prohibit ballot solicitation, Chairman 
Battista and Member Schaumber agreed with their colleagues to remand 
the case to the Regional Director to resolve the challenged ballots to 
determine whether the Union’s ballot collection could have affected the 
election result. 
4.  Anonymous Telephone Threats 
In Cedars-Sinai Medical Center,40 the Board unanimously found that 
anonymous telephone threats to an antiunion employee a few weeks 
before the election tended to interfere with employee free choice and 
warranted setting aside the election. 
Petitioner California Nurses Association filed a representation petition 
on October 30, 2002, seeking to represent a unit of registered nurses 
(RNs) at employer Cedars-Sinai Medical Center.  The election was 
conducted on December 11 through 13, 2002.  The tally of ballots 
showed 695 for and 627 against the petitioner, with 10 challenged 
ballots, an insufficient number to affect the results of the election. 
The employer filed 19 timely objections to the conduct of the 
election, alleging, inter alia, that, in the time leading up to the election, 
the petitioner, by its agent and supporters, made a series of anonymous 
telephone threats to known antiunion employees. 
Two such employees were emergency room nurses Christine Foxon 
and Scott Barnes.  Foxon and Barnes, who were among the most active 
opponents of the petitioner’s organizing efforts, recruited nurses who 
also opposed these efforts to attend meetings; they also distributed 
antiunion flyers and cofounded an antiunion organization called “One 
Voice, Our Voice.” 
Beginning sometime in August and spanning through October or 
November, Foxon began to receive a series of threatening phone calls. 
The first three calls essentially warned Foxon to “back off” her 
opposition to the petitioner and that she “needed to be careful” about 
 
40 342 NLRB No. 58 (Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and Walsh) 
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opposing the petitioner.  After receiving the third call, Foxon pressed 
“*69” and the individual who answered the phone said “California 
Nurses.”  During the fourth and final call, the caller told Foxon that he or 
she knew that Foxon had two little girls and that she needed to think 
about her family and her girls and back off. 
In November, Barnes also began to receive threatening phone calls.  
Barnes, who was a pet owner and animal lover, received a total of seven 
to ten calls in which the callers variously told him to “stop fucking with 
the [Petitioner],” that little kittens look good in frying pans, that they 
would stab his dogs, and that wouldn’t it be terrible if his Corgis (the 
breed of dogs he owned) were run over.  These calls stopped at the end 
of November, 2 weeks before the election. 
Barnes testified that he discussed these threats with Foxon and other 
coworkers; he also told 20 to 30 other nurses of the threats at a meeting 
of the emergency room department. 
The administrative law judge, in recommending that the employer’s 
objections be overruled in their entirety, found, inter alia, that the threats 
to Foxon and Barnes did not rise to the level of objectionable conduct.  
Applying the Board’s standard for party conduct,41 the judge found that 
the threats—though likely disseminated to a determinative number of 
unit employees—did not have the tendency to interfere with voting 
employees’ freedom of choice.  The judge reasoned that the threats were 
made to only two unit employees, and they were less intimidating 
because they were made anonymously; and, she reasoned that employees 
who had heard about the threats would not have reason to believe that the 
callers had the power to effectuate violence on unit employees.  She 
further posited that, because the threatening calls had ended 2 weeks 
before the election, it was reasonable to assume that the cessation of the 
threats had been disseminated and that the threats did not persist in the 
minds of unit employees as they were casting their votes. 
The employer subsequently filed timely exceptions with the Board to 
the judge’s recommendation to overrule its objections, including those 
pertaining to the threats to Foxon and Barnes. 
Reversing the judge, the Board found that the threats to Barnes 
constituted objectionable conduct that warranted setting aside the 
election.  In doing so, the Board found that the employer had failed to 
show that any of the threatening calls to Foxon took place in the “critical 
period” between the filing of the petition and the election.  However, the 
Board found that, given the similarities between these threats and the 
 
41 A party’s preelection conduct is objectionable if it objectively has “the tendency to interfere with 
employees’ freedom of choice.”  Cambridge Tool & Mfg. Co., 316 NLRB 716 (1995).  
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threats to Barnes, it was appropriate to consider the prepetition threats to 
Foxon “only to the extent that they add[ed] meaning and dimension” to 
the postpetition threats to Barnes.  See Dresser Industries.42
Turning then to the threats to Barnes, the Board, applying the standard 
for party conduct,43 found that these threats had a tendency to interfere 
with voting employees’ freedom of choice in the election.   Specifically, 
the Board found that the judge erred in finding that the anonymous 
threats to Barnes were less serious than direct threats.  The Board 
reasoned that “the anonymous threats were potentially even more 
menacing than a direct threat might have been” because the callers 
“knew specific details about Barnes’ life,” and he “could not take 
definitive measures to protect himself and his pets against individuals 
whose identities he did not know.” 
The Board noted that “[t]hreats such as these are certainly quite 
severe; and where, as here, they are tied to an employee’s antiunion 
stance or activities, the threats are reasonably calculated to interfere with 
his freedom of choice.”  The Board stated that the threats to Barnes were 
such that they would tend to cause other unit employees who had heard 
about them to “reasonably assume that the Petitioner was willing to 
physically harm any employee—or the loved ones of any employee—
who opposed it or voted against it in the election.”  The Board found that 
these threats were even more disturbing when viewed in the context of 
the prepetition threats of bodily harm to Foxon and her daughters. 
The Board further pointed out that a shift of only 34 votes—out of 
over 1,300 cast—could have changed the results of the election; and, it 
found that more than this number of employees had likely heard about 
the threats to Barnes, as there was evidence that these threats had been 
widely discussed throughout the unit between the time of their cessation 
and the time of the election.  Thus, the Board, contrary to the judge, 
concluded that, given the serious nature of the threats, “they would tend 
to linger in the minds of employees who had heard about them for weeks 
after the threats had ended.” 
For the reasons described above, the Board found that the threats to 
Barnes constituted objectionable conduct that warranted setting aside the 
election.  The Board therefore directed that a second election be held.  In 
view of this disposition, the Board found it unnecessary to pass on the 
 
42 242 NLRB 74, 74 (1979). 
43 Even though the record did not reflect who made these threats, the Board applied the standard for 
party conduct because there were no exceptions to the judge’s application of that standard.  
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employer’s exceptions to the judge’s recommendations to overrule its 
remaining objections.44
5.  Threats of Reprisals 
In Manhattan Crowne Plaza,45 a Board majority found that a 
memorandum sent by the employer to its employees did not threaten the 
employees with a loss of benefits and wages and thus did not interfere 
with the employees’ free choice in the election.   The majority noted that 
it is well settled that an employer “is free to communicate to his 
employees any of his general views about unionism or any of his specific 
views about a particular union, so long as the communications do not 
contain a ‘threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.’”46  Here, the 
employer provided a recent, concrete example of a negative outcome for 
employees who were represented by the same union that sought to 
represent the employer’s employees.  The memorandum described a 
series of events at hotels—a year of negotiations followed by the union’s 
rejection of an employer’s final offer—that resulted in the employees 
there losing their jobs.  The union had rejected the employer’s offer, and 
that rejection prompted the events, which followed. 
Further, the memorandum did not say that these same incidents were 
going to happen if the employer’s employees voted in favor of union 
representation.  On the contrary, it noted, “each set of negotiations is 
different.”  The Board majority further noted that the employer made no 
predictions. It said, “each set of negotiations is different.”  In sum, the 
employer simply described what could happen; it was not predicting 
what would happen.  The Board majority therefore found that the 
employer’s memorandum did not, under all these circumstances, convey 
a threat of reprisal if the employees selected the union as their collective-
bargaining representative but rather that it comes within the range of 
permissible campaign conduct. 
In dissent, Member Walsh concluded that the Regional Director 
correctly found that the employer interfered with the election by 
threatening employees, in a memorandum sent a week before the 
election, that unionization would result in the loss of their jobs and 
benefits.  Member Walsh would find that the memorandum was a clear 
attempt to communicate the message that unionization at two other hotels 
caused those employees to lose their jobs and benefits, and that 
unionization would likewise cause the employer’s employees to lose 
 
44 Chairman Battista, however, would have found that the vandalism of the cars of three antiunion 
nonunit employees was also objectionable when coupled with the other conduct found to be 
objectionable. 
45 341 NLRB No. 90 (Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber; Member Walsh dissenting). 
46 Id., slip op. at 1, citing NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969). 
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their jobs and benefits.  Member Walsh further noted that simply stating 
“each set of negotiations is different” was not sufficient to neutralize that 
message.  Furthermore, the employer offered no statement of objective 
facts supporting its suggestion that its employees would suffer the same 
fate as those at the other two hotels.  Finally, although the memorandum 
blamed the union for the loss of the jobs and benefits at the other hotels, 
the memorandum actually discussed conduct—subcontracting out work 
and firing employees—that was within the employer’s control rather than 
the union’s control. 
6.  Preelection Promises of Benefits 
In Suburban Journals of Greater St. Louis, L.L.C.,47 the Board 
majority in agreement with the hearing officer, overruled objections that 
the employer promised benefits to employees if the union were 
decertified and that the employer blamed the union for benefits being 
withheld. Thus, the Board certified the results of the election. 
Employee Bradley filed a petition on June 23, 2003, seeking to 
decertify the union as the representative of the employer’s editorial and 
advertising department employees. The resulting August 4, 2003, 
election produced 7 votes for and 7 against the union and no challenged 
ballots. 
In July 2003, Bradley faxed to the employer’s human resources 
manager, Buhrman, a comparison prepared by the union of the 
employees’ current health insurance plan and the one that the employer 
had proposed in bargaining. Buhrman determined that the comparison 
was misleading and erroneous. Employee Dawson called Buhrman three 
times to request information regarding the employer’s unrepresented 
employees’ benefits. In light of these inquiries, Buhrman decided to meet 
with each unit employee individually to discuss insurance matters. 
The meetings were held in a Denny’s restaurant during the final week 
of July preceding the August 4 election. In each meeting, Buhrman 
presented an outline of the employer’s unrepresented employees’ 
benefits and a chart showing the unrepresented employees’ biweekly 
insurance contributions. She also presented a comparison for each 
employee of how much the employee paid for insurance and how much 
unrepresented employees were paying under the equivalent employer 
plan. Finally, she presented a copy of the union’s insurance plan 
comparison with the employer’s corrections marked on it. 
At each meeting, Buhrman told the employee that she thought that the 
employer’s insurance plan was the better plan. She told employee May 
that it was unfortunate that the employees did not currently have the 
 
47 343 NLRB No. 24 (Members Schaumber and Meisburg; Member Walsh dissenting). 
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stock purchase plan or 5 percent pay increase that the unrepresented 
employees had received. When Dawson asked why the editorial staff was 
not given the 5 percent pay increase, Buhrman responded that the union 
had not asked for such an increase. Only employees Cunningham and 
Bradley asked her what the employees would get if they voted to 
decertify the union. She told them that she could not make any promises. 
In overruling the objections, the Board majority found that nothing in 
Buhrman’s meetings with employees constituted an implied promise of 
benefits if the employees voted to decertify the union. Buhrman’s 
comparison charts did not convey an implied promise of benefits, as they 
were simple comparisons of existing health insurance costs for unit 
employees and unrepresented employees and did not project future 
benefits. Additionally, the benefit comparisons were presented in 
response to an employee’s requests and therefore were less likely to be 
considered an implied promise of benefits. Further, Buhrman, when 
asked what employees would get if they decertified the union, explicitly 
stated that she could not make any promises. Moreover, while 
Buhrman’s meetings with employees took place during the week 
preceding the election, the meetings closely followed the employee 
inquiry and the union’s benefits misrepresentation that prompted the 
meetings. 
Dissenting, Member Walsh would have sustained the objection that 
the employer promised benefits to employees if the union were 
decertified. He found that, in the last few days of the election, the 
employer clearly implied to virtually all unit employees that they would 
receive improved benefits if they decertified the union. In his view, 
“Buhrman’s focused emphasis on the unrepresented employees’ better 
benefits and higher wages during the one-on-one lunches with unit 
employees just a few days before the election effectively created a 
sufficient measure of implied assurance, urgency, and personal 
obligation that reasonably interfered with the unit employees’ ability to 
freely choose whether to continue to be represented by the Union.” 
In Allen’s Electric Co.,48 the Board majority held that it was not 
objectionable for a union to promise and later pay reimbursements to 
employees for wages they lost due to voting.  The Board also 
unanimously found that the union’s arrangement of an election-day 
carpool for voters was not objectionable, even though the carpool had the 
effect of increasing the reimbursements payable to two voters. 
 
48 340 NLRB No. 119 (2003) (Members Liebman and Walsh; Member Schaumber dissenting in 
part). 
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Eligibility to vote in the election was determined under the 
Steiny/Daniel formula49 applicable to construction industry elections, and 
many eligible voters were working for employers other than Allen’s 
Electric.  In response to a voter’s expression of concern about losing 
wages at his current employer in order to vote, the union organizer 
promised reimbursement for such lost wages.  The offer was orally 
communicated to other prospective voters by various means.  The union 
organizer repeatedly emphasized that reimbursement depended only on 
an individual’s loss of wages due to voting, not on how the individual 
voted, which the union would have no way of knowing.  Several voters 
who were unemployed or scheduled for work shifts that did not conflict 
with the election were told that they were ineligible for reimbursement, 
because they had no lost wages to reimburse.  After the election, six 
voters requested and received reimbursement.  The payments were 
calculated based on each voter’s hourly wage and number of work hours 
lost (including voters’ travel time), less applicable payroll taxes.  One 
voter was reimbursed for approximately a half-hour extra time, based on 
his mistaken estimate of how long the trip to his distant worksite would 
take. 
The Board majority concluded that the union’s preelection promises 
of reimbursement were not objectionable because they did not 
reasonably tend to interfere with the voters’ free and uncoerced choice.  
The Board found that “[v]oters would have reasonably understood that 
the purpose of the wage reimbursements was to return them to the 
financial position they would have been in had they not lost worktime by 
voting,” and thus were not a “benefit” prohibited by Sunrise 
Rehabilitation Hospital.50  The majority also concluded that the 
payments themselves, which were provided after the election, could not 
have interfered with voters’ choice in the election that had already 
occurred.  The extra half-hour’s payment to one voter did not justify 
setting aside the election: it was based on an apparently good-faith, if 
mistaken, estimate of the voter’s lost wages and, in any event, the voter 
did not know of the overpayment until after the election. 
Member Schaumber, dissenting, would have found that the promises 
of reimbursement tainted the election because it was not shown that the 
offer was communicated to all eligible voters.  Finding that “it would not 
be unreasonable to infer that announcements of the offer were kept 
largely within the community of prounion employees,” Member 
Schaumber concluded that the reimbursement offer “unfairly cast its 
 
49 See Steiny & Co., 308 NLRB 1323 (1992); Daniel Construction Co., 133 NLRB 264 (1961), 
modified 167 NLRB 1078 (1967). 
50 320 NLRB 212 (1995). 
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weight in favor of unionization” in a manner prohibited by Savair Mfg. 
Co.51 Although the employer never alleged that the union’s failure to 
communicate the offer to all eligible voters was objectionable, and the 
parties never litigated it, Member Schaumber found it necessary to 
address this issue because “the Employer’s objection and exception put 
the Union’s conduct before the Board for review” and this issue was “a 
key element of the Union’s conduct.” 
7.  Maintenance of Overbroad No-Solicitation Policy 
In Pacific Beach Hotel,52 the Board majority adopted the 
recommendation of the administrative law judge to sustain two union 
election objections alleging that the employer interfered with the election 
by interrogating four employees and by maintaining an overbroad no-
solicitation policy. The Board majority directed a second election if the 
revised tally of ballots did not result in a majority for the union.53
The judge found that the employer’s interrogations fell within the 
scope of an objection alleging that the employer engaged in coercive 
threats. At the end of the hearing, the union withdrew an objection 
expressly alleging that the employer engaged in coercive interrogations 
of employees. However, the parties had fully litigated the issue of 
interrogations during the hearing, and both parties briefed the issue to the 
judge. The Board majority found that the issue of interrogations was 
within the scope of the objection alleging the threats because both 
objections concerned conduct that was “coercive” and “interfering,” and 
because the parties had fully litigated the issue, thus preventing any 
prejudice to the employer. In dissent, Chairman Battista asserted that 
because the interrogations were clearly not within the scope of the 
objection alleging threats, the objection should be overruled.  In his view, 
because the objection specifically relating to an alleged interrogation was 
withdrawn, it cannot be resurrected by “seeking to shoe-horn it into 
[another objection].” 
Concerning the alleged overbroad no-solicitation policy, the Board 
majority of Members Liebman and Walsh, citing Freund Baking Co.,54 
held that the mere maintenance of an overbroad rule could affect the 
results of an election.  Employees of the employer were given a 
handbook upon hire which consisted of rules of conduct, including a 
prohibition against solicitation “for any cause or organization AT ANY 
 
51  414 U.S. 270 (1973). 
52 342 NLRB No. 30 (Members Liebman and Walsh; Chairman Battista dissenting in part). 
53 The Union received 209 votes, with 204 votes against and 36 determinative challenged ballots.  
The Board adopted the judge’s recommended disposition of the challenges, except for one ballot, 
which would be held in abeyance pending a revised tally. 
54 336 NLRB 847 (2001). 
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TIME WHILE ON COMPANY PROPERTY.” The rule stated that it 
specifically applied to “labor unions,” among others. The majority found 
that this rule was overbroad, was applied to all unit employees, was 
disseminated to all in the unit upon their hire, and that employees were 
never informed that they could disregard it.  In these circumstances, the 
majority found that mere maintenance of the rule reasonably could lead 
employees wishing to engage in permissible Section 7 conduct to believe 
that such conduct would result in discipline.  Accordingly, the majority 
found that the rule interfered with the election and sustained the 
objection. 
In dissent, Chairman Battista noted that the rule was not enforced or 
referred to during the critical period, and that solicitation freely occurred 
despite the rule. Thus, it was “virtually impossible” to conclude that the 
mere maintenance of the policy could have affected the results of the 
election.55
D.  Objections to Conduct of Board Agent 
1.  Statements of Personal Opinion 
In Sonoma Health Care Center,56 the Board majority overruled 
objections alleging that comments made by a Board agent impermissibly 
tainted the election process.  During a break in the voting, the employer’s 
observer overheard the union’s observer ask the Board agent why 
companies do not like unions.  The Board agent responded:  
“[C]ompanies don’t like unions because they cannot fire or hire anyone, 
and they cannot take benefits from the staff.”  Upon hearing that the 
employer had paid $60,000 to “the consultant” the Board agent replied 
“whoa, $60,000.”  Later, when asked why he had answered the union 
observer’s initial question, the Board agent replied, “[W]ell, I can just 
give my opinion because I’m not going to vote.”  There was no evidence 
that anyone else heard (or heard about) any of this dialogue. 
The Board unanimously agreed that the standard to be applied is that 
set forth in Athbro Precision Engineering Corp.,57 which requires that an 
election be set aside when the conduct of the Board election agent tends 
to destroy confidence in the Board’s election process or could reasonably 
be interpreted as impairing the election standards the Board seeks to 
maintain.  A majority of the Board58 interpreted Athbro to require that an 
election be set aside when the conduct of the Board election agent tends 
 
55 Citing Clark Equipment Co., 278 NLRB 498, 505 (1986). 
56 342 NLRB No. 93 (Members Liebman, Schaumber, Walsh, and Meisburg; Chairman Battista 
dissenting). 
57 166 NLRB 966 (1967). 
58 Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and Meisburg. 
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to destroy confidence in the Board’s election process or could reasonably 
be interpreted as impairing the election standards the Board seeks to 
maintain.  Citing Hudson Aviation Services,59 they concluded that 
statements of personal opinion by a Board agent may be sufficiently 
partisan to warrant setting aside an election even if made to a limited 
audience and even if unaccompanied by procedural irregularities or other 
“actions that reasonably create the appearance that the election 
procedures will not be fairly administered.” 
A majority of the Board60 found that the specific statements of 
personal opinion made by the Board agent in this case, while intemperate 
and inappropriate, did not mandate setting aside the election under 
Athbro.  Members Liebman and Walsh concluded that these statements 
were not objectionable under Athbro, which they read as holding that a 
Board’s agent’s mere statement of personal feelings to a limited audience 
will not taint an election, unless they reasonably create the appearance 
that the election procedures will not be fairly administered.  While 
Members Schaumber and Meisburg declined to adopt their concurring 
colleagues’ “overly restricted reading” of the Athbro standard, they 
ultimately agreed that application of Athbro to the specific facts of this 
case did not mandate setting aside the election. 
Chairman Battista, dissenting, concluded that the election should be 
set aside under Athbro because the Board agent’s statements reasonably 
called into question his impartiality.  Chairman Battista stated: “The 
Board’s election process is rightly called the ‘crown jewel’ of the 
Board’s endeavors. . . . Today, the Board’s crown jewel has been 
tarnished.  Worse, it has been tarnished by the actions of the Board’s 
own agent.  And, worse still, the Board puts its imprimatur on the result.”  
The Chairman said he “would restore the luster” to the Board’s “crown 
jewel” by setting aside the election so that a new election, with 
unquestionable fairness and integrity, could be held. 
2.  Failure to Lodge Eligibility Challenges 
In Lakewood Engineering and Manufacturing, Co.,61 the Board 
overruled the union’s objections and refused to set aside an election 
where the Board agent failed to challenge the ballot of a voter suspected 
to be ineligible to vote. 
The Board scheduled a representation election for January 22, 2003, 
with an eligibility cut-off date of December 22, 2002.  Unfair labor 
 
59 288 NLRB 870 (1988). 
60 Members Liebman, Schaumber, Walsh, and Meisburg. 
61 341 NLRB No. 101 (2002) (Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and Walsh). 
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practice charges filed by an intervenor union blocked the January 22 
election.  The Regional Director dismissed the charges and rescheduled 
the election for February 24 and 25, 2003.  Over the employer’s 
objection, the Regional Director decided to use the same December 22, 
2002, eligibility cut-off date.  As required, the employer supplied the 
region with a new Excelsior list and included among the 320 names, 8 
employees who were hired between December 22, 2002, and February 2, 
2003, whom the employer contended should be eligible to vote.  Along 
with the Excelsior list, the employer broke out the names of the 8 new 
hires.   At the preelection conference, the union noticed the inclusion of 
the 8 new hires on the list and requested that the Board agent remove the 
names.  The Board agent refused.  The February 24 and 25 election 
ended with no party receiving a majority of votes cast and a runoff 
election was scheduled for April 24, 2003.  The issue of the eight new 
hires came up again at the April 24 preelection conference.  The union 
requested that the Board agent remove the names; and the Board agent 
refused, stating that the union could challenge their ballots if they voted.  
Of the new hires, 4 voted without challenge, 3 voted under challenge, 
and 1 apparently did not vote. 
The union filed objections arguing that the Board agent’s failure to 
challenge the ballots of the 7 new hires who voted required that the 
election be set aside.  The Regional Director sustained the objections 
without a hearing, determining that because the Board agent knew the 
eight new hires were hired after the eligibility cut-off date, her failure to 
challenge their ballots required that the election be set aside.  The Board 
disagreed and overruled the objections. 
The Board began with the basic proposition that “the parties bear the 
primary responsibility for challenging voter eligibility.”  Generally, “a 
Board agent must challenge a ballot only when he or she has ‘actual 
knowledge of the voter’s ineligibility’ and not merely where an 
employee’s eligibility is ‘in dispute.’”  The Board further explained that 
a Board agent has such actual knowledge in two limited circumstances: 
“(1) where an employee’s name does not appear on the Excelsior list or 
(2) where the Board has made an affirmative ruling that a given 
employee or employee classification is ineligible to vote or is to vote 
under challenge.”  Here, because the eight new hires were included on 
the Excelsior list and the Board had not ruled on their eligibility, the 
Board agent was not required to challenge their ballots.  Further, because 
all parties were aware that the eight new hires were included on the 
Excelsior list and were in a position to challenge their ballots if they 
desired, the Board would not entertain a postelection challenge. 
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V 
Supreme Court Litigation 
During fiscal year 2004, the Supreme Court decided, on the 
merits, no cases involving the Board as a party.  The Board did not 
participate as amicus in any cases before the Court.  The Court denied 
five private party petitions for certiorari in Board cases, and granted 
none. 
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VI 
Unfair Labor Practices 
The Board is empowered under Section 10(c) of the Act to prevent 
any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in Sec. 8) 
affecting commerce.  In general, Section 8 prohibits an employer or a 
union or their agents from engaging in certain specified types of activity 
that Congress has designated as unfair labor practices.  The Board, 
however, may not act to prevent or remedy such activities until an unfair 
labor practice charge has been filed with it.  Such charges may be filed 
by an employer, an employee, a labor organization, or any other person 
irrespective of any interest he or she might have in the matter.  They are 
filed with the Regional Office of the Board in the area where the alleged 
unfair labor practice occurred. 
This chapter deals with decisions of the Board during fiscal year 2004 
that involved novel questions or set precedents that may be of substantial 
importance in the future administration of the Act. 
A.  Employer Interference with Employee Rights 
1.  No-Solicitation Rules 
In City Market, Inc.,1 the Board majority found that the respondent 
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when, during an organizing campaign, 
it promulgated a no-solicitation rule.  Although the rule was facially 
valid, the Board majority found that the respondent instituted it 
specifically in response to its employees’ union organizing activities.  
Further, the respondent failed to demonstrate that it promulgated the rule 
to maintain production and discipline. 
The respondent posted a “No-Solicitation Policy” and “Interoffice 
Memorandum” on an employee bulletin board in the store’s breakroom 
after the union had resumed an organizing campaign.  The store manager 
testified that the respondent posted the policy in response to two 
employees’ complaints of organizing efforts by union supporters.  There 
was no evidence that the solicitation attempts that preceded the posting 
involved unlawful or unprotected activity. 
The Board majority found that when a rule such as the one in this 
case has lain dormant for a substantial period of time, and is resurrected 
only in the context of the union campaign, there is a reasonable 
presumption of a nexus between these two events.  Once it is shown that 
                                                 
1 340 NLRB No. 151 (Chairman Battista and Member Walsh; Member Schaumber dissenting in 
part). 
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the rule was promulgated in the context of a union campaign, the burden 
of explanation lies with the employer to explain its timing.  The 
respondent’s explanation was that it received complaints from employees 
about the union organizing, but the Board majority agreed with the judge 
that those complaints concerned protected solicitations by fellow 
employees.  Accordingly, “since the reason for the resurrection of the 
policy was protected concerted activity, i.e. solicitation not shown to be 
unprotected, the resurrection of the policy was unlawful.” 
In dissent, Member Schaumber stated that the no-solicitation policy 
was lawful, expressly permitting, for example, solicitations during 
employee meals and breaktime, and therefore its posting prior to the 
second election was not, without more, unlawful.  Member Schaumber 
argued that the majority erred in relying solely on the timing of the 
respondent’s posting of the rule in finding a violation of Section 8(a)(1).  
Even assuming arguendo that the General Counsel established a prima 
facie case that promulgation of the “Solicitation Policy” was unlawful, 
Member Schaumber found that the respondent rebutted that prima facie 
case by establishing that its no-solicitation policy was implemented in 
response to legitimate employee complaints. “[S]ince the respondent has 
the right to establish rules to ensure production and maintain discipline, 
the promulgation of the no-solicitation policy was not unlawful.  And in 
these circumstances, the mere fact that the respondent promulgated the 
rule in the context of a union campaign cannot render the lawful 
promulgation unlawful.” 
2.  Other Employer Rules 
In Double Eagle Hotel & Casino,2 a unanimous panel of the Board 
found, among other things, that the respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) 
by maintaining a rule in its employee handbook entitled “Customer 
Service.”  Members Liebman and Walsh also found unlawful two other 
rules in the handbook entitled “Confidential Information” and 
“Communication.” 
The “Customer Service” rule provided, in part, that employees were 
“[n]ever [to] discuss Company issues, other employees, and personal 
problems to or around our guests.  Be aware that having a conversation 
in public areas with another employee will in all probability be 
overheard.”  The Board found that the reference to “Company issues” 
and “other employees” reasonably encompassed subjects such as wages 
and working conditions and that, by prohibiting the discussion of these 
legally protected subjects in “public areas,” the rule was unlawfully 
 
2 341 NLRB No. 17 (Members Liebman and Walsh; Chairman Battista concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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overbroad.  The Board explained that although the respondent, a 
gambling casino, had the right for business reasons to apply the rule to 
the “gambling area,” its extension of the rule to “public areas,” which 
necessarily included the casino parking lots and public restaurants and 
restrooms, rendered the rule unlawful. 
A Board majority additionally found that the Respondent’s 
“Confidential Information” and “Communication” rules were unlawful 
under the test set forth in Lafayette Park Hotel,3 which holds that where 
“rules are likely to have a chilling effect on Section 7 rights, the Board 
may conclude that their maintenance is an unfair labor practice, even 
absent evidence of enforcement.”  In finding that the “Confidential 
Information” rule was unlawful, the majority noted that the rule warned 
employees that they would be disciplined if they discussed confidential 
information, which was defined “to include wages and working 
conditions such as ‘disciplinary information, grievance/complaint 
information, performance evaluations, salary grade, types of pay 
increases and termination date of employees.’”  They concluded that the 
rule, “which on its face and on threat of discipline, expressly prohibits 
the discussion of wages and other terms and conditions of employment, 
plainly infringes upon Section 7 rights and violates Section 8(a)(1).”  The 
Board majority also found that the “Communication” rule was similarly 
unlawful because it “reference[d] the confidentiality rule” in prohibiting 
“communicat[ion of] any confidential or sensitive information 
concerning the Company or any of its employees to any non-employee” 
without respondent’s approval. 
Chairman Battista, in a partial dissent, agreed with the administrative 
law judge’s finding that both the “Confidential Information” and 
“Communication” rules were lawful.  The Chairman found that while 
rules that clearly proscribe Section 7 activity could, without evidence of 
their application, be found unlawful, neither rule was of that character.  
The Chairman further found that because there was no evidence that 
these rules were enforced unlawfully and because both rules, rather than 
being “aimed at Section 7 activity,” achieve a reasonable balance 
between Section 7 rights and the need for confidentiality, their mere 
maintenance did not violate the Act. 
In Co-Op City,4 a panel majority of the Board agreed with the 
administrative law judge that the respondent did not violate Section 
8(a)(1) by maintaining a rule that prohibited employees from 
 
3 326 NLRB 824 (1998). 
4 341 NLRB No. 34 (Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber; Member Walsh dissenting). 
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participating in the election of the members of the respondent’s board of 
directors. 
The respondent owned, maintained, and operated a cooperative 
housing development in the Bronx, New York, known as Co-Op City.  
The union represented the security officers and lobby guards employed 
by the respondent.  The election rule in issue prohibited employees from 
using their positions as employees to affect the outcome of the election 
of a member of the respondent’s board of directors. 
Iris Baez, who ran for the board in 1999, proposed creating a new 
position of lobby attendant.  The union believed that the proposal might 
lead to downsizing of the security department.  Joseph Pizzano, the union 
president and a security officer, distributed a two-page flyer in late April 
1999 that criticized Baez’s candidacy and her stand on the lobby 
attendant proposal.  Thereafter, Pizzano was discharged for violating the 
election rule.5
Citing Lutheran Social Service of Minnesota,6 the Board majority 
stated that employees do not have a general right under Section 7 to 
participate in the election of a company’s board of directors.  Therefore, 
the majority reasoned that the respondent’s rule on its face does “not 
reach or ‘chill’ protected activity.”  The majority recognized that in 
Board law there is an exception for employee protests over the selection 
of a supervisor or manager if the identity and capabilities of the 
supervisor have a direct impact on the employees’ job interests.7  
However, the majority found that the respondent’s board members do not 
have a direct impact on the employees’ terms and conditions of 
employment.  In addition, the potential effect on the security officers of 
hiring lobby attendants was at most indirect and speculative.  The 
majority found that the evidence “simply does not establish a direct link 
or nexus between the implementation of the lobby attendant program and 
the unit employees’ working conditions.”  The majority held that 
Pizzano’s activities aimed at defeating Baez in the election “were not 
protected, and the Rule as applied to him was not unlawful.” 
Dissenting, Member Walsh stated that the rule was overbroad and 
clearly directed at protected activity.  He emphasized that employees 
may protest the selection of a manager who will have a direct impact on 
their terms and conditions of employment.  Member Walsh asserted that 
the employees did not lose the right to express their views about the 
lobby attendant proposal simply because the issue arose during the 
election of the board of directors. 
 
5 The complaint did not challenge his discharge as an unfair labor practice. 
6 250 NLRB 35, 41 (1980). 
7 Dobbs Houses, 135 NLRB 885, 888 (1962), enf. denied 325 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1962). 
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3.  Soliciting Employees to Withdraw Support from the Union 
In Kentucky Fried Chicken,8 the Board concluded that the respondent 
unlawfully solicited employees to decertify the union through speeches 
delivered at its stores during negotiations for a new collective-bargaining 
agreement.  In the speeches, the respondent told employees that the 
parties were near agreement on a new contract, but that it was not certain 
whether the union still had the support of a majority of employees.  The 
respondent cited evidence of employee turnover and union inactivity, and 
noted that unrepresented employees were receiving a wage increase that 
was withheld from them because the union objected to it.  The 
respondent told employees that although it might not have enough 
evidence to establish a loss of majority, it had learned that many 
employees did not favor the union, and that it would be interviewing its 
managers to see if there was any more evidence because it could not 
question the employees.  Following these speeches, employees submitted 
statements to the respondent indicating disaffection from the union, and 
the respondent thereafter withdrew recognition. 
The Board concluded that the speeches unlawfully solicited 
employees to withdraw their support from the union.  The Board also 
concluded that the respondent’s subsequent withdrawal of recognition, 
on the basis of employee statements of disaffection submitted after the 
speeches, was unlawful because the speeches “tainted” the statements of 
disaffection and precluded the existence of a “good faith uncertainty” 
concerning the union’s continued majority status.9
Members Liebman and Walsh found that the speeches also 
unlawfully implied that the union was not necessary for employees to 
receive a wage increase and that the union was to blame because 
employees did not receive a wage increase.  Member Schaumber, 
dissenting in part, noted that the complaint alleged only that the speeches 
unlawfully solicited employee disaffection from the union, and found 
“no need to parse the speeches” to identify additional ways in which they 
could be found to violate the Act. 
4.  Protected Employee Activities 
In Winston-Salem Journal,10 the Board reversed the administrative 
law judge and found that the employer violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act 
by threatening employee John Mankins with discipline and Section 
8(a)(3) by suspending him.  Members Liebman and Walsh further found 
 
8 341 NLRB No. 13 (Members Liebman and Walsh; Member Schaumber dissenting in part and 
concurring in part). 
9 The Board applied the “good faith uncertainty” standard because the case arose prior to the Board’s 
decision in Levitz, 333 NLRB 717 (2001). 
10 341 NLRB No. 18 (Members Liebman and Walsh; Chairman Battista dissenting in part). 
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that the employer unlawfully discharged Mankins.  Contrary to the judge, 
the Board found that the employer threatened, suspended, and discharged 
Mankins not because he was insubordinate, but rather because he had 
engaged in the protected activity of complaining about the treatment of 
employees by a supervisor, and that his conduct had not lost the 
protection of the Act. 
Specifically, the Board found that the employer unlawfully 
threatened Mankins when, in the process of complaining at a crew 
meeting that his supervisor, Leonard, was treating the employees 
unfairly, Mankins loudly called Leonard a racist.  Citing Churchill’s 
Restaurant,11 the Board first found that Mankins’ complaint at the crew 
meeting was protected activity.  The Board next applied the Atlantic 
Steel12 factors (place of the discussion, subject matter of discussion, 
nature of the conduct, and provocation by unfair labor practices) and 
determined that Mankins’ conduct was not so opprobrious as to lose the 
protection of the Act.  Consequently, the Board found that the employer 
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when Leonard threatened Mankins 
with discipline for Mankins’ conduct at the crew meeting. 
Following Leonard’s threat, Mankins again called him a racist.  In 
response, Leonard suspended Mankins.  The Board found that Mankins’ 
remark was again protected, and, applying the Atlantic Steel factors, 
concluded that Mankins’ second outburst had not lost the Act’s 
protection.  Thus, the suspension violated Section 8(a)(3). 
Finally, as Mankins exited the plant to serve his suspension, he 
walked through a room called the quiet room where he saw Leonard and 
called him a “bastard red-neck son-of-a-bitch.”  Based on this conduct, 
the employer discharged Mankins 5 days later, for “serious 
insubordination.”  The majority found that Mankins’ comments were a 
continuation of his protest against Leonard’s alleged unfair treatment, 
were uttered as he was leaving the facility by the most direct route, 
and—while inflammatory—were not so opprobrious as to cost him the 
protection of the Act. 
Chairman Battista dissented on the issue of Mankins’ discharge.  
Applying the Atlantic Steel factors, Chairman Battista agreed with the 
majority that the location of the outburst favored Mankins losing the 
Act’s protections.  Nor, the Chairman stated, was it merely a 
continuation of the earlier exchange with Leonard.  Rather, the Chairman 
found it physically and temporally removed.  In addition, the Chairman 
found that the unfair labor practices that provoked Mankins’ offensive 
 
11 276 NLRB 775, 777 fn. 11 (1985). 
12 245 NLRB 814 (1979). 
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remarks “were not so egregious to provoke the outrageous outburst that 
occurred.”  The Chairman concluded that Mankins’ outburst was highly 
offensive and insubordinate, and was therefore not protected. 
In Waters of Orchard Park,13 the Board majority held that two 
nursing home employees were not engaged in protected activity under 
the Act when they called the New York State Department of Health 
Patient Care Hotline to report excessive heat in the respondent’s nursing 
home. 
There was particularly hot weather in Buffalo, New York, in June 
and July of 2002, and the older portions of the respondent’s nursing 
home did not have central air conditioning. To deal with the heat, the 
respondent began furnishing bottled spring water for the staff, and, on 
July 1, the respondent installed two freestanding air conditioners in the 
unit of the nursing home involved in this case.  On July 1 and 3, two 
patients were sent to the hospital.  Both showed symptoms of 
dehydration.  When Kathleen Reed, a certified nursing assistant, arrived 
at work at 2 p.m. on July 4, two more patients had been sent to the 
hospital.  Reed observed that the patients were refusing to eat and drink, 
were unresponsive, and were taking off their clothes.  When Carol 
Gunnersen, a licensed practical nurse, arrived at 3:30 p.m., she also 
noticed that patients were lethargic and were taking their clothes off.  
There was no bottled water available for the staff on that day, since it 
was locked in the nursing director’s office during her holiday absence. 
Later that afternoon, Gunnersen dialed the phone number for the New 
York State Department of Health Patient Care Hotline and tossed the 
phone to Reed.  Reed stated that there was no water for staff members, 
that several residents were dehydrated, and that she was very hot and 
wanted them to come look into the conditions.  Reed did not identify 
herself truthfully, but said that she was a relative of a resident.  The 
respondent learned of the call the next morning and began an 
investigation.  When Reed was questioned about the call to the hotline, 
she initially claimed that she had no knowledge of the call.  She later 
admitted that she had made the call.  Reed was suspended pending 
further investigation and was asked to leave the premises.  She was 
discharged on July 11.  Gunnersen was suspended on July 6.  She never 
returned to work. 
Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber agreed with the judge 
that Reed and Gunnersen were engaged in concerted activity.  However, 
contrary to the judge, they found that their activity was not protected 
 
13 341 NLRB No. 93 (Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber; Member Meisburg concurring; 
Members Liebman and Walsh dissenting). 
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under the Act because it did not relate to a term or condition of their 
employment.  The majority explained: 
 
Reed and Gunnersen explicitly disclaimed an interest in their 
own working conditions when they called the hotline.  Reed 
called the hotline to express their concern about patients, as 
distinguished from an effort to improve their lot as employees.  
Indeed, Reed went out of her way, to the point of lying, to tell 
the authorities that she was a relative of a resident.  If Reed 
wanted to complain about employee conditions, she need only to 
have truthfully identified herself as an employee.  In addition, it 
is significant that the hotline that she called was the “Patient 
Care Hotline.” 
 
The majority relied on precedent holding that employee concerns for the 
“quality of care” and the “welfare” of their patients are not interests 
encompassed by Section 7’s mutual aid or protection clause. 
     Member Meisburg concurred with the majority’s determination that 
the employees’ discipline did not violate the Act.  He wrote: 
 
     It is undoubtedly a good thing that the employees in this case 
complied with the State law requiring them to report the conditions 
they found.  It is even more of a good thing when the State law at 
issue protects an interest as important as patient care.  But the 
National Labor Relations Act is not a general whistleblowers’ 
statute.  Absent an intent to improve wages, hours, or working 
conditions, concerted action of the type in this case cannot be 
deemed “mutual aid or protection.”  Because the employees here 
testified that their sole motive was to act in the interest of their 
patients, we cannot find that their conduct was protected by the 
Act. 
  
     In dissent, Members Liebman and Walsh found that Reed and 
Gunnersen’s concerns over patient care necessarily involved their 
working conditions and that Board law supports this conclusion.  They 
pointed out that the respondent posted a State notice that required the 
nursing home employees “to report any instance of patient physical 
abuse, mistreatment or neglect” to the State health department.  They 
agreed with the judge that this requirement was an important part of the 
employees’ working conditions in caring for the patients.  They also 
noted that the severity of the heat directly affected the manner in which 
the nursing home employees carried out their resident-care duties. 
Members Liebman and Walsh also expressed their view that in the health 
care field, it is illogical to separate patient care from working conditions. 
They stated: 
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     Contrary to the majority, we do not believe that the 
intertwining of patient care with the working conditions of those 
in the healthcare field impermissibly expands the scope of 
Section 7.  Taking care of the patients here is the work of Reed 
and Gunnersen.  If they cannot protect their patients from the 
effects of excessive heat, they cannot fully perform their work.  
The link between their call to the hotline and their interests as 
employees is, therefore, direct and in no way attenuated. 
 
     In Pathmark Stores, Inc.,14 the Board held that the respondent did not 
violate the Act when it prohibited bargaining-unit employees from 
wearing “Don’t Cheat About the Meat!” T-shirts and hats during their 
working time in customer areas of the respondent’s grocery stores. 
     The case arose when the union learned that the respondent was 
stocking the meat departments in its stores with case-ready, i.e., 
“prepackaged” meat.  Historically, the unit employees had cut all meat in 
the stores.  The sale of prepackaged meat reduced the unit employees’ 
working hours.  In response, the union distributed handbills that 
accurately identified meats the union knew had been prepackaged, and 
encouraged consumers to ask unit employees which meats they had cut 
fresh.  The union emphasized the latter question because the prepackaged 
meat was not labeled in any way to distinguish it from fresh-cut meat. 
     The union also distributed to employees T-shirts bearing the message 
“Local 342-50 says: Don’t Cheat About the Meat!” and hats bearing the 
slogan “Don’t Cheat About the Meat!”  The union asserted that the 
respondent was cheating its customers by allowing them to observe unit 
employees cutting meat products, thereby creating the impression that all 
the respondent’s meat was cut fresh, and then selling prepackaged meat 
that was not labeled as such.  The nature of the union’s dispute with the 
respondent was well publicized in major media in New York City. 
     Subsequently, unit employees arrived at work wearing the slogan-
bearing T-shirts and hats.  Although the respondent had no policy on 
uniforms and had permitted employees to wear other union insignia, the 
respondent threatened to suspend the employees if they did not remove 
these particular T-shirts and hats before starting work.  The respondent 
asserted that the “Don’t Cheat About the Meat!” slogan depicted it as 
dishonest and could damage its relationship with its customers, by 
encouraging customers to think—aside from the union’s criticisms of the 
sale of prepackaged meat—that the respondent was somehow cheating 
them in connection with its meat products.  The employees refused to 
 
14 342 NLRB No. 31 (Chairman Battista and Members Liebman and Schaumber). 
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remove the T-shirts and hats prior to commencing work, and were 
suspended. 
     The Board assumed for purposes of the case that the employees’ 
activity was protected, but nevertheless concluded that the respondent 
did not violate the Act.  The Board found, under Republic Aviation Corp. 
v. NLRB,15 that the respondent established, as an affirmative defense, 
special circumstances justifying its decision to prohibit the employees 
from wearing the “Don’t Cheat About the Meat!” T-shirts and hats 
during their working time in customer areas of the grocery stores. 
     The Board reasoned that the union’s slogan was ambiguous and that it 
was reasonable for the respondent to expect that the slogan likely could 
lead the respondent’s customers to believe that, aside from the issue of 
prepackaging, the respondent was cheating them in some way with 
respect to the meat offered for sale.  The Board acknowledged the 
General Counsel’s contention that, in the context of the union’s publicity 
campaign, customers might have understood the “Don’t Cheat About the 
Meat!” slogan as simply referring to the dispute with the union over the 
sale of prepackaged meat.  However, in striking a balance between the 
parties’ competing interests, the Board found that the respondent’s 
concerns were appropriately gauged on the basis of its reasonable 
construction of the ambiguous slogan. 
     For these reasons, the Board dismissed the complaint. 
     The issue presented in Exxon Mobil Corp.,16 was whether the 
respondent unlawfully terminated Chief Steward Nick Slusher because of 
his involvement in allegedly protected grievance-related conduct.  A 
Board majority found, contrary to the judge, that Slusher was not in fact 
engaged in protected grievance activity, but instead was engaged in 
unprotected harassment of a fellow employee because of that employees’ 
dissident union activities.  The majority therefore found that the 
respondent lawfully terminated Slusher for his unprotected conduct. 
     The facts showed that, on February 26, 2003, unit member Dan 
Breneisen filed a decertification petition with the Board.  Five days prior 
to the April 11, 2003 scheduled election date, Slusher showed a court 
abstract to fellow employees and supervisors allegedly showing that 
Breneisen had been charged with driving-under-the-influence.  Breneisen 
filed a complaint with the respondent alleging that Slusher harassed him 
by “tak[ing] personal and confidential records about me and [passing] 
out photocopies to my fellow-co-workers.”  The respondent informed 
 
15 324 U.S. 793 (1945). 
16 343 NLRB No. 44 (Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber; Member Walsh dissenting). 
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Slusher that it had received another harassment complaint against him 
which it would investigate after the election. 
     On the date of the election, but before the ballots were tallied, Slusher 
filed a grievance alleging disparate treatment under the respondent’s 
drug policy.  The union was decertified in the election.  After the 
election, Slusher claimed that he had distributed the court abstract in 
support of his grievance. 
     The majority rejected Slusher’s contention, finding that his grievance 
filing was an after-the-fact attempt to cloak his unprotected harassment 
of Breneisen for filing the decertification petition.  They noted that 
Slusher had learned of Breneisen’s alleged conduct months earlier, but 
had taken no action.  “Thus, the timing of Slusher’s discovery of the DUI 
incident and the distribution of the court abstract, as compared to this 
subsequent grievance filing, shows that Slusher’s object in circulating the 
DUI record was to harass Breneisen, who he knew was subject to 
discharge under the respondent’s strict drug policy” if it was determined 
that Breneisen had failed to report the incident.  Further, the grievance 
was filed only after Slusher learned that the respondent would investigate 
Breneisen’s claim that Slusher had harassed him.  Finally, the employee 
who, in his grievance, Slusher claimed was treated disparately from 
Breneisen had already been discharged for too long a period for a timely 
grievance to be filed.  In these circumstances, the majority found that 
Slusher, an experienced union official, who was punctilious in enforcing 
the contract, filed his grievance in “an attempt to cloak Slusher’s earlier 
harassment of Breneisen with protected status.”  The majority cautioned 
that “[w]hile Section 7 shields employees from potential employer 
discipline or other adverse action in the exercise of Section 7 rights, it 
does not permit employees to use grievances as a sword to gain 
immunity from the consequences of harassment.” 
     Member Walsh dissented, emphasizing the long-held rule that 
grievance-related activity conducted prior to the actual grievance filing is 
protected, concerted activity.  Member Walsh explained that, applying 
that rule in this case, Steward Slusher’s showing of the court abstract to 
demonstrate the basis for filing his subsequent grievance was protected, 
concerted activity.  Member Walsh observed that the judge credited 
Slusher’s testimony that he showed fellow employees the court abstract 
in support of his belief that a grievance should be filed, and that the 
“protected status of a steward discussing and advocating the potential 
filing of a grievance with unit members is incontrovertible.”  Member 
Walsh declared that the “majority’s depiction of steward Slusher’s 
protected grievance activity as unprotected harassment of Breneisen is 
simply unfounded,” explaining that Breneisen had no confidentiality 
Sixty-Ninth Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board 84 
 
                                                
interest in the court abstract (a public document), and in any event that 
the fact that the respondent or even Breneisen felt that Slusher was 
engaged in harassment did not render the grievance-related activity 
unprotected.  Member Walsh thus concluded that Slusher was clearly 
engaged in protected, grievance-related activity; that his discharge for 
such activity was unlawful; and that he engaged in neither harassment 
not extreme behavior causing him to lose the protection of the Act. 
5.  Access to Employer Property 
     In ITT Industries, Inc.,17 a Board majority affirmed an earlier 
decision,18 on remand from the D.C. Circuit,19 that the respondent 
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by denying access to offsite 
employees to handbill in its parking lot. 
     On two occasions, employees from one of the respondent’s plants 
handbilled in support of the union in the parking lot of another of the 
respondent’s plants, asking employees to sign an organizing petition.  
The respondent’s superintendent each time told the handbillers to leave.  
The respondent asserted security concerns for ejecting the handbillers, 
citing various incidents where security was violated over the past few 
years. 
     In its original decision, the Board adopted without comment, the 
judge’s finding that the respondent had violated Section 8(a)(1).  The 
judge applied the standard set forth in Tri-County Medical Center,20 that 
prohibits an employer from denying off-duty employees entry to non-
working areas to handbill except where justified by business reasons.  
The judge had found the evidence of interference with vehicles in the 
parking “woefully inadequate” to warrant banning the handbillers from 
the parking lot. 
     The D.C. Circuit found “that it is no means obvious that Section 7 
extends non-derivative access rights to off-site employees . . . [and] the 
Board was obligated to engage in considered analysis and explain its 
chosen interpretation.”21
     On remand from the D.C. Circuit, the majority applied Hillhaven 
Highland House,22 and found that the offsite employees had a 
nonderivative right of access.  The majority further found that since the 
offsite employees were seeking to organize the onsite employees in a 
single, 3-plant unit that included their own plant, the common concerns 
 
17 341 NLRB No. 118 (Members Liebman and Walsh; Chairman Battista dissenting). 
18 331 NLRB 4 (2000). 
19 ITT Industries v. NLRB, 251 F.3d 995 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
20 222 NLRB 1089 (1976). 
21 ITT Industries v. NLRB, supra at 1004. 
22 336 NLRB 646 (2001), enfd. 344 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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shared by the respondent’s onsite and offsite employees were even 
greater than those that existed in Hillhaven.23
     The majority further found that the respondent’s security concerns, 
although legitimate, did not justify the total exclusion of the 
Respondent’s offsite employees from its parking lot.  Thus, they noted, 
“it is easier for an employer to regulate the conduct of an employee . . . 
than it is . . . to control a complete stranger’s infringement on its property 
interests.” 
     Weighing the “substantial” Section 7 organizational rights of the 
respondent’s offsite employees against the respondent’s security 
concerns, the majority found that the respondent had not met its burden, 
under Hillhaven, of demonstrating that its security needs warranted the 
absolute prohibition of handbilling on its property by offsite employees. 
     Chairman Battista, in dissent, found that the various security 
violations that had occurred on the respondent’s property, including a 
person who entered the property to physically confront an employee and 
a threat to shoot an employee, “clearly demonstrate substantial security 
concerns, and a need to limit access to those who work at the facility.”  
He emphasized that the respondent’s longstanding security policy “was 
developed solely in response to its security concerns” and that the 
security measures undertaken by the respondent “bore no relation to any 
protected concerted activity.”  He distinguished Hillhaven Highland 
House, supra, as not involving “actual events of vandalism and threats of 
physical harm.”  Chairman Battista concluded, “[i]n balancing Section 7 
rights against security measures, I strike the balance here in favor of the 
latter.” 
     In St. Luke’s Memorial Hospital,24 the Board considered whether the 
respondent violated the Act by discriminatorily enforcing its no-
solicitation/no-distribution and 2-day notice policies against the union.  
The administrative law judge had found that the respondent violated 
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by discriminatorily applying both policies.  
The Board found merit in the respondent’s exceptions to the judge’s 
decision, finding that the General Counsel failed to demonstrate that such 
rules were applied in a discriminatory manner.  Accordingly, the 
complaint was dismissed. 
     The facts of the case arose when, in July 2000, the respondent 
acquired the formerly state-run Jose A. Gandara Hospital, renaming it St. 
Luke’s Memorial Hospital (“St. Luke’s II”).  The respondent also owned 
another nearby hospital (“St. Luke’s I”) and transferred from it a group 
 
23 Id. at 649. 
24 342 NLRB No. 106 (Chairman Battista and Members Liebman and Walsh). 
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of union-represented employees to the new facility at St. Luke’s II.  
Although the respondent’s facility at St. Luke’s II was not unionized, the 
respondent agreed to apply the terms of the collective-bargaining 
agreement to those transferred employees.  The collective-bargaining 
agreement contained provisions entitling union representatives to visit 
the hospital’s premises to ensure compliance with the agreement, 
“provided they notify the corresponding Hospital representative in 
advance about their visit.”25
     In correspondence with the union in October 2000, the respondent 
advised the union of its no-solicitation/no-distribution policies and its 
requirement that the union give 2-days’ advance notice before visiting 
with their represented employees.  For 1-1/2 years following the 
correspondence, union representatives frequently visited the transferred 
represented employees at the respondent’s facility, giving advance notice 
of only a few hours each time. 
     In early April 2002, the union’s representative, Ingrid Vega, called the 
respondent to announce her intent to visit that day.  Vega and another 
union official sat in the respondent’s cafeteria distributing copies of the 
collective-bargaining agreement and talking to employees for 1–2 hours.  
The respondent asked the union representatives to leave, asserting that 
they had failed to give adequate notice of their intent to visit. 
     In its complaint and at trial, the General Counsel alleged that the 
respondent’s ejection of the two union representatives in April 2002 
under its no-solicitation/no-distribution rule and prior notice policy was 
unlawful.  More specifically, the General Counsel alleged that the 
respondent applied the rule “selectively and disparately by denying 
access to union representatives to the respondent’s cafeteria and 
prohibiting union solicitations and distributions, while permitting 
nonunion solicitations and distributions.”26  The judge agreed with the 
General Counsel, finding that the respondent discriminatorily applied 
both policies by permitting solicitation and distribution by other parties 
(without prior notice), while not allowing the union to do so. 
     The Board disagreed with the judge’s finding that the respondent 
violated Section 8(a)(1) by evicting the union representatives from the 
cafeteria. The Board noted that the General Counsel had failed to 
demonstrate that the respondent treated nonunion solicitations differently 
from union solicitations.  More specifically, the Board found that the 
respondent’s permitting regional newspapers to be placed in the cafeteria 
was not “sufficiently analogous” to the union’s actions, because “these 
 
25 342 NLRB No. 106, slip op. at 1. 
26 Slip op. at 2. 
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newspapers were not provided for the purpose of engendering any reply 
or other action on the patrons’ part.”27
     Likewise, the Board found that the union had failed to establish that 
the Respondent’s tolerance of a single instance of an employee 
solicitation for personal business was sufficient to show discriminatory 
treatment.  In the absence of evidence demonstrating that the respondent 
“knew, or was likely to have known, of the employee’s solicitation, this 
single isolated incident fails to demonstrate the respondent’s tolerance of 
such conduct.” 
     As to the 2-day prior notification rule, the Board also found no 
evidence of discrimination, as there was “no evidence that the [2-day 
notification] request applied only to the union and not to other 
organizations.”28  Moreover, there was no evidence that any other 
organizations were permitted, or even attempted, to enter onto the 
hospital’s property without advance notice. 
     In a footnote, Members Liebman and Walsh stated that the “record 
evidence suggests that the respondent unlawfully interfered with the 
employees’ right of access to their elected union representatives, as 
established by past practice, and/or unilaterally changed the parties’ 
agreement and practice regarding notification and access.”29  However, 
the General Counsel did not litigate this theory. 
6.  Unlawful Employer Threats 
In Gold Kist, Inc.,30 the Board found that the respondent violated 
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by threatening loss of benefits and the 
inevitability of strikes and strike violence if employees selected the union 
as their collective-bargaining representative.  After the union filed a 
petition seeking to represent some 900 employees at the respondent’s 
Douglas, Georgia, poultry processing plant, the respondent held a series 
of meetings with the employees.  In the meetings, Crawford, the 
respondent’s labor relations manager, told employees that the union 
thrived on hostility, strikes were its only weapon to win the respondent’s 
agreement to the union’s proposals, and a strike was likely to be violent.  
A video shown in meetings during the week before the election depicted 
violence that had occurred during a strike 11 years earlier at another of 
the respondent’s plants, including a picture of a bullet hole in a car 
accompanied by the sound of a gunshot.  Crawford pointed out 
employees in the video throwing rocks at a bus and trying to cut its tires.  
After the video, Crawford presented slides that showed a car with a 
 
27 Slip op. at 3. 
28 Slip op. at 3. 
29 Slip op. at 3 fn. 8. 
30 341 NLRB No. 135 (Members Liebman, Schaumber, and Walsh). 
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bullet hole, a bus with shattered windows, and a man with a bandaged 
neck.  Another slide urged employees to make sure that a strike would 
not happen there by voting “no union.”  The respondent also put up 
posters in its plant showing scenes of violence from the slides.  Written 
on the posters were descriptions of the violence and the slogan “vote no 
violent strikes, vote no union!”  Other posters stated that, in return for 
striking at five other plants, employees had gotten “lost paychecks, 
violence (acid in cars, windshields shattered, cars shot into, woman shot), 
[and] some employees lost their jobs.”  At the bottom of the posters was 
the message “Don’t let it happen here.  Vote no union!” 
     The Board found that the respondent, through its statements, video, 
slides, and posters, created a reasonable impression in the minds of its 
employees that, if they chose the union, a strike was inevitable and was 
likely to be violent.  The Board found that the respondent was not 
attempting to influence the employees by reasoned argument, but rather 
was aggressively appealing to the employees’ fear of a strike and 
violence.  By doing so, the Board found, the respondent interfered with, 
restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of their Section 7 
rights and, therefore, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 
     The Board also found that the respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by 
soliciting grievances and promising to remedy them, threatening to 
withdraw an existing condition of employment if the employees selected 
the union to represent them, more closely monitoring prounion 
employees and restricting their movement, and threatening that other 
employers would refuse to hire employees because of their union 
activities.  Additionally, the Board found that the respondent violated 
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by depriving employee Preston of 
overtime work. The Board sustained the objections that paralleled the 
unfair labor practices and set aside the election, which the union had lost 
by a vote of 345 to 523. 
     In Kelly Brothers Sheet Metal, Inc.,31 the Board majority held that the 
respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when it told employees 
during a union organizing campaign that it could afford to keep them 
working right now, but if they went union, it could not keep them 
working because there were not that many union jobs around. 
     The respondent installs HVAC systems in new and renovated 
buildings.  In March 2002, it began work on a hospital construction 
project.  In late November or early December, employees were told to 
leave the hospital and go back to the shop and clock out.  Bobby Kelly, 
the respondent’s project manager, told employees that they were going to 
 
31 342 NLRB No. 9 (Members Schaumber and Walsh; Chairman Battista dissenting in part). 
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have a meeting about the union, but that they should go across the street 
to the graveyard since he would have to give the union equal time if he 
spoke to them on company property.  Kelly then told the group of 50 to 
60 employees that “he could afford to keep us working year-round right 
now, but if we went union, he couldn’t keep us working because there 
wasn’t [sic] that many union jobs around.  There weren’t any union 
contractors around.” 
     The Board majority affirmed the administrative law judge’s finding 
that the respondent unlawfully threatened employees with the loss of job 
opportunities if they selected the union as their bargaining representative.  
The majority stated that, pursuant to NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,32 “an 
employer may ‘make a prediction as to the precise effects he believes 
unionization will have on his company.  In such a case, however, the 
prediction must be carefully phrased on the basis of objective fact to 
convey an employer’s belief as to demonstrably probable consequences 
beyond his control . . . .’”  In this case, the majority found that “the 
Respondent furnished no objective basis for claiming that unionization 
would adversely affect its operations” and “produced no evidence 
whatsoever as to the number of nonunion or unionized contractors in the 
area or that it would be unable to operate as a unionized company.”  The 
majority concluded that employees would reasonably interpret Kelly’s 
statement “as an unlawful threat of job loss because the Respondent did 
not, as Gissel Packing requires, phrase its prediction on the basis of 
objective facts to convey its belief as to ‘demonstrably probable 
consequences beyond his control.’” 
     Chairman Battista, dissenting on this issue, found “Kelly’s stated 
doubt about the continuing viability of the company ‘because there 
[weren’t] that many union jobs around’ to be a lawful expression of his 
opinion about the possible effect of unionization.”  Chairman Battista 
pointed out that it is not unusual in the construction industry for unions 
to insist upon and obtain clauses that require the signatory to work only 
on union jobs.  He continued: “The employer here was simply making 
the prediction that, under such a clause, work would dry up because there 
were not that many union jobs available.”  Thus, Chairman Battista 
concluded, “the Respondent was making an economic prediction, not an 
unlawful threat to retaliate.” 
     In Miller Industries Towing Equipment,33 a panel majority reversed 
the judge and held that pre-election statements by two high-ranking 
 
32 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969). 
33 342 NLRB No. 112 (Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber; Member Liebman dissenting in 
part). 
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members of management did not unlawfully threaten employees that 
unionization would result in layoffs.   
     A few days before a representation election, respondent’s general 
manager, Baker, met with a group of about 20 employees.  According to 
one employee, Baker said that there “might be a possibility of a layoff, if 
the Union came in, and they really couldn’t afford it.”  The panel 
majority found “these general references to ‘possibilities’ are inadequate 
to establish” a threat because they “do not detail how or why the Union 
would force the Respondent to lay off employees, but do clearly indicate 
that these possibilities would be based on the respondent having no 
alternative” to a layoff.  The majority compared Baker’s statement to 
another that was alleged unlawful but dismissed by the judge, and found 
it equally vague and too abbreviated to constitute a threat. 
     On the day before the election, respondent’s chief executive officer 
(Badgley) held a meeting with the entire work force.  He described how, 
despite declining sales figures and financial losses over the past 2 years, 
respondent avoided layoffs by moving work that had been done by 
outside sources into the facility.  He noted that two of respondent’s 
unionized former competitors had gone bankrupt and that its current 
competitors were nonunion.  He said that others in the industry might use 
the prospect of respondent’s unionization to gain a competitive edge and 
that the possibility of a strike could lead to business interruptions and 
harm its relationship with customers. 
     The majority disagreed with the judge’s finding that Badgley equated 
unionization with dire consequences, finding instead that some of the 
statements were based on “demonstrable facts and verifiable accounts of 
past events,” and others were “limited to Badgley’s views about the 
possible impact of the Union in dealing with a less-than-vigorous 
industry climate.”  Distinguishing Ipilli, Inc.34 and Crown Cork & Seal 
Co.,35 the majority stated that Badgley did not predict unavoidable 
consequences, but merely offered his perspective on the effect of 
unionization on respondent’s business condition. 
     Member Liebman, in dissent, agreed with the judge that these 
comments from two of respondent’s highest-ranking officials should be 
considered together, as they reflected respondent’s singular purpose of 
creating “fear and uncertainty about the effect of unionization on job 
security.”  The statements were made within days of each other, just 
before the election, and dealt with a matter of great importance to 
employees.  Badgley’s reminder about respondent’s decision to avoid 
 
34 321 NLRB 445 (1996). 
35 308 NLRB 445 (1992). 
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layoffs by bringing work in-house implicitly suggested that respondent 
could decide differently in the future, particularly if employees rejected 
his request that they work together and forego union representation.  
Describing the majority’s view as failing to apply the appropriate test for 
coercion, that is, how the standards would be perceived by a reasonable 
employee, Member Liebman cited NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.:36  “[T]he 
Board must be alert to pick up intended implications of the [employer] 
that might be more readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear.” 
7.  Waiver of Employee Rights 
     In Engelhard Corp.,37 the Board majority adopted the judge’s finding 
that the respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by suspending 38 
employees because they picketed its shareholders’ meeting at a location 
70 miles from the plant.  The majority concluded that the picketing did 
not contravene the no-strike/no-lockout clause in the parties’ collective-
bargaining agreement because well-established principles of Board law 
require that waivers of statutory rights, such as the right to picket, must 
be “clear and unmistakable.”38  Applying these principles to the 
interpretation of the specific contractual language at issue in the case, the 
panel majority concluded that the no-strike clause did not apply to the 
picketing in question because the clause clearly stated that the parties’ 
intent was to “prevent any suspension of work due to labor disputes.”  
Because the picketing was at a location remote from the plant, the Board 
majority found that it reasonably could not be expected to, and in fact did 
not cause a suspension of work.  Accordingly, the majority found that the 
no-strike clause did not apply. 
     Dissenting, Member Schaumber found that the parties’ no-strike/no-
lockout pledge established a clear and unmistakable waiver of the right 
to picket the shareholders’ meeting, because in it the union agreed “that 
it will not call, participate in, or sanction, during the term of this 
Agreement, any strike, boycott, picketing, work-stoppage or slow-down 
whatsoever.”  Construing the clause by its literal terms to apply to the 
picketing in question fulfilled the intent of the parties, in Member 
Schaumber’s view, because it would aid in the prevention of suspensions 
of work.  In addition, Member Schaumber found that the no-strike clause 
imposed obligations on the employer that went beyond those necessary 
to prevent suspensions of work, and that a broader reading of the union’s 
pledge was therefore required as well. 
 
36 395 U.S. 575 at 617. 
37 342 NLRB No. 5 (Members Liebman and Walsh; Member Schaumber dissenting). 
38 Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 709 (1983). 
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8.  Seeking Police Assistance in Response to Picketing 
     In Nations Rent, Inc.,39 the Board majority found 1) that the General 
Counsel did not carry his burden of showing that the respondent 
discharged employee Jerry Bickel; and 2) that the respondent did not 
instigate police interference with lawful picketing in violation of Section 
8(a)(1) of the Act.  Member Walsh dissented with respect to both of 
those findings. 
     On May 19, 2001, Bickel verbally informed Manager Dan Olinger 
that he was going on strike to protest the respondent’s unfair labor 
practices.40   Bickel simultaneously handed Olinger a letter stating that 
the strike was “in protest of the [Respondent’s] unfair labor practices” 
and that Bickel looked forward to returning to work once the “dispute” 
was resolved.41  After handing the letter to Olinger, Bickel said, “I’m 
gone.”42  He then shook hands with another manager who was present 
and told him it had been nice working with him.  Later the same day, 
Olinger drafted and mailed a letter to Bickel, accepting Bickel’s “letter of 
resignation” and requesting that Bickel return any company property in 
his possession.43  Bickel received this letter the following week and 
responded with a letter dated June 4, 2001, clarifying that he had not 
resigned, but was on an unfair labor practice strike.  The respondent did 
nothing in response to Bickel’s June 4 letter. 
     In evaluating the General Counsel’s allegation that the respondent 
discharged Bickel by its actions in the spring of 2001, the Board majority 
considered “the entire course of relevant events following Bickel’s 
declaration of an unfair labor practice strike, and not merely the 
respondent’s May 19 letter” accepting Bickel’s resignation.44  Citing 
North American Dismantling Corp.,45 the majority reasoned that a 
discharge would be shown if this course of events would logically lead a 
prudent person in Bickel’s position to believe his tenure had been 
terminated.  Here, however, the majority found no basis for Bickel to 
form such a belief.  After receiving Bickel’s June 4 letter, the respondent 
did not quarrel with Bickel’s “last word” that he had not resigned.46  Nor 
did the respondent otherwise indicate to Bickel that his employment with 
the respondent had ended, such as by reiterating its request that he return 
 
39 342 NLRB No. 19 (Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber; Member Walsh dissenting). 
40 The respondent does not dispute that Bickel had been engaged in union organizing activities and 
that some of the measures the respondent took to counteract those activities violated the Act. 
41 Id., slip op. at 1. 
42 Id.  
43 Id. 
44 Id., slip op. at 2. 
45 331 NLRB 1557 (2000), enfd. in relevant part and remanded 35 Fed.Appx. 132 (6th Cir. 2002). 
46 Nations Rent, supra, 342 NLRB No. 19, slip op. at 2. 
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company property or by mailing him a final paycheck.  Thus, the 
majority found that the General Counsel failed to show that Bickel had 
been discharged. 
     In dissent, Member Walsh concluded, based on the entire course of 
events relied on by the majority as well as the respondent’s prior 
unlawful actions against Bickel, that Bickel would have reasonably 
believed himself discharged by the Respondent’s actions in the spring of 
2001. 
     On May 23, 2001, as representatives of the union picketed in a public 
easement area outside the respondent’s property, the respondent moved 
several pieces of heavy equipment into the easement.  Thereafter, one of 
the pickets moved his car from the easement onto the respondent’s 
property.  Observing this car on the respondent’s property, Manager 
Olinger contacted local police and asked that an officer be sent to the 
respondent’s facility.  When a police officer arrived in response to 
Olinger’s call, Olinger told him that one of the pickets’ cars had been 
parked on the respondent’s property and that the car had been moved 
shortly after Olinger called the police.  Olinger said he suspected that the 
pickets had a police scanner, which enabled them to remove the car from 
the respondent’s property before police arrived.  Olinger also said the 
pickets were following employees home at night.  Olinger concluded by 
asking the police officer to “look into that or ask [the pickets] about 
that.”47  Acting on Olinger’s concerns, the police officer spoke to the 
pickets and warned them that each of Olinger’s allegations, if true, could 
justify their arrest under state law.  The pickets denied having a police 
scanner and denied following employees home at night, admitting only 
that they had followed employees to other jobsites.  The pickets further 
stated that they trespassed onto the respondent’s property only briefly, in 
order to accommodate the movement of the respondent’s equipment. 
     Citing Great American,48 the Board majority stated that “an employer 
may seek to have police take action against pickets where the employer 
is motivated by some reasonable concern, such as public safety or 
interference with legally protected interests.”49  Here, according to the 
majority, the respondent acted on its reasonable concerns that the pickets 
were trespassing, using a police scanner, and stalking employees after 
work.  Under these circumstances, the majority concluded that the 
Respondent’s involvement of police in speaking to the pickets did not 
violate Section 8(a)(1). 
 
47 Id., slip op. at 3. 
48 322 NLRB 17, 21 (1996). 
49 Id. 
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     Member Walsh, in dissent, rejected the majority’s position that the 
respondent sought police assistance based on “reasonable concerns.”  
Citing the respondent’s contemporaneous efforts to unlawfully interfere 
with the picketing (e.g., by moving its equipment into the public 
easement), Member Walsh concluded that the respondent’s asserted 
concerns were pretextual and did not justify the respondent’s 
involvement of police in speaking to the pickets. 
9.  Union Acting as an Employer 
     In Operating Engineers,50 the Board considered the issue of whether a 
union can, under Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, lawfully discharge one of its 
key employees for criticizing the union’s collective-bargaining policies 
and decisions.  The Board assumed, without deciding, that the 
employee’s criticism of the union’s policy was concerted activity 
consistent with the “mutual aid or protection” clause of Section 7.  It then 
held that any arguable Section 7 interest of the employee was 
outweighed by the strong legitimate interest of the union in ensuring 
loyalty by its key employees to its policies.  Accordingly, it held that the 
employee’s discharge did not violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 
10.  Weingarten Rights 
     Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and Meisburg ruled in 
IBM Corp.,51 that employees who work in a nonunionized workplace are 
not entitled under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act to have 
a coworker accompany them to an interview with their employer, even if 
the affected employee reasonably believes that the interview might result 
in discipline.  Members Liebman and Walsh dissented. 
     The majority overruled Epilepsy Foundation of Northeast Ohio,52 
which had extended to unrepresented employees a right to have a 
coworker present during such interviews, and returned to pre-Epilepsy 
Board precedent holding that Weingarten rights apply only to unionized 
employees.  Under NLRB v. J. Weingarten,53 employees represented by a 
union have the right to have a representative accompany them to a 
disciplinary interview.  Member Schaumber agreed with the majority 
opinion and had a separate concurrence. 
     In this case, IBM, whose employees are not represented by a union, 
denied three employees’ requests to have a coworker present during 
investigatory interviews about a former employee’s allegations that they 
 
50 341 NLRB No. 114 (Members Liebman, Schaumber, and Walsh). 
51 341 NLRB No. 148 (Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and Meisburg; Members 
Liebman and Walsh dissenting). 
52 331 NLRB 676 (2000). 
53 420 U.S. 251 (1975). 
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had engaged in harassment.  An NLRB administrative law judge, 
applying Epilepsy Foundation, found that IBM violated Section 8(a)(1) 
of the Act by denying the employees’ requests for the presence of a 
coworker.  Upon review, a Board majority reversed Epilepsy and 
therefore reversed the judge. 
     Chairman Battista and Member Meisburg, in reversing the judge, 
found that national labor policy is best served by not extending to a 
nonunion workplace a right to representation at a disciplinary interview.  
They noted changes in work environments requiring employers to 
conduct various types of workplace investigations pursuant to Federal, 
State, and local laws, especially workplace discrimination and sexual 
harassment, and the need for an employer to conduct those investigations 
in a thorough, prompt, and confidential manner.  They also noted 
increasing instances of workplace violence and the aftermath of events of 
September 11, 2001. 
     Chairman Battista and Member Meisburg pointed out that in a 
nonunion workplace, coworkers do not represent the interests of the 
entire work force; coworkers have no official status as does a union 
representative in dealing with an employer and thus cannot redress the 
imbalance of power between employers and employees; coworkers do 
not have the same knowledge and skills as a union representative and 
thus are not as effective in facilitating workplace interviews; and, finally, 
the presence of a coworker, instead of a union representative, may 
compromise the confidentiality of a workplace investigation.  For these 
reasons, they concluded that a nonunion employer has the right to 
conduct prompt, efficient, thorough, and confidential workplace 
investigations without the presence of a coworker, saying: 
 
     Our reexamination of Epilepsy Foundation leads us to 
conclude that the policy considerations supporting that decision 
do not warrant, particularly at this time, adherence to the holding 
in Epilepsy Foundation.  In recent years, there have been many 
changes in the workplace environment, including ever-increasing 
requirements to conduct workplace investigations, as well as 
new security concerns raised by incidents of national and 
workplace violence. 
     Our considerations of these features of the contemporary 
workplace leads us to conclude that an employer must be 
allowed to conduct its required investigations in a thorough, 
sensitive, and confidential manner.  This can best be 
accomplished by permitting an employer in a nonunion setting to 
investigate an employee without the presence of a coworker. 
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     Member Schaumber joined the rationale of the majority and offered 
his own views in a separate concurring opinion.  He found that the right 
to the presence of a witness in a predisciplinary investigatory interview is 
unique to a workplace in which employees are represented by a union 
and is distinctly derived from the statute.  Member Schaumber concluded 
that the language of the statute does not provide such a right to 
nonrepresented employees.  In this regard, he explained that the “better 
construction and the one most consistent with the language and policies 
of the Act, is that the Weingarten right is unique to employees 
represented by a Section 9(a) bargaining representative.  The Board’s 
decision to the contrary in Epilepsy sheared Weingarten from its 
historical, factual, and analytical roots; infringed upon recognized and 
fundamental common law management prerogatives; and ignored extant 
Board precedent that requires actual proof—rather than presuming its 
existence—of activity which is both ‘concerted’ and ‘for mutual aid and 
protection’ to qualify for protection under Section 7.  Consequently, 
Epilepsy represented an abrupt and unwarranted departure from 
established law, an error we correct through our decision today.” 
     Members Liebman and Walsh in dissent wrote:  “Today, American 
workers without unions, the overwhelming majority of employees, are 
stripped of a right integral to workplace democracy.”  They found no 
persuasive basis for the majority’s “abruptly overruling” Epilepsy 
Foundation of Northeast Ohio, a recent decision upheld on appeal as 
“both clear and reasonable.”  Members Liebman and Walsh concluded 
that a statutory foundation for coworker representation exists under 
Section 7 even in the absence of a union, and that due process 
considerations supported such representation.  The presence of a 
coworker at a disciplinary interview gives the affected worker a 
“potential witness, advisory, and advocate” in what can be an adversarial 
situation, Members Liebman and Walsh explained.  “On this view, it is 
our colleagues who are taking a step backwards.  They have neither 
demonstrated that Epilepsy Foundation is contrary to the Act, nor offered 
compelling policy reasons for failing to follow precedent.  They have 
overruled a sound decision not because they must, and not because they 
should, but because they can.  As a result, today’s decision itself is 
unlikely to have an enduring place in American labor law.  We dissent.” 
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B.  Employer Discrimination Against Employees 
1.  Quit Versus Discharge 
     In Chartwells, Compass Group, USA, Inc.,54 the Board majority held 
that even assuming the continued validity of the “Hobson’s choice” 
theory of unlawful constructive discharge, an alleged Hobson’s choice 
constructive discharge would only violate Section 8(a)(3) if both the 
respondent’s motive for the reprimand was unlawful and the employee’s 
motive for quitting was fear that continued union activity would result in 
discharge.  The majority found that the evidence here did not show either 
of these two necessary elements.55
     Here, an employee complained to the respondent during a union 
organizing campaign that Eileen Bramsen, the principal union supporter, 
had told the employee that she (the employee) would be discharged if she 
did not join the union.  The respondent summoned Bramsen to a 
disciplinary interview, read to Bramsen a work rule prohibiting 
employees from intimidating other employees, and accused Bramsen of 
violating the rule.  Bramsen demanded to know who her accusers were 
and what her allegedly improper conduct was.  The respondent refused to 
give Bramsen the requested information, citing confidentiality concerns.  
Bramsen angrily started to leave the office.  As Bramsen left, the 
respondent asked if Bramsen was quitting and Bramsen replied that she 
was. 
     In undertaking a Hobson’s choice evidentiary analysis here, the 
majority first addressed the issue of the respondent’s motive for issuing 
Bramsen the reprimand.  After reviewing the evidence, they found that 
the respondent’s motive was Bramsen’s unprotected intimidation of the 
employee, not Bramsen’s protected union activities. 
     Then, assuming arguendo that the respondent’s motive for issuing the 
reprimand was unlawful, the majority addressed the separate issue of 
Bramsen’s motive for quitting.  After reviewing the evidence, the 
majority found that Bramsen’s motive for quitting was Bramsen’s anger 
at the respondent’s refusal to identify the complaining employees, not a 
fear by Bramsen that she would be discharged if she continued her 
protected union activities.  For these reasons, the majority found that the 
respondent did not constructively discharge Bramsen in violation of 
Section 8(a)(3). 
 
54 342 NLRB No. 121 (Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber; Member Walsh dissenting in 
part). 
55 See Hoerner Waldorf Corp., 227 NLRB 612 (1976); Intercon I (Zercom), 333 NLRB 223, 224 
(2001). 
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     Member Walsh, dissenting, affirmed the validity of Hobson’s choice 
theory of unlawful constructive discharge.  He then stated that the 
threshold issue was whether Bramsen would reasonably have understood 
the reprimand as being aimed at her union activities, rather than whether 
the respondent’s motive for issuing the reprimand was unlawful.  
Member Walsh found that Bramsen would reasonably have understood 
the reprimand as being aimed at her union activities.  Member Walsh 
further found that, in any event, the respondent’s motive in issuing the 
reprimand was unlawful.  Finally, with regard to the majority’s finding 
that Bramsen’s motive for quitting was her anger at the respondent’s 
refusal to identify the complaining employees rather than her fear of 
discharge if she continued her union activity, Member Walsh asserted 
that the majority’s finding was an “effort to artificially parse out aspects 
of the [disciplinary interview]”; he further found the anger was itself 
based in part on the unlawful reprimand and that the quit was therefore 
an unlawful constructive discharge. 
2.  Title VII Liability Concern as a Defense 
     In St. Pete Times Forum,56 the Board unanimously adopted the 
administrative law judge’s finding that the respondent violated Section 
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by discharging employee Peter Mullins.  
Although the Board recognized the respondent’s legitimate interest in 
preventing workplace sexual harassment and a correlative obligation to 
respond when such incidents occur, the Board concluded that the 
respondent failed to show that it would have discharged Mullins even in 
the absence of his union activity in order to avoid the imposition of Title 
VII liability. 
     The respondent contended that it discharged Mullins because of its 
apprehension of potential hostile environment sexual harassment liability 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, arising out of an 
encounter between Mullins and Alice Castillo, an employee of a vendor 
doing business on the respondent’s premises.  According to Castillo, 
Mullins initiated a conversation about the merits of unionization and 
when she expressed some skepticism, Mullins called her a “Yankee 
bitch.”  The respondent argued that Mullins’ angry outburst at Castillo 
created sufficient concern for Title VII liability that it discharged him. 
     Relying on Supreme Court decisions under Title VII and the 
testimony of the respondent’s director of human resources, who testified 
that she did not believe Mullins sexually harassed Castillo, the Board 
found that the respondent did not establish that it discharged Mullins in 
order to avoid liability under Title VII.  For this reason, the Board agreed 
 
56 342 NLRB No. 53 (Members Liebman, Schaumber, and Walsh). 
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with the judge that the respondent’s asserted Title VII concerns were 
pretextual. 
     The Board also addressed the admonition of the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals in Adtranz ABB Daimler-Benz Transportation v. 
NLRB,57 to interpret the Act in a manner that is sensitive to employers’ 
responsibilities to address workplace harassment under Title VII.  In 
doing so, the Board found that this case did not present the issues that 
were of concern in Adtranz.  At issue in Adtranz was the employer’s 
maintenance of a policy prohibiting “abusive or threatening language” on 
company premises.  Here, on the other hand, the question presented was 
whether the respondent discharged Mullins because he was a union 
supporter.  Under the established principles set forth in Wright Line,58 
once the General Counsel made the required initial showing that Mullins’ 
union activity was a motivating factor in the decision to discharge him, 
the burden shifted to the respondent to show that it would have 
discharged him even in the absence of his union activities, here, because 
of its Title VII concerns.  The Board concluded that the respondent failed 
to make that showing based on the specific facts of the case, and thus this 
case did not raise the issue of interfering with employers’ Title VII 
responsibilities generally that was of concern to the court in Adtranz. 
3.  Salting: Refusal to Consider and Hire Union Applicants 
     In Jacobs Heating and Air Conditioning,59 the Board majority found 
that the respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by refusing to 
hire three union applicants. 
     The majority found that the General Counsel failed to meet his burden 
under FES,60 to show that the union applicants had experience or training 
relevant to the announced or generally known requirements of advertised 
positions.  The majority found that “[it was] clear from the Respondent’s 
advertisement that the relevant experience for the position was broad: 
i.e., experience in “all aspects” of HVAC work, not merely some.  The 
union applicants had narrow, not broad experience.  Their experience 
was primarily in the sheet metal aspect of HVAC work, which was only 
a small portion of the Respondent’s business.”  The majority went on to 
find that, even if the General Counsel had met his burden, the respondent 
had shown that the union applicants did not possess the specific 
 
57 253 F.3d 19, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
58 Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 
989 (1982), approved in NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 398–403 
(1982). 
59 341 NLRB No. 128 (Chairman Battista and Member Meisburg; Member Liebman dissenting in 
part). 
60 331 NLRB 9 (2000), enfd. 301 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 2002). 
Sixty-Ninth Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board 100
 
                                                
qualifications the position required, and that others had superior 
qualifications and were hired for that reason. 
     Dissenting in part, Member Liebman found that the General Counsel 
had shown that the union applicants were experienced in some, if not 
most, areas of HVAC work.  Contrary to the majority, Member Liebman 
found that the respondent’s advertisement sought “experienced” persons, 
but did not specify that applicants should be experienced in all aspects of 
HVAC work.  Thus, the General Counsel met his burden under FES to 
show that the applicants had both experience and training relevant to the 
announced requirements. 
     In Allied Mechanical Services,61 the Board found that the 
respondent’s refusal to consider for employment and to hire four 
applicants62 violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, but that its 
refusal to consider or hire four others63 was not unlawful.  Applying the 
standards set forth in FES,64 the Board found that the respondent hired 
plumbers and pipefitters shortly after union members Calhoun, Conroy, 
Hill, and Kiss applied for plumbing and pipefitting jobs with the 
respondent; that Calhoun, Conroy, Hill, and Kiss had experience and 
training relevant to the requirements of the positions; and that a number 
of factors showed the respondent’s antiunion animus, including its 
president’s instructions to its human resources director not to interview 
union members.  The Board further found that the respondent failed to 
show that it would not have hired Calhoun, Conroy, Hill, and Kiss even 
in the absence of their union activities or affiliation.  The Board found 
that the evidence did not support the respondent’s contention that it did 
not consider the applications of Calhoun, Conroy, Hill, and Kiss because 
it already had enough applicants and was “into the process” of 
scheduling interviews and checking references when it received the 
union members’ applications.  The Board noted that this explanation 
conflicted with the respondent’s written policy of considering all current 
applications when filling vacancies.  Further, the respondent had only 6 
current applications when it received the applications of Calhoun, 
Conroy, Hill, and Kiss, and it hired 5 new employees within a month and 
tentatively hired a 6th, plus it hired 10 more over the subsequent 4 
months.  Thus, the Board found implausible the respondent’s contention 
that it disregarded the applications of Calhoun, Conroy, Hill, and Kiss 
because it already had a sufficient supply. 
 
61 341 NLRB No. 141 (Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and Meisburg). 
62 Applicants Calhoun, Conroy, Hill, and Kiss. 
63 Applicants Englehart, Hampton, Newcomb, and West. 
64 331 NLRB 9 (2000). 
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     The Board, however, reversed the judge and found that the respondent 
did not violate the Act by refusing to consider and hire applicants 
Englehart, Hampton, Newcomb, and West.  The Board found that the 
respondent considered only current applications when hiring, and these 
applicants’ applications were not current.  Under the respondent’s policy, 
an application was deemed current if it had been filed within 30 days or 
if the applicant had contacted the respondent or the respondent had 
contacted the applicant during the past 30 days.  Englehart, Hampton, 
Newcomb, and West’s applications were at least 2 months old at the time 
that the respondent began considering hiring new employees, and they 
had not contacted the respondent during the past 30 days, nor had the 
respondent contacted them.  Contrary to the judge, the Board found that 
the respondent had not discriminatorily applied its policy of considering 
only current applications.  Rather, the respondent had deviated from this 
policy on only one occasion in a year in which it hired 25 employees.  
The Board found this deviation to be an isolated event and an insufficient 
basis for finding discriminatory application of the policy. 
     The Board also found that the respondent did not violate Section 
8(a)(5) and (1) by withdrawing recognition from Plumbers Local 357.  
Local 357 was formed by the merger of Plumbers Locals 337 and 513.  
The respondent had a bargaining obligation with Local 337.  The Board 
noted that, following an incumbent union’s merger or affiliation, an 
employer’s duty to recognize and bargain with the union continues 
unless the union’s members did not have an adequate opportunity to 
participate in a vote on the merger conducted with adequate due process 
safeguards or unless the merger caused changes so dramatic that 
substantial continuity was lost between the pre- and postaffiliation 
union.65  Because Local 337’s members did not have an opportunity to 
vote on the merger, the Board found that the respondent had no 
obligation to recognize and bargain with the entity that resulted from the 
merger. 
     In American, Inc.,66 a majority of the Board held that the respondent 
did not violate Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by failing to consider 
for hire and/or hire certain union-affiliated applicants. 
     In March, April, and May 2003, the respondent was performing 
electrical work on a grocery store in Bakersfield, California.67  The 
complaint alleged that the respondent unlawfully failed to consider for 
 
65 In support of this proposition, the Board cited NLRB v. Financial Institution Employees (Seattle-
First National Bank), 475 U.S. 192, 199 (1986), and Minn-Dak Farmers Cooperative, 311 NLRB 
942, 945 (1993), enfd. 32 F.3d 390 (8th Cir. 1994). 
66 342 NLRB No. 76 (Chairman Battista and Member Meisburg; Member Liebman dissenting). 
67 All dates are 2003 unless stated otherwise. 
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hire and/or hire union-affiliated electrician applicants during this time 
period. 
     The key issue in the case was unlawful motivation:  whether, under 
FES,68 the respondent failed to consider or hire the applicants because of 
their union affiliation.  The majority affirmed the administrative law 
judge’s finding that the General Counsel failed to satisfy his burden of 
showing that antiunion animus was a motivating factor in the 
respondent’s conduct.  The majority relied on the fact that the judge did 
not credit the only direct evidence of such animus: an alleged threat by a 
manager that the respondent would close its electrical shop before 
allowing it to be unionized.  The majority acknowledged that some of the 
respondent’s conduct might have appeared suspicious, e.g., the 
respondent deviated from its targeted wage range to hire nonunion 
applicants over union applicants, but the majority concluded that such 
suspicion, without more, was insufficient to support a finding of 
unlawful motivation. 
     Dissenting, Member Liebman would have remanded the case to the 
judge to explain her decision not to credit the manager’s alleged threat 
and to address record evidence strongly suggesting unlawful motive.  As 
to the manager’s threat, Member Liebman found that the judge actually 
failed to make a credibility determination.  In Member Liebman’s view, 
all the judge did was summarily discredit both the employee who 
claimed to have heard the threat and the manager’s denial that he made 
the threat.  Member Liebman argued that the judge must provide some 
explanation, especially when making key credibility determinations.  She 
found the judge’s failure to resolve this critical conflict particularly 
problematic because of other credited record evidence pointing to 
unlawful motivation. 
4.  Employer Lockouts 
     In Sociedad Espanola de Auxilio y Beneficencia de Puerto Rico,69 the 
Board majority held that the respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(3) 
by advancing a lockout after the union canceled the strike.  The majority 
also held that the respondent’s statement that the lockout was not against 
the employees, but against the union, did not independently violate 
Section 8(a)(1).  Member Liebman dissented on both counts. 
     The union notified the respondent that it would conduct work 
stoppages on December 22–24, 1998, and on December 31, 1998–
January 2, 1999, to protest unfair labor practices.  In response, the 
 
68 331 NLRB 9 (2000), enfd. 301 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 2002). 
69 342 NLRB No. 40 (Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber; Member Liebman dissenting in 
part). 
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respondent decided to lock out employees on December 24–30—i.e., 
between the two planned strikes—to make it easier to recruit 
replacements, who would thus have a continuous period of employment 
during the holiday season.  The union learned of the planned lockout on 
December 21.  Later that night, with replacement workers already on 
site, the union canceled the first strike.  The respondent, rather than call 
off the lockout, advanced it to coincide with what would have been the 
commencement of the strike.  Employees were called and told not to 
report to work; those employees who reported to work were sent away.  
One employee who was sent away commented that this was the way the 
institution “paid the long-time employees.”  The respondent’s human 
resources director replied that the “reprisal” was not against the 
employees, but against the union. 
     All of the panel members agreed that the judge correctly determined 
that, because a lockout, standing alone, is not inherently destructive of 
employee rights, the legality of Respondent’s lockout must be 
determined using the Great Dane “comparatively slight” impact test.  
NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc.70  Under that test, an antiunion 
motivation must be proved to sustain the charge if the employer has 
come forward with evidence of “legitimate and substantial business 
justifications” for its conduct.  The panel majority reversing the judge, 
found that the respondent’s reasonable concern for its business and its 
patients provided a legitimate and substantial business justification for 
the lockout.  The majority noted that the respondent had “reasonable 
grounds for believing that a strike was imminent,” and that the 
respondent could “reasonably be concerned that the ‘11th hour’ 
cancellation would not be true and effective.”  The majority further 
concluded that it was “this operative purpose, rather than antiunion 
animus, that motivated the Respondent.”  Finally, the majority found that 
it “was not unreasonable—indeed, it was truthful—for Roman to blame 
the Union for the lockout.” 
     Dissenting Member Liebman wrote that the “employer locked out its 
employees to punish the Union for calling a lawful strike, just as the 
employer’s human resources director told employees (a statement that 
itself violated the Act).”  Member Liebman reasoned, first, that the 
respondent “never proved that it would have had difficulty in finding 
replacement workers during the union’s two planned strikes.”  Second, 
even if the respondent had met that burden, its lockout was motivated by 
antiunion animus, as evidenced both by its comment and by its additional 
 
70 388 U.S. 26 (1967). 
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unlawful conduct of firing a union activist and soliciting employees to 
decertify the union. 
     In Midwest Generation,71 a Board majority held that the respondent’s 
partial lockout of only full-term strikers, but excluding nonstrikers and 
crossover employees, did not violate the Act. 
     The union commenced an economic strike in support of its bargaining 
position following unsuccessful negotiations for a successor contract.  
Virtually the entire bargaining unit of over 1000 employees participated 
in the strike.  Approximately eight employees did not and continued 
working (the nonstrikers).  During the course of the strike approximately 
47 employees individually offered to return to work and the respondent 
accepted them back (the crossover employees).  Approximately 2 months 
later, the union terminated the strike and made an unconditional offer to 
return to work on behalf of all strikers.  The respondent declined the 
union’s offer and notified the union it was locking out all striking 
employees until a new contract was reached (these are the full-term 
strikers).  The respondent did not, however, lock out the currently 
working nonstrikers or crossover employees. 
     A Board majority found the partial lockout to be lawful.  They 
explained that the lockout was brought in support of the respondent’s 
legitimate bargaining position, and thus could not be considered 
inherently destructive of employee rights under NLRB v. Great Dane 
Trailers.72  The majority then found that the respondent had clearly 
established a legitimate and substantial business justification for the 
lockout: it was brought for the purpose of bringing economic pressure to 
bear in support of its legitimate bargaining position.  It further found that 
the respondent had justified the partial nature of its lockout: it applied 
only to employees who were actively participating in the strike in 
support of the union’s bargaining demands in order to pressure them to 
abandon those demands. 
     The majority further observed that the respondent used the nonstrikers 
and crossover employees to maintain operations during the strike, and 
that the Board has long recognized the legality of partial lockouts when 
justified by operational needs and—as in this case—without regard to 
union membership status.  The majority additionally found no evidence 
whatsoever that the lockout was motivated by antiunion animus.  In light 
of all these circumstances, the majority concluded that the respondent’s 
distinction in locking out only full-term strikers constituted lawful 
economic pressure in support of its bargaining position. 
 
71 343 NLRB No. 12 (Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber; Member Walsh dissenting). 
72 388 U.S. 26 (1967). 
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     Member Walsh dissented.  He criticized the majority’s “one-sided 
approach” and failure to balance the parties’ conflicting legitimate 
interests.  Member Walsh observed that the respondent had not advanced 
any operational justification for the partial nature of the lockout, and 
criticized the majority for “invent[ing]” one. He further found that the 
respondent presented no evidence establishing that the nonstrikers and 
the crossover employees had in fact abandoned the union’s bargaining 
position, and thus that the respondent had not substantiated its asserted 
business justification.  Emphasizing the powerful negative effect of a 
partial lockout on Section 7 rights, Member Walsh underscored that “the 
law requires a partial lockout be justified by substantial business 
reasons.”  Absent such justification here, he concluded a violation of 
Section 8(a)(3) had been established under the framework set forth in 
Great Dane Trailers, supra. 
C.  Employer Bargaining Obligation 
     An employer and the representative of its employees, as selected by a 
majority of employees in an appropriate unit pursuant to Section 9(a), 
have a mutual obligation to bargain in good faith about wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment.  An employer or labor 
organization violates Section 8(a)(5) or 8(b)(3) of the Act, respectively, 
if it does not fulfill its bargaining obligation. 
1.  Withdrawal from Multiemployer Bargaining 
     In D. A. Nolt, Inc.,73 the Board majority reversed the administrative 
law judge and found that Roofing Contractor Nolt violated Section 
8(a)(5) of the Act when it refused to apply the collective-bargaining 
agreement negotiated by the multiemployer association to which it 
belonged.  The majority found that the judge had erred in finding that 
Nolt had lawfully withdrawn from the association because the union and 
the association had engaged in secret negotiations. 
     Specifically, the Board majority found that Nolt did not properly 
withdraw from the association as required by Retail Associates.74  In that 
case, the Board held that employers cannot withdraw from multi-
employer bargaining after negotiations begin, unless there is mutual 
consent or “unusual circumstances.”  In Chel LaCort,75 the Board found 
that the association’s deliberate withholding of information from its 
member concerning the start of negotiations was not an “unusual 
circumstance” under Retail Associates, but rather a matter of internal 
 
73 340 NLRB No. 152 (Members Liebman and Walsh; Chairman Battista dissenting). 
74 120 NLRB 388 (1958). 
75 315 NLRB 1036 (1994). 
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communications.76  In dicta, Chel stated that there was no evidence of 
“collusion or conspiracy,” and “left to another case to decide whether or 
when such evidence would be sufficient to show ‘unusual 
circumstances.’”77
     The Board majority found that the association’s decision to withhold 
information from Nolt concerning the start of negotiations was no 
different than the situation in Chel.78  The majority found that there was 
no intention to harm Nolt, and thus no collusion or secret negotiations.79  
Accordingly, they found that there were no unusual circumstances 
justifying Nolt’s untimely withdrawal.80
     Even were there unusual circumstances, the Board majority found that 
Nolt’s conduct after it learned of the negotiations resulted in its forfeiture 
of any right to withdraw.  After reaching agreement with the union, the 
association allowed individual members to withdraw rather than accept 
the agreement; Nolt voted to accept the agreement.81  The Board majority 
concluded that this acceptance, coupled with Nolt’s attempt, several 
months later, after its relationship with the union had soured, to withdraw 
from the association and repudiate the contract, was an impermissible 
attempt to enjoy the “best of two worlds.”82  Accordingly, the Board 
majority ordered Nolt to recognize and bargain with the union, honor the 
terms of the contract negotiated by the association and union, and make 
whole its employees for any loss of earnings or benefits suffered by the 
repudiation of the union and refusal to apply the contract. 
     Chairman Battista dissented and found that the association’s 
withholding of information, at the union’s request, concerning the start of 
negotiations was collusive and thus constituted an unusual circumstance 
justifying withdrawal.83  The Chairman further found that the instructions 
on the ballot and cover letter provided to Nolt after the union and 
association had negotiated a new agreement were confusing and 
internally inconsistent.  Because the cover letter provided that Nolt 
reserved the right to withdraw from the association until 90 days prior to 
the expiration of the current agreement, which Nolt did, the Chairman 
found that Nolt lawfully withdrew within the time period stipulated by 
contract, regardless of how it voted on the confusing ballot.  Acropolis 
 
76 Id. at 1037. 
77 Id. at fn. 5. 
78 Nolt, slip op. at 3. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Id. at 4. 
81 Id. at 3. 
82 Ibid, citing Michael J. Bollinger Co., 252 NLRB 406, 407 (1980), enfd. mem 705 F.2d 444 (4th 
Cir. 1983).  
83 Id. at 6. 
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Painting.84  Accordingly, the Chairman found that Nolt was no longer a 
member of the association bound to the new agreement the association 
negotiated with the union. 
     In CTS, Inc.,85 the Board majority found that although the employer 
failed effectively to withdraw from a multiemployer bargaining unit 
under Retail Associates, Inc.,86 the employer was nevertheless not bound 
by the results of multiemployer bargaining because the union’s course of 
conduct toward the employer, including the union’s demonstrated 
willingness to engage in individual bargaining with the employer, 
established that the union acquiesced in the employer’s attempted 
withdrawal from multiemployer bargaining. 
     Although not a member of the multiemployer bargaining association, 
the employer had agreed to assume and be bound by the terms of a 
multiemployer collective-bargaining agreement between the association 
and the union.  The agreement provided that it would continue in effect 
until its termination date, and from year to year thereafter, unless 
terminated by timely written notice from either party to the other.  The 
agreement also set out the steps the employer was required to follow to 
withdraw from multiemployer bargaining. 
     The union timely notified the individual employers (including the 
employer) who were party to the agreement that the union intended to 
terminate the agreement and to negotiate changes to the terms of the 
agreement.  Contrary to the requirements of the agreement, however, the 
union’s notice of termination was not addressed to the association itself. 
The union said in its notice that it was “ready and willing to meet and 
confer with you on mutually convenient dates.”  Shortly after receiving 
the union’s notice, the employer notified the union in writing that the 
employer was terminating the agreement as of the expiration date, unless 
the employer and the union reached a settlement on a new agreement 
before the expiration date of the current one.  The employer’s notice to 
the union was, however, untimely (premature) under the termination 
provisions of the agreement. 
     The employer subsequently notified the union that the employer 
wanted to meet with the union to review the employer’s “issues.”  The 
union replied to the employer that it would “get back to [the employer] 
and [they] would do it.”  The employer made 6–8 followup calls to the 
union attempting to set a date for a negotiation meeting.  Although no 
date for such a meeting was set, the union told the employer that it would 
negotiate with the employer, and the union never told the employer that 
 
84 272 NLRB 150 (1984). 
85 340 NLRB No. 99 (Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber; Member Walsh dissenting).   
86 120 NLRB 388, 394 (1958).
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it could not bargain with the employer.  At one point, the employer told 
the union that the employer did not agree with having other parties 
negotiate a collective-bargaining agreement for the employer. 
     In the meantime, the association and the union engaged in 
negotiations, and reached agreement on and entered into a successor 
collective-bargaining agreement.  The employer told the union that the 
employer did not agree to this new agreement, and notified the union in 
writing that the employer wanted an opportunity to negotiate an 
individual agreement with the union.  The employer told the union that in 
the meantime, the employer would continue to pay wages and benefits 
under the terms of the predecessor agreement.  The union responded by 
telling the employer that the employer was obligated by the new 
agreement and should pay the increased wages called for under that 
agreement.  Nevertheless, the union subsequently agreed to meet with the 
employer at a restaurant.  At the meeting, the employer gave the union a 
document styled “Summary of Economic Proposals.”  The document 
asserted that the employer was not part of any multiemployer bargaining 
group, and it set out specific bargaining proposals on various proposed 
terms and conditions of employment.  The union reviewed the document 
and told the employer that no union could ever agree to the employer’s 
proposals.  Subsequently, the union notified the employer by letter that 
the union considered the employer to be bound by the new agreement 
between the association and the union, and that the union intended to 
enforce that agreement with the employer in the same manner as the 
union did with all other signatories to the agreement.  The employer 
replied by letter that it did not agree with the union’s position, asserting 
that the prior collective-bargaining agreement between the employer and 
the union had expired on its expiration date, and stating that the 
employer remained committed to negotiating a new collective-bargaining 
agreement with the union.  The employer asked in the letter that the 
union contact it to arrange mutually agreeable times, dates, and locations 
for continued negotiations.  The union did not do so. 
     The complaint alleged that the employer violated Section 8(a)(5) and 
(1) of the Act by refusing to adhere to the terms of the new collective-
bargaining agreement between the multiemployer association and the 
union. 
     The majority dismissed the complaint.  It found that the union’s 
communications with the employer could reasonably be understood as 
stating that the union wanted to terminate the current collective-
bargaining agreement and negotiate changes and modifications to the 
agreement with employers individually, and further found that the union 
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implicitly acquiesced in and validated the employer’s ineffective attempt 
under Retail Associates to withdraw from multiemployer bargaining. 
     First, the majority found that the employer’s conduct and 
communications with the union following the employer’s ineffective 
attempt to withdraw from multiemployer bargaining clearly evidenced 
the employer’s plan to withdraw from multiemployer bargaining and 
engage in individual bargaining.  Then, citing I. C. Refrigeration 
Service,87 the majority also found that the totality of the union’s conduct 
and communications with the employer evidenced the union’s 
acquiescence in the employer’s plan: e.g., addressing the contract 
termination letter to “all contractors,” but not to the association itself, 
and offering in the letter to meet and negotiate with individual employers 
on modifications to the current agreement that would be incorporated 
into a new agreement; agreeing to meet with the employer to begin 
reviewing the issues that the employer was concerned about and to begin 
negotiating a new collective-bargaining agreement; not telling the 
employer, in the face of the employer’s repeated requests for individual 
bargaining with the union, that the union did not intend to bargain 
individually with the employer; and meeting with the employer in the 
restaurant and reviewing a list of the employer’s contract proposals. 
     In dissent, Member Walsh found that the employer violated the Act 
by failing and refusing to abide by the new collective-bargaining 
agreement between the multiemployer association and the union.  Citing 
Standard Roofing, Inc.,88 he found that the union’s contract termination 
letter, while not addressed to the association itself, nevertheless did not 
constitute or reasonably communicate a withdrawal by the union from 
multiemployer bargaining and an intent instead to engage in bargaining 
on an individual employer basis.  He found that the union’s subsequent 
course of multiemployer bargaining with the association belied any such 
communication or intent. 
     Member Walsh found that the union’s conduct following its contract 
termination letter, culminating in the restaurant meeting with the 
employer, could not be considered individual negotiations with the 
employer.  He noted that at that meeting, the union was expressly wary 
of accepting the employer’s proffered economic proposals.  Before 
accepting the list of proposals, the union told the employer that the 
employer was bound by the new collective-bargaining agreement 
between the association and the union, and that there would be no 
substantive discussion of the employer’s proposals.  Member Walsh also 
 
87 200 NLRB 687, 689 (1972). 
88 290 NLRB 193, 199 (1988), enfd. mem. in pertinent part 920 F.2d 933 (6th Cir. 1990). 
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found that, under I. C. Refrigeration, the union’s conduct did not 
reasonably demonstrate to the employer that the union consented or 
acquiesced in the employer’s unsuccessful attempt to withdraw from 
multiemployer bargaining, because the union’s course of conduct was 
not clearly contrary to the union’s claim that the employer had not 
withdrawn from multiemployer bargaining.  Member Walsh further 
found that any such asserted union acquiescence was belied by the 
union’s not meeting with the employer about negotiating an individual 
collective-bargaining agreement despite the employer’s repeated requests 
that the union do so, and by the union’s subsequent demands that the 
employer abide by the new multiemployer collective-bargaining 
agreement. 
2.  Mandatory Subjects of Bargaining 
     In Servicenet,89 the Board concluded that the respondent violated 
Section 8(a)(5) by bargaining to impasse on contractual proposals 
concerning the method by which future changes to a health insurance 
would be decided and a duration clause.  The Board found that both 
proposals were nonmandatory subjects and that the respondent therefore 
acted unlawfully when it insisted to impasse on them. 
     The health insurance clause provided that the respondent could deal 
directly with a group of employees appointed by the union over changes 
to its health insurance plan during the term of the proposed agreement.  
Citing Retlaw Broadcasting,90 the Board concluded that the proposal 
“would be a license for the employer to go to impasse over whether it has 
to deal with the union; that is the antithesis of good faith bargaining.” 
     As to the duration clause, the Board found that while duration clauses 
normally are mandatory subjects of bargaining, over which a party may 
lawfully bargain to impasse, the respondent’s proposal was different 
because it provided that the whole contract, including the contractual no-
strike clause, would continue in full force and effect until a successor 
agreement was agreed upon and ratified by the parties.  Members 
Liebman and Walsh analogized the clause to an interest arbitration 
clause, which the Board has found to be nonmandatory, because it 
required adherence to the contract after it had expired and, in light of the 
contractual no-strike clause, would compel the union to relinquish its 
right to exercise its economic weapons perpetually.  Member Schaumber, 
concurring, found that the clause was nonmandatory but rejected the 
analogy to an interest arbitration clause.  Instead, he concluded that the 
 
89 340 NLRB No. 148 (2003) (Members Liebman, Schaumber, and Walsh).  
90 324 NLRB 138, enfd. 172 F.3d 660 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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clause was nonmandatory because it failed to provide a fixed term for the 
proposed new agreement. 
     In Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,91 a Board majority (Chairman Battista and 
Member Walsh; Member Schaumber dissenting) agreed with the 
administrative law judge’s finding that the respondent violated 8(a)(5) 
and (1) of the Act by failing to notify and bargain with the union prior to 
the installation and use of surveillance cameras in the workplace.  A 
different majority (Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber; Member 
Walsh dissenting) agreed with the judge’s decision not to revoke the 
discipline imposed on 16 employees whose misconduct was recorded by 
the surveillance camera. 
     The respondent installed hidden surveillance cameras in work and 
break areas of its facility.  For approximately 6 weeks it observed 18 
employees in a stairwell, in an elevator motor room, and on the rooftop.  
Sixteen of the employees were later disciplined for misconduct that the 
respondent observed through use of the cameras. 
     Chairman Battista and Member Walsh found that the use of hidden 
surveillance cameras in the workplace is a mandatory subject of 
bargaining.  While the area surveilled was not a part of the physical plant 
in which employees worked frequently, employees did work there 
regularly, at least once a month.  The cameras filmed employees going 
about their regular tasks.  Also, the roof area was a designated break area 
where employees often took their breaks without prohibition from the 
respondent. 
     Member Schaumber noted that the respondent installed the cameras to 
detect suspected, illegal drug-related activity.  He also noted that the 
cameras were trained inside of and at the staircase leading to an isolated 
elevator motor’s room located on the roof of a building, that very few 
employees were authorized to enter the motor’s room, and that those who 
were authorized entered the room no more than twice a month for 
specific maintenance functions.  In Member Schaumber’s view, the 
Respondent’s limited use of cameras in a single isolated area 
distinguishes this case from decisions such as Colgate Palmolive Co.,92 
in which the Board analogized the use of video cameras in areas 
frequented by employees to intrusive investigatory tools such as physical 
examinations, drug and alcohol tests, and polygraph examinations. 
     Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber affirmed the judge’s 
proposed remedy and rejected the General Counsel’s contention that the 
respondent must rescind the discipline received by the 16 employees 
 
91 342 NLRB No. 49 (Chairman Battista; Members Schaumber and Walsh concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
92 323 NLRB 515 (1997). 
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whose misconduct was observed by the cameras.  They agreed with the 
judge that the employees’ misconduct was in violation of plant rules, and 
such misconduct was the basis for the discipline.  Citing Taracorp 
Industries,93 Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber found an 
insufficient nexus between the respondent’s unlawful installation and use 
of the cameras and the employees’ misconduct to warrant a make-whole 
remedy.  They found that the General Counsel’s requested make-whole 
relief was contrary to the specific remedial restriction contained in 
Section 10(c) of the Act. 
     Member Walsh disagreed with his colleagues’ failure to rescind the 
discipline imposed on the 16 employees for conduct discovered solely 
through use of the unlawfully installed cameras, noting that absent the 
unlawful installation and use of the cameras, the respondent had no basis 
to even question those 16 employees, let alone to discipline them.  He 
wrote: “In order to remedy its unlawful conduct, the Respondent must be 
ordered to rescind the employees’ discipline, expunge the employees’ 
files of any reference to their discipline, make the employees whole, and 
offer reinstatement to those employees who were discharged.” 
     In Trailmobile Trailer, LLC,94 the Board adopted the administrative 
law judge’s decision and found that an employer violated the Act by 
failing to bargain over the installation of video cameras, and by failing to 
attend grievance meetings, after it withdrew recognition from the union.  
Chairman Battista dissented, finding that the employer had no obligation 
either to bargain over the installation of the cameras, or to attend the 
grievance meetings, because the employer’s bargaining obligation had 
ceased upon its withdrawal of recognition. 
     The case involved an employer’s unilateral conduct occurring after it 
had withdrawn recognition from the union.  The complaint did not allege 
that the withdrawal of recognition—which occurred prior to the 
expiration of the contract—was unlawful, but did allege that the 
subsequent failure to bargain over the installation of surveillance 
cameras and the subsequent refusal to attend grievance meetings violated 
the Act. 
     In the absence of a complaint allegation, the majority reversed the 
judge’s finding that the withdrawal of recognition was unlawful.  The 
majority found, however, that the employer’s subsequent conduct in 
failing to bargain over the camera installation and refusing to attend 
grievance meetings was unlawful.  With respect to the refusal to attend 
grievance meetings, the majority relied on the fact that the employer did 
 
93 273 NLRB 221 (1984). 
94 343 NLRB No. 17 (Members Liebman and Walsh; Chairman Battista dissenting). 
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not use the withdrawal of recognition as its justification for the refusal, 
but “actually argue[d] that it was faithfully administering the contract in 
the area of grievances.” 
     With respect to the obligation to bargain over the installation of the 
security cameras, the majority noted that the employer did defend its 
refusal to bargain based on its prior withdrawal of recognition, but held 
that this defense was “contrary to well-established law.”  The majority 
held that under Burger Pits, Inc.,95 “an employer with a good-faith doubt 
about a union’s majority status may lawfully implement unilateral 
changes only after the expiration of the contract.”  The majority further 
explained that under Burger Pits, “[r]equiring an employer to administer 
a contract carries the inherent obligation to recognize, until the expiration 
date, the union with whom the contract is made.”  Thus, because the 
employer here unilaterally installed the cameras prior to the expiration of 
the contract, the installation violated Section 8(a)(5). 
     In his dissent, Chairman Battista rejected the majority’s finding that 
the employer was obligated to bargain over the camera installation and to 
attend grievance meetings after the withdrawal of recognition.  Noting 
that an 8(a)(5) violation depends on the existence of a Section 9 
relationship, Chairman Battista found that because the withdrawal of 
recognition was lawful, there was no Section 9 relationship thereafter, 
and thus the employer was under no obligation to bargain over the 
camera installation or to attend the grievance meetings.  Because of the 
absence of a Section 9 relationship at the time the conduct occurred, the 
Chairman found no merit to the majority’s contention that the employer’s 
defense, which relied on the language in the contract, warranted a finding 
of an 8(a)(5) violation.  The Chairman further found that Burger Pits, 
cited by the majority, was not to the contrary because, unlike here, the 
withdrawal of recognition in that case was unlawful. 
     In Kansas AFL–CIO,96 the Board found that the respondent violated 
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by eliminating a bargaining unit 
position and terminating the employee who held that position without 
providing the union prior notice and an opportunity to bargain. 
     The union represented the respondent’s unit employees at the time the 
unit position was eliminated and had done so for more than 25 years.  
The respondent has deducted dues from the unit employees’ paychecks 
and remitted those dues to the union since the early 1990’s.  Although 
the union’s business agent visited the respondent’s facility only 
sporadically over the years, this was largely because the union authorized 
 
95 273 NLRB 1001 (1984), affd. 785 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1986). 
96 341 NLRB No. 131 (Chairman Battista and Members Liebman and Walsh). 
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the employees to negotiate for themselves in regard to changes in terms 
and conditions of employment.  In essence, the union designated the 
employees as the union’s agent for negotiating purposes.  However, the 
union remained the principal and the respondent treated it as such. 
     Further, the respondent acknowledged the existence of its collective-
bargaining obligations when it eliminated the unit position.  First, the 
respondent referenced “the office contract” in the termination letter.  
Second, after the union’s business manager wrote a letter to the 
respondent protesting the circumstances of the employee’s termination, 
the respondent’s executive secretary did not question the business 
agent’s capacity or status in acting on the employee’s behalf.  Rather, the 
respondent’s executive secretary responded to the union’s concerns in a 
letter that ended by stating that if the union “still had concerns about the 
propriety of [the respondent’s] actions concerning the reduction-in-force, 
please advise. . . .” 
     With particular emphasis on these facts, the Board agreed with the 
judge that the respondent was obligated to bargain with the union 
concerning the elimination of the unit position and the termination of the 
unit employee.  The Board, therefore, adopted the judge’s finding that 
the respondent’s failure to do so was unlawful. 
3.  Withdrawal of Recognition 
     In MSK Corp.,97 the Board held that, in determining whether an 
employer had a good-faith uncertainty under Allentown Mack,98 
statements by known union opponents to the effect that other unnamed 
employees opposed union representation were entitled to little weight 
and that, even when combined with statements expressing opposition to 
the union by 30 percent of unit employees, did not demonstrate a good-
faith uncertainty. 
     The respondent was a Burns99 successor.  The respondent knew the 
following regarding the employees’ support for the union: (a) some 
employees recently signed authorization cards; (b) six identified 
employees (out of a unit of 20) made statements directly to management 
opposing union representation; (c) some unidentified employees made 
statements directly to a management official opposing union 
representation; and (d) two identified employees told management that 
“most” of the employees and “most of the employees I talked to” 
opposed the union. 
 
97 341 NLRB No. 11 (Chairman Battista and Members Liebman and Walsh). 
98  Allentown Mack Sales & Service v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998). 
99  NLRB v. Burns Security Service, 406 U.S. 272 (1972). 
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     The Board noted that, under Allentown Mack, an employer claiming 
good-faith doubt “must demonstrate ‘doubt’ in the sense of ‘uncertainty’ 
rather than ‘disbelief,’” and that the Board “does not exclude classes of 
evidence—such as an employee’s hearsay assertion to the employer 
regarding the antiunion sentiments of other employees—but rather 
accords such evidence the weight to which it is entitled based on its 
reliability.”  The Board gave “some weight” to the fact that the 
respondent knew some employees signed authorization cards and gave 
“substantial weight” to the fact that six identified employees made 
statements directly to management opposing union representation.  The 
Board found that the statements by unidentified employees directly to a 
management official opposing union representation “would add little” 
because it was unclear how many employees made the statements and it 
was unclear to what extent these employees included the six employees 
already identified as opposing union representation.100  The Board gave 
“little weight” to the two employees’ statements regarding other 
employees’ opposition to union representation because the respondent 
knew the two employees were outspoken union opponents, the other 
employees were not identified (hence raising the possibility of double-
counting the six employees already identified as opposing union 
representation), and it was unclear whether the references to “most of the 
employees” referred to “most” of a small start-up crew rather than 
“most” of the bargaining unit.  The Board concluded that “reliable 
evidence” showed only 6 of 20 unit employees opposed union 
representation and that this did not demonstrate good-faith uncertainty. 
     Generally speaking, an employer may lawfully withdraw recognition 
from a union that no longer has majority status.101  Under Section 8(a)(5) 
of the Act, however, an employer must recognize its employees’ 
collective-bargaining representative for the year following certification, 
absent unusual circumstances.  This is so even if the employer is 
presented during that time with evidence indicating that a majority of 
unit employees wish no longer to be represented by the union.102  In 
Chelsea Industries,103 the Board held further that an employer could not 
withdraw recognition after the certification year ended based on a 
decertification petition signed by employees and received by the 
employer 5 months before the end of the certification year.  Moreover, an 
employer is barred from relying on an employee petition to withdraw 
 
100 The judge discredited the management official’s testimony regarding the unidentified employees’ 
statements; the Board affirmed the credibility determination but found that, even if credited, the 
testimony would be entitled to little weight regarding the good-faith uncertainty issue. 
101 Laidlaw Waste Systems, 307 NLRB 1211 (1992); Market Place, 304 NLRB 995 (1991). 
102 Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954). 
103 331 NLRB 1648 (2000), enfd. 285 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
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recognition if the petition is tainted by the employer’s unfair labor 
practices.104  Thus, evidence supporting a withdrawal of recognition 
“must be raised in a context free of unfair labor practices of the sort 
likely, under all the circumstances, to affect the union’s status, cause 
employee disaffection, or improperly affect the bargaining relationship 
itself.”105  However, Lee Lumber requires specific proof of a causal 
relationship between the unfair labor practices and the loss of support.  
The standards for such a causal nexus are the closeness in time to the 
withdrawal of recognition and the likelihood that the unlawful conduct 
would have a lasting detrimental effect on employees, diminish the union 
in their eyes, or affect morale, union activity, or union membership.106
     In LTD Ceramics,107 the respondent withdrew recognition from the 
union based on an employee petition received after the certification year 
ended, but bearing signatures dated on the last day of the certification 
year.  The Board majority agreed with the judge’s dismissal of the 
8(a)(5) allegation, finding, as did the judge, that the prematurity of the 
signatures was “so slight as to be insignificant,” and that Chelsea 
Industries was distinguishable and did not bar reliance on the petition. 
     In addition, the Board found that the respondent violated Section 
8(a)(5) and (1) by posting and implementing an attendance policy that 
was a subject of negotiation between the parties, without agreement to 
the policy itself, or to posting and implementation, by the union.  But the 
majority further held, however, that this unfair labor practice was not 
sufficient to taint the petition.  The Board found no “causal nexus” 
between the unilateral change and the employees’ disaffection with the 
union, noting that, although the unilateral change was relatively close in 
time to the withdrawal of recognition, nothing in the record indicated that 
it had a detrimental or lasting effect on unit employees, or that it 
diminished the union’s standing in their eyes, or adversely affected their 
morale, organizational activities, or union membership. 
     Member Walsh, in dissent, found that the respondent’s unilateral 
posting of a new attendance policy was causally connected to the petition 
and the subsequent withdrawal of recognition.  He noted that the petition 
was circulated very soon after the policy was posted, there was no 
showing of employee disaffection prior to the posting and that the 
unilateral posting indicated to employees that their union was irrelevant.  
Member Walsh found it unnecessary to reach the issue of the timeliness 
 
104 United Supermarkets, 287 NLRB 119 (1987), enfd. 862 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1989). 
105 Lee Lumber & Building Material Corp., 322 NLRB 175, 177 (1996), affd. in part and remanded 
in part 117 F.3d 1454 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
106 Master Slack Corp., 271 NLRB 78, 84 (1984). 
107 341 NLRB No. 14 (Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber; Member Walsh concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
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of the petition. 
     In AT Systems West,108 the Board, among other things, reversed the 
judge’s finding that the respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(5) and (2) 
of the Act by withdrawing recognition from the union and thereafter 
entering into a collective-bargaining agreement with a different labor 
organization.  The Board found that the respondent’s withdrawal of 
recognition was unlawful because it came at a time when the respondent 
was obligated to bargain with the union for a reasonable period following 
a settlement agreement.  The majority additionally found that the 
withdrawal of recognition was unlawful because there was a nexus 
between the employees’ disaffection with the union and the respondent’s 
unremedied unfair labor practices. 
     In July 1998, the respondent began face-to-face negotiations with the 
union concerning seven or eight of the respondent’s branches, including 
Sacramento.  No collective-bargaining agreement was reached.  On 
March 3, 1999, the respondent sent specifically tailored letters to unit 
employees at each of its Sacramento, Oakland, and Ventura facilities 
entitled “Don’t Blame Us.”  These letters expressed the respondent’s 
frustration that 17 months had passed without a signed collective-
bargaining agreement and pointed out that some employees had gone 3 
or 4 years without a pay increase.  In a section entitled “How Can We 
Move Forward?” the letters suggested five courses of action the 
employees could take, including going to the NLRB and demanding a 
decertification election, and establishing in some creditable form to the 
respondent that the union did not represent a majority of the employees.  
Attached to the letters were contract proposals that the respondent was 
simultaneously providing, for the first time, to the union. 
     The union filed unfair labor practice charges over the letters and the 
Board, in Armored Transport, Inc.,109 found that by sending employees 
the letters with attached contract proposals the union engaged in 
unlawful direct dealing in violation of Section 8(a)(5).  The Board also 
found that the respondent unlawfully solicited employees to decertify the 
union in violation of Section 8(a)(1).  This decision issued after the 
judge’s opinion in this case. 
     In July 1999, the respondent implemented a new wage scale for the 
Sacramento unit employees.  The union filed an unfair labor practice 
charge alleging an unlawful unilateral change.  On September 9, 1999, 
the respondent submitted a last, best, and final proposal for the 
Sacramento unit.  On September 18, 1999, the union conducted a 
 
108 341 NLRB No. 12 (Members Liebman and Walsh; Chairman Battista concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
109 339 NLRB 374 (2003). 
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ratification vote among the Sacramento employees and the tally showed 
21 votes against ratification and 20 in favor.  However, a comparison of 
this tally to documents each employee signed before voting showed that 
there were two more votes cast than employee documents.  When some 
employees objected to the vote, a union official told them that one or two 
votes were not significant enough to warrant a revote.  About 2 months 
later the respondent implemented the terms of the final offer. 
     In December 1999, the union and the respondent entered into an 
informal Board settlement agreement regarding the July 1999 unilateral 
wage increase.  Under the terms of the settlement agreement, the 
respondent agreed that it would not unilaterally implement new wages 
and that it would, on request, meet and bargain with the union. 
     In early March 2000, several Sacramento employees began soliciting 
unit employees to oppose continued union representation.  A majority of 
unit employees signed the petition, which the employees turned over to 
the respondent.  Upon receiving this, the respondent concluded that the 
union no longer represented a majority of its Sacramento employees.  
Following its withdrawal of recognition from the union, the respondent 
recognized and bargained with the employee-formed union, ATSEA.  
After one bargaining session, the respondent entered into a collective-
bargaining agreement with ATSEA. 
     Applying the factors set forth in Lee Lumber & Building Material 
Corp.,110 the Board found that the respondent failed to bargain with the 
union for a reasonable time following the December 1999 settlement 
agreement, and thus, it was not free to withdraw recognition from the 
union.  The Board relied on the facts that this was an initial contract, the 
bargaining was complex, only 3 months had elapsed since the settlement 
agreement, and the parties were exchanging letters showing the intent to 
bargain in good faith.  In these circumstances, the Board concluded the 
respondent had not satisfied its obligation to continue bargaining with the 
union for a reasonable period, and that the respondent violated Section 
8(a)(5) by withdrawing recognition at a time when it was obligated to 
bargain under the terms of the settlement agreement.  The Board also 
found that the respondent recognized and bargained with the employee-
formed union ATSEA in violation of Section 8(a)(2), stating that an 
employer may recognize and bargain only with the exclusive 
representative of its employees. 
     Members Liebman and Walsh, citing Master Slack Corp.,111 
additionally found that there was a causal relationship between the 
 
110 334 NLRB 399 (2001), enfd. 310 F.3d 209 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
111 271 NLRB 78 (1984). 
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respondent’s unremedied unfair labor practices (the “Don’t Blame Us” 
letters and attached contract proposals) and the employees’ disaffection 
from the union.  The majority found that the unlawful conduct was of a 
type that “reasonably tends to have a negative effect on union 
membership and to undermine the employees’ confidence in the 
effectiveness of their selected collective-bargaining representative.”112  
The Board majority found it not surprising that an employee petition 
rejecting the union arose, and that under these circumstances, the 
respondent could not lawfully challenge the union’s majority status.  
Therefore, the respondent’s withdrawal of recognition from the union 
and its refusal to bargain with the union, violated 8(a)(5) of the Act. 
     In his partial dissent, Chairman Battista stated that he agreed with the 
judge that there was no causal nexus between the respondent’s “Don’t 
Blame Us” letters and the employees’ disaffection from the union.  
Chairman Battista noted that the period between the last of the letters and 
the employee disaffection was 9 months and there were no unfair labor 
practices during that period.  Rather, the parties bargained in good faith 
after the last of the letters.  Also, there was an intervening event, closer 
in time to the disaffection, which would also reasonably cause the 
disaffection.  That event was the ratification vote, which was marred by 
irregularities in the count.  Chairman Battista also cited evidence that the 
employees were dissatisfied with the lack of effective representation at 
the bargaining table.  On these bases he concluded that the evidence 
failed to establish a causal nexus between the earlier unfair labor 
practices and the employee disaffection. 
4.  Refusal to Execute Collective-Bargaining Agreement 
     In Hempstead Park Nursing Home,113 the panel majority reversed the 
administrative law judge’s finding that the respondent violated Section 
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act when it failed and refused to execute the draft 
collective-bargaining agreement submitted to it by the union.  The 
majority found that the respondent was under no duty to execute the draft 
agreement because the parties did not achieve a “meeting of the minds” 
on the pension plan provision of the draft contract.  Although the parties 
memorialized their agreement for a successor collective-bargaining 
agreement in a memorandum of agreement (MOA), the majority found 
that the parties “attached reasonable but incompatible meanings to 
certain terms within the pension plan provision as set forth in the parties’ 
MOA.” 
 
112 Slip op. at 5. 
113 341 NLRB No. 41 (Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber; Member Walsh dissenting). 
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     The parties reached agreement on a successor collective-bargaining 
contract in March 2002, and memorialized this agreement in a written 
memorandum of agreement.  The MOA contained the substantive terms 
of a collective-bargaining agreement, but was not a fully integrated 
contract.114  Among other things, the MOA “specifically addressed” the 
“New York State Nurses Association Pension Plan.”  The pension plan, 
as stated in the MOA, set forth the rates (per annum per full-time 
employee) pursuant to which the respondent was obligated to contribute 
to the pension plan.  The dates of contribution read “yr 1,” “yr 2,” and 
“yr 3.”  In April, the union’s pension plan and benefit fund office sent the 
respondent a letter clarifying the dates of contribution for the pension 
plan provision.  The fund office’s interpretation was as follows: 
 
Section 9.03 – NYSNA Pension Plan 
Effective 03/01/02 — 12/31/02: $0 
Effective 01/01/03 — 12/31/03: $4,968 
Effective 01/01/04 — 12/31/04: $5,613 
Effective 01/01/05 — 02/28/05: To be determined by Trustees. 
 
The respondent did not reply to the fund office’s letter.  In September 
2002, the union sent the respondent the draft collective-bargaining 
agreement for signing.  The draft contract incorporated the fund’s 
interpretation of the pension plan provision.  After receiving the draft 
contract, the respondent wrote the union requesting, inter alia, that the 
dates to the pension plan be read as follows: 
 
03/01/02 — 02/28/03 = $0 
03/01/03 — 02/29/04 = $4,968 
03/01/04 — 02/28/05 = $5,613 
 
The union refused to change the dates of the pension plan section.  The 
union explained that “[t]he pension contributions are determined on a 
calendar year basis, from January 1st through December 31st of each 
year.”  Thereafter, respondent refused to execute the draft collective-
bargaining agreement. 
     Reversing the judge’s finding that the draft collective-bargaining 
agreement accurately reflected the parties’ understanding as stated in the 
MOA and thus that the respondent violated the Act by refusing to sign it, 
the majority found that both parties had not reached a “meeting of the 
minds” on the pension plan provision as set forth in the MOA.  Thus, the 
 
114 The opening page of the MOA read: 
Any and all terms and conditions of employment of the March 1, 1998 to February 28, 2001 
agreement, letters of understanding, or otherwise, not specifically addressed by this 
Memorandum of Agreement shall remain unchanged, and are hereby incorporated into this 
Memorandum of Agreement. 
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respondent was under no obligation to sign the draft contract.  The 
majority held that the respondent and the union attached reasonable but 
incompatible meanings to the terms “yr 1,” “yr 2,” and “yr 3” of the 
pension plan provision in the MOA.  “Because the MOA refers only to 
‘yr 1,’ ‘yr 2,’ and ‘yr 3,’ without beginning or ending dates, the Union 
maintain[ed] that the calendar year dating method of the prior contract 
was incorporated by reference into the MOA.”  The respondent, 
however, argued that the parties did not agree on a calendar-year dating 
method, but on a contract-year dating method.  Under the respondent’s 
interpretation, the references to “yr 1,” “yr 2,” and “yr 3” correspond to 
the first, second, and third years of the successor contract.115  Because of 
the ambiguity surrounding the terms “yr 1,” “yr 2,” and “yr 3,” and the 
parties’ attachment of different meanings to those terms, the majority 
found that the parties did not reach a “meeting of the minds.”  “When . . . 
misunderstandings may be traced to ambiguity for which neither party is 
to blame or for which both parties are equally to blame, and the parties 
differ in their understanding, their seeming agreement will create no 
contract.”  Meat Cutters Local 120 (United Employers, Inc.).116  Thus, 
the majority dismissed the complaint. 
     In dissent, Member Walsh agreed with the administrative law judge 
and found that the union’s interpretation of the pension plan provision 
was the reasonable interpretation, and the respondent’s was not.  Member 
Walsh explained: 
 
The MOA, in plain language, states that the terms and conditions 
of employment of the predecessor agreement will remain 
unchanged and are incorporated into the new agreement if “not 
specifically addressed by this Memorandum of Agreement.”  
Because the MOA did not give specific dates in the pension plan 
provision, the Union properly incorporated the calendar year 
dating method of the pension plan provision from the previous 
agreement. 
 
Accordingly, Member Walsh would have found the violation. 
5.  Claims of Inability to Pay 
     In AMF Trucking & Warehousing, Inc.,117 the Board majority 
reversed the administrative law judge and found that the respondent’s 
 
115 The respondent also argued that, contrary to the union’s understanding, it never agreed to allow 
the trustees the unfettered discretion in setting the contribution rates for the last 2 months of the 
pension plan.  The majority found merit in the respondent’s argument, citing, inter alia, ambiguity of 
the phrase “Insert new rates as determined by Trustees,” at the beginning of sec. 9.03. 
116 154 NLRB 16, 26–27 (1965). 
117 342 NLRB No. 116 (Chairman Battista and Member Meisburg; Member Walsh dissenting). 
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statements during the course of negotiations did not effectively 
communicate a claim of inability to pay, and thus the respondent’s 
subsequent refusal to furnish the union with requested financial 
information did not violate the Act. 
     The case involved the respondent’s comments during negotiations for 
a successor contract.  The negotiations focused primarily on wages, 
health insurance, and pension plans.  Responding to the union’s proposal 
to increase health and pension benefits, the respondent stated that the 
union was asking for “pie in the sky,” that the respondent had purchased 
the company “in distress a year and a half earlier, and that the company 
was still in distress.”  The respondent added that it was “fighting to [stay] 
alive,” and was “weaker this year” than it had been in previous years.  At 
the subsequent negotiating session, the respondent responded to the 
union’s proposal to increase wages by stating that it was “still fighting to 
keep the business alive,” and that “the business was weaker than it was in 
previous years.”  Thereafter, the union requested access to the 
respondent’s financial records.  The respondent refused the request, 
denying that it was claiming an inability to pay. 
     Reversing the administrative law judge’s finding that the respondent 
was obligated to grant the union’s request for access to the financial 
records, the majority held that the respondent’s statements during 
negotiations did not communicate an inability to pay.  The majority 
found that the respondent’s statements neither claimed that it had 
insufficient assets nor that acquiescence to the union’s demands would 
cause it to go out of business.  The majority found that the respondent’s 
statements were distinguishable from those at issue in Shell Co.,118 where 
an respondent characterized its financial situation as “a matter of 
survival.”  The majority also found the respondent’s statements 
distinguishable from those at issue in Lakeland Bus Lines,119 where an 
employer said, among other things, that “the future of [the company] 
depends on” acceptance of the employer’s offer.  The majority found 
that, unlike the statements in those cases, the respondent’s statements 
here did not convey any bleak predictions about the employer’s future.  
The majority also found that it was unnecessary to pass on whether the 
Board’s decision in Lakeland, which was not enforced by the D.C. 
Circuit, was correctly decided. 
     In his dissent, Member Walsh rejected the majority’s finding that the 
respondent’s statements did not amount to a claim of inability pay.  He 
found that the respondent’s statements clearly communicated that it 
 
118 313 NLRB 133 (1993). 
119 335 NLRB 322 (2001), enf. denied 347 F.3d 955 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
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could not afford the union’s bargaining demands, and that if the 
respondent had to pay the union’s bargaining demands it would lose its 
fight for its economic life.  Accordingly, Member Walsh found that the 
respondent was obligated to furnish the union with the requested 
financial information. 
     In American Polystyrene Corp.,120 the Board majority found that an 
employer that denied claiming an inability to pay and that further 
explained why it chose not to meet the union bargaining demands was 
not obligated to furnish the union with requested financial information. 
     During bargaining for a successor contract, union negotiator Ferro 
asked Employer General Manager and Negotiator Tan if she was saying 
that she could not afford the union’s proposals.  Tan replied, “No, I can’t.  
I’d go broke.”121  At the end of that bargaining session, Ferro gave Tan a 
letter stating she had claimed she could not afford the union proposals 
and requesting to review the employer’s financial records.  The next day, 
Tan gave Ferro a letter stating: “I am rejecting this request.  While I have 
told you that we are a small company and times are tough, at no time 
have I ever told you we cannot afford your proposals.  Rather, in these 
uncertain economic times, we believe that we need to take a more 
cautious approach than what you propose.” 
     The judge found that Tan’s “go broke” comment constituted a claim 
that the respondent was unable to afford the union’s proposals.  The 
Respondent, therefore, was obligated to substantiate its claim.122  The 
judge found that Tan’s subsequent denial that she made the “go broke” 
statement was inadequate to retract the inability to pay claim.  
Accordingly, the judge found the respondent’s refusal to provide the 
information violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. 
     The Board majority reversed and found Tan’s denial of the request for 
information sufficiently retracted any claim of inability to pay that she 
might have made.  Relying on cases where employers have successfully 
retracted such claims,123 the majority found that “the Respondent’s 
response was made immediately and in writing, and it unequivocally 
advised the Union that the Respondent’s ability to pay for the Union’s 
bargaining proposals was not in question.”  The majority further stated 
that although Tan’s testimony denying the “go broke” statement was 
discredited by the judge, there was no evidence of bad faith on the 
respondent’s part in denying that it was unable to pay for the union’s 
 
120 341 NLRB No. 67 (Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber; Member Walsh dissenting). 
121 Tan denied making this statement.  The judge discredited her testimony on this point. 
122 NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956). 
123 Advertisers Mfg. Co., 275 NLRB 100 (1985); Central Management Co., 314 NLRB 763 (1994). 
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proposals.  Accordingly, the majority concluded that the respondent had 
no duty to provide the requested information. 
     In his dissent, Member Walsh found the respondent’s retraction of the 
inability to pay claim was insufficient and, therefore, the respondent’s 
refusal to provide the requested information violated the Act.  Tan’s 
retraction began with a false denial of the fact that she made the “go 
broke” statement.  As found by the judge, the union knew Tan had made 
the “go broke” statement.  Tan’s lie was a sign of bad faith and “place[d] 
in doubt the veracity of any subsequent statements about the subject 
matter of the lie.”  The union had no reason to believe the rest of Tan’s 
retraction statement and, therefore, according to the dissent, “the 
Respondent did not unequivocally retract its initial claim.” 
6.  Surface Bargaining 
     In St. George Warehouse,124 the Board adopted the administrative law 
judge’s findings that the respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by 
unilaterally transferring unit work to temporary agency employees and 
by refusing to provide the union with certain requested information.  The 
Board majority reversed the judge’s finding that the respondent violated 
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by engaging in surface bargaining. 
     The respondent warehouses containers from ships.  On October 27, 
2000, the union was certified as the exclusive collective-bargaining 
representative of a unit of warehouse employees. 
     Prior to the union election, the respondent had used a fluctuating 
number of temporary agency employees to supplement its permanent 
work force of “direct hires,” or bargaining unit employees.125  Sometime 
after the election, without notifying the union, the respondent decided to 
stop hiring direct hires and to use temporary agency employees instead.  
As unit employees quit or were fired for cause, the respondent did not 
replace them.  Instead, the respondent used temporary agency employees.  
As a result, the unit decreased over time, from about 42 employees at the 
time of the election to about 8 employees at the time of the July 2002 
hearing before the judge. 
     Meanwhile, from October 2001 through at least May 2002, the parties 
met and bargained. Although they reached agreement on some issues, 
they did not reach an overall agreement.  
     The Board adopted the judge’s finding that the respondent violated 
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by unilaterally transferring unit work to 
 
124 341 NLRB No. 120 (Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber; Member Walsh dissenting in 
part). 
125 The bargaining unit description specifically excluded temporary agency employees. 
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temporary agency employees and by failing to provide the union with 
certain requested information. 
     On the surface bargaining allegation, however, the Board majority 
reversed the judge and found that the totality of the respondent’s conduct 
did not support a finding of surface bargaining.  The majority 
emphasized that the respondent met frequently and regularly with the 
union, made concessions and reached agreement on a number of issues, 
gave explanations for many of its bargaining positions, and did not 
engage in regressive bargaining or propose reductions in existing 
benefits.  The majority found that the respondent’s conduct away from 
the bargaining table did not show an intent to frustrate agreement.  
Although the respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by unilaterally 
transferring unit work to temporary agency employees and failing to 
provide certain requested information, the majority found no nexus 
between those violations and the respondent’s conduct at the bargaining 
table.  Although the transfer of unit work diminished the unit, the 
majority found that this did not preclude good-faith bargaining as to the 
remaining unit.  Furthermore, although the respondent failed to provide 
the union with certain requested information, the majority emphasized 
that the parties were able to continue negotiations while the information 
requests were pending.  Finally, the majority disagreed with dissenting 
Member Walsh’s reliance on a statement by the respondent’s counsel 
that the union would not get a contract and would end up abandoning the 
shop.  The majority found that the statement was simply a frustrated 
prediction that the parties would not be able to reach agreement, was not 
evidence that the respondent intended to frustrate agreement, and, in any 
event, did not outweigh the other evidence of good-faith bargaining.  
Accordingly, the majority reversed the judge and dismissed the surface 
bargaining allegation. 
     In dissent, Member Walsh found that the totality of the respondent’s 
conduct demonstrated surface bargaining.  Member Walsh emphasized 
the respondent’s other violations of Section 8(a)(5) and (1), including the 
unilateral transfer of unit work to temporary agency employees and the 
refusal to provide requested information.  Contrary to the majority, 
Member Walsh found a nexus between these violations and the 
respondent’s conduct during negotiations.  Member Walsh found that the 
unilateral transfer of unit work demonstrated the respondent’s intent to 
eliminate the very unit for which the parties were bargaining.  Regarding 
the refusal to provide information, Member Walsh noted that the 
requested information was related to the transfer of unit work to 
temporary agency employees, which was a key point of contention 
during bargaining.  Contrary to his colleagues, Member Walsh also 
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found that the statement by the respondent’s counsel and lead negotiator 
that the union would not get a contract strongly suggested that the 
respondent lacked a sincere desire to reach agreement.  Finally, Member 
Walsh found that the respondent’s conduct at the bargaining table, such 
as its failure to give reasons for rejecting certain union proposals, further 
showed the respondent’s intent to frustrate bargaining.  Accordingly, 
Member Walsh found that the totality of the respondent’s conduct 
warranted a finding of surface bargaining in violation of Section 8(a)(5) 
and (1). 
7.  Proposals for Midterm Contract Modifications 
     In St. Barnabas Medical Center,126 the Board unanimously adopted 
the judge’s finding that the respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of 
the Act when it implemented wage increases during the term of the 
contract without the union’s consent.  The Board rejected the 
respondent’s argument that, “[o]nce the Union urgently requested that 
wages be reopened and the Medical Center agreed, the Union and the 
Medical Center incurred the same bargaining obligations and rights that 
they would enjoy or have had no contract been in existence.”  Rather, the 
Board, relying on well-established precedent, held that the proposal of a 
midterm modification does not impose a bargaining obligation on either 
party.  Accordingly, the Board found that the respondent was not 
justified in unilaterally increasing employees’ wages midterm. 
     The respondent is an acute care facility in Livingston, New Jersey.  It 
employs approximately 800 registered nurses (RNs) at its facility.  The 
union represents the respondent’s RNs, and has represented them since 
1991.  The most recent agreement between the parties covered the period 
of November 2, 1999 to November 1, 2002.  The collective-bargaining 
agreement did not contain a wage reopener provision. 
     By letter to the union dated January 23, 2001, the respondent 
requested a meeting with the union to discuss the staffing crisis with the 
hospital’s cardio-thoracic RNs.  That same day, the union made a 
“formal request . . . regarding the feasibility of a wage re-opener in the 
current collective-bargaining agreement.”  On April 16, 2001, the 
respondent distributed a memorandum to all employees of its facility.  
The memo stated that, effective June 1, all eligible employees would 
receive an increase of 5 percent.  Subsequently, the respondent notified 
the union that an impasse had been reached on all outstanding issues, and 
thus the respondent would implement its last offer in its entirety 
“effective immediately.”  Despite the union’s objections, the respondent 
implemented the wage increase on June 7, 2001. 
 
126 341 NLRB No. 151 (Chairman Battista and Members Schaumber and Walsh). 
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     Affirming the judge’s finding that the respondent unlawfully 
implemented wage increases without the union’s consent, the Board 
reasoned that, “‘[a]s the recipient of a midterm proposal clearly has no 
duty to discuss or agree to it, we find the party proposing a midterm 
modification does not incur a bargaining obligation by tendering its 
proposal.’”  341 NLRB at slip op. 1 (quoting Connecticut Light & Power 
Co., 271 NLRB 766, 766–767 (1984)).  Furthermore, the Board found 
that “absent a wage reopener provision, the parties do not incur 
traditional bargaining obligations by meeting and discussing proposals 
for midterm modification.  Therefore, when the union requested that the 
respondent meet to discuss the ‘feasibility of a wage reopener,’” the 
union did not incur traditional bargaining obligations.  Accordingly, the 
respondent unlawfully increased unit wages during the term of the 
contract without the union’s consent. 
8.  Direct Dealing 
     In Georgia Power Co.,127 a Board majority held that the respondent’s 
establishment of a committee to review the crew leader selection process 
was a lawful effort by the respondent to formulate bargaining proposals 
on that topic, and did not constitute unlawful direct dealing with 
bargaining unit employees. 
     The respondent and the union had negotiated a memorandum of 
understanding concerning the crew leader selection process.  Some 
employees complained to management about that negotiated process. 
The respondent thereafter created an employee committee concerning the 
process.  The respondent specifically assured the union that the crew 
leader selection process would not change without negotiations with the 
union, and specifically advised the committee that it was not a forum for 
negotiations.  The committee met twice, and then submitted 
recommendations to management on the process. 
     A Board majority found, contrary to the administrative law judge, that 
the respondent did not engage in unlawful direct dealing with the 
employees on the committee.  Rather, the majority held that the 
establishment of the committee was a “lawful effort by Respondent to 
formulate proposals regarding the crew leader selection process.”  Slip 
op. at 2.  The majority emphasized that the respondent “made clear that it 
would honor its bargaining obligation to the Union” and that the crew 
leader selection process “would change only via negotiations.”  Id.  The 
majority accordingly concluded that the respondent “lawfully turned to 
its employees to assist it in formulating” bargaining proposals, while 
 
127 342 NLRB No. 18 (Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber; Member Walsh dissenting in 
part). 
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“remaining vigilant in honoring its obligation to bargain exclusively with 
the Union.”  Id. 
     Member Walsh dissented from the majority’s reversal of the judge’s 
finding that the respondent bypassed the union and dealt directly with 
bargaining unit employees in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the 
Act by establishing the employee committee to review the crew leader 
selection process.  “By virtue of the Union’s status as exclusive-
bargaining representative, the Respondent was obligated to deal only 
with the Union with respect to this subject.”128  Instead of doing so, 
however, Member Walsh observed that the respondent met directly with 
employees; without notifying the union created the committee; and 
solicited their comments on changes to the process, while flatly barring 
any participation by the union.  Member Walsh concluded that 
Respondent’s direct communication with unit employees, to the 
exclusion of the union, strongly supported a finding of unlawful direct 
dealing. 
9.  Duty to Provide Requested Information 
     In Southern California Gas Co.,129 the Board majority found that the 
respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by failing 
and refusing to provide the union with certain requested information.  
Rather, the majority found that the requested documents were not 
relevant or necessary for collective-bargaining purposes, but were sought 
for the purpose of pursuing a complaint with a state agency.  
Accordingly, the respondent was under no obligation to provide the 
union with the requested information. 
     By letter to the respondent dated February 20, 2002, the union stated 
that it had filed a formal safety complaint with the California Public 
Utilities Commission (CPUC) regarding incomplete Maximo130 backlog 
orders and deleted Maximo orders.  Thus, the union requested that the 
respondent provide it with copies of all cancelled Maximo orders for 
transmission and storage for the last 2 years so that it might “intelligently 
represent the members of the Union before the Commission.”  The 
respondent refused to provide the requested documents because they did 
not relate to a grievance or to general negotiations.  Thereafter, the 
General Counsel issued a complaint alleging that the respondent violated 
the Act by not providing the union with the requested information. 
     The majority found no merit in the General Counsel’s allegation.  The 
majority noted that “where a union requests information concerning the 
 
128 Slip op. at 4. 
129 342 NLRB No. 56 (Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber; Member Walsh dissenting). 
130 “Maximo” is a work order tracking system. 
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terms and conditions of employment of bargaining unit employees, that 
information is ‘presumptively relevant’ to the union’s proper 
performance of its collective-bargaining duties,” and thus an employer is 
obligated to provide the information requested.  Here, however, the 
majority found that the information requested by the union was not 
presumptively relevant to the union’s collective-bargaining 
responsibilities.  Rather, the requested Maximo information was relevant 
solely to a complaint filed with a state agency.  Because the complaint 
filed with the CPUC was “an action outside of the collective-bargaining 
context,” the respondent had no obligation to provide the union with the 
requested documents.  Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed. 
     Member Walsh dissented.  Because safety is a term and condition of 
employment over which an employer is required to bargain, and because 
here the requested documents related to the safety of employees, 
Member Walsh found that the respondent was obligated to provide the 
union with this information.  Furthermore, Member Walsh found that 
relevancy of the information sought was also shown by the union’s 2001 
letters to the respondent, which “shed light” on the 2002 request.  Those 
letters indicated that the union was investigating a grievance and needed 
the Maximo orders to determine whether the safety of its employees was 
at risk.  Therefore, the respondent was aware from the 2001 letters that 
“the requested Maximo orders concerned a possible safety grievance.”  
Moreover, the dissent found that under the parties’ collective-bargaining 
agreement, employees have a right not “to work under conditions or 
operate equipment which does not meet the requirements of the State of 
California pertaining to employee safety.”  Thus, there was a “direct 
link” between the union’s pursuit of a safety claim with the CPUC and 
the parties’ contract.  Accordingly, the respondent was obligated to 
furnish the requested information and its refusal to do so is a violation of 
the Act. 
     In Boden Store Fixtures, Inc.,131 the Board held that the respondent 
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing the union’s 
request for information relating to a grievance filed by the union, even 
though the union was not a named party to the national agreement 
between the respondent and the Carpenters. 
     The respondent’s national agreement with the Carpenters obligated 
the respondent to comply with the terms of certain local agreements 
where it did business.  This included the union’s local agreement with an 
Oregon contractors’ association.  That local agreement contained a 
grievance procedure, which expressly authorized the union to process 
 
131 342 NLRB No. 68 (Chairman Battista and Members Liebman and Meisburg). 
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grievances concerning violations of the local agreement.  The local 
agreement also restricted employers’ ability to contract out bargaining 
unit work. 
     The union, having reason to believe that the respondent was violating 
the local contracting-out restriction, filed a grievance and requested 
certain information to assist it in processing the grievance.  The 
respondent refused to provide the information, asserting that the union 
did not have standing to make the request because it was not a named 
party to the national agreement and because the respondent had 
previously ended any bargaining relationship with the union. 
     The Board rejected the respondent’s argument.  The Board 
emphasized that, when the respondent agreed to comply with the union’s 
local agreement, specifically the local grievance procedure, the 
respondent accepted the Carpenters’ effective delegation of authority to 
the union to enforce the local agreement.  Accordingly, the Board held 
that the respondent was obliged to provide the union with requested 
information. 
     In Allen Storage and Moving Co.,132 a Board majority found that the 
respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by refusing to 
provide the union with confidential information.  Member Walsh found 
the information was not confidential.  The Board unanimously found that 
the respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by canceling 
employees’ insurance policies and violated Section 8(a)(3) by locking 
out its employees. 
     The respondent unilaterally cancelled the life insurance policies it 
maintained for employees.  Employees went on strike after the union 
apprised them of the status of contract negotiations, including the 
respondent’s cancellation of the insurance policies.  The respondent 
accepted the union’s unconditional offer to return to work with the 
caveat that there was not enough work for all employees to return 
immediately.  The respondent refused to provide the union with 
information about its work and twice locked out its employees.  The 
respondent told the union that the lockout would end if the union 
accepted a bargaining proposal that included, inter alia, a proposal to 
provide employees with an insurance policy that had a much lower face 
value than the cancelled policies. 
The Board unanimously found that the respondent unlawfully 
cancelled its employees’ life insurance policies.  The Board also 
unanimously found that the lockouts were unlawful under the principles 
 
132 342 NLRB No. 44 (Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber; Member Walsh dissenting in 
part). 
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of American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB,133 which states that a lockout is 
permissible if it is for the “sole purpose of bringing economic pressure to 
bear in support of [the employer’s] legitimate bargaining position.”  
Here, the lockouts were partly in support of the respondent’s insurance 
proposal, which, on its face, might have been legitimate had it not been 
proposed in the face of the respondent’s unlawful cancellation of the 
former policies.  The Board concluded that the respondent’s proposal 
would have required employees to accept the respondent’s unlawful 
conduct, i.e., cancellation of insurance policies, in order to end the 
lockout, and that, in this context, the lockouts cannot be found lawful. 
     The Board majority, reversing the judge, also found that the 
respondent lawfully refused to give the union information, which the 
respondent proved was confidential (customer names).  The respondent 
was concerned that the union would misuse the information, based on 
union contacts with its customers during the strike.  These concerns were 
justified, the Board majority stated, because the union contacted 
customers after the lockout, urging them to remain neutral during its 
dispute with the respondent and threatening to boycott them if they did 
not do so. 
     The majority noted that although an employer has a statutory duty to 
furnish a union with necessary and relevant information, a substantial 
claim of confidentiality may justify a refusal to provide otherwise 
relevant information.134  The Board requires an employer to bargain 
towards an accommodation satisfying both a union’s need for the 
information and the employer’s need for confidentiality.135  The Board 
majority found that the respondent had satisfied this bargaining 
obligation in offering the union a chance to review its “financials.”  The 
union, without explanation, did not accept that offer. 
     Member Walsh, dissenting, would not find the requested information 
to be confidential, finding no reason to suspect that the union would 
misuse the information at the time the respondent rejected the union’s 
request.  Member Walsh also found that the respondent’s offer to allow a 
review of its “financials” was not necessarily a substitute for the 
information the union sought, agreeing with the judge that the 
accommodation was proffered only because it would support the 
respondent’s claim that it had insufficient work after the strike. 
 
133 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965). 
134 Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979). 
135 Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 301 NLRB 1104, 1105–1106 (1991). 
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10.  Duty to Bargain Over Effects of Outsourcing Decision 
     In Komatsu America Corp.,136 the Board unanimously adopted the 
administrative law judge’s finding that the respondent did not violate 
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by failing to engage in meaningful effects 
bargaining regarding the respondent’s outsourcing initiative.  The Board 
held that the respondent satisfied its effects bargaining obligation and did 
not present the union with a fait accompli even though the respondent 
implemented a “volume-related” reduction in force before effects 
bargaining was complete. 
     The respondent announced its outsourcing initiative in January 2002, 
and transferred the manufacture of a rear suspension subassembly and, in 
June, one axle assembly, to its facilities in Japan, while negotiations were 
in progress.  On July 1, 2002, however, the respondent implemented a 
“volume-related” reduction in force because of a general downturn in 
business.  Even though the reduction in force adversely affected the 
entire work force, the employee complement in the machine shop, as a 
percentage of the entire work force, actually increased following the 
reduction in force.  At the time of the reduction in force, the vast 
majority of components manufactured in the machine shop had not been 
outsourced, and the respondent added work to the machine shop and 
increased the employee complement in the machine shop, as well as the 
entire work force, after July 1, as business improved. 
     In these circumstances, the Board concluded that a causal nexus had 
not been shown between the outsourcing initiative and the reduction in 
force.  The Board also concluded that the union was not deprived of its 
bargaining leverage nor was it presented with a fait accompli by the July 
1 reduction-in-force because the parties initiated effects bargaining prior 
to the June outsourcing and, notwithstanding the July 1 layoffs, 
continued substantive effects bargaining covering all open issues for 
some time thereafter. 
11.  Alleged Union Waiver of Right to Bargain 
     In Toma Metals, Inc.,137 the Board majority adopted the 
administrative law judge’s finding that the respondent violated Section 
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by recalling laid-off employees without 
providing the union with adequate notice and opportunity to bargain 
about the recalls. 
     On June 1, 2001, the union became the employees’ exclusive 
bargaining representative after winning an election.  On June 8, 2001, the 
 
136 342 NLRB No. 62 (Members Schaumber and Meisburg; Member Walsh dissenting in part on 
another point). 
137 342 NLRB No. 78 (Members Liebman and Schaumber; Chairman Battista dissenting in part). 
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respondent decided to lay off eight employees.  Shawn Rolley, a 
representative of the Steelworkers testified that he first learned of the 
layoffs through telephone calls from plant workers on June 8, 2001.  He 
stated that he did not contact the respondent after learning of the layoffs 
as he felt it would be futile, because the workers had been laid off by the 
time he received word of the respondent’s actions.  Over the following 
months, three of the employees who were laid off in June were recalled 
to work.  The respondent did not give the union prior notice of the 
recalls. 
     The Board majority agreed with the administrative law judge that the 
respondent violated the Act by failing to provide the union with adequate 
notice and opportunity to bargain over the recalls.  The majority noted 
that here the layoff and the recall of employees were linked, and the 
respondent gave the union advance notice of neither action.  The 
majority found that where the issue is one of the union’s alleged waiver 
of its right to bargain, the employer’s prior conduct clearly matters.  The 
majority stated that “[b]y presenting the layoff as a fait accompli, and by 
then failing to give advance notice of the recalls (an effect of the layoff), 
the Respondent excused any alleged failure of the Union’s to demand 
bargaining with respect to either the layoff or the recalls.”138
     The majority also noted that in a letter sent by the respondent to union 
representative Rolley 2 days before the layoffs, the respondent stated that 
it would be permanently laying off eight employees due to continuing 
unfavorable economic conditions.  The majority held that in light of the 
respondent’s representation to the union that the layoffs would be 
permanent, it is unreasonable to conclude that the union should have 
expected, at the time it learned of the layoffs, that the employees would 
be recalled.  The majority further noted that there is also no evidence that 
the respondent gave the union actual notice prior to the recalls and that 
the union did not find out about the recalls until after they had already 
occurred.  Therefore, the majority found that the union did not waive its 
right to bargain over the recalls. 
     Chairman Battista, dissenting in part, stated that he did not find that 
the respondent’s recall of laid-off employees was unlawful because, 
although he agreed that the respondent’s notice to the union about the 
layoffs was untimely, he found that the union subsequently became 
aware that there would be recalls.  Chairman Battista noted that even 
after such awareness, the union never requested bargaining about the 
manner of the recalls but rather simply filed unfair labor practice 
 
138 See, e.g., Intersystems Design Corp., 278 NLRB 759 (1986) (no waiver where union did not 
receive timely notice of layoff). 
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charges.  Chairman Battista stated that when the first recall occurred the 
union should have known that recalls were not only a possibility but a 
reality.  Chairman Battista found that layoffs and recalls are not part and 
parcel of the same thing.  Therefore, the duty to bargain about one is not 
encompassed in the duty to bargain over the other. 
12.  Unilateral Changes and Past Practice 
     In Courier-Journal I,139 the Board majority held that the respondent’s 
unilateral changes to the health insurance contributions of represented 
employees did not violate Section 8(a)(5) of the Act because the 
respondent acted in a manner consistent with a long-established past 
practice of treating represented employees the same as unrepresented 
employees. 
     The respondent publishes and distributes the Courier-Journal, a daily 
newspaper based in Louisville, Kentucky.  The union represents two 
bargaining units of employees working in the engraving and pressroom 
departments.  The most recent contracts for those departments expired on 
August 7, 2000. 
     The respondent has made changes in the costs or benefits of 
employees’ health insurance coverage for both represented and non-
represented employees each year since July 1, 1991.  In each instance, it 
did so without first bargaining with the union, and, until fall 2001, the 
union never objected. 
     On July 1, 2001, the respondent increased employees’ contributions 
for healthcare insurance.  On September 24, 2001, the respondent 
announced another increase in employee healthcare contributions 
effective January 1, 2002.  At a bargaining session on October 3, 2001, 
the union’s lead negotiator objected to the changes. 
     The union filed unfair labor practice charges, arguing that the 
respondent’s unilateral changes in health insurance premiums—a 
mandatory subject of bargaining—violated Section 8(a)(5). 
     The Board majority found that the changes did not violate Section 
8(a)(5) because they were implemented pursuant to a well established 
past practice.  The majority held the changes were lawful because the 
respondent regularly made similar unilateral changes, unopposed by the 
union, in the past, and because the changes were made in a manner 
consistent with contractual provisions requiring that changes to the 
benefits of represented employees should be made on the “same basis as” 
those of unrepresented employees. 
 
139 342 NLRB No. 113 (Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber; Member Liebman dissenting in 
part). 
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     Dismissing the dissent’s contention that the respondent had excessive 
discretion with respect to the prior changes, the Board’s majority held 
that the respondent’s discretion was limited by changes made to the 
benefits of unrepresented employees, and in accord with the past 
practice. 
     In her partial dissent, Member Liebman asserted that while the 
respondent had made many changes unilaterally in the bargaining unit 
employees’ health insurance benefits over a number of years, the union 
did not protest the changes until 2002.  She contended that lacking either 
the union’s formal or tacit approval, the respondent was no longer 
entitled to act unilaterally.  Member Liebman said: “When the union 
ceased to acquiesce, and actively opposed not only the respondent’s 
specific changes, but also its authority to act unilaterally at all, that 
underpinning was swept away.”  She would find that the respondent 
violated Section 8(a)(5) by making unilateral changes in unit employees’ 
health care benefits in January 2002. 
     In Courier-Journal II,140 the companion case to Courier-Journal I,141 
the Board majority found, as they had in Courier-Journal I, that the 
respondent’s practice of making unilateral changes to health insurance 
premiums became an established term and condition of employment, and 
therefore that the respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(5) when it acted 
consistently with that practice by making further unilateral changes. 
     In this case, as in Courier-Journal I, the respondent’s collective-
bargaining agreement (with a different union) authorized the respondent 
to change the costs and benefits of the health care plan for bargaining 
unit employees unilaterally, on the same basis as for nonrepresented 
employees.  Pursuant to this provision, the respondent made numerous 
unilateral changes in both represented and nonrepresented employees’ 
health insurance costs and benefits during the term of the contract.  After 
the contract expired, the respondent unilaterally increased employee 
contributions effective July 1, 2000, July 1, 2001, January 1, 2002, and 
January 1, 2003.  The union did not protest the changes until it filed a 
charge on January 29, 2003. 
     Under those circumstances, the majority found that the respondent’s 
practice has become an established term and condition of employment, 
and thus did not violate the Act. 
     As in Courier-Journal I, Member Liebman dissented, arguing that the 
union did not waive its right to bargain over postcontract expiration 
changes in employee health benefits and costs, and therefore that the 
 
140 342 NLRB No. 118 (Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber; Member Liebman dissenting). 
141 342 NLRB No. 113. 
Sixty-Ninth Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board 136
 
                                                
respondent’s unilateral changes in those conditions violated Section 
8(a)(5). 
13.  Unilateral Change that is not Material, Substantial, 
or Significant 
     In Crittenton Hospital,142 the Board reversed the administrative law 
judge’s finding that the respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the 
Act by failing and refusing to notify and bargain with the union over the 
change made to its dress code policy in October 2001, prohibiting the 
registered nurses (RNs) from using acrylic or artificial nails on the job. 
     The respondent operates an acute care hospital.  The Michigan Nurses 
Association (MNA) was the bargaining representative for the 
respondent’s RNs for several years before it ultimately lost a second 
election to the union.  In April 2001, the parties reached a contract that 
made no reference to the dress code policy that had been in place under 
the prior MNA contract.  In October 2001, Michael Jagels, the 
respondent’s director of human resources and chief negotiator, changed 
the dress code policy by requiring employees who provided hands-on 
health care to patients, such as RNs, to remove acrylic or artificial nails.  
Under the prior policy, fingernails could not be longer than 1/8 inch past 
the tip of an employee’s fingers and the use of acrylic and decorated 
nails was “strongly discouraged.” 
     In finding that the respondent unlawfully failed to notify and bargain 
with the union over the October change made to its dress code policy, the 
judge reasoned, among other things, that apparel rules were a mandatory 
subject of bargaining under Board law.  Although it acknowledged this 
precedent, the Board found the dress code change lawful because the 
General Counsel failed to show that the change was material, substantial, 
and significant.  The Board explained that the revised dress code did not 
constitute a material departure from the previous policy.  Further, the 
Board observed that the General Counsel failed to show how this change 
affected or would affect the RNs’ terms and conditions of employment. 
14.  Transfer of Unit Employees to Nonunit Positions 
     In Hanson SJH Construction,143 the Board majority affirmed the 
administrative law judge’s finding that the respondent did not violate 
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act when, at the employees’ request, it 
transferred six employees from the laborers bargaining unit to the heavy 
equipment operators unit, withdrew recognition from the union as their 
representative, and unilaterally discontinued trust fund contributions on 
 
142 342 NLRB No. 67 (Members Schaumber, Walsh, and Meisburg). 
143 342 NLRB No. 98 (Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber; Member Walsh dissenting). 
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their behalf.  The majority found that the work of the six transferred 
employees did not remain essentially the same as the work that they had 
performed in the laborers unit. 
     The respondent’s operations consist of employees in three units that 
work at a common paving site: a laborers unit (the laborers), a drivers 
unit (the drivers), and a heavy equipment operators unit (the operators).  
Two distinct unions represent the laborers and drivers, but no union 
represents the operators.  The laborers perform operators work on an 
“overflow” or “as assigned” basis, when there are no operator unit 
employees available to complete the operating tasks.  Thus, the laborers 
are never guaranteed operator work. 
     In August 2001, employees in the drivers unit went on strike, and 
many of the laborers honored this strike.  Four of the laborers and two of 
the laborer foremen honored the strike for a short period of time, but 
subsequently asked the respondent if they could return to work in the 
operators unit.  The respondent granted their request and transferred the 
six employees to the operators unit, where they received the higher 
operators wage rate, plus operator fringe benefits.  The six employees 
resigned from the union; at that time, the respondent stopped applying 
the union’s contract to the six employees and discontinued making 
contractually required trust fund payments on their behalf. 
     It is well settled that an employer violates Section 8(a)(5) of the Act 
when, without the consent of the union, it removes a group of employees 
from a bargaining unit without showing that the group is sufficiently 
dissimilar from the remainder of the unit to warrant removal.  See, e.g., 
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 312 NLRB 373, 377 (1993).  Here, the 
majority rejected the General Counsel’s argument that the six transferred 
employees performed essentially the same duties in their operator 
positions as they had in their laborer positions.  Rather, the majority 
found that although the laborers performed some operator functions, they 
had no “entitlement” to operator work.  “The record is clear that the 
essential work of the laborers unit was laborers work and that operators 
work in this unit was ‘non-full time, non-guaranteed, as available, as 
assigned, on again off again.”144  Furthermore, after the employees 
transferred into the operators unit, they no longer performed any laborers 
work, but were only assigned operator duties.  Accordingly, the Board 
majority dismissed the complaint. 
     In his dissent, Member Walsh found that the respondent did not 
satisfy its burden of establishing that the removed group of employees 
was “sufficiently dissimilar” from the remainder of the unit to warrant 
 
144 Slip op. at 2. 
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removal.  Member Walsh specifically found that “while in the laborers 
unit, the four employees performed some operator work.  After their 
removal from the laborers unit, the employees performed primarily 
operator duties, but also regularly performed some laborer work.  In sum, 
the employees’ new job was the mirror image of their former job.”  
Therefore, Member Walsh would have found that the respondent violated 
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 
D.  Union Interference with Employee Rights 
     Even as Section 8(a) of the Act imposes certain restrictions on 
employers, Section 8(b) limits the activities of labor organizations and 
their agents.  Section 8(b)(1)(A), which is generally analogous to Section 
8(a)(1), makes it an unfair labor practice for a union or its agents to 
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights, 
which generally guarantee them freedom of choice with respect to 
collective activities.  However, an important proviso to Section 
8(b)(1)(A) recognizes the basic right of a labor organization to prescribe 
its own rules for acquisition and retention of membership. 
1.  Operation of Hiring Hall 
     In Electrical Workers Local 48 (Oregon-Columbia Chapter of 
NECA),145 the Board held that the union’s departures—both intentional 
and unintentional—from the rules governing its hiring hall violated 
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. 
     IBEW Local 48 operates a hiring hall in Portland, Oregon.  From 
October 1992 to May 1994, Local 48 departed from the dispatching rules 
governing its hall, both intentionally and unintentionally.  Intentional 
out-of-order dispatches were given to applicants in the following 
categories:  (1) those who engaged in union organizing as “salts” (union 
members who take jobs with nonunion employers in order to organize 
their employees) and “peppers” (newly organized employees of 
nonunion employers who remain with those employers for a time to 
engage in further organizing); (2) “stripped” employees (i.e., employees 
of nonunion employers who are persuaded to join the union and leave 
their employer); (3) those given off-the-books dispatches as a reward for 
joining Local 48; (4) those who, following discharge, were promptly 
redispatched to the discharging employer to resolve a dispute over the 
discharge; (5) those who preserved their position on the out-of-work list 
despite missing a compulsory resign deadline; and (6) those dispatched 
in response to a name request.  Unintentional departures from the hiring-
 
145 342 NLRB No. 10 (Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber; Member Walsh dissenting in 
part). 
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hall rules benefited applicants of two kinds:  those permitted to register 
on book 1 at a time when they were ineligible to do so, and those who 
improperly retained their position on the out-of-work list due to Local 
48’s failure to apply the contractual “short call” rule. 
     Under Board law, a union’s deliberate departure from the rules 
governing its hiring hall violates the duty of fair representation and 
Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) unless the union demonstrates that the 
departure was pursuant to a valid union-security clause or was necessary 
to the effective performance of its representative function.  Applying this 
test, the majority found unlawful all six categories of intentional 
dispatching irregularities listed above.  In doing so, the majority 
explained at some length its view that rewarding union organizing efforts 
with out-of-order dispatches cannot be justified as necessary to the 
effective performance of the representative function.  Quoting the 
Supreme Court’s statement that “the policy of the Act is to insulate 
employees’ jobs from their organizational rights,”146 the majority found 
this policy “plainly undermined by a dispatching regime that steers work 
to employees who engage in union organizing, to the disadvantage of 
those who do not.” 
     Dissenting in part, Member Walsh would have found no violation for 
Local 48’s dispatching practices in furtherance of its organizational 
efforts.  In his view, “salts” and “peppers” forewent opportunities to 
qualify for book 1 as well as more lucrative jobs with union contractors, 
and Local 48’s departures from its dispatch rules “compensated them for 
their personal sacrifice and prevented them from being unfairly penalized 
for their organizing work.”  Member Walsh also disagreed with the 
majority as to the lawfulness of dispatching practices (2), (4), and (6) 
listed above. 
     Turning to Local 48’s unintentional dispatching irregularities, the 
Board unanimously found that they evinced reckless disregard for 
established procedures and employees’ interests, and therefore 
constituted gross negligence under applicable Board law.147  The Board 
acknowledged that the D.C. and Ninth Circuits apply a different standard 
than does the Board, but found it unnecessary to address that difference 
because the same result would be reached in this case under either 
standard. 
 
146 Radio Officers’ Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 40 (1954). 
147 Plumbers Local 342 (Contra Costa Electric), 329 NLRB 688 (1999); Plumbers Local 342 
(Contra Costa Electric), 336 NLRB 549 (2001). 
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E.  Multiple Union Liability 
     In Electrical Workers Local 98 (Wohlsen Construction),148 a majority 
of the Board held that respondent Electrical Workers Local 98 and 
respondent Electrical Workers Local 380 were jointly and severally 
liable for certain 8(b) violations committed by Local 98 representatives. 
     In 1998, Local 98 Organizer Timothy Browne and Local 380 
Organizer Kenneth MacDougall initiated an organizing campaign at 
State Electric (State).  MacDougall was “head[ing] up that campaign.”  
Ultimately, Local 380, alone, filed a petition seeking certification, 
though Local 98 Organizer Browne played an integral role in the 
campaign. 
     MacDougall and Browne’s organizing strategy included visiting 
employers who were doing business with State, or were considering 
doing so, regarding the employers’ contracting with State.  On one 
occasion, MacDougall and Browne picketed a jobsite while State was on 
the job. 
     Also, Local 380 Organizer MacDougall and Local 98 Organizer 
Browne monitored State’s attempt to win a contract on a high school 
construction project in the Cheltenham, PA school district.  Browne 
attended a school district meeting, where he threatened to picket the job, 
warning that “no one would come in or out and this would cause a lot of 
delays.”  MacDougall attended the meeting, but did not appear with 
Browne.  The evidence showed that, although MacDougall and Browne 
had discussed beforehand the latter’s appearance at the meeting, they did 
not discuss picketing the district or its jobsite. 
     Neither Local 380 nor Local 98 ever picketed the Cheltenham high 
school jobsite.  Browne, however, visited the site several times.  He took 
pictures of employees and the license plates on their vehicles, and 
blocked a State employee from operating a forklift for about 15–30 
minutes.  When the employee asked Browne to move, Browne 
responded, “I know who you are, I know where you live.  We’re going to 
get you some day.”  Browne engaged in similar activities on additional 
occasions.  However, there was no evidence that MacDougall discussed 
with Browne his visiting the District’s job site, knew that Browne 
intended to visit the site, or later learned or approved of any of Browne’s 
coercive conduct at the site. 
     The judge found that Local 98 Organizer Browne’s conduct involving 
State was unlawful, and also that Local 380 was jointly and severally 
liable for the conduct.  The judge reasoned that Local 380 and Local 98 
were engaged in a “joint venture” for the purpose of organizing State’s 
 
148 342 NLRB No. 74 (Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber; Member Liebman dissenting). 
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employees.  The judge relied on the Board’s decision in Sheet Metal 
Workers Local 19 (Delcard Associates),149 which held that, in a joint 
venture among unions, each union is liable for unfair labor practices 
committed by the other unions in furtherance of their shared objective.  
As an alternative basis for finding Local 380 liable for the violations, the 
judge found that Local 98 Organizer Browne, himself, was Local 380’s 
agent at the times in question. 
     The Board majority affirmed the judge’s finding that Local 380 was 
liable for Browne’s misconduct.  However, the majority relied only on 
the judge’s agency analysis, finding it unnecessary to pass on the judge’s 
application of Delcard Associates.  The majority found that Browne had 
actual authority to speak for Local 380 at the school district meeting, and 
that Browne had apparent authority to act on behalf of Local 380 at the 
construction site.  The majority emphasized that, although MacDougall 
had not authorized Browne’s particular acts, it was enough that 
MacDougall had permitted Browne to represent Local 380 in support of 
the campaign generally.150
     Member Liebman dissented.  She argued that, while Local 98 was 
liable for Browne’s unfair labor practices, the majority was stretching 
agency principles too far by imposing liability on Local 380.  Further, 
Member Liebman would have overruled the joint-venture theory of 
liability for the reasons given by the Third Circuit, principally, that the 
theory was inconsistent with the plain language of Section 8(b) of the 
Act.151
F.  Failure to Give 8(d) Notice 
     In Boghosian Raisin Packing Co.,152 the Board majority found that 
where a union unknowingly failed to send notice of dispute to the 
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS), as required by 
Section 8(d)(3), and the unit employees subsequently engaged in a strike, 
the strikers lost their protection under the Act pursuant to Section 
8(d)(3)’s loss-of-protected-status provision.  The strikers could therefore 
be lawfully discharged. 
     The union gave the respondent employer timely notice of intent to 
reopen the parties’ contract months before its expiration and, as required 
by Section 8(d)(3), also sent notice to the state labor mediation service.  
However, due to an undiscovered clerical error, the union’s notice to the 
FMCS was never sent. 
 
149 316 NLRB 426 (1995), enf. denied 154 F.3d 137 (3d Cir. 1998). 
150 Bio-Medical Applications of Puerto Rico, Inc., 269 NLRB 827, 828 (1984). 
151 NLRB v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 19, 154 F.3d 137 (3d Cir. 1998), denying enf. to 316 NLRB 
426 (1995). 
152 342 NLRB No. 32 (Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber; Member Liebman dissenting). 
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     After failing to reach agreement, the parties extended the contract 
(including the no-strike clause) beyond its expiration date in order to 
continue bargaining, subject to termination by either party.  However, the 
union ultimately took a strike vote and gave the required week’s notice 
of termination.  When doing so, the union completed a Teamsters Joint 
Council questionnaire regarding the dispute.  The questionnaire 
specifically questioned whether 8(d)(3) notice had been provided to the 
FMCS and directed that the return mail receipt of such delivered notice 
was to be affixed.  Without taking any action to verify that the required 
notice had been sent, the union signed the questionnaire, affirming that it 
had. 
     After receiving notice from the union terminating the extension 
agreement, the respondent’s counsel/negotiator called the FMCS to 
inquire whether the union had filed the required notice, and learned it 
had not.  The final bargaining session was held on September 30, at 
which time the parties remained far apart.  Thereafter, the union engaged 
in active preparations for a strike. 
     The strike began on October 30.  Promptly after it commenced, the 
respondent informed the union that no notice was on file at the FMCS 
and that unless the union could produce documentation showing that it 
had send the notice, the strike was unlawful and all of the strikers were 
subject to discharge.  Later the same day, the union offered to return to 
work under status quo terms and conditions of employment and resume 
bargaining.  The Union did not, however, take any other action to end the 
strike even when it became clear, on October 1, that the statutory 8(d)(3) 
notice requirement had not been met. 
     The picketing continued for 4 additional days.  Throughout that 
period the respondent continued to reserve the option to terminate all the 
strikers and ultimately did so. 
     Several months later, after the respondent had hired replacements, a 
majority of the employees then working at the plant signed a 
decertification petition.  The respondent then withdrew recognition from 
the union and made unilateral changes in terms of employment. 
     The majority found that Section 8(d)(3) expressly requires that before 
a union can engage in a strike it must, among other things, give written 
notice to FMCS of its intent to strike.  The majority stated that 8(d)(3) 
evidences “a clear expression of Congressional intent to minimize the 
interruption of commerce resulting from strikes and to further the use of 
mediation to assist parties in settling their labor disputes peaceably.”  
Here, those requirements were not met.  Although acknowledging that 
“enforcement of these statutory provisions may in circumstances yield a 
harsh result,” the majority noted that the requirements are clear, as are 
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the forfeiture consequences of noncompliance.  The majority rejected, as 
unsupported by the evidence, the dissent’s claim that the respondent 
purposely withheld from the union its knowledge that the 8(d)(3) 
requirement had not been met, for the purpose of inducing an unlawful 
strike.  The majority noted that the respondent testified, without 
contradiction, that—based on the absence of 8(d)(3) notice—it thought 
that the union would not strike.  Further, the majority noted that the 
obligation to notify FMCS was the union’s, and there is no basis for 
placing any obligation on the respondent to disclose the union’s failure to 
comply. 
     In dissent, Member Liebman stated that the application of Section 
8(d)’s loss-of-status provision in this case “defeats the purpose of Section 
8(d)—to avert strikes—and imposes a harsh penalty that serves no 
statutory purpose.”  In her view, the respondent’s course of conduct “was 
not consistent with the good faith demanded by Section 8(d),” and the 
respondent had a duty to inform the union of its filing infraction “if it 
intended to rely on the loss-of-status provision.”  Instead, however, the 
respondent exploited its knowledge and “used the loss-of-status 
provision as a club, rejecting repeated offers by the Union to return to 
work . . . before ultimately firing all striking employees when the Union 
made too few concessions.”  Because the strikers retained their 
protection under the Act, in Member Liebman’s view, their discharge for 
striking was unlawful, as were the respondent’s subsequent actions. 
G.  Equal Access to Justice Act 
     In B. F. Goodrich,153 the Board reversed in part the recommended 
order of the administrative law judge, and denied the respondent union’s 
application for attorney’s fees and expenses under the Equal Access to 
Justice Act (EAJA) and the Board’s rules and regulations.  These fees 
and expenses had been incurred by the respondent in defending against 
an unfair labor practice charge filed by the General Counsel alleging that 
the respondent had breached its duty of fair representation.  The 
respondent had prevailed against that charge, with the Board affirming 
the judge’s original decision that the respondent had not violated Section 
8(b)(1)(A) by its treatment of the charging party’s grievance. 
     In considering the respondent’s EAJA application filed thereafter, the 
judge found that the unfair labor practice case consisted of two distinct 
“components,” and that the General Counsel was “substantially justified” 
in pursuing only one of those components.  In his supplemental decision, 
thus, the judge awarded the respondent one-half of its requested fees and 
expenses, derived by the “admittedly unscientific method” of “simply 
 
153 343 NLRB No. 42 (Members Liebman, Schaumber, and Meisburg). 
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dividing the Respondent’s claimed fees and costs in half. . . .”  The 
General Counsel filed exceptions, arguing that the respondent was not 
entitled to recover any fees; the respondent, conversely, filed cross-
exceptions seeking recovery of 100 percent of its requested fees. 
     The Board, reversing the judge in part, dismissed the respondent’s 
application in its entirety.  The Board rested its decision on the 
“fundamental premise” that the case “involved a single grievance giving 
rise to a single Section 8(b)(1)(A) allegation.”  The Board reasoned that 
the judge had erred by fragmenting that “single allegation, namely that 
the union violated its duty of fair representation vis-à-vis employee 
Smith by its handling of his grievance.”  The Board concluded that the 
General Counsel was “substantially justified in litigating that allegation, 
both because:  (1) it had a reasonable basis in law and fact, and (2) it 
involved credibility issues not subject to resolution by the General 
Counsel at the investigative stage of the proceeding.” 
H.  Remedial Order Provisions 
1.  Union’s Noncompliance with Settlement Agreement 
     In Postal Service,154 the Board majority found that the respondent 
local union violated the provisions of a settlement agreement with the 
charging party, a nonmember unit employee, by publishing a 
commentary in its newsletter commenting adversely on the settlement 
and the employee. 
     The employee’s charge, under Section 8(b)(1)(A), contested her 
exclusion from the settlement of a grievance involving lost work.  The 
grievance settlement had provided for a lump sum payment to be divided 
among the affected unit employees as lost pay.  The steward who 
negotiated the grievance settlement, however, excluded the nonmember 
employee from sharing in the payment.  After the Regional Director 
issued a complaint, the parties settled the charge through a non-Board 
settlement agreement requiring the union to make an appropriate 
payment to the employee and to post a notice stating that the union 
“recognizes and observes the rights of all employees in the Unit.” 
     The union posted the notice and made the required payment.  The 
following month, however, the union’s president, in his monthly column 
appearing on the union newsletter’s front page under the headline, “Want 
Union Benefits?  Join the Union to Get Them,” identified the charging 
party by name, explained the nature of her underlying grievance and 
Board charge, and noted that the employee “doesn’t pay dues and 
probably never will [but] certainly demands everything that dues paying 
 
154 340 NLRB No. 166 (Chairman Battista and Member Walsh; Member Liebman dissenting). 
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members struggle for.”  The column went on to state that “at some point, 
even when you are right, litigation costs more to defend than it is worth” 
and that “we [therefore] decided to avoid further litigation that promised 
to run into the thousands” by settling the charge.  The president 
concluded that “I am never surprised at the steps a SCAB, FREE 
LOADER or what ever you choose to call a person who refuses to pay 
their fair share and take a free ride on the dues of dues paying 
membership.  I tell you right now, I am proud of [the steward who settled 
the grievance] and stand behind and support her 100%.  She never 
intentionally did anything wrong, and I don’t believe she ever will.” 
     The employee filed a second charge, and the Regional Director, 
revoking his dismissal of the initial complaint, issued a consolidated 
complaint alleging both the initial, grievance-related violation and a 
second violation through the newsletter column. 
     The Board majority found that the president’s comments “completely 
undermine[d] the assurances in the notice that the Respondent would 
respect the rights of all unit employees.”  In the majority’s view, the 
column “communicated a clear disregard for the rights of non-member 
employees” and indicated that the president, notwithstanding the 
settlement, “applauded what [the steward] had done: i.e., conduct alleged 
to be discriminatory and unlawful.”  The column therefore “exceeded 
Section 8(c)’s zone of protection by suggesting that it is . . . laudable for 
a union to discriminate against non-members.”  The majority also noted 
that if an employer took actions analogous to the union’s and posted a 
post-settlement notice “excoriat[ing] membership in the union and 
say[ing] that the employer ‘supports the supervisor 100%,’” the Board 
would undoubtedly find the employer noncompliant.  The majority 
accordingly approved the revocation of dismissal of the initial complaint 
and remanded the case for litigation of both allegations.155
     In dissent, Member Liebman noted that the union had fully complied 
with the requirements of the non-Board settlement and found that the 
newsletter column, “[d]espite its harsh words . . . was protected by 
Section 7.”  On the basis of this Section 7 right, Member Liebman 
distinguished the union from an employer in an analogous situation.   In 
her view, the column’s primary theme was “the perceived unfairness of 
the Union’s obligation to represent an employee who ‘doesn’t pay dues 
and probably never will’ but at the same time ‘demands everything that 
dues paying members struggle for.’”  She found that the personal 
references to the charging party, “while antagonistic, did not threaten not 
to represent her or other non-members in the future and were protected 
 
155 The majority “express[ed] no view on the merits of either allegation.” 
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under established law that ‘favor[s] uninhibited, robust, and wide-open 
debate in labor disputes.’”  Member Liebman also found that the union 
had a right to explain to its members why it had expended their dues 
money to settle the litigation. 
2.  Nonmajority Bargaining Order 
     In First Legal Support Services,156 a partially divided Board held that 
the respondent committed egregious violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) 
of the Act in response to the union’s organizing effort, that the General 
Counsel failed to establish that the union obtained a card majority for 
purposes of a remedial bargaining order, and that the judge properly 
declined to issue a nonmajority bargaining order or other extraordinary 
remedies except a broad cease-and-desist order. 
     The case arose when the union began organizing the respondent’s 
bicycle and driver couriers.  The respondent engaged in a campaign of 
“category one unfair labor practices” under NLRB v. Gissel Packing 
Co.157  The judge, however, did not recommend a remedial bargaining 
order under Gissel because he found that the General Counsel failed, by 
one authorization card, to establish that the union had obtained majority 
support among the employees, and because Board precedent does not 
permit nonmajority bargaining orders.158
     The respondent did not except to the judge’s unfair labor practice 
findings, or to his finding that they were “category I” violations.  
Accordingly, the Board unanimously adopted the findings.  The majority 
also affirmed the judge’s finding that the General Counsel failed to 
establish a card majority, in light of conflicting testimony about the 
circumstances in which the union obtained a final, decisive authorization 
card.  The majority affirmed the judge’s decision not to issue a 
bargaining order in the absence of a card majority.  Last, the majority 
found no need for extraordinary relief, other than the broad cease-and-
desist order issued by the judge. 
     Member Liebman, in a separate dissent, would have granted the 
special remedies sought by the General Counsel.  Further, Member 
Liebman would have issued a remedial bargaining order because, in her 
view, the judge erroneously refused to count the union’s decisive 
authorization card. 
     Finally, even assuming that the General Counsel failed to establish 
that a majority of unit employees supported the union, Member Liebman 
 
156 342 NLRB No. 29 (Members Schaumber and Meisburg; Member Liebman dissenting in part). 
157 395 U.S. 575, 613 (1969). 
158 Gourmet Foods, 270 NLRB 578 (1984). 
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would have overruled Gourmet Foods, supra, and issued a bargaining 
order. 
3.  Forfeiture of Reinstatement and Backpay Remedies 
     In Precoat Metals,159 the Board majority adopted the judge’s finding 
that, inter alia, the customary remedy of reinstatement and backpay be 
withheld from the discriminatee because he gave false testimony and 
engaged in “deliberate and malicious” misconduct that undermined the 
Board’s ability to effectively administer the policies of the Act. 
     On August 31, 1998, employee Jack Focht accompanied employees 
Chester Florian and Jim White to the Board’s Chicago Regional Office 
and gave an affidavit in support of Florian’s unfair labor practice charge 
against the respondent employer.  At a September 11 meeting, Focht 
informed Regional Manager Ray Drufke and Plant Manager Jim Boyle 
Jr. that he was working with Florian’s attorney and that he went to the 
NLRB.  Thereafter, Drufke shared Focht’s information with his 
supervisor, Vice President of Manufacturing Roger Kramer.  On 
September 14, Kramer and Drufke met with Focht to discuss, inter alia, 
the fact that Focht was working with “someone’s attorney in conjunction 
with the Board.”  The meeting resulted in the respondent employer 
placing Focht on a paid leave of absence.  Focht remained on a paid 
leave of absence until October 28.  On that date, Focht met with Human 
Relations Director John Christopher and Kramer.  Kramer offered Focht 
a last chance agreement and a transfer to the respondent employer’s 
Jackson, Mississippi facility.  On November 2, Focht declined the 
respondent employer’s offer.  On November 3, the respondent employer 
terminated Focht. 
     The Board agreed with the judge that the credible evidence 
established that the respondent employer placed Focht on a paid leave of 
absence, offered him a last chance agreement, and discharged him 
because he went to the Board and was working with “someone’s 
attorney.”  Accordingly, the Board adopted the judge’s ruling that the 
respondent employer violated Section 8(a)(4) and (1) of the Act by 
retaliating against Focht for engaging in statutorily protected activity. 
     In determining that Focht was not entitled to reinstatement and 
backpay, the Board majority agreed with the judge that Focht 
undermined the Board’s process when he falsely testified in his pre-
hearing affidavit and during the trial, and engaged in misconduct during 
his employment with the respondent employer.  Relying on the balancing 
 
159 341 NLRB No. 143 (Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber; Member Walsh dissenting in 
part). 
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test set forth in Toll Mfg. Co.,160 the Board majority assessed “the impact 
of the discriminatee’s transgression on the integrity of the Board’s 
processes.”161
     In this case, the Board majority found that Focht’s “lies to the Board 
agent about core issues involved in the unfair labor practice charge filed 
by employee Florian,” and his false testimony at trial concerning a 
central issue in the case, not only “prolonged the proceedings and 
compounded the waste of the Board’s resources” but also constituted 
“malicious abuse of the Board’s processes” sufficient to warrant that the 
Board protect the integrity of its process by not allowing Focht to benefit 
from his abuse of the Board’s policies.162
     In addition, the Board majority found that while Focht’s abuse of the 
Board process is the sole and independent reason for the denial of 
reinstatement and backpay, it agreed with the judge that Focht’s 
misconduct in the workplace further demonstrated that he was “unfit for 
reemployment with the Respondent Employer.”163  Relying on numerous 
examples set forth by the judge, the Board majority determined that 
Focht sowed seeds of distrust and caused conflicts between the 
employees, the respondent employer and the respondent union, and  that, 
if reinstated, he would continue to disrupt the workplace.  In light of this, 
the Board majority found that it would not effectuate the policies of the 
Act to order Focht’s reinstatement. 
     Member Walsh, dissenting in part, found that Focht should not have 
been denied reinstatement and backpay based on the circumstances 
present in this case.  Member Walsh noted that while false testimony by 
a discriminatee may justify the denial of backpay and reinstatement, the 
Board is not precluded from awarding those remedies where it would 
effectuate the Board’s policies, citing ABF Freight System v. NLRB.164
     Applying the principles set forth in Toll Mfg., Member Walsh 
determined that although the judge found Focht to be generally an 
untrustworthy witness, the judge credited that portion of Focht’s 
testimony relating to the 8(a)(4) violation, and Focht, therefore, should 
not have been precluded from a remedy even though his testimony was 
discredited on other matters in the case.  He also found that, unlike the 
circumstances present in Toll Mfg., Focht’s false testimony did not affect 
in any way the unfair labor practice to be remedied nor did it result in 
any benefit to Focht.  Based on the above, Member Walsh concluded 
 
160 341 NLRB No. 115. 
161 Id. at slip op. at 4. 
162 341 NLRB No. 143, slip op. at 3–4. 
163 Id., slip op. at 5. 
164 510 U.S. 317 (1994). 
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that, “a forfeiture of remedy should be reserved for cases in which an 
employee seeks to profit from his abuse and manipulation of the Board 
processes.”165
     With regard to Focht’s misconduct during his employment, Member 
Walsh relied on the test set forth in Berkshire Farm Center,166 to 
determine that the respondent employer failed to show that subsequent 
misconduct, or discovery of that conduct, would have resulted in a lawful 
discharge of Focht.  Member Walsh found that there was no contention 
that the misconduct occurred after the discharge or that the respondent 
employer became aware of Focht’s misconduct after the termination.  As 
demonstrated by the record, Member Walsh found that the respondent 
employer tolerated Focht’s conduct and failed to prove that the 
misconduct was of a type that would have resulted in the employee’s 
lawful termination. 
4.  Calculation of Backpay 
     In Velocity Express, Inc.,167 the Board majority held that it was 
inappropriate to deduct from gross backpay certain employment-related 
expenses that discriminatee Edwin Kirk would have incurred had he not 
been unlawfully discharged by the Respondent. 
     Discriminatee Edwin Kirk was employed by the respondent as a 
delivery driver until March 1999, at which time he was unlawfully 
discharged.168  Kirk owned the vehicle he operated on his route, and was 
paid a regular salary from which the respondent deducted expenses for 
vehicle insurance and pagers.  Kirk was responsible for all expenses 
related to the operation of his vehicle, including gasoline and repairs. 
     The majority held that it was appropriate to calculate Kirk’s backpay 
by deducting from gross backpay Kirk’s severance pay, his interim 
earnings, and the expenses for insurance and pagers normally deducted 
by the respondent.  Relying on established law that “the Board does not 
deduct from gross backpay those expenses that employees would have 
incurred had they not been unlawfully discharged,”169 the majority 
rejected the respondent’s argument that Kirk’s backpay should further be 
reduced by the amount of employment-related expenses he would have 
incurred had he continued to work for the respondent. 
 
165 341 NLRB No. 143, slip op. at 7. 
166 333 NLRB 367 (2001). 
167 342 NLRB No. 87 (Members Liebman and Walsh; Chairman Battista dissenting). 
168 See 332 NLRB 1522 (2000), enfd. 292 F.3d 777 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
169 See Laborers Local 38 (Hancock-Northwest), 268 NLRB 167 (1983), enfd. in relevant part 748 
F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1984); East Texas Steel Castings Co., 116 NLRB 1336, 1342 (1956), enfd. 225 
F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1958), clarified 281 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 1960); Myerstown Hosiery Mills, 99 NLRB 
630, 631 (1952). 
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     Dissenting, Chairman Battista found that a backpay formula that 
included a deduction of Kirk’s employment-related expenses from gross 
backpay was the formula used in determining his interim earnings, and 
would most closely approximate what Kirk actually would have earned 
had he continued to work for the Respondent. 
5.  Reimbursing Union for Dues not Checked Off 
     In Heartland Health Care Center d/b/a Plymouth Court,170 the Board 
granted the General Counsel’s request that the Board modify the judge’s 
remedy to order the respondent to pay the union the dues it should have 
checked off and remitted during the effective dates of the contract while 
the respondent refused to recognize the union.171  Citing W. J. Holloway 
& Son,172 the Board explained that it requires an employer to reimburse 
the union for dues-checkoff payments that it failed to make under the 
collective-bargaining agreement where employees have individually 
signed valid authorizations for the employer to deduct union dues from 
their wages.  Applying this principle, the Board noted that the collective-
bargaining agreement contained a union security clause and a dues-
checkoff provision, and the respondent had a practice of checking off 
dues, which it discontinued after withdrawing recognition from the 
union.  On these facts, Members Schaumber and Meisburg found it 
reasonable to infer that at least some employees had executed valid 
authorizations, although the extent of authorized checkoff was not 
shown. 
     Member Walsh found it unnecessary to infer from the record at this 
stage of the proceeding that at least some employees had in fact executed 
valid dues-checkoff authorizations.  He reasoned that the modification of 
the judge’s recommended Order did not turn on whether the record in the 
unfair labor practice proceeding established that at least some employees 
in fact executed valid dues-checkoff authorizations. 
6.  No Affirmative Remedy Due to Mootness 
     In Borgess Medical Center,173 the Board majority held that the 
respondent had no obligation to provide the union with access to 
requested information or bargain over an accommodation, 
notwithstanding the fact that the respondent had violated Section 8(a)(5) 
 
170 341 NLRB No. 49 (Members Schaumber, Walsh, and Meisburg). 
171 There were no exceptions to the judge’s finding that the respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(5) and (1) 
of the Act by withdrawing recognition of the union as the exclusive collective-bargaining 
representative of the respondent’s employees. 
172 307 NLRB 487 fn. 3 (1992), citing California Blowpipe & Steel Co., 218 NLRB 736, 754 (1975), 
enfd. 543 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
173 342 NLRB No. 109 (Chairman Battista and Member Meisburg; Member Liebman dissenting in 
part). 
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by failing to meet its duty to accommodate its confidentiality interest in 
the information with the union’s need.  The majority’s conclusion was 
based on its finding that the information request was moot. 
     The respondent operates an acute care hospital in Kalamazoo, 
Michigan.  It requires all employees to complete incident reports in order 
to document problems that occur in treating patients.  A nurse was 
discharged after giving the wrong medication to a patient and attempting 
to cover up the error, in part by omitting to file an incident report. The 
union requested to view the respondent’s incident reports concerning 
medication errors pursuant to a grievance filed on behalf of the nurse.  
The respondent refused to supply the incident reports on the grounds that 
they are confidential and protected from disclosure by Michigan State 
Law.174
     The Board majority agreed with the administrative law judge’s 
conclusion that the respondent failed to meet its duty to accommodate 
the union’s need and its own legitimate confidentiality interest in the 
incident reports.  However, the Board majority declined to order an 
affirmative remedy because the grievance arbitration was complete and 
the union did not appeal the arbitrator’s decision.  The majority found 
that because the union failed to articulate any current or future potential 
need for the information, the respondent was under no obligation to 
provide it. 
     In her partial dissent, Member Liebman argued that the burden of 
showing mootness falls on the party asserting it, and that the respondent 
here had not met that burden merely because the grievance proceeding 
has concluded.175  Moreover, the dissent argued that the majority’s 
approach creates an incentive for employers to refuse to promptly 
disclose information and ignores the on-going relationship between the 
parties, of which the grievance process is only a part.  Finally, the dissent 
warned that the majority decision, read in light of the delay in the 
Board’s handling of cases, means that unions will risk being denied an 
affirmative remedy if they fail to expressly identify a potential future 
need for requested information aside from the immediate need when the 
request is made. 
 
174 Michigan’s Peer Review Statute states:  “The records, data, and knowledge collected for or by 
individuals or committees assigned a professional review function in a health facility or agency, or 
institution of higher education in this state that has colleges of osteopathic and human medicine, are 
confidential, shall be used only for the purposes provided in this article, are not public records, and 
are not subject to court subpoena.”  MCLA 333.20175 (8); see also MCLA 333.21515. 
175 Bloomsburg Craftsmen, 276 NLRB 400 fn. 2, 405 (1985); Postal Service, 307 NLRB 429, 429 fn. 
2 (1992). 
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I.  Default Judgment Proceeding 
     In Michigan Inn,176 the Board majority denied the General Counsel’s 
motion for default judgment against certain of the named respondents, 
which had failed to file an answer to the consolidated complaint.  The 
majority found that a substantial portion of the complaint was ambiguous 
or inconsistent, thereby making it impossible to determine whether it was 
appropriate to find that some or all of these respondents had violated the 
Act as alleged and what the appropriate remedy should be. 
     The complaint alleged numerous violations of Section 8(a)(3), (5), 
and (1) of the Act by various companies and their alleged successor 
companies.  Only the alleged successor respondents filed answers to the 
complaint. The General Counsel therefore filed a motion for default 
judgment against the other (predecessor) respondents that did not file an 
answer. 
     The Board majority denied the motion, finding the complaint 
deficient in several respects.  First, the complaint failed to specify which 
respondents committed which violations.  Second, it failed to specify the 
dates when many of the alleged violations occurred.  Third, the 
complaint contained inconsistent allegations regarding when the 
predecessor respondents ceased managing and controlling the facility.  
Fourth, the complaint allegations were insufficient to find that the 
predecessor respondents unlawfully laid off all unit employees and 
closed or partially closed the facility in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and 
(5).  Fifth, the complaint and motion failed to explain the basis for 
finding that the predecessor respondents’ other alleged 8(a)(5) conduct 
also violated 8(a)(3).  Finally, the complaint also raised a number of 
other remedial issues, such as whether restoration and reinstatement 
remedies were appropriate. 
     The majority found that the complaint was not well pleaded in these 
circumstances, and that the motion for partial default judgment should 
therefore be denied and the case remanded.  The majority stated that it 
shared the dissent’s concern that this would result in delaying a remedy 
for the alleged unfair labor practices.  However, paraphrasing Judge 
Posner’s decision in NLRB v. Brooke Industries Inc.,177 the majority 
stated that “we are also properly concerned with the ‘integrity and 
manageability of the [administrative] process,’” and rejected the 
dissent’s “suggestion (in the words of Judge Posner) that ‘we have no 
choice but to rubber stamp’ the General Counsel’s motion for default 
judgment in these circumstances.”  The majority further noted that the 
 
176 340 NLRB No. 115 (Chairman Battista and Member Schaumber; Member Walsh dissenting). 
177 867 F.2d 434, 435–436 (7th Cir. 1989). 
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General Counsel could promptly address the ambiguities and 
inconsistencies in the complaint on remand by issuance of an amended 
complaint. 
     In dissent, Member Walsh stated that, in his view, the complaint 
allegations against the predecessor respondents were well pleaded and 
there was no merit to the six objections raised by the majority sua sponte.  
Quoting the D.C. Circuit in Vincent Industrial Plastics, Inc. v. NLRB,178 
that “relief delayed under the Act may be relief denied,” Member Walsh 
stated that he would therefore grant the General Counsel’s motion for 
default judgment against the predecessor respondents and issue an order 
requiring those respondents to make the victimized employees whole. 
 
 
178 209 F.3d 727, 739 (2000). 
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VII 
Enforcement Litigation 
A.  Access to Private Property 
In Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB,1 the Supreme Court held that 
employees may engage in protected union solicitation and distribution of 
materials on an employer’s premises during nonworking time, unless the 
employer can show that prohibiting the solicitation is necessary to 
maintain production and discipline.  In NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,2 
the Supreme Court, recognizing the distinction between an “employee” 
and a “nonemployee” as one “of substance,”3 held that “an employer may 
validly post his property against nonemployee distribution of union 
literature” so long as “the employer’s notice or order does not 
discriminate against the union by allowing other distribution.”4  The 
Supreme Court based its employee-nonemployee distinction on the 
ground that employees are already rightfully on the employer’s property, 
pursuant to the employer-employee relationship, thus implicating only 
the employer’s managerial, rather than its property, interests.5  That 
holding was reaffirmed in Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,6 where the Supreme 
Court clarified that only rarely will nonemployees be permitted access to 
private property to engage in activity protected by Section 7 of the Act. 
In Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich,7 the Supreme Court elaborated 
that “[t]he right of employers to exclude union organizers from their 
private property emanates from state common law, and while this right is 
not superseded by the NLRA, nothing in the NLRA expressly protects 
it,” and that “this Court consistently has maintained that the NLRA may 
entitle union employees to obtain access to an employer’s property under 
limited circumstances.”8  In several cases decided during the past year, 
the appellate courts continued to work through the circumstances in 
which nonemployees may have access to private property to engage in 
union activity. 
                                           
1 324 U.S. 793 (1945). 
2 351 U.S. 105 (1956). 
3 Id. at 113. 
4 Id. at 112. 
5 Id. at 113. 
6 502 U.S. 527 (1992). 
7 510 U.S. 200 (1994). 
8 510 U.S. at 217 fn. 21 (citing Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 537, and Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 112). 
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In American Postal Workers Union v. NLRB,9 the D.C. Circuit 
affirmed the Board’s dismissal of a complaint alleging that the Postal 
Service violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when it expelled from its 
contract drivers’ lounge an off-duty contract driver and a union 
representative who were engaged in union organizing.  The Board had 
found (with one member dissenting), and no party disputed before the 
court, that the off-duty contract driver was a “nonemployee” whose 
access rights, like those of a nonemployee union representative, were 
governed by Lechmere.10  The court upheld the Board’s disputed finding 
that the Postal Service’s exclusion of those individuals was not 
discriminatory, and was therefore lawful, because there was no evidence 
that the Postal Service had ever permitted access to other 
nonemployees.11  The court rejected the union’s argument that the Postal 
Service’s policy prohibiting union solicitation in the contract drivers’ 
lounge was facially discriminatory because it singled out union 
solicitation and was invalid without regard to whether the Postal Service 
granted access to other nonemployees to engage in other solicitation, 
emphasizing that the challenged policy supplemented a general no-
solicitation rule prohibiting commercial and charitable solicitations.12
A second D.C. Circuit case explored, but did not decide, some 
constitutional and federalism questions implicated in Supreme Court 
cases, teaching that Federal labor rights are, in part, dependent on State 
law governing access to private property under State law.  In Waremart 
Foods d/b/a Winco Foods, Inc. v. NLRB,13 the court, in accordance with 
the Board’s reading of Lechmere, Babcock, and Thunder Basin, looked 
to California law to determine whether the employer, which operated a 
large freestanding grocery store, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by 
prohibiting nonemployee union representatives from engaging in 
consumer handbilling on its premises.  The court had, in an earlier 
published decision in the same case, found itself “unsure whether 
[California law] should be viewed as creating a special exemption for 
labor activity,” and had accordingly issued an order certifying two State-
law questions to the California Supreme Court.14  In certifying those 
questions, the court had observed that, “[u]nless California law is as the 
Board says it is, this case is indistinguishable from Lechmere,” a point 
the Board did not dispute.15  The court expressed concern, however, that 
 
9 370 F.3d 25 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
10 Postal Service, 339 NLRB 1175 (2003). 
11 370 F.3d at 28–29. 
12 Id. 
13 354 F.3d 870 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
14 Waremart Foods d/b/a Winco Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 333 F. 223 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
15 Id. at 224. 
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“[i]f state law does give labor unions some special exemption, as the 
Board’s analysis . . . may suggest,” then the court would “need [to] reach 
the constitutional question” of whether the State law violates the First 
Amendment’s prohibition against content discrimination.16  After the 
California Supreme Court declined to answer the certified questions, the 
D.C. Circuit denied enforcement of the Board’s order, resolving the 
State-law issue in favor of the employer and thereby avoiding a 
definitive ruling on the constitutional question.  Guided both by 
constitutional concerns and by its reading of recent California decisions, 
the court, distinguishing California cases providing for access to large 
privately-owned shopping centers, found that there was no State law 
right of access to engage in union-related or other speech activity on the 
sidewalks adjacent to a freestanding grocery store such as the one at 
issue in Waremart.17
A third case involved one of those rare instances where State property 
law required the owners of certain types of private property, like 
shopping malls, to respect individual free speech rights to the same 
extent that the Government must in a public forum.18  Glendale 
Associates involved informational handbilling by the union representing 
employees of ABC outside The Disney Store, one of 65 stores inside the 
Glendale Galleria.  During contract negotiations with ABC, the union 
sought to put pressure on ABC’s parent, Disney Enterprises, which was 
also the parent of The Disney Store, by passing out handbills asking 
prospective customers of The Disney Store to express their concerns 
about Disney’s employment practices to Disney and to Congress.  The 
Galleria, however, had a rule prohibiting certain groups from engaging in 
an activity, such as handbilling, that named a tenant of the Galleria.  
Because the union refused to remove the reference to The Disney Store 
from its handbills, the Galleria denied the union permission to distribute 
them and, when the union attempted to do so anyway, threatened to call 
the police. 
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Board that the Galleria violated 
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by promulgating, maintaining and enforcing, 
by threats to call the police, a rule at the Galleria prohibiting handbilling 
or other expressive activities protected by Section 7 of the Act that 
identify by name the Galleria’s owner, manager, or any tenant of the 
Galleria.  There was no dispute in the case that the handbilling was 
protected by the Act.  The only question was whether the Galleria had a 
right under California State property law to exclude that activity.  The 
 
16 Id. (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Dist. Council of Carpenters, 25 Cal.3d 317 (1979)). 
17 354 F.3d at 875–876. 
18 Glendale Associates, Ltd. v. NLRB, 347 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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court had previously held that the California Constitution “prohibits 
owners of shopping malls and general access stores from excluding 
speech activity on their private adjacent sidewalks and parking lots.”19  
As part of California’s broader free speech protections, privately owned 
shopping centers are required to respect individual free speech rights on 
their premises to the same extent that Government entities are bound to 
observe State and Federal free speech rights.20  The court concluded that 
the Galleria’s prohibition on literature that named a Galleria tenant, 
owner, or manager was a content-based restriction that was untenable 
under California free-speech law because it disfavored speech solely on 
the basis that the speech may adversely affect a business interest.21  
Accordingly, California property law gave the shopping center no right 
to exclude the union from exercising its free-speech rights, which were 
also Section 7 rights, on the shopping center’s premises. 
B.  Mandatory Subjects of Bargaining 
In Verizon New York, Inc. v. NLRB,22 the court agreed with the Board 
that the employer violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by 
unilaterally eliminating a longstanding practice allowing employees to 
participate in blood drives during the workday with no loss of pay.  For 
over 30 years, the employer had allowed employees to participate in 
eight annual union-organized blood drives during the workday.  In 2001, 
however, the employer announced that employees would no longer enjoy 
the right to participate in blood drives during the workday without loss of 
pay.  Instead, the union would have to schedule the drives after work 
hours, so the employees could participate on their own time.  The union 
filed a grievance requesting bargaining over this unilateral change, but 
the employer refused to negotiate. 
In finding that the employer’s unilateral change violated the Act, the 
court agreed with the Board that “whether ‘employees will be paid while 
they engage in nonwork activities’” during the workday was “a 
mandatory subject of bargaining.”23  The court determined that the 
Board’s unilateral change finding “fit[] comfortably” within Board 
precedent requiring employers to bargain over whether they pay 
employees for engaging in nonwork activities during the workday, such 
as serving jury duty, washing up, and cashing paychecks.24  Like the 
Board, the court rejected the employer’s claim that permitting employees 
 
19 NLRB v. Calkins, 187 F.3d 1080, 1090 (9th Cir. 1999). 
20 Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal.3d 899, 911 (1979), affirmed, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
21 347 F.3d at 1157–1158. 
22 360 F.3d 206 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
23 Id. at 210. 
24 Id. 
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to give blood on paid company time was not a mandatory subject of 
bargaining because it was a decision to engage in a philanthropic activity 
that lies at “the core of entrepreneurial control.”25  The court explained 
that, although “[m]anagement certainly has the prerogative to choose 
whether to support charities, and which ones[,]” how it “goes about this 
may be another matter.”26  Where, as here, the employer supported a 
charity by permitting employees to receive wages for time not worked, 
its decision to cease doing that impacts the “amount of pay received for 
the number of hours worked” and, therefore, is “‘germane’ to an 
individual’s employment[,]” and a mandatory subject of bargaining.27   
C.  Discharge for Protected Activity 
Under Wright Line,28 even where the Board’s General Counsel has 
met his burden to prove that an employee’s protected activity motivated 
an employer’s decision to take adverse action against the employee, the 
employer may still escape liability by establishing an affirmative defense 
that “demonstrate[s] that the same action would have taken place even in 
the absence of the protected conduct.”29  In Bowling Transp., Inc. v. 
NLRB,30 the Sixth Circuit considered the character of a proper affirmative 
defense under Wright Line: the defense must state a reason for an 
employer’s action which is independent of the employee’s protected 
activity and must be based on a reason that is itself lawful under the Act.  
In Bowling, the employer—a trucking company that transported products 
for AK Steel—discharged two employees because they complained to 
AK Steel’s officials about the employer’s handling of safety bonuses 
established by AK Steel for its contractors’ employees.  AK Steel, in 
turn, had barred the two employees from working on its property because 
of their complaint.31
The employer argued that it would have discharged the two 
employees even in the absence of their protected activity because AK 
Steel had barred the employees from working on its property, the only 
way the employees could be productively employed.  The Board rejected 
the defense, holding that the employer could not rely on AK Steel’s 
actions as a basis for its affirmative defense because AK Steel had barred 
 
25 Id. at 209 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 498 (1979) (quoting Fibreboard Paper 
Prods. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 222, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring))). 
26 Id. at 209–10. 
27 Id. at 210. 
28 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. on other grounds, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981). 
29 Id. at 1089. 
30 352 F.3d 274 (6th Cir. 2003). 
31 AK Steel was not charged with violating the Act or otherwise made a party to the proceeding. 
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the employees from its premises for an “unlawful reason.”32  The court 
agreed, holding that an affirmative defense “must show some 
independent and lawful basis for a[n] . . . employee’s termination.”33  
The court reasoned that “[t]o allow an employer to escape liability by 
asserting one unlawful motive in place of another unlawful motive would 
produce absurd results.”34  However, because AK Steel was not a party to 
the proceeding, the court was “reluctant” to adopt the Board’s view that 
AK Steel’s actions were “unlawfully motivated.”35  Instead, the court 
rejected the employer’s affirmative defense because AK Steel’s action 
was motivated by the protected activity, and therefore was not an 
independent basis for the discharges. 
D.  Extraterritorial Application of Act 
In EEOC v. Arabian Oil Co. (Aramco),36 the Supreme Court referred 
to the “longstanding principle of American law ‘that legislation of 
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within 
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States’” and that extraterritorial 
application will not be found absent “the affirmative intention of the 
Congress clearly expressed . . . .”  In Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. 
NLRB,37 the Third Circuit applied this principle to reject the Board’s 
assertion of jurisdiction over the discharge of United States citizens 
whose permanent place of employment was in the United States, but who 
were discharged for engaging in protected concerted activity while 
temporarily working in Canada. 
The two discharged employees, who had volunteered for a 2-week 
work assignment in Canada, were discharged when they refused to go to 
work in protest against what they considered an inadequate daily 
allowance for food in Canada.  The Board found that their discharges 
violated the Act and ordered the employer to offer them reinstatement to 
their United States jobs and make them whole for loss of earnings 
suffered as a result of the failure to retain or reinstate them in those jobs.  
While recognizing that the presumption against extraterritorial 
application extends to the Act,38 the Board held that the application of the 
Act to United States citizens, permanently employed by a United States 
employer in the United States but temporarily working for that employer 
abroad, was not extraterritorial, since the effect of the unlawful conduct 
 
32 Bowling Transportation, 336 NLRB 393, 394–395 (2001). 
33 352 F.3d at 283. 
34 352 F.3d at 283 fn.11. 
35 352 F.3d at 283. 
36 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). 
37 365 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2004). 
38 McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional, 372 U.S. 10 (1963). 
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would be principally felt in the United States, where the employees’ 
permanent jobs were; application of the Act would not interfere with 
Canadian law, since the Board’s order would affect only the American 
operations of an American employer; and failure to assert jurisdiction 
over the discharge of employees from United States jobs would 
undermine the Act’s policy of protecting the right of employees to 
engage in concerted activity. 
Denying enforcement, the court held that the Board lacked 
jurisdiction.  In the court’s view, the Board’s policy arguments in favor 
of asserting jurisdiction were irrelevant, because the question was solely 
one of statutory construction.  The court noted that the general 
jurisdictional language of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act had been held 
insufficient in Aramco to overcome the presumption against 
extraterritorial application, and held that the general language of the Act 
was likewise insufficient.  Further, the court noted, while Congress had 
amended both Title VII and the Americans With Disabilities Act after 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Aramco, to provide explicitly for 
extraterritorial application, it had not similarly amended the Act. 
 
163 
 
VIII 
Injunction Litigation 
A.  Injunction Litigation Under Section 10(j) 
Section 10(j) of the Act empowers the Board, in its discretion, to 
petition a U.S. district court for appropriate, temporary injunctive relief 
or restraining order in aid of the unfair labor practice proceeding.  
Section 10(j) proceedings can be initiated after issuance of an unfair 
labor practice complaint under Section 10(b) of the Act against any 
employer or labor organization.1  Any injunction issued under Section 
10(j) lasts until final disposition of the unfair labor practice case by the 
Board. 
In Fiscal 2004, the Board filed in district courts a total of 11 petitions 
for temporary injunctive relief under Section 10(j).  Of these petitions, 10 
were filed against employers, and one petition was filed against an 
employer and a labor organization.  Two cases authorized in the prior 
fiscal year were also pending in district courts at the beginning of this 
fiscal year.  Of these 13 cases, two were settled or adjusted prior to court 
action, and one case was withdrawn prior to a court decision due to 
changed circumstances.  District courts granted injunctions in nine cases 
and denied them in none.  One case remained pending in district court at 
the end of the fiscal year. 
Three of the cases litigated in district courts involved employer 
interference with nascent union organizational campaigns, including two 
cases where the violations precluded a fair election and warranted a 
Gissel bargaining order.2  Another four cases involved improper 
employer withdrawals of recognition from an incumbent union.  One 
case involved an employer that was engaging in a pattern of bad faith 
bargaining with an established union.  Finally, one case which was 
decided by a circuit court of appeals involved an attempt by an employer 
to undermine the status of an incumbent union. 
Chavarry v. E.L.C. Electric, Inc.3 involved employer interference with 
a union’s organizational campaign where the Board had conducted an 
election and the votes were not resolved.  The union had not achieved 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Schaub v. West Michigan Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 250 F.3d 962 (6th Cir. 2001); 
Hoffman v. Inn Credible Caterers, Ltd., 247 F.3d 360 (2d Cir. 2001); Hirsch v. Dorsey Trailers, Inc., 
147 F.3d 243 (3d Cir. 1998). 
2 See generally NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). 
3 1:04-CV-0123-JDT-TAB (S.D. Ind. Indianapolis Division). 
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majority status during the preelection campaign.  The court found that 
the Regional Director had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the 
merits concerning a wide variety of Section 8(a)(1) violations, including 
unlawful work rules, threats of physical violence and more onerous 
working conditions, isolation of employees from other workers, and 
interrogations.  The court further found a likelihood that the Regional 
Director would successfully prove that the employer discriminatorily laid 
off most employees and returned them as employees of a labor broker.  
The Region argued that interim relief was necessary for the union to 
maintain its presence in the unit and to prevent both the “scattering” of 
the laid off employees and the resultant “chilling” impact on union 
organizational efforts.  In granting injunctive relief, the court stated, “[it] 
concludes that these effects of the passage of time will irreparably harm 
the labor effort and the employees.  These effects also demonstrate that 
there is no adequate remedy at law.”4  The court granted a broad cease 
and desist order and affirmatively ordered the interim reinstatement of all 
the laid off employees and the reduction of the employer’s use of the 
labor broker in order to reinstate the employees pending the outcome of 
the administrative proceeding. 
Two cases this fiscal year presented situations where employers 
allegedly engaged in serious violations during union organizational 
campaigns where the Regions were seeking to impose card-majority 
remedial bargaining orders under Gissel.  In Overstreet v. Desert 
Toyota,5 and Tremain v. H H 3 Trucking, Inc.,6 the courts granted interim 
Gissel bargaining orders in favor of unions that had achieved card 
majorities during the campaigns. 
In Desert Toyota, the district court based its findings of the Regional 
Director’s likelihood of success on the merits upon two decisions of 
Board administrative law judges (ALJs) which had sustained in 
substantial part the General Counsel’s unfair labor practice complaints.  
The Regional Director alleged that the employer discharged two primary 
union activists in a 31-person unit and continued to engage in additional 
unfair labor practices after the issuance of the administrative law judge’s 
decision finding violations.  In granting interim reinstatement and Gissel 
bargaining orders, the court in Desert Toyota stated that “ ‘. . . . [t]o 
refuse to issue an interim bargaining order in these circumstances would 
                                                 
4 The district court relied upon NLRB v. Electro-Voice, Inc., 83 F.3d 1559 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. 
denied 519 U.S. 1055 (1997). 
5 CV-S-03-1275-LRH (PAL) (D. Nev.) (as amended). 
6 Civil No. 03-C-50494 (N. D. Ill. Western Division). 
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allow [the Respondent] to take advantage of the declining support for the 
Union and result in significant harm to the Board’s remedial authority.’”7
In the second Gissel case, HH3 Trucking, the district court found a 
likelihood of success in proving that the employer had, during a union 
organizing campaign, discriminatorily discharged four of five employees 
in a small unit of truck drivers and subcontracted their work to a labor 
broker.  In addition to granting the remedial bargaining order, the court 
ordered the interim reinstatement of the discharged employees to 
available work.  The court further required the employer, when work was 
not available for the discharged employees, to provide to the Region 
information concerning trucking work performed by owner-operators 
working for the respondent, as well as payroll records for all drivers 
working for respondent, including temporary employees.  Finally, the 
court ordered the employer to bargain with the union over any future 
decision to transfer or subcontract bargaining unit work, including to 
employees provided by a temporary employment agency. 
Four cases decided this fiscal year involved employers that allegedly 
withdrew recognition from unions without establishing an untainted loss 
of majority support for those bargaining representatives.  In Miller v. H 
& N Fish Co.,8 Glasser v. Plymouth Court,9 Moore-Duncan v. Laneko 
Engineering Co., Inc.,10 and Pye v. EAD Motors Eastern Air Devices, 
Inc.,11 the courts granted interim orders requiring the employers to 
recognize and bargain with the respective unions.  The antiunion petition 
in H & N Foods was tainted by the employer’s unlawful statements to 
employees blaming the union for the absence of a wage increase, and by 
the employer’s unilateral changes to terms and conditions of 
employment.  In Laneko, where the employer required employees to sign 
an antiunion petition before returning to work after a strike, the court 
rejected the employer’s argument that injunctive relief was unnecessary 
because the two-facility unit was a “small and intimate” unit that could 
reconstitute itself after a Board order, and noted that employee support 
for the union already had begun to wane.12  The court in Heartland found 
reasonable cause to believe that the recently-negotiated collective-
bargaining agreement, which had been signed by both parties, ratified by 
the membership, and partially implemented by the employer, precluded 
the employer’s reliance on a subsequently-signed antiunion petition to 
 
7 The district court quoted from Scott v. Stephen Dunn & Associates, 241 F.3d 652, 668 (9th Cir. 
2001).  
8 Civil No. C-03-4002-CW (N.D. Ca.).  
9 Civil No. 03-CV-73429 (E.D. Mich.).  
10 174 LRRM 2395 (E.D. Pa.).  
11 175 LRRM 2441 (D.N.H.).  
12 See Kobell v. Suburban Lines, Inc., 731 F.2d 1076, 1093 (3d Cir. 1984).  
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withdraw recognition, despite the employer’s assertion that the union had 
rejected the contract by questioning the language of one provision.  In 
EAD Motors, the court found that the Regional Director had a strong 
likelihood of success in proving that the employer prematurely had 
declared impasse and implemented unilateral changes to the employees’ 
terms and conditions of employment prior to its withdrawal of 
recognition, noting the administrative law judge’s decision finding such 
violations.  In addition, the courts in Laneko and EAD Motors ordered 
those employers to cease recognizing employee committees that had 
been established after they withdrew recognition, and the court in EAD 
Motors ordered the employer to provide relevant requested information 
to the union. 
One case decided during the reporting period concerned an 
employer’s alleged pattern of bad faith bargaining with an incumbent 
union.  In Miller v. Renzenberger, Inc.,13 the employer presented contract 
proposals that reserved for it largely unfettered control of terms and 
conditions of employment, refused to provide relevant information 
requested by the union, threatened employees with job loss, and 
discharged two open union supporters in a unit of 60 drivers.  Relying on 
the decision of a Board administrative law judge, the court concluded 
that the Region had shown a likelihood of success on the merits that the 
employer had engaged in the alleged misconduct.  The court applied 
traditional equitable principles and concluded that as all the equitable 
factors weighed in favor of the petitioner, the interim injunction was just 
and proper.14  In addition to granting an interim bargaining order, the 
court also ordered the reinstatement of two discharged employees and 
required the employer to provide requested information. 
In addition to the district court cases discussed above, one court of 
appeals affirmed the issuance of a 10(j) injunction during the fiscal year.  
In Ahearn v. Kentucky River Medical Center, Inc.,15 the Sixth Circuit 
rejected the employer’s argument that the court’s longstanding 
“reasonable cause/just and proper” standard should be replaced by the 
“traditional” test for issuing 10(j) injunctions.  The court concluded that 
the district court did not err in finding reasonable cause to believe that 
the employer had terminated three returning strikers unlawfully, or that 
the employer’s poststrike unilateral change to the employees’ break 
schedule also violated the Act.  With respect to the terminations, the 
court noted that the administrative law judge’s decision, which issued 
after the injunction, supported the reasonable cause determination.  
                                                 
13 No. CIV. S-04-1518 WBS PAN (E.D. Ca.). 
14 The district court relied upon Scott v. Toyota of Berkeley, Inc., 106 LRRM 2070 (N.D. Ca. 1980). 
15 351 F.3d 226 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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Finally, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
finding that interim reinstatement was just and proper because the 
multiple terminations would have an inherently chilling effect on other 
employees, and because there was evidence that the terminations had in 
fact chilled union activity. 
B.  Injunction Litigation Under Section 10(1) 
Section 10(l) imposes a mandatory duty on the Board to petition for 
"appropriate injunctive relief" against a labor organization or its agent 
charged with a violation of Section 8(b)(4)(A), (B), and (C),16 or Section 
8(b)(7),17 and against an employer or union charged with a violation of 
Section 8(e),18 whenever the General Counsel's investigation reveals 
"reasonable cause to believe that such charge is true and a complaint 
should issue."19  In cases arising under Section 8(b)(7), however, a 
district court injunction may not be sought if a charge under Section 
8(a)(2) of the Act has been filed alleging that the employer had 
dominated or interfered with the formation or administration of a labor 
organization and, after investigation, there is "reasonable cause to believe 
such charge is true and that a complaint should issue."  Section 10(l) also 
provides that its provisions shall be applicable, "where such relief is 
appropriate," to threats or other coercive conduct in support of 
jurisdictional disputes under Section 8(b)(4)(D) of the Act.20  In addition, 
under Section 10(l) a temporary restraining order pending the hearing on 
the petition for an injunction may be obtained, without notice to the 
employer, upon a showing that "substantial and irreparable injury to the 
charging party will be unavoidable" unless immediate injunctive relief is 
granted.  Such ex parte relief, however, may not extend beyond 5 days. 
In this report period, the Board filed 6 petitions for injunctions under 
Section 10(l).  Of the total caseload, comprised of this number together 
with 1 case pending at the beginning of the period, 3 cases were settled, 2 
 
16 Sec. 8(b)(4)(A), (B), and (C), as enacted by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 
prohibited certain types of secondary strikes and boycotts, strikes to compel employers or self-
employed persons to join labor or employer organizations, and strikes against Board certifications of 
bargaining representatives.  These provisions were enlarged by the 1959 amendments of the Act 
(Title VII of Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act) to prohibit not only strikes and the 
inducement of work stoppages for these objects but also to proscribe threats, coercion, and restraint 
addressed to employers for these objects, and to prohibit conduct of this nature where an object was 
to compel an employer to enter into a “hot cargo” agreement declared unlawful in another section of 
the Act, Sec. 8(e). 
17 Sec. 8(b)(7), incorporated in the Act by the 1959 amendments, makes organizational or 
recognitional picketing under certain circumstances an unfair labor practice. 
18 Sec. 8(e), also incorporated in the Act by the 1959 amendments, makes hot cargo agreements 
unlawful and unenforceable, with certain exceptions for the construction and garment industries.  
19 See generally Pye v. Teamsters Local Union No. 122, 61 F.3d 1013 (1st Cir. 1995); Kinney v. 
International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150, 994 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1993).  
20 Sec. 8(b)(4)(D) was enacted as part of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.  
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were dismissed, and 1 was pending court action at the close of the report 
year.  During this period, 5 petitions went to final order, the courts 
granting injunctions in 3 cases and denying them in 2 cases.  Injunctions 
were issued in 2 cases involving secondary boycott action proscribed by 
Section 8(b)(4)(B), as well as in instances involving a violation of 
Section 8(b)(4)(A), which proscribes certain conduct to obtain hot cargo 
agreements barred by Section 8(e).  Injunctions were also issued in 1 
case to proscribe alleged recognitional or organizational picketing in 
violations of Section 8(b)(7). 
Of the 2 cases in which injunctions were denied, both involved 
secondary picketing activity by labor organizations. 
Two Section 10(l) cases decided during the fiscal year continued to 
raise somewhat novel issues under Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act, 
which were the subject of prior injunctive proceedings in Fiscal 2003.21  
These cases, Kohn v. Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters,22 and 
Benson v. Carpenters Locals 184 and 1498,23 involved the display by a 
union of a large stationary banner (20 feet by 4 feet) near the premises of 
a “neutral” employer.  The banner, held by 3–4 individuals and 
accompanied by handbills, stated in large letters “Shame on [neutral 
employer],” and read in smaller type in the upper corners of the banner 
the words, “Labor Dispute.”  The banner failed to name the primary 
employer with which the union had a primary labor dispute.  The 
Regional Directors argued that the use of the banner by several union 
agents, which in essence called for a consumer boycott of the neutral 
employer, either constituted “signal picketing” or traditional picketing 
under the Act, and was misleading defamatory speech beyond the 
protections of the First Amendment.  Regarding the misleading language 
theory, the Regions argued that the banner deceived consumers into 
believing that the union had a primary labor dispute with the neutral 
employer.  Under either theory, the Regional Directors argued that the 
use of the banners under these circumstances constituted coercive 
conduct under Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act which also had a 
proscribed “cease doing business” object. 
The district courts denied the requested injunction in both the 
Southwest Regional Council and the Carpenters Locals 184 and 1498 
                                                 
21 See Overstreet v. Carpenters Local 1506, Civil No. 03-0773 J (JFS) (S.D. Ca.), appeal pending 
Docket No. 03-56135 (9th Cir.), described in the 2003 Annual Report.  In Overstreet the district 
court denied the requested 10(l) relief.  The Board has appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals. 
22 289 F. Supp. 2d 1155 (C. D. Ca.), appeal pending Docket No. 03-57228 (9th Cir.). 
23 175 LRRM 2988, Case No. 2:04-CV-00782 PGC (D. Utah Central Division). 
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cases.24  In the Southwest Regional Council decision, the district court 
concluded that the union bannering did not constitute “threatening, 
coercive, or restraining” conduct under Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).25  It also 
found no merit to the Regional Director’s misleading language theory, as 
it concluded that the message on the banner was not false, as the union 
had a secondary labor dispute with the neutral employer.26  In the 
Carpenters Locals 184 and 1498 case, the court reviewed these two 
earlier court decisions on bannering and concluded that the union’s 
conduct did not constitute “threats, coercion or restraint” under Section 
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act because they were like lawful handbilling and 
billboards and truthfully advised the public about its lawful secondary 
labor dispute with the neutral employers. 
In another case involving somewhat unusual facts, a district court 
enjoined a union’s activities that allegedly constituted an unlawful 
secondary boycott within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).  The 
court in Kentov v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 15,27 found reasonable 
cause to believe that the union’s mock funeral procession in front of a 
neutral hospital in connection with its dispute involving primary 
construction employers, coerced and threatened the hospital and its 
patients and visitors.  The procession was conducted by four union 
representatives carrying a coffin-like box, accompanied by another union 
representative wearing an oversized grim reaper costume.  The court 
found reasonable cause to believe that, although the union 
representatives did not carry traditional picket signs or impede ingress or 
egress, the union’s actions constituted a mixture of conduct and 
communication that properly could be enjoined pending the Board’s 
decision. 
 
 
24 The Board has filed an appeal in the Southwest Regional Council decision to the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals.  
25 289 F. Supp. 2d at 1165–1168.  The district court relied upon Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. 
Florida Gulf Coast Building and Construction Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988).  
26 289 F. Supp. 2d at 1168–1169. 
27 Civil No. 8:04-CV-1730-T-27TBM (M.D. Fla.), appeal pending Docket No. 04-14126-J (11th 
Cir.).  
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IX 
Contempt Litigation and Compliance Branch 
     During fiscal year 2004, the Contempt Litigation and Compliance 
Branch (CLCB) continued its role as a full-service office, combining 
advice, training, and assistance to Regions with Federal court litigation, 
including contempt, actions under the Federal Debt Collection 
Procedures Act (FDCPA) and bankruptcy actions.  A total of 445 cases 
were referred to CLCB during the fiscal year for advice and/or 
assistance, or for consideration of contempt proceedings or other 
appropriate action to achieve compliance with the Act.  Of this total, 159 
cases were formal submissions respecting contempt or other compliance 
actions; in 286 other cases, advice and/or assistance was solicited and 
provided to the Regions or other Agency personnel and the cases 
returned for further administrative processing.  CLCB also conducted 
149 asset/entity database investigations to assist Regions in their 
compliance efforts, a task over and above the 445 referrals to CLCB 
referenced above.  In addition, more than 320 hours were devoted to 
training Regional and other Agency personnel and members of the 
private sector bar on contempt and compliance issues. 
     Of the 159 contempt or other formal submissions, voluntary 
compliance was achieved in 20 cases during the fiscal year, without the 
necessity of filing a contempt petition or other initiating papers, and 29 
other cases settled after the filing of a formal pleading in court but before 
trial.  In 68 other cases, it was determined that contempt or other 
proceedings were not warranted. 
     In cases deemed to have merit, 12 civil contempt or equivalent 
proceedings were instituted, including one in which body attachment was 
sought.  A number of ancillary compliance proceedings were also 
instituted by CLCB in FY 2004, including 10 proceedings to obtain 
postjudgment writs of garnishment under FDCPA; one motion for 
execution on property under FDCPA; and one motion for a disposition 
order for funds previously garnished.  CLCB instituted seven 
proceedings in bankruptcy courts, including three actions to declare 
backpay debts obtained by the Board non-dischargeable; one arguing 
against approving a free and clear sale without protections for the 
Board’s interests; and three seeking 2004 examinations.  Finally, CLCB 
instituted nine subpoena enforcement actions and one request for a 
protective restraining order during the fiscal year. 
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     Seven civil contempt or equivalent adjudications were awarded in 
favor of the Board in FY 2004, including one writ of body attachment.  
During FY 2004, CLCB also successfully obtained 2 protective 
restraining orders and/or injunctions; one order declaring backpay debts 
nondischargeable; one order protecting the Board’s interests against 
potential successors/alter egos in a free and clear sale; 16 postjudgment 
writs of garnishment; one order granting a writ of execution 
postjudgment; 2 turnover orders for garnished funds; and 11 subpoena 
enforcement orders. 
     During the fiscal year, CLCB collected $6000 in fines and $1,437,766 
in backpay, while recouping $400,000 in court costs and attorneys’ fees 
incurred in contempt. 
     Several noteworthy cases came to a conclusion during the fiscal year.  
In Daufuskie,1 CLCB fought an ultimately successful battle on several 
fronts.  The Branch prevailed in a contempt proceeding before the 
Special Master appointed by the D.C. Circuit based on the employer’s 
failure to properly reinstate employees and to restore contractual terms 
and benefits; the discriminatory discharge of an employee and bad faith 
bargaining.  While the contempt proceeding was pending, the employer 
sold its business to another entity.  CLCB obtained a protective 
restraining order (PRO) requiring the employer to deposit $5.5 million of 
the sales proceeds into the registry of the court to protect the Board’s 
backpay claim.  Contempt proceedings were then instituted because of 
the employer’s failure to obey the PRO.  Ultimately, the employer was 
forced to disgorge $5.5 million under the PRO and reached a backpay 
settlement for that amount.  It also agreed to a consent contempt 
adjudication and the payment to the Board of $400,000 in costs and 
attorneys’ fees, among other remedies.  Finally, the Court, sua sponte, 
ordered a hearing into whether the attorneys for the employer were in 
contempt and should be reported to their respective bars based on 
misconduct in failing to cause their client to comply with the PRO.  The 
Special Master’s decision holding the attorneys in contempt is pending 
appeal before the D.C. Circuit. 
     Another complex and significant case was settled during the fiscal 
year, after extended litigation.  In Cable Car, 2  attorneys for CLCB 
prevailed in a civil contempt case before a Special Master appointed by 
the Ninth Circuit, based on allegations of discriminatory discharges and 
bad faith bargaining.  At the same time, CLCB began a series of 
garnishment actions aimed at enforcing a backpay award issued in a 
 
1 Board Case 11–CA–17334, D.C. Cir. Nos. 99-1189, 99-1296. 
2 Board Cases 20–CA–25377, –25789, 9th Cir. Nos. 97-70069, 97-70253. 
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separate Cable Car decision.  A global settlement was ultimately 
reached, with Cable Car agreeing to pay $248,000 in backpay and to 
enter into a consent order in connection with their contumacious conduct. 
     Other notable cases resolved during the fiscal year included United 
Postal Service, in which CLCB settled 17 cases of alleged Weingarten 
violations by USPS.  The settlement included a requirement on the part 
of USPS to implement a nationwide educational program for supervisors 
and managers.  In Montauk,3 CLCB, in conjunction with Region 29 and 
Special Litigation, settled a protracted bankruptcy case for $105,000 in 
backpay; and in Southern Illinois,4 CLCB obtained a nondischargeability 
order in a bankruptcy court even in the absence of a liquidated backpay 
judgment. 
     The U.S. Postal and Weingarten cases concern numerous Board and 
Regional cases and case cites. 
 
 
3 Board Case 29–CA–19518, U.S. Bankruptcy Ct., Eastern District of  NY, Case No. 897-85005-
478. 
4 Board Case 14–CA–26946, U.S. Bankruptcy Ct., Southern District of Ill., Case No. 03-60615. 
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Special Litigation 
The Board participates in a number of cases that fall outside the 
normal process of statutory enforcement and review.  The following 
represent the most significant cases decided this year: 
A.  Litigation Concerning the Board’s Jurisdiction 
In T & J Meat Packing, Inc. v. SEIU, Local 1,1 the U.S. District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois granted the Board’s motion to 
intervene and took under advisement the Board’s motion to stay an 
employer’s Section 301 suit seeking a declaratory judgment that it had 
not entered into a collective-bargaining agreement with the union.  At the 
time the employer filed suit, the Region had issued a complaint and a 
notice of hearing on related unfair labor practice charges filed by the 
union for alleged violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.  The 
Board argued that because the court’s jurisdiction over the suit was 
questionable in light of Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Div. v. 
UAW,2 the court should await the Board’s resolution of the same 
contractual issues in the pending administrative proceeding.  The district 
court declined to stay its consideration, and addressed the Textron issue 
in its decision on the union’s motion to dismiss complaint.  In Textron, 
the Supreme Court held that Section 301 jurisdiction arises only in the 
context of suits alleging breach of a collective-bargaining agreement.  
The district court noted, however, that Textron also envisioned that a 
district court has jurisdiction to declare a contract invalid where the 
plaintiff has been accused of violating that contract.  Accordingly, the 
district court concluded that Section 301 jurisdiction is conferred 
whenever an employer’s complaint alleges that it has been accused of 
contract breach by the union, and states with particularity the sections of 
the contract allegedly violated.  Finding that the employer here had done 
so in its amended complaint, the court denied the union’s motion to 
dismiss.  The court then held evidentiary hearings and found that the 
parties had not entered into a collective-bargaining agreement.  The court 
added in a footnote that its ruling on the contract formation issue would 
have preclusive effect on the Board, in light of NLRB v. Donna-Lee 
                                                 
1 2004 WL 813537 (N.D. Ill.) (not reported in F. Supp. 2d and not containing amendment to 
opinion). 
2 523 U.S. 653 (1998). 
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Sportswear3 and NLRB v. Heyman.4  Upon the Board’s motion to amend 
judgment, the district court acknowledged that the Board unfair labor 
practice case had been dismissed, and the preclusion finding was moot 
and therefore mere dicta having no force of law. 
In Amerco v. NLRB,5 the United States District Court for the District 
of Arizona granted the Board’s motion to dismiss claims seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief against the Board, individual Board 
members, the General Counsel, and a Regional Director.  The claims 
arose from the prosecution of unfair labor practice claims against U-Haul 
Co. of Nevada, Inc. While the hearing before an administrative law judge 
was in progress, the General Counsel amended the administrative 
complaint, seeking to hold three additional related entities responsible for 
the unfair labor practices alleged as a single integrated business 
enterprise.  The newly added respondents sued and alleged that 15 days 
of administrative hearing were held without their participation, denying 
them notice and an opportunity to participate in the process.  Plaintiffs 
moved the court to declare that the Board defendants violated Board 
regulations and plaintiffs’ due process rights.  Plaintiffs further sought an 
injunction preventing the consolidation of the amended complaint with 
the ongoing administrative hearing, limiting the issues that may proceed 
against plaintiffs, and limiting participation by the presiding 
administrative law judge and Board attorneys in future proceedings 
against plaintiffs.  The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to grant the 
requested relief because the Supreme Court in Myers v. Bethlehem 
Shipbuilding Corp.6 held that a district court may not enjoin unfair labor 
practice hearings.  The court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the case 
fell within the narrow Fay v. Douds7 exception whereby a district court 
might review nonfrivolous allegations of a constitutional violation.  The 
court reasoned that unlike Fay v. Douds, the case at issue did not involve 
representation matters, but rather, a challenge to an unfair labor practice 
proceeding.  This distinction is important, the district court explained, 
because parties in unfair labor practice proceedings may seek immediate 
redress from an adverse Board order in a circuit court and therefore will 
not be deprived of meaningful judicial review if the district court 
declines jurisdiction.  Moreover, the court noted that the Act vests 
exclusive power to prevent unfair labor practices in the Board, with 
                                                 
3 836 F.2d 31 (1st Cir. 1987). 
4 541 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1976). 
5 330 F. Supp. 2d 1083 (D.Ariz.), appeal pending (9th Cir. No. 04-16389). 
6 303 U.S. 41, 43, 47–48 (1938). 
7 172 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1949). 
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rights of appeal in a circuit court, and Myers explicitly stated that all 
constitutional questions are open to examination by the circuit court.   
B.  Litigation Under the Equal Access to Justice Act 
In Nova Plumbing, Inc. v. NLRB,8 the D.C. Circuit granted in part the 
employer’s request for attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice 
Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412.  The EAJA award was limited to fees 
incurred in litigating the Section 10(f) appeal before the court, based on 
the fact that “the argument on which [the employer] prevailed was not 
presented to the Board.”  In the underlying case, the circuit court relied 
on the Supreme Court’s decision in International Ladies Garment 
Workers v. NLRB,9 a case the employer did not cite in the proceedings 
before the Board, to conclude that the employer did not violate the Act 
when it withdrew recognition from and refused to bargain with a union.  
In granting the EAJA award, the court reduced the fees that the employer 
claimed for the court litigation on the grounds that the hours claimed “far 
exceed the time that was reasonably necessary to support the 
[employer’s] petition for review .  .  .  .  ”  The employer’s application 
had sought a total of $132,849.09, with approximately $70,000 of that 
amount for litigating the appellate proceeding.  The court reduced the 
award to $37,000.00.  
In Precision Concrete v. NLRB,10 the D.C. Circuit granted in part and 
denied in part the employer’s motion for attorney fees and expenses 
under the EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412.  In the underlying case, the Board 
found several violations of the Act, one of which was based on employer 
conduct that was never alleged in a charge, but was asserted for the first 
time in the General Counsel’s complaint.  The Board found that Section 
10(b) of the Act did not preclude consideration of the misconduct 
because it was closely related to other conduct included in a timely filed 
charge.  Based solely on its findings as to this uncharged conduct, the 
Board found a union strike was an unfair labor practice strike, and 
Precision accordingly was required to reinstate and pay backpay to 
striking employees.11  On review, the D.C. Circuit rejected the Board’s 
exercise of jurisdiction over the disputed allegation because it did not 
share a “significant factual affiliation” with the activity alleged in the 
charge that had been filed against the employer.12  Thus, the court 
vacated the Board’s order insofar as it directed reinstatement based upon 
the uncharged conduct.  In its EAJA decision, the court granted the 
 
8 No. 02-1085, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 6149 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam). 
9 366 U.S. 731 (1961). 
10 362 F.3d 847 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam). 
11 337 NLRB 211, 213–214 (2001). 
12 334 F.3d 88, 93 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
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application in part because the Board lacked a “compelling argument for 
asserting jurisdiction” where the circuit had held there is none.13 
However, the court substantially reduced the amount claimed by the 
employer under the EAJA because the employer sought fees incurred to 
litigate the entire case before the administrative law judge and the Board, 
including issues on which the employer did not prevail.  The court 
further reduced the amount claimed because it found the employer 
sought remuneration for unreasonable and excessive time spent preparing 
its appeal, and claimed expenses that are not recoverable under the EAJA 
(including expenses for couriers, telephone calls and traveling).  The 
court accordingly reduced the employer’s requested EAJA award from 
approximately $144,000 to $75,000. 
In NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan,14 the District Court for the District of 
New Mexico granted a Native American tribe’s application for attorney 
fees and expenses filed pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 2412.  In the underlying case, the en banc Tenth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s decision dismissing the Board’s Nash-Finch 
complaint15 and finding that the NLRA does not preempt a tribal 
ordinance which prohibits private employers and unions from entering 
into union-security agreements.  The district court granted the tribe’s 
EAJA application in large part, and ordered the Board to pay 
approximately $392,000 in fees and expenses, concluding that the 
Board’s litigation position was not substantially justified.  The district 
court rejected the Board’s argument that its position that the NLRA 
prohibited the tribe from enacting the ordinance was reasonable, and 
based on settled principles of labor law and Indian law.  The court further 
found that the cogency of Judge Murphy’s dissent in the en banc opinion 
was not strong enough to provide substantial justification for the Board’s 
position.  The court concluded that the tribe was entitled to recover an 
enhanced hourly attorney rate because of the expertise of its attorneys in 
Indian law.  After the district court’s EAJA decision, the Agency filed a 
notice of appeal.  While the case was pending on appeal, the parties 
settled the matter for approximately 57 percent of the fees and expenses 
allowed by the court. 
In addition to the above EAJA decisions, in NLRB v. Triple A Fire 
Protection, Inc.,16 the Eleventh Circuit issued an order without an 
accompanying opinion, denying an employer’s application for fees and 
expenses under the EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412.  The employer sought 
                                                 
13 362 F.3d at 852. 
14 305 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (D.N.M.). 
15 NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138 (1971). 
16 No. 96-6944 (11th Cir.). 
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approximately $292,000 in fees and expenses after it prevailed in a 
contempt proceeding brought against it when it failed to comply with an 
enforced Board order. 
C.  Preemption Litigation 
In Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer,17 the Ninth Circuit unanimously 
affirmed a district court injunction prohibiting on preemption grounds 
the enforcement of California statute sections that prohibit employers 
who receive state grants or funds in excess of $10,000 from using such 
funding to advocate against or in favor of union organizing.  The Board 
had filed an amicus brief in the circuit court arguing that the sections 
were preempted.  Initially, the Ninth Circuit determined that the 
California statute constituted “regulation” by California, and that the 
market participant exception did not apply to protect against a finding of 
preemption.  The court further  reasoned that “[b]ecause the California 
statute, on its face, directly regulates the union organizing process itself 
and imposes substantial compliance costs and litigation risk on 
employers who participate in that process, it interferes with an area 
Congress intended to leave free of state regulation.  It is therefore 
preempted under Machinists.”18  The court also concluded that, in light 
of its finding of Machinists preemption, it need not reach the question of 
Garmon preemption.19  The court rejected the argument advanced by 
California and the AFL–CIO that preemption should not apply because 
this was a facial, not an as-applied, challenge to the statute.  In doing so, 
the court found that because “California has burdened the NLRA through 
the very act of regulating[, t]here is thus ‘no set of circumstances . . . 
under which the Act would be valid’ as to employers covered by the 
NLRA.”20  The court also found inapposite California and the AFL–
CIO’s analogy to First Amendment cases distinguishing direct 
restrictions on speech from instances where the government limits the 
use of government funds to subsidize speech or conduct.  Finally, the 
court found that the existence of certain federal statutes that limit 
employers’ use of specific federal grant or program funds to advocate for 
or against union organizing to be too ambiguous a basis for inferring 
congressional intent to permit California’s broad-based intrusion into the 
collective bargaining process. 
 
17 364 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.). 
18 Id. at 1165 (pet. for rehearing pending). 
19 San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). 
20 364 F.3d at 1169. 
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D.  Litigation Alleging Agency Misconduct 
In Richard Lawson Excavating, Inc. v. NLRB,21 the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissed all 
counts of a complaint alleging that the Board’s acceptance of an 
allegedly illegal videotape from a charging party union violated 
plaintiffs’ rights under the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic 
Surveillance Control Act, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5701 et seq. (the “Pennsylvania 
Wiretap Act”), the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 
18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (the “Federal Wiretap Act”), and the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  During an organizing drive, a 
union member videotaped a conversation among other union members 
and the plaintiff supervisor.  The union gave the videotape to the Board, 
believing the tape could be useful to the investigation of unfair labor 
practice charges pending against the employer.  Plaintiffs did not allege 
that the Board solicited or directed the taping. 
The court dismissed with prejudice plaintiffs’ claim for damages 
under Section 2520 of the Federal Wiretap Act for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, explaining that Section 2520 expressly precludes relief 
against the United States.  The court also held that if the plaintiffs instead 
intended to bring their Federal Wiretap Act claim as a Federal Tort 
Claim under 18 U.S.C. § 2712, any such action was dismissed without 
prejudice.  In so holding, the court noted that plaintiffs conceded they 
had not met the 18 U.S.C. § 2712 prerequisites to commence an action.  
Further, the court dismissed with prejudice plaintiffs’ claim under the 
Pennsylvania Wiretap Act, as plaintiffs conceded that sovereign 
immunity precluded that claim.  Finally, the court dismissed with 
prejudice the procedural due process claim, noting that plaintiffs had not 
shown that they would be entitled to a hearing, and they had conceded 
that there is no due process remedy for their alleged injury.  The case 
currently remains pending against the union. 
In Gilgallon v. NLRB,22 the Third Circuit affirmed a district court 
dismissal of a complaint against the Board and individual Board 
employees.  The district court complaint had alleged numerous 
constitutional, fraud, and malicious prosecution claims against the Board 
and four Board employees for actions taken in litigating a contempt 
proceeding following the plaintiffs’ failure to comply with an order 
pursuant to Section 10(j) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 10(j).  The Third Circuit 
held that the plaintiffs could not challenge in this action against the 
Board and its employees, the district court’s orders in the separate 10(j) 
                                                 
21 333 F. Supp. 2d 358 (W.D. Pa.). 
22 No. 03-2886 (3d Cir.). 
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litigation.  In particular, the Third Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt 
to raise an argument already rejected by the Third Circuit in the prior 
appeal in the 10(j) case:  that the plaintiffs were not properly joined as 
respondents in the 10(j) proceeding.  Noting that in its earlier opinion in 
the 10(j) case the circuit had warned plaintiffs that frivolous and 
vexatious litigation would lead to sanctions, the circuit court found this 
appeal to be frivolous, and ordered plaintiffs to show cause why the court 
should not award the Board damages and double costs.   
E.  Litigation Under the Bankruptcy Code 
In Provident Nursing Home,23 the United States Bankruptcy Court for 
the Southern District of Florida approved a collective-bargaining 
agreement that had been negotiated during the course of an employer’s 
bankruptcy proceeding.  The employer and the union had agreed that the 
provisions in the agreement would become effective upon approval by 
the bankruptcy court, but the employer subsequently opposed the 
approval by the court.  While the court was considering the union’s 
motion for approval, the collective-bargaining agreement expired.  Thus, 
the court considered whether the motion for approval was moot, and 
whether it had authority to approve the collective-bargaining agreement 
retroactively.  At the court’s request, the Board filed a memorandum 
addressing the issues raised.  In its decision, the court noted that its 
approval was not required because contracts entered into postpetition “in 
the ordinary course of business” do not require court approval.  
Nonetheless, it found that it did have authority to grant retroactive 
approval under Section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code,24 and that equity 
favored such approval.  The court reasoned that the agreement did not 
affect the rights of creditors in the property of the employer/debtor’s 
estate.  Moreover, the employer had already accepted the benefit of labor 
peace and the work of the bargaining unit employees, and accordingly, 
must also accept the burdens of the agreement. 
 
 
23 No. 98-25061-BKC-AJC (Bankr. S.D. Fla.). 
24 11 U.S.C. § 105. 
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APPENDIX 
 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN STATISTICAL TABLES 
 
The definitions of terms contained in this glossary are not intended for general 
application but are specifically directed toward increasing comprehension of the 
statistical tables that follow. Thus the definitions are keyed directly to the terms used in 
such tables. 
Adjusted Cases 
Cases are closed as “adjusted” when an informal settlement agreement is executed 
and compliance with its terms is secured. (See “Informal Agreement,” this glossary.) 
In some instances, a written agreement is not secured but appropriate remedial action 
is taken so as to render further proceeding unnecessary. A central element in an 
“adjusted” case is the agreement of the parties to settle differences without recourse 
to litigation. 
Advisory Opinion Cases 
See “Other Cases—AO” under “Types of Cases.” 
Agreement of Parties 
See “Informal Agreement” and “Formal Agreement,” this glossary. The term 
“agreement” includes both types. 
Amendment of Certification Cases 
See “Other Cases—AC” under “Types of Cases.” 
Backpay 
Amounts of money paid or to be paid employees as reimbursement for wages lost 
because they were discriminatorily discharged or unlawfully denied employment, 
plus interest on such money. Also included is payment for bonuses, vacations, other 
fringe benefits, etc., lost because of the discriminatory acts, as well as interest 
thereon. All moneys noted in table 4 have been reported as paid or owing in cases 
closed during the fiscal year. (Installment payments may protract some payments 
beyond this year and some payments may have actually been made at times 
considerably in advance of the date a case was closed; i.e., in a prior fiscal year.) 
Backpay Hearing 
A supplementary hearing to receive evidence and testimony as to the amount of 
backpay due discriminatees under a prior Board or court decree. 
Backpay Specification 
The formal document, a “pleading,” which is served on the parties when the Regional 
Director and the respondent are unable to agree as to the amounts of backpay due 
discriminatees pursuant to a Board order or court decree requiring payment of such 
backpay. It sets forth in detail the amount held by the Regional Director to be owing 
each discriminatee and the method of computation employed. The specification is 
accompanied by a notice of hearing setting a date for a backpay hearing. 
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Case 
A “case” is the general term used in referring to a charge or petition filed with the 
Board. Each case is numbered and carries a letter designation indicating the type of 
case. See “Types of Cases.” 
Certification 
A certification of the results of an election is issued by the Regional Director or the 
Board. If a union has been designated as the exclusive bargaining representative by a 
majority of the employees, a certification of representative is issued. If no union has 
received a majority vote, a certification of results of election is issued. 
Challenges 
The parties to an NLRB election are entitled to challenge any voter. At the election 
site, the challenged ballots are segregated and not counted when other ballots are 
tallied. Most frequently, the tally of unchallenged ballots determines the election and 
the challenged ballots are insufficient in number to affect the results of the election. 
The challenges in such a case are never resolved, and the certification is based on the 
tally of (unchallenged) ballots. 
 
When challenged ballots are determinative of the result, a determination as to whether 
or not they are to be counted rests with the Regional Director in the first instance, 
subject to possible appeal to the Board. Often, however, the “determinative” challenges 
are resolved informally by the parties by mutual agreement. No record is kept of 
nondeterminative challenges or determinative challenges which are resolved by 
agreement prior to issuance of the first tally of ballots. 
Charge 
A document filed by an employee, an employer, a union, or an individual alleging 
that an unfair labor practice has been committed. See “C Case” under “Types of 
Cases.” 
Complaint 
The document which initiates “formal” proceedings in an unfair labor practice case. 
It is issued by the Regional Director when he or she concludes on the basis of a 
completed investigation that any of the allegations contained in the charge have merit 
and adjustment or settlement has not been achieved by the parties. The complaint sets 
forth all allegations and information necessary to bring a case to hearing before an 
administrative law judge pursuant to due process of law. The complaint contains a 
notice of hearing, specifying the time and place of hearing. 
Election, Runoff 
An election conducted by the Regional Director after an initial election, having three 
or more choices on the ballot, has turned out to be inconclusive (none of the choices 
receiving a majority of the valid votes cast). The Regional Director conducts the 
runoff election between the choices on the original ballot which received the highest 
and the next highest number of votes. 
Election, Stipulated 
An election held by the Regional Director pursuant to an agreement signed by all the 
parties concerned. The agreement provides for the waiving of hearing and the 
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establishment of the appropriate unit by mutual consent. Postelection rulings are 
made by the Board. 
Eligible Voters 
Employees within an appropriate bargaining unit who were employed as of a fixed 
date prior to an election, or are otherwise qualified to vote under the Board’s 
eligibility rules. 
Fees, Dues, and Fines 
The collection by a union or an employer of dues, fines, and referral fees from 
employees may be found to be an unfair labor practice under Section 8(b)(1)(A) or 
(2) or 8(a)(1) and (2) or (3), where, for instance such moneys were collected pursuant 
to an illegal hiring hall arrangement, or an invalid or unlawfully applied union-
security agreement; where dues were deducted from employees’ pay without their 
authorization; or, in the cases of fines, where such fines restrained or coerced 
employees in the exercise of their rights. The remedy for such unfair labor practices 
usually requires the reimbursement of such moneys to the employees. 
Fines 
See “Fees, Dues, and Fines.” 
Formal Action 
Formal actions may be documents issued or proceedings conducted when the 
voluntary agreement of all parties regarding the disposition of all issues in a case 
cannot be obtained, and where dismissal of the charge or petition is not warranted. 
Formal actions, are, further, those in which the decision-making authority of the 
Board (the Regional Director in representation cases), as provided in Sections 9 and 
10 of the Act, must be exercised in order to achieve the disposition of a case or the 
resolution of any issue raised in a case. Thus, formal action takes place when a Board 
decision and consent order is issued pursuant to a stipulation, even though the 
stipulation constitutes a voluntary agreement. 
Formal Agreement (in unfair labor practice cases) 
A written agreement between the Board and the other parties to a case in which 
hearing is waived and the specific terms of a Board order agreed upon. The 
agreement may also provide for the entry of a consent court decree enforcing the 
Board order. 
Compliance 
The carrying out of remedial action as agreed upon by the parties in writing (see 
“Formal Agreement,” “Informal Agreement”); as recommended by the administrative 
law judge in the decision; as ordered by the Board in its decision and order; or 
decreed by the court. 
Dismissed Cases 
Cases may be dismissed at any stage. They are dismissed informally when, following 
investigation, the Regional Director concludes that there has been no violation of the 
law, that there is insufficient evidence to support further action, or for a variety of 
other reasons. Before the charge is dismissed, however, the charging party is given 
the opportunity to withdraw the charge by the administrative law judge, by the Board, 
or by the courts through their refusal to enforce orders of the Board. 
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Dues 
See “Fees, Dues, and Fines.” 
Election, Consent 
An election conducted by the Regional Director pursuant to an agreement signed by 
all parties concerned. The agreement provides for the waiving of a hearing, the 
establishment of the appropriate unit by mutual consent, and the final determination 
of all postelection issues by the Regional Director. 
Election, Directed 
Board-Directed 
An election conducted by the Regional Director pursuant to a decision and direction 
of election by the Board. Postelection rulings are made by the Regional Director or 
by the Board. 
Regional Director-Directed 
An election conducted by the Regional Director pursuant to a decision and direction 
of election issued by the Regional Director after a hearing. Postelection rulings are 
made by the Regional Director or by the Board. 
Election, Expedited 
An election conducted by the Regional Director pursuant to a petition filed within 30 
days of the commencement of picketing in a situation in which a meritorious 
8(b)(7)(C) charge has been filed. The election is conducted under priority conditions 
and without a hearing unless the Regional Director believes the proceeding raises 
questions which cannot be decided without a hearing. 
 
Postelection rulings on objections and/or challenges are made by the Regional 
Director and are final and binding unless the Board grants an appeal on application 
by one of the parties. 
Election, Rerun 
An election held after an initial election has been set aside either by the Regional 
Director or by the Board. 
Informal Agreement (in unfair labor practice cases) 
A written agreement entered into between the party charged with committing an 
unfair labor practice, the Regional Director, and (in most cases) the charging party 
requiring the charged party to take certain specific remedial action as a basis for the 
closing of the case. Cases closed in this manner are included in “adjusted” cases. 
Injunction Petitions 
Petitions filed by the Board with respective U.S. district courts for injunctive relief 
under Section 10(j) or Section 10(e) of the Act pending hearing and adjudication of 
unfair labor practice charges before the Board. Also, petitions filed with the U.S. 
court of appeals under Section 10(e) of the Act. 
Jurisdictional Disputes 
Controversies between unions or groupings of employees as to which employees will 
perform specific work. Cases involving jurisdictional disputes are received by the 
Board through the filing of charges alleging a violation of Section 8(b)(4)(D). They are 
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initially processed under Section 10(k) of the Act which is concerned with the 
determination of the jurisdictional dispute itself rather than with a finding as to whether 
an unfair labor practice has been committed. Therefore, the failure of a party to comply 
with the Board’s determination of dispute is the basis for the issuance of an unfair labor 
practice complaint and the processing of the case through usual unfair labor practice 
procedures. 
Objections 
Any party to an election may file objections alleging that either the conduct of the 
election or the conduct of a party to the election failed to meet the Board’s standards. 
An election will be set aside if eligible employee-voters have not been given an 
adequate opportunity to cast their ballots, in secrecy and without hindrance from fear 
or other interference with the expression of their free choice. 
Petition 
See “Representation Cases.” Also see “Other Cases—AC, UC, and UD” under 
“Types of Cases.” 
Proceeding 
One or more cases included in a single litigated action. A “proceeding” may be a 
combination of C and R cases consolidated for the purpose of hearing. 
Representation Cases 
This term applies to cases bearing the alphabetical designations RC, RM, or RD. (See 
“R Cases” under “Types of Cases,” this glossary, for specific definitions of these 
terms.) All three types of cases are included in the term “representation” which deals 
generally with the problem of which union, if any, shall represent employees in 
negotiations with their employer. The cases are initiated by the filing of a petition by 
a union, an employer, or a group of employees. 
Representation Election 
An election by secret ballot conducted by the Board among the employees in an 
appropriate collective-bargaining unit to determine whether the employees wish to be 
represented by a particular labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining. 
The tables herein reflect only final elections which result in the issuance of a 
certification of representative if a union is chosen, or a certification of results if the 
majority has voted for “no union.” 
Situation 
One or more unfair labor practice cases involving the same factual situation. These 
cases are processed as a single unit of work. A situation may include one or more CA 
cases, a combination of CA and CB cases, or combination of other types of C cases. 
It does not include representation cases. 
Types of Cases 
General: 
Letter designations are given to all cases depending upon the subsection of 
the Act allegedly violated or otherwise describing the general nature of each 
case. Each of the letter designations appearing below is descriptive of the 
case it is associated with. 
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C Cases (unfair labor practice cases) 
A case number which contains the first letter designation C, in combination 
with another letter, i.e., CA, CB, etc., indicates that it involves a charge that 
an unfair labor practice has been committed in violation of one or more 
subsections of Section 8. 
CA: 
A charge that an employer has committed unfair labor practices in violation 
of Section 8(a)(1), (2), (3), (4), or (5), or any combination thereof. 
CB: 
A charge that a labor organization has committed unfair labor practices in 
violation of Section 8(b)(1), (2), (3), (5), or (6), or any combination thereof. 
CC: 
A charge that a labor organization has committed unfair labor practices in 
violation of Section 8(b)(4)(i) and/or (A), (B), or (C), or any combination 
thereof. 
CD: 
A charge that a labor organization has committed an unfair labor practice in 
violation of Section 8(b)(4)(i) or (ii)(D). Preliminary actions under Section 
10(k) for the determination of jurisdictional disputes are processed as CD 
cases. (See “Jurisdictional Disputes” in this glossary.) 
CE: 
A charge that either a labor organization or an employer, or both jointly, 
have committed an unfair labor practice in violation of Section 8(e). 
CG:  
A charge that a labor organization has committed unfair labor practices in 
violation of Section 8(g). 
CP: 
A charge that a labor organization has committed unfair labor practices in 
violation of Section 8(b)(7)(A), (B), or (C), or any combination thereof. 
R Cases (representation cases) 
A case number which contains the first letter designation R, in combination 
with another letter, i.e., RC, RD, RM, indicates that it is a petition for 
investigation and determination of a question concerning representation of 
employees, filed under Section 9(c) of the Act. 
RC: 
A petition filed by a labor organization or an employee alleging that a 
question concerning representation has arisen and seeking an election for 
determination of a collective-bargaining representative. 
RD: 
A petition filed by employees alleging that the union previously certified or 
currently recognized by the employer as their collective-bargaining 
representative no longer represents a majority of the employees in the 
appropriate unit and seeking an election to determine this. 
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RM: 
A petition filed by an employer alleging that a question concerning 
representation has arisen and seeking an election for the determination of a 
collective-bargaining representative. 
Other Cases 
AC: 
(Amendment of Certification cases): A petition filed by a labor organization 
or an employer for amendment of an existing certification to reflect changed 
circumstances, such as changes in the name or affiliation of the labor 
organization involved or in the name or location of the employer involved. 
AO: 
(Advisory Opinion cases): As distinguished from the other types of cases 
described above, which are filed in and processed by Regional Offices of the 
Board, AO or “advisory opinion” cases are filed directly with the Board in 
Washington and seek a determination as to whether the Board would or 
would not assert jurisdiction, in any given situation on the basis of its current 
standards over the party or parties to a proceeding pending before a state or 
territorial agency or a court. (See subpart H of the Board’s Rules and 
Regulations, Series 8, as amended.) 
UC: 
(Unit Clarification cases): A petition filed by a labor organization or an 
employer seeking a determination as to whether certain classification of 
employees should or should not be included within a presently existing 
bargaining unit. 
UD: 
(Union Deauthorization case): A petition filed by employees pursuant to 
Section 9(e)(1) requesting that the Board conduct a referendum to determine 
whether a union’s authority to enter into a union-shop contract should be 
rescinded. 
UD Cases 
See “Other Cases—UD” under “Types of Cases.” 
Unfair Labor Practice Cases 
See “C Cases” under “Types of Cases.” 
Union Deauthorization Cases 
See “Other Cases—UD” under “Types of Cases.” 
Union-Shop Agreement 
An agreement between an employer and a labor organization which requires 
membership in the union as a condition of employment on or after the 30th day 
following (1) the beginning of such employment or (2) the effective date of the 
agreement, whichever is the later. 
Unit, Appropriate Bargaining 
A grouping of employees in a plant, firm, or industry recognized by the employer, 
agreed upon by the parties to a case, or designated by the Board or its Regional 
Director, as appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining. 
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Valid Vote 
A secret ballot on which the choice of the voter is clearly shown. 
Withdrawn Cases 
Cases are closed as “withdrawn” when the charging party or petitioner, for whatever 
reasons, requests withdrawal or the charge of the petition and such request is 
approved. 
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Table 1.—Total Cases Received, Closed, and Pending, Fiscal Year 20041
 
Identification of filing party   
 
 
Total  
AFL–CIO 
Unions 
Other 
National 
Unions 
Other 
local 
Unions 
 
Individuals 
 
Employers 
 All Cases 
Pending October 1, 2003.................... *22,120 13,718 628 722 6,201 851 
Received fiscal 2004........................... 31,787 16,835 960 874 11,666 1,452 
On docket fiscal 2004......................... 53,907 30,553 1,588 1,596 17,867 2,303 
Closed fiscal 2004.............................. 34,851 18,986 1,061 1,009 12,300 1,495 
Pending September 30, 2004.............. 19,056 11,567 527 587 5,567 808 
 Unfair labor practice cases2
Pending October 1, 2003.................... 20,513 12,683 593 634 5,838 765 
Received fiscal 2004........................... 26,890 13,525 749 639 10,693 1,284 
On docket fiscal 2004......................... 47,403 26,208 1,342 1,273 16,531 2,049 
Closed fiscal 2004.............................. 29,954 15,688 853 755 11,317 1,341 
Pending September 30, 2004.............. 17,449 10,520 489 518 5,214 708 
 Representation cases3
Pending October 1, 2003.................... 1,453 984 34 82 296 57 
Received fiscal 2004........................... 4,588 3,187 202 215 843 141 
On docket fiscal 2004......................... 6,041 4,171 236 297 1,139 198 
Closed fiscal 2004.............................. 4,605 3,186 198 236 853 132 
Pending September 30, 2004.............. 1,436 985 38 61 286 66 
 Union-shop deauthorization cases 
Pending October 1, 2003.................... 62 -- -- -- 62 -- 
Received fiscal 2004........................... 127 -- -- -- 127 -- 
On docket fiscal 2004......................... 189 -- -- -- 189 -- 
Closed fiscal 2004.............................. 125 -- -- -- 125 -- 
Pending September 30, 2004.............. 64 -- -- -- 64 -- 
 Amendment of certification cases 
Pending October 1, 2003.................... 5 5 0 0 0 0 
Received fiscal 2004........................... 17 7 2 1 0 7 
On docket fiscal 2004......................... 22 12 2 1 0 7 
Closed fiscal 2004.............................. 12 8 2 1 0 1 
Pending September 30, 2004.............. 10 4 0 0 0 6 
 Unit clarification cases 
Pending October 1, 2003.................... 87 46 1 6 5 29 
Received fiscal 2004........................... 165 116 7 19 3 20 
On docket fiscal 2004......................... 252 162 8 25 8 49 
Closed fiscal 2004.............................. 155 104 8 17 5 21 
Pending September 30, 2004.............. 97 58 0 8 3 28 
 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions.  Advisory Opinion (AO) cases not included.  See Table 22. 
2 See Table 1B for totals by types of cases. 
3 See Table 1A for totals by types of cases. 
* Totals for cases pending Oct. 1, 2003, differ from last year’s annual report.  Revised totals result from postreport adjustments to 
last year’s “on docket” and/or “closed figures.” 
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Table 1A.—Unfair Labor Practice Cases Received, Closed, and Pending, 
Fiscal Year 20041
 
Identification of filing party   
 
 
Total  
AFL–CIO 
Unions 
Other 
National 
Unions 
Other 
local 
Unions 
 
Individuals 
 
Employers 
 CA Cases 
Pending October 1, 2003.................... *17,576 12,620 586 615 3,690 65 
Received fiscal 2004.......................... 19,943 13,447 733 615 5,103 45 
On docket fiscal 2004......................... 37,519 26,067 1,319 1,230 8,793 110 
Closed fiscal 2004.............................. 22,874 15,601 836 728 5,648 61 
Pending September 30, 2004.............. 14,645 10,466 483 502 3,145 49 
 CB Cases 
Pending October 1, 2003.................... 2,583 46 6 15 2,133 383 
Received fiscal 2004........................... 6,193 54 13 16 5,546 564 
On docket fiscal 2004......................... 8,776 100 19 31 7,679 947 
Closed fiscal 2004.............................. 6,317 57 14 18 5,629 599 
Pending September 30, 2004.............. 2,459 43 5 13 2,050 348 
 CC Cases 
Pending October 1, 2003.................... 202 5 0 0 6 191 
Received fiscal 2004........................... 440 3 0 3 23 411 
On docket fiscal 2004......................... 642 8 0 3 29 602 
Closed fiscal 2004.............................. 423 7 0 1 21 394 
Pending September 30, 2004.............. 219 1 0 2 8 208 
 CD Cases 
Pending October 1, 2003.................... 67 9 0 1 2 55 
Received fiscal 2004........................... 155 18 0 3 3 131 
On docket fiscal 2004......................... 222 27 0 4 5 186 
Closed fiscal 2004.............................. 157 19 0 4 4 130 
Pending September 30, 2004.............. 65 8 0 0 1 56 
 CE Cases 
Pending October 1, 2003.................... 25 2 0 3 4 16 
Received fiscal 2004........................... 29 2 0 0 6 21 
On docket fiscal 2004......................... 54 4 0 3 10 37 
Closed fiscal 2004.............................. 39 2 0 3 5 29 
Pending September 30, 2004.............. 15 2 0 0 5 8 
 CG Cases 
Pending October 1, 2003.................... 14 0 0 0 3 11 
Received fiscal 2004........................... 30 0 0 0 2 28 
On docket fiscal 2004......................... 44 0 0 0 5 39 
Closed fiscal 2004.............................. 27 0 0 0 4 23 
Pending September 30, 2004.............. 17 0 0 0 1 16 
 CP Cases 
Pending October 1, 2003.................... 46 1 1 0 0 44 
Received fiscal 2004........................... 100 1 3 2 10 84 
On docket fiscal 2004......................... 146 2 4 2 10 128 
Closed fiscal 2004.............................. 117 2 3 1 6 105 
Pending September 30, 2004.............. 29 0 1 1 4 23 
 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
* Totals for cases pending Oct. 1, 2003, differ from last year’s annual report.  Revised totals result from postreport adjustments to last 
year’s “on docket” and/or “closed figures.” 
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Table 1B.—Representation Cases Received, Closed, and Pending, 
Fiscal Year 20041
 
Identification of filing party   
 
 
 
Total 
 
AFL–CIO 
Unions 
Other 
National 
Unions 
Other 
local 
Unions 
 
Individuals 
 
Employers 
 RC Cases 
Pending October 1, 2003.................... *1,096 981 34 81 0 -- 
Received fiscal 2004.......................... 3,608 3,186 202 215 5 -- 
On docket fiscal 2004........................ 4,704 4,167 236 296 5 -- 
Closed fiscal 2004.............................. 3,620 3,183 198 236 3 -- 
Pending September 30, 2004.............. 1,084 984 38 60 2 -- 
 RM Cases 
Pending October 1, 2003.................... 57 -- -- -- -- 57 
Received fiscal 2004.......................... 141 -- -- -- -- 141 
On docket fiscal 2004........................ 198 -- -- -- -- 198 
Closed fiscal 2004.............................. 132 -- -- -- -- 132 
Pending September 30, 2004.............. 66 -- -- -- -- 66 
 RD Cases 
Pending October 1, 2003.................... 300 3 0 1 296 -- 
Received fiscal 2004.......................... 839 1 0 0 838 -- 
On docket fiscal 2004........................ 1,139 4 0 1 1,134 -- 
Closed fiscal 2004.............................. 853 3 0 0 850 -- 
Pending September 30, 2004.............. 286 1 0 1 284 -- 
 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
* Totals for cases pending Oct. 1, 2003, differ from last year’s annual report.  Revised totals result from postreport adjustments to 
last year’s “on docket” and/or “closed figures.” 
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          Table 2.—Types of Unfair Labor Practices Alleged, Fiscal Year 2004— 
                                                             Page 1 of 3 
 
 Number of cases showing 
specific allegations 
 
Percent of total cases 
A.  Charges filed against employers under Sec. 8(a) 
Subsections of Sec. 8(a): Total cases................................. 19,946 100.0 
8(a)(1)................................................................................. 3,040 15.2 
8(a)(1)(2)............................................................................ 152 0.8 
8(a)(1)(3)............................................................................ 6,826 34.2 
8(a)(1)(4)............................................................................ 165 0.8 
8(a)(1)(5)............................................................................ 7,216 36.2 
8(a)(1)(2)(3)....................................................................... 129 0.6 
8(a)(1)(2)(4)....................................................................... 6 0 
8(a)(1)(2)(5)....................................................................... 59 0.3 
8(a)(1)(3)(4)....................................................................... 492 2.5 
8(a)(1)(3)(5)....................................................................... 1,640 8.2 
8(a)(1)(4)(5)....................................................................... 10 0.1 
8(a)(1)(2)(3)(4)................................................................... 6 0 
8(a)(1)(2)(3)(5).................................................................. 67 0.3 
8(a)(1)(2)(4)(5)................................................................... 4 0 
8(a)(1)(3)(4)(5)................................................................... 115 0.6 
8(a)(1)(2)(3)(4)(5).............................................................. 19 0.1 
Recapitulation1
8(a)(1)................................................................................. 19,946 100.0 
8(a)(2)................................................................................. 442 2.2 
8(a)(3)................................................................................. 9,294 46.6 
8(a)(4)................................................................................. 817 4.1 
8(a)(5)................................................................................. 9,130 45.8 
B.  Charges filed against unions under Sec. 8(b) 
Subsections of Sec. 8(b): Total cases................................. 6,887 100.0 
8(b)(1)................................................................................. 5,141 74.6 
8(b)(2)................................................................................. 43 0.6 
8(b)(3)................................................................................. 336 4.9 
8(b)(4)................................................................................. 595 8.6 
 
 
1 A single case may include allegations of violations of more than one subsection of the Act.  Therefore, the total of the various 
allegations is greater than the total number of cases. 
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          Table 2.—Types of Unfair Labor Practices Alleged, Fiscal Year 2004— 
                                                             Page 2 of 3 
 
 Number of cases showing 
specific allegations 
 
Percent of total cases 
8(b)(5)................................................................................. 6 0.1 
8(b)(6)................................................................................. 3 0 
8(b)(7)................................................................................. 100 1.5 
8(b)(1)(2)………………………………………………… 531 7.7 
8(b)(1)(3)............................................................................ 83 1.2 
8(b)(1)(5)............................................................................ 9 0.1 
8(b)(2)(3)............................................................................ 2 0 
8(b)(3)(5)............................................................................ 2 0 
8(b)(3)(6)............................................................................ 4 0.1 
8(b)(1)(2)(3)....................................................................... 29 0.4 
8(b)(1)(2)(5)....................................................................... 2 0 
8(b)(1)(2)(6)....................................................................... 1 0 
Recapitulation1
8(b)(1)................................................................................ 5,796 84.2 
8(b)(2)................................................................................ 608 8.8 
8(b)(3)................................................................................. 456 6.6 
8(b)(4)................................................................................. 612 8.9 
8(b)(5)................................................................................ 19 0.3 
8(b)(6)................................................................................. 8 0.1 
8(b)(7)................................................................................ 104 1.5 
B1.  Analysis of 8(b)(4) 
Total cases 8(b)(4).............................................................. 595 100.0 
8(b)(4)(A)........................................................................... 22 3.7 
8(b)(4)(B)........................................................................... 384 64.5 
8(b)(4)(C)........................................................................... 17 2.9 
8(b)(4)(D)........................................................................... 155 26.1 
8(b)(4)(A)(B)...................................................................... 15 2.5 
8(b)(4)(B)(C)...................................................................... 2 0.3 
Recapitulation1
8(b)(4)(A)........................................................................... 37 6.2 
 
 
1 A single case may include allegations of violations of more than one subsection of the Act.  Therefore, the total of the various 
allegations is greater than the total number of cases. 
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          Table 2.—Types of Unfair Labor Practices Alleged, Fiscal Year 2004— 
                                                             Page 3 of 3 
 
 Number of cases showing 
specific allegations 
 
Percent of total cases 
8(b)(4)(B)........................................................................... 401 67.4 
8(b)(4)(C)........................................................................... 19 3.2 
8(b)(4)(D)........................................................................... 155 26.1 
B2.  Analysis of 8(b)(7) 
Total cases 8(b)(7).............................................................. 100 100.0 
8(b)(7)(A)........................................................................... 18 18.0 
8(b)(7)(B)........................................................................... 6 6.0 
8(b)(7)(C)........................................................................... 72 72.0 
8(b)(7)(A)(B)..................................................................... 1 1.0 
8(b)(7)(A)(C)..................................................................... 2 2.0 
8(b)(7)(B)(C)..................................................................... 1 1.0 
Recapitulation1
8(b)(7)(A)........................................................................... 21 21.0 
8(b)(7)(B)........................................................................... 8 8.0 
8(b)(7)(C)........................................................................... 75 75.0 
C.  Charges filed under Sec. 8(e) 
Total cases 8(e)................................................................... 29 100.0 
Against unions alone.......................................................... 23 79.3 
Against employers alone.................................................... 5 17.2 
Against both....................................................................... 1 3.4 
D.  Charges filed Sec. 8(g) 
Total cases 8(g).................................................................. 30 100.0 
 
 
1 A single case may include allegations of violations of more than one subsection of the Act.  Therefore, the total of the various 
allegations is greater than the total number of cases. 
                                   Table 3A.—Formal Actions Taken in Unfair Labor Practice Cases, Fiscal Year 20041
 
Formal actions taken by type of case 
CD 
 
 
Types of formal actions taken 
 
 
 
Cases in 
which 
formal 
actions 
taken 
 
Total 
formal 
actions 
taken 
 
 
CA 
 
 
CB 
 
 
CC 
Jurisdic-
tional 
disputes 
Unfair 
labor 
practices 
 
 
CE 
 
 
CG 
 
 
CP 
 
CA 
com-
bined 
with CB 
 
C 
combined 
with rep-
resentation 
cases 
 
Other C  
combina-
tions 
10(k) notices of hearings issued................................              27 25 -- -- -- 25 -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Complaints issued.....................................................             2,972 1,840 1,584 140 24 -- 0 1 1 5 33 44 8
Backpay specifications issued..................................             129 65 63 0 0 -- 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
Hearings completed, total.........................................              752 310 267 18 5 0 0 1 0 0 3 14 2
 Initial ULP hearings............................................              718 294 252 17 5 0 0 1 0 0 3 14 2
 Backpay hearings................................................              5 4 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 Other hearings.....................................................              29 12 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Decisions by administrative law judges, total..........  745 345 291 25 4 0 0 1 0 0 3 20 1 
 Initial ULP decisions...........................................              684 314 263 22 4 0 0 1 0 0 3 20 1
 Backpay decisions .............................................. 5 5 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
      Supplemental decisions ...................................... 56 26 24 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Decisions and orders by the Board, total.................. 976 521 451 36 2 8 0 0 0 0 3 17 4 
      Upon consent of parties:……………………….     
            Initial decisions............................................. 21 9 3 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
            Supplemental decisions................................. 5 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
      Adopting administrative law judges’ decisions 
      (no exceptions filed):.......................................... 
             
            Initial ULP decisions..................................... 206 121 105 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 
            Backpay decisions......................................... 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
            Supplemental decisions……………………. 9           6 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0   0 
      Contested:............................................................              
            Initial ULP decisions.................................... 635 336 297 15 1 8 0 0 0 0 3 10 2 
            Decisions based on stipulated record............ 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
            Supplemental ULP decisions........................ 74 29 21 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
            Backpay decisions......................................... 22 14 13 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
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Table 3B.—Formal Actions Taken in Representation and Union Deauthorization Cases, 
Fiscal Year 20041—Page 1 of 2 
 
 Formal actions taken by type of case 
 
 
 
Types of formal actions taken 
Cases in 
which 
formal 
actions 
taken2
Total 
formal 
actions 
taken3
 
 
 
RC 
 
 
 
RM 
 
 
 
RD 
 
 
 
UD 
Hearings completed, total....................................................... 624 589 508 12 69 6 
  Initial hearing.................................................................... 460 431 373 8 50 1 
  Hearing on objections and/or challenges.......................... 164 158 135 4 19 5 
Decisions issued, total............................................................ 464 449 387 12 50 13 
  By Regional Director........................................................ 407 394 341 10 43 13 
  Elections directed....................................................... 348 336 298 5 33 13 
  Dismissals on record................................................... 59 58 43 5 10 0 
  By Board........................................................................... 57 55 46 2 7 0 
 Transferred by Regional Directors for initial decision 3 3 3 0 0 0 
Elections directed.................................................... 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Dismissals on record............................................... 2 2 2 0 0 0 
Other 1 1 1 0 0 0 
 Review of Regional Directors' decisions:        
      Requests for review received.................................. 209 208 155 20 33 2 
      Withdrawn before request ruled upon..................... 32 31 24 2 5 0 
      Board action on request ruled upon, total............... 184 181 133 20 0 1 
           Granted............................................................... 42 40 31 1 8 1 
           Denied................................................................ 129 128 95 18 15 0 
           Remanded.......................................................... 13 13 7 1 5 0 
    Withdrawn after request granted, before Board 
    review........................................................................ 2 2 2 0 0 0 
    Board decision after review, total............................. 54 52 43 2 7 0 
           Regional Directors' decisions:        
                Affirmed........................................................ 14 13 10 1 2 0 
                Modified........................................................ 9 9 8 1 0 0 
                Reversed........................................................ 31 30 25 0 5 0 
           Outcome:        
                 Election directed.......................................... 33 32 27 1 4 0 
                 Dismissals on record.................................... 7 7 3 1 3 0 
                 Other….…...………….…………………... 14 13 12 0 1 0 
Decisions on Objections and/or Challenges, total.................. 476 454 395 7 52 15 
     By Regional Directors....................................................... 221 205 179 2 24 10 
     By Admininstrative Law Judges…………...…………… 11 11 11 0 0 0 
     By Board............................................................................ 244 238 205 5 28 5 
  In stipulated elections................................................. 211 206 176 5 25 4 
       No exceptions to Regional Directors’ reports....... 98 96 80 1 15 4 
       Exceptions to Regional Directors’ reports............. 113 110 96 4 10 0 
            In directed  elections ( after transfer by Regional 
            Director)..................................................................... 28 
 
28 26 0 2 1 
       Review of Regional Directors' supplemental 
       decisions:        
                Request for review received................................... 24 18 16 0 2 1 
      Withdrawn before request ruled upon..................... 4 4 4 0 0 0 
 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
2 Total includes petitions consolidated into one decision. 
3 Case counts for UD not included. 
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Table 3B.—Formal Actions Taken in Representation and Union Deauthorization Cases, 
Fiscal Year 20041—Page 2 of 2 
 
 Formal actions taken by type of case 
 
 
 
Types of formal actions taken 
Cases in 
which 
formal 
actions 
taken2
Total 
formal 
actions 
taken3
 
 
 
RC 
 
 
 
RM 
 
 
 
RD 
 
 
 
UD 
    Board action on request ruled upon, total................. 22 19 15 1 3 0 
          Granted................................................................ 1 1 0 0 1 0 
          Denied................................................................. 19 16 13 1 2 0 
          Remanded........................................................... 2 2 2 0 0 0 
    Withdrawn after request granted, before Board 
    review....................................................................... 0 
 
0 0 0 0 0 
    Board decision after review, total............................. 5 4 3 0 1 0 
          Regional Directors' decisions:      
                Affirmed....................................................... 3 2 1 0 1 0 
                Modified....................................................... 0 0 0 0 0 0 
                Reversed....................................................... 2 2 2 0 0 0 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
2 Total includes petitions consolidated into one decision. 
3 Case counts for UD not included. 
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       Table 3C.—Formal Actions Taken in Amendment of Certification and 
                               Unit Clarification Cases, Fiscal Year 20041
 
Formal actions taken by type of 
case2Types of formal actions taken 
Cases in 
which formal 
actions taken 
AC UC 
Hearings completed........................................................................... 48 2 39 
Decisions issued after hearing........................................................... 71 6 54 
  By Regional Directors................................................................ 60 4 49 
       By Board.................................................................................... 11 2 5 
   Transferred by Regional Directors for initial decision......... 1 1 0 
   Review of Regional Directors’ decisions:............................      
         Requests for review received.......................................... 26 1 19 
         Withdrawn before request ruled upon............................ 1 0 1 
         Board action on requests ruled upon, total..................... 30 1 21 
               Granted..................................................................... 16 1 9 
                Denied...................................................................... 13 0 11 
                Remanded................................................................ 1 0 1 
         Withdrawn after request granted, before Board review.. 0 0 0 
          Board decision after review, total.................................. 10 1 5 
                Regional Directors’ decisions:.................................      
                       Affirmed........................................................... 7 0 3 
                        Modified.......................................................... 0 0 0 
                        Reversed.......................................................... 3 1 2 
 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
2 While columns at left counts “cases,” these two columns reflect “situations,” i.e., one or more unfair labor practice cases involving 
the same factual situation. 
                           Table 4.—Remedial Actions Taken in Unfair Labor Practice Cases Closed, Fiscal Year 20041—Page 1 of 2 
 
Remedial action taken by– 
Employer  Union
Pursuant to– Pursuant to– 
Agreement of parties Order of– Agreement of parties Order of– 
Action taken Total all 
Total 
Informal 
settlement 
Formal 
settlement 
Recommen-
dation of 
administra-
tive law 
judge 
Board    Court
Total 
Informal 
settlement 
Formal 
settlement 
Recommen
-dation of 
administra-
tive law 
judge 
Board Court
A. By number of cases involved... 211,752             -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Notice posted.………………..              1,907 1,596 1,285 5 81 101 124 311 269 2 12 10 18
Recognition or other 
 assistance withdrawn…...... 9             9 3 0 0 6 0 -- -- -- -- -- --
Employer–dominated union 
 disestablished ……………. 4             4 3 0 0 1 0 -- -- -- -- -- --
Employees offered reinstate- 
  ment ………..……...……. 1,299             1,299 1,151 3 29 45 71 -- -- -- -- -- --
Employees placed on prefe- 
     rential hiring list ….....….... 42             42 37 0 1 0 4 -- -- -- -- -- --
Hiring hall rights restored........ 12 -- -- -- -- -- -- 12 9 0 2 1 0 
Objections to employment  
 withdrawn........................... 7             -- -- -- -- -- -- 7 7 0 0 0 0
Picketing ended........................              86 -- -- -- -- -- -- 86 86 0 0 0 0
Work stoppage ended..............              13 -- -- -- -- -- -- 13 13 0 0 0 0
Collective bargaining begun.... 2,643 2,529 2,415 4 21 35 54 114 106 1 1 3 3 
Backpay distributed.................              2,075 2,031 1,857 6 38 52 78 44 36 0 5 3 0
Reimbursement of fees, dues, 
 and fines.............................. 148             63 57 0 0 3 3 85 85 0 0 0 0
Other conditions of  
 employment improved........ 0             0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other remedies.........................              0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B. By number of employees  
     affected:              
Employees offered reinstate- 
 ment, total........................... 3,496             3,496 3,058 0 44 193 201 -- -- -- -- -- --
 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions.  Data in this table are based on unfair labor practice cases that were closed during Fiscal Year 2004 after the company and/or union had satisfied all remedial action requirements. 
2 A single case usually results in more than one remedial action, therefore, the total number of actions exceeds the number of cases involved. 
                           Table 4.—Remedial Actions Taken in Unfair Labor Practice Cases Closed, Fiscal Year 20041—Page 2 of 2 
 
Remedial action taken by– 
Employer  Union
Pursuant to– Pursuant to– 
Agreement of parties Order of– Agreement of parties Order of– 
Action taken Total all 
Total 
Informal 
settlement 
Formal 
settlement 
Recommen-
dation of 
administra-
tive law 
judge 
Board    Court
Total 
Informal 
settlement 
Formal 
settlement 
Recommen
-dation of 
administra-
tive law 
judge 
Board Court
Accepted...........................              2,790 2,790 2,471 0 36 171 112 -- -- -- -- -- --
Declined............................              706 706 587 0 8 22 89 -- -- -- -- -- --
Employees placed on prefe- 
      rential hiring list............... 342             342 317 0 2 0 23 -- -- -- -- -- --
Hiring hall rights restored........ 12 -- -- -- -- -- -- 12 9 0 2 1 0 
Objections to employment 
      withdrawn......................... 7             -- -- -- -- -- -- 7 7 0 0 0 0
Employees receiving backpay:              
From either employer or 
     union............................ 31,074          30,784 26,817 350 1,011 1,040 1,566 290 170 0 5 3 112
From both employer and 
     union............................ 11             11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Employees reimbursed for 
      fees, dues, and fines:…….              
From either employer or 
     union.................................. 1,984             1,476 1,407 0 0 66 3 508 508 0 0 0 0
From both employer and 
     union.................................. 1,606             1,387 1,387 0 0 0 0 219 219 0 0 0 0
C. By amounts of monetary 
    recovery, total .................... 3207,129,282           206,608,766 182,113,581 1,386,856 1,222,518 6,700,027 15,185,784 520,516 328,940 0 75,345 116,231 0
Backpay (includes all 
    monetary payments except 
    fees, dues, and fines).......... 205,713,297 205,352,374 180,891,856 1,386,856 1,222,518 6,675,644 15,175,500 360,923 169,347    0 75,345 116,231 0
Reimbursement of fees, 
    dues,and fines..................... 1,415,985 1,256,392 1,221,725         0 0 24,383 10,284 159,593 159,593 0 0 0 0
 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions.  Data in this table are based on unfair labor practice cases that were closed during Fiscal Year 2004 after the company and/or union had satisfied all remedial action requirements. 
2 A single case usually results in more than one remedial action, therefore, the total number of actions exceeds the number of cases involved. 
3 The remedies secured in FY 2004 include a $97,182,500 settlement in a single case involving 889 employees as well as a $25,000,000 settlement involving 411 employees. 
                                           Table 5.—Industrial Distribution of Cases Received, Fiscal Year 20041—Page 1 of 5 
 
Unfair labor practice cases Representation cases Union 
deauthor-
ization 
cases 
Amend-
ment of 
certifica-
tion cases 
Unit clari-
fication 
cases 
 
 
 
Industrial Group2
 
All 
cases All C 
cases 
CA        
   
CB CC CD CE CG CP All R 
cases 
RC RM RD
UD AC UC
Crop Production...................................................... 33                22 19 3 0 0 0 0 0 11 10 0 1 0 0 0
Animal Production.................................................. 21                14 11 3 0 0 0 0 0 7 6 0 1 0 0 0
Fishing, Hunting and Trapping................................ 3                3 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Support Activities for Agriculture and Forestry...... 21                19 12 3 0 2 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0
     Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting...... 78                58 43 9 1 2 1 0 2 20 18 0 2 0 0 0
Oil and Gas Extraction............................................ 45                37 30 7 0 0 0 0 0 8 6 0 2 0 0 0
Mining (except Oil and Gas)................................... 141                121 101 15 1 0 2 0 2 18 12 0 6 0 0 2
Support Activities for Mining................................. 37                32 28 0 3 0 0 0 1 4 2 0 2 0 0 1
     Mining................................................................ 223                190 159 22 4 0 2 0 3 30 20 0 10 0 0 3
     Utilities............................................................... 574                458 365 90 1 2 0 0 0 106 82 5 19 2 0 8
Building, Developing and General Contracting...... 515                456 251 84 85 26 1 0 9 58 52 3 3 1 0 0
Heavy Construction................................................. 292                259 153 46 29 17 4 1 9 33 24 2 7 0 0 0
Special Trade Contractors....................................... 2,854               2354 1,636 455 154 70 4 0 35 492 407 28 57 5 0 3
     Construction....................................................... 3,661                3069 2,040 585 268 113 9 1 53 583 483 33 67 6 0 3
Food Manufacturing................................................ 971                834 666 159 7 0 2 0 0 130 102 1 27 2 0 5
Beverage and Tobacco Product Manufacturing...... 246                205 156 46 1 0 2 0 0 40 32 0 8 0 0 1
Textile Mills............................................................ 49                40 33 7 0 0 0 0 0 9 9 0 0 0 0 0
Textile Product Mills............................................... 22                15 12 3 0 0 0 0 0 7 6 0 1 0 0 0
Apparel Manufacturing........................................... 57                51 43 7 0 0 0 0 1 6 4 0 2 0 0 0
Leather and Allied Product Manufacturing............. 14                11 9 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0
     31-Manufacturing............................................... 1,359                1156 919 224 8 0 4 0 1 195 156 1 38 2 0 6
Wood Product Manufacturing................................. 164                137 109 26 2 0 0 0 0 26 17 1 8 1 0 0
Paper Manufacturing............................................... 415                383 289 94 0 0 0 0 0 30 22 0 8 1 0 1
Printing and Related Support Activities.................. 173                148 121 24 1 2 0 0 0 25 14 0 11 0 0 0
Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing.......... 144                118 94 21 1 0 0 0 2 23 18 0 5 2 0 1
 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
2 Source:  Standard Industrial Classification, Statistical Policy Division, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, D.C., 1972. 
                                           Table 5.—Industrial Distribution of Cases Received, Fiscal Year 20041—Page 2 of 5 
 
Unfair labor practice cases Representation cases Union 
deauthor-
ization 
cases 
Amend-
ment of 
certifica-
tion cases 
Unit clari-
fication 
cases 
 
 
 
Industrial Group2
 
All 
cases All C 
cases 
CA        
   
CB CC CD CE CG CP All R 
cases 
RC RM RD
UD AC UC
Chemical Manufacturing......................................... 363                302 252 50 0 0 0 0 0 58 44 1 13 2 1 0
Plastics and Rubber Products Manufacturing.......... 260                216 177 38 1 0 0 0 0 41 29 1 11 3 0 0
Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing......... 288                254 209 41 3 1 0 0 0 32 23 1 8 2 0 0
     32-Manufacturing............................................... 1,807                1558 1,251 294 8 3 0 0 2 235 167 4 64 11 1 2
Primary Metal Manufacturing................................. 571                516 387 128 1 0 0 0 0 51 36 2 13 2 1 1
Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing................ 526                452 351 97 3 1 0 0 0 66 46 2 18 4 2 2
Machinery Manufacturing....................................... 318                281 208 72 1 0 0 0 0 36 29 1 6 0 0 1
Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing.. 80                67 54 13 0 0 0 0 0 12 8 0 4 0 0 1
Electrical Equipment, Appliance and Component 
Manufacturing......................................................... 281                250 197 50 3 0 0 0 0 28 22 1 5 1 0 2
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing.............. 1,237                1121 714 400 6 0 1 0 0 113 91 1 21 1 0 2
Furniture and Related Product Manufacturing........ 110                100 75 25 0 0 0 0 0 9 7 0 2 0 1 0
Miscellaneous Manufacturing................................. 570                486 392 89 5 0 0 0 0 81 56 3 22 2 0 1
     33-Manufacturing............................................... 3,693                3273 2,378 874 19 1 1 0 0 396 295 10 91 10 4 10
Wholesale Trade, Durable Goods............................ 272                206 174 28 3 1 0 0 0 64 44 8 12 1 0 1
Wholesale Trade, Nondurable Goods...................... 504                406 313 86 5 1 0 0 1 91 74 3 14 5 0 2
     Wholesale Trade................................................. 776                612 487 114 8 2 0 0 1 155 118 11 26 6 0 3
Motor Vehicle and Parts Dealers............................ 330                231 208 21 2 0 0 0 0 98 80 2 16 1 0 0
Furniture and Home Furnishings Stores.................. 40                35 24 9 2 0 0 0 0 5 3 1 1 0 0 0
Electronics and Appliance Stores............................ 14                13 8 5 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
Building Material and Garden Equipment and 
Supplies Dealers...................................................... 59                43 38 5 0 0 0 0 0 15 10 0 5 1 0 0
Food and Beverage Stores....................................... 1,040                940 579 352 3 0 0 0 6 97 65 5 27 2 0 1
Health and Personal Care Stores............................. 87                65 52 13 0 0 0 0 0 21 18 1 2 0 0 1
Gasoline Stations..................................................... 18                15 14 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 1 0 0 0
 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
2 Source:  Standard Industrial Classification, Statistical Policy Division, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, D.C., 1972. 
                                           Table 5.—Industrial Distribution of Cases Received, Fiscal Year 20041—Page 3 of 5 
 
Unfair labor practice cases Representation cases Union 
deauthor-
ization 
cases 
Amend-
ment of 
certifica-
tion cases 
Unit clari-
fication 
cases 
 
 
 
Industrial Group2
 
All 
cases All C 
cases 
CA        
   
CB CC CD CE CG CP All R 
cases 
RC RM RD
UD AC UC
Clothing and Clothing Accessories Stores.............. 56                48 34 12 0 0 0 0 2 7 4 1 2 1 0 0
     44-Retail Trade................................................... 1,644                1390 957 418 7 0 0 0 8 247 182 10 55 5 0 2
Sporting Goods, Hobby, Book and Music Stores.... 29                29 23 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
General Merchandise Stores.................................... 203                182 133 45 2 0 0 0 2 21 18 0 3 0 0 0
Miscellaneous Store Retailers................................. 39                29 19 8 1 0 1 0 0 10 8 0 2 0 0 0
Nonstore Retailers................................................... 29                22 20 2 0 0 0 0 0 7 6 0 1 0 0 0
     45-Retail Trade................................................... 300                262 195 61 3 0 1 0 2 38 32 0 6 0 0 0
Air Transportation................................................... 44                32 20 12 0 0 0 0 0 9 8 0 1 2 1 0
Rail Transportation.................................................. 24                17 15 2 0 0 0 0 0 7 7 0 0 0 0 0
Water Transportation............................................... 176                164 67 96 0 1 0 0 0 12 6 0 6 0 0 0
Truck Transportation............................................... 761                635 482 137 7 2 0 0 7 119 92 5 22 4 0 3
Transit and Ground Passenger Transportation........ 718                573 419 154 0 0 0 0 0 123 97 0 26 17 0 5
Pipeline Transportation........................................... 18                16 13 3 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0
Scenic and Sightseeing Transportation................... 17                13 12 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 0
Support Activities for Transportation...................... 457                367 217 139 5 2 4 0 0 85 73 2 10 2 0 3
     48-Transportation............................................... 2,215                1817 1,245 544 12 5 4 0 7 361 289 7 65 25 1 11
Postal Service.......................................................... 2,437                2436 1,716 720 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Couriers and Messengers......................................... 253                223 158 65 0 0 0 0 0 29 28 0 1 0 0 1
Warehousing and Storage Facilities........................ 473                369 279 87 2 1 0 0 0 101 92 1 8 2 0 1
     49-Transportation............................................... 3,163                3028 2,153 872 2 1 0 0 0 131 121 1 9 2 0 2
Publishing Industries............................................... 304                263 218 45 0 0 0 0 0 36 27 1 8 1 0 4
Motion Picture and Sound Recording Industries..... 54                48 27 15 1 4 1 0 0 6 5 0 1 0 0 0
Broadcasting and Telecommunications................... 937                831 653 169 5 4 0 0 0 98 59 2 37 6 0 2
Information Services and Data Processing             
Services.................................................................... 71                59 48 11 0 0 0 0 0 12 9 1 2 0 0 0
 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
2 Source:  Standard Industrial Classification, Statistical Policy Division, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, D.C., 1972. 
 
                                           Table 5.—Industrial Distribution of Cases Received, Fiscal Year 20041—Page 4 of 5 
 
Unfair labor practice cases Representation cases Union 
deauthor-
ization 
cases 
Amend-
ment of 
certifica-
tion cases 
Unit clari-
fication 
cases 
 
 
 
Industrial Group2
 
All 
cases All C 
cases 
CA        
   
CB CC CD CE CG CP All R 
cases 
RC RM RD
UD AC UC
     Information......................................................... 1,366                1201 946 240 6 8 1 0 0 152 100 4 48 7 0 6
Monetary Authorities—Central Bank..................... 25                20 18 2 0 0 0 0 0 5 4 1 0 0 0 0
Credit Intermediation and Related Activities.......... 44                39 36 2 1 0 0 0 0 4 3 0 1 0 0 1
Securities, Commodity Contracts and Other 
Intermediation and Related Activities..................... 17                14 13 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0
Insurance Carriers and Related Activities............... 51                46 26 20 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 0 2 0 0 1
Funds, Trusts and Other Financial Vehicles (U.S. 
Only)........................................................................ 6                6 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
     Finance and Insurance........................................ 143                125 99 25 1 0 0 0 0 16 12 1 3 0 0 2
Real Estate............................................................... 229                206 123 62 18 2 0 0 1 22 19 1 2 0 0 1
Rental and Leasing Services.................................... 187                135 114 18 3 0 0 0 0 51 40 2 9 1 0 0
Owners and Lessors of Other Non-Financial 
Assets....................................................................... 7                6 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
     Real Estate and Rental and Leasing................... 423                347 240 83 21 2 0 0 1 74 60 3 11 1 0 1
     Professional, Scientific and Technical Services. 301                233 185 39 8 0 1 0 0 62 56 1 5 2 0 4
     Management of Companies and Enterprises...... 53                48 28 20 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 0 0 0 0 0
Administrative and Support Services...................... 1,828                1454 1,053 369 11 9 2 0 10 349 302 12 35 19 0 6
Waste Management and Remediation Services...... 590                450 403 41 4 1 0 0 1 136 109 2 25 1 0 3
     Administrative and Support, Waste 
     Management and Remediation Services............ 2,418                1904 1,456 410 15 10 2 0 11 485 411 14 60 20 0 9
     Educational Services.......................................... 419                325 269 48 6 0 1 1 0 85 70 2 13 1 0 8
Ambulatory Health Care Services........................... 433                334 299 35 0 0 0 0 0 93 69 0 24 2 0 4
Hospitals.................................................................. 1,503                1236 950 260 9 1 1 12 3 220 179 1 40 7 7 33
Nursing and Residential Care Facilities.................. 1,626                1268 1,082 171 2 1 0 11 1 340 257 18 65 5 2 11
Social Assistance..................................................... 377                284 251 31 1 0 0 1 0 84 66 1 17 4 0 5
 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
2 Source:  Standard Industrial Classification, Statistical Policy Division, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, D.C., 1972. 
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Unfair labor practice cases Representation cases Union 
deauthor-
ization 
cases 
Amend-
ment of 
certifica-
tion cases 
Unit clari-
fication 
cases 
 
 
 
Industrial Group2
 
All 
cases All C 
cases 
CA        
   
CB CC CD CE CG CP All R 
cases 
RC RM RD
UD AC UC
     Health Care and Social Assistance..................... 3,939                3122 2,582 497 12 2 1 24 4 737 571 20 146 18 9 53
Performing Arts, Spectator Sports and Related 
Industries................................................................. 201                174 88 79 3 2 1 0 1 24 23 0 1 0 0 3
Museums, Historical Sites and Similar Institutions 11                9 6 3 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0
Amusement, Gambling and Recreation Industries.. 246                214 157 57 0 0 0 0 0 29 15 1 13 1 0 2
     Arts, Entertainment and Recreation................... 458                397 251 139 3 2 1 0 1 55 40 1 14 1 0 5
Accommodation...................................................... 586                524 397 122 5 0 0 0 0 61 40 2 19 1 0 0
Foodservices and Drinking Places........................... 476                420 328 85 5 0 0 0 2 51 31 4 16 0 0 5
     Accommodation and Foodservices..................... 1,062                944 725 207 10 0 0 0 2 112 71 6 35 1 0 5
Repair and Maintenance.......................................... 248                180 155 25 0 0 0 0 0 66 59 0 7 1 0 1
Personal and Laundry Services............................... 353                287 232 43 9 0 0 2 1 64 50 2 12 1 0 1
Religious, Grantmaking, Civic, and Professional 
and Similar Organizations....................................... 505                434 224 199 6 2 0 2 1 53 40 1 12 1 1 16
Private Households.................................................. 3                3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
     Other Services (except Public Administration).. 1,109                904 613 268 15 2 0 4 2 183 149 3 31 3 1 18
Executive, Legislative, Public Finance and 
General Government............................................... 13                11 10 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0
Justice, Public Order, and Safety............................. 90                68 53 14 1 0 0 0 0 19 16 0 3 2 1 0
Administration of Human Resource Programs........ 24                16 14 2 0 0 0 0 0 7 5 1 1 0 0 1
Administration of Environmental Quality 
Programs.................................................................. 5                4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Administration of Housing Programs, Urban 
Planning, and Community Development................ 5                2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 1 0 0 0
Administration of Economic Programs................... 16                15 14 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Space Research and Technology............................. 1                1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
National Security and International Affairs............ 10                3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 6 5 0 1 0 0 1
     Public Administration......................................... 164                120 99 20 1 0 0 0 0 39 32 1 6 2 1 2
     Unclassified Establishments............................... 429                339 250 88 1 0 0 0 0 86 68 3 15 2 0 2
    Total, all industrial groups................................... 31,777               26880 19,935 6,191 440 155 29 30 100 4588 3,608 141 839 127 17 165
 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
2 Source:  Standard Industrial Classification, Statistical Policy Division, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, D.C., 1972. 
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Unfair labor practice cases Representation cases Union 
deauthor-
ization 
cases 
Amend-
ment of 
certifica-
tion cases 
Unit clari-
fication 
cases 
 
 
Division and State2
 
All 
cases All C 
cases 
CA        
   
CB CC CD CE CG CP All R 
cases 
RC RM RD
UD AC UC
Illinois......................................................................                 1,988 1628 1,091 393 73 40 3 0 28 340 280 12 48 15 0 5
Indiana....................................................................                 698 609 483 112 8 5 0 0 1 83 66 2 15 2 0 4
Michigan..................................................................                2,191 1859 1,280 553 16 3 1 2 4 317 248 17 52 3 1 11 
Ohio.........................................................................                1,731 1506 1,148 341 8 3 1 2 3 207 168 6 33 7 3 8 
Wisconsin................................................................                 678 557 425 128 1 2 0 1 0 99 46 4 49 12 0 10
     East North Central.............................................. 7,286 6159 4,427 1,527 106 53 5 5 36 1046 808 41 197 39 4  38
Alabama..................................................................                 400 353 310 40 0 0 0 0 3 47 42 1 4 0 0 0
Kentucky..................................................................                 464 401 347 53 0 0 1 0 0 62 42 2 18 1 0 0
Mississippi...............................................................                 161 136 114 22 0 0 0 0 0 25 20 0 5 0 0 0
Tennessee................................................................                 378 342 251 91 0 0 0 0 0 34 22 1 11 1 0 1
     East South Central.............................................. 1,403 1232 1,022 206 0 0 1 0 3 168 126 4 38 2 0 1 
New Jersey..............................................................                 1,334 1101 813 235 27 21 0 0 5 221 181 4 36 4 0 8
New York................................................................                3,488 2951 1,923 920 49 23 9 6 21 505 434 11 60 14 0 18 
Pennsylvania............................................................                 1,776 1477 1,178 261 17 14 2 2 3 272 220 5 47 8 2 17
     Middle Atlantic.................................................. 6,598 5529 3,914 1,416 93 58 11 8 29 998 835 20 143 26 2  43
Arizona....................................................................                 450 407 315 61 27 0 0 0 4 41 32 2 7 1 0 1
Colorado..................................................................                 425 371 321 46 4 0 0 0 0 52 36 1 15 1 0 1
Idaho........................................................................                 74 59 55 4 0 0 0 0 0 13 13 0 0 0 0 2
Montana...................................................................                 96 72 63 7 0 1 0 0 1 23 15 2 6 0 0 1
New Mexico............................................................                 192 142 129 13 0 0 0 0 0 46 38 0 8 3 1 0
Nevada....................................................................                 478 432 316 96 12 4 3 0 1 45 29 1 15 0 0 1
Utah.........................................................................                 150 134 48 23 61 0 0 1 1 15 10 0 5 0 0 1
Wyoming................................................................                 56 48 45 3 0 0 0 0 0 8 7 0 1 0 0 0
     Mountain............................................................ 1,921 1665 1,292 253 104 5 3 1 7 243 180 6 57 5 1 7 
Connecticut..............................................................                 510 451 350 97 3 0 0 0 1 57 49 4 4 2 0 0
 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
2 The States are grouped according to the method used by the Bureau of Census, U.S. Department of Commerce. 
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Unfair labor practice cases Representation cases Union 
deauthor-
ization 
cases 
Amend-
ment of 
certifica-
tion cases 
Unit clari-
fication 
cases 
 
 
Division and State2
 
All 
cases All C 
cases 
CA        
   
CB CC CD CE CG CP All R 
cases 
RC RM RD
UD AC UC
Massachusetts..........................................................                 842 715 556 123 23 12 0 1 0 118 93 5 20 1 1 7
Maine......................................................................                 112 102 96 6 0 0 0 0 0 10 9 0 1 0 0 0
New Hampshire......................................................                 51 42 37 5 0 0 0 0 0 8 7 0 1 1 0 0
Rhode Island............................................................                 159 122 99 15 6 2 0 0 0 33 28 0 5 1 0 3
Vermont..................................................................                 60 51 45 6 0 0 0 0 0 9 6 1 2 0 0 0
     New England...................................................... 1,734 1483 1,183 252 32 14 0 1 1 235 192 10 33 5 1 10 
Puerto Rico..............................................................                 346 270 227 41 0 0 0 2 0 69 61 0 8 1 0 6
Virgin Islands..........................................................                 17 13 11 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 1 1 0 0
     Outlying Areas.................................................... 363 283 238 43 0 0 0 2 0 72 63 0 9 2 0 6 
Alaska......................................................................                 73 49 30 19 0 0 0 0 0 23 14 2 7 1 0 0
American Samoa....................................................                 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
California................................................................                 3,928 3397 2,319 987 50 20 3 4 14 498 393 14 91 21 0 12
Federated States of Micronesia..............................                 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Guam......................................................................                 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Hawaii......................................................................                 328 278 222 56 0 0 0 0 0 45 30 0 15 0 5 0
Marshall Islands......................................................                 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Northern Mariana Islands........................................                 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Oregon.....................................................................                 324 251 201 45 3 0 2 0 0 66 45 5 16 2 0 5
Palau........................................................................                 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Washington..............................................................                 737 584 441 133 6 1 3 0 0 141 109 1 31 10 0 2
     Pacific................................................................ 5,391 4559 3,213 1,240 59 21 8 4 14 774 592 22 160    34 5 19
District Of Columbia...............................................                 192 148 87 54 4 0 0 1 2 41 32 7 2 1 0 2
Delaware..................................................................                 120 99 79 18 2 0 0 0 0 19 10 1 8 1 0 1
Florida......................................................................                 995 848 680 152 9 0 1 6 0 143 117 0 26 0 1 3
Georgia....................................................................                 433 370 287 79 3 1 0 0 0 54 46 0 8 0 1 8
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
2 The States are grouped according to the method used by the Bureau of Census, U.S. Department of Commerce. 
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Unfair labor practice cases Representation cases Union 
deauthor-
ization 
cases 
Amend-
ment of 
certifica-
tion cases 
Unit clari-
fication 
cases 
 
 
Division and State2
 
All 
cases All C 
cases 
CA        
   
CB CC CD CE CG CP All R 
cases 
RC RM RD
UD AC UC
Maryland..................................................................                 465 372 297 65 5 1 0 1 3 87 72 2 13 5 0 1
North Carolina.........................................................                 275 242 193 49 0 0 0 0 0 32 25 0 7 0 0 1
South Carolina.........................................................                 114 104 78 26 0 0 0 0 0 10 6 0 4 0 0 0
Virginia....................................................................                 393 335 284 51 0 0 0 0 0 58 45 1 12 0 0 0
West Virginia..........................................................                 397 347 292 49 5 0 0 0 1 47 41 2 4 1 1 1
     South Atlantic..................................................... 3,384 2865 2,277 543 28 2 1 8 6 491 394 13 84 8 3 17 
Iowa.........................................................................                 247 204 172 31 0 0 0 0 1 42 37 2 3 0 0 1
Kansas......................................................................                 179 155 110 44 1 0 0 0 0 23 17 1 5 0 0 1
Minnesota................................................................                 417 297 230 61 4 0 0 1 1 108 76 2 30 3 1 8
Missouri...................................................................                 698 603 459 131 9 2 0 0 2 93 61 5 27 1 0 1
North Dakota...........................................................                 15 9 7 2 0 0 0 0 0 6 6 0 0 0 0 0
Nebraska..................................................................                 87 72 66 6 0 0 0 0 0 15 12 1 2 0 0 0
South Dakota...........................................................                 30 20 16 4 0 0 0 0 0 8 6 0 2 0 0 2
     West North Central............................................ 1,673 1360 1,060 279 14 2 0 1 4 295 215 11 69 4 1 13 
Arkansas..................................................................                 231 204 167 37 0 0 0 0 0 26 18 2 6 0 0 1
Louisiana.................................................................                 343 287 192 95 0 0 0 0 0 55 40 2 13 0 0 1
Oklahoma................................................................                 215 185 148 34 3 0 0 0 0 29 21 4 4 0 0 1
Texas........................................................................                 1,194 1074 806 267 1 0 0 0 0 117 99 3 15 0 0 3
     West South Central............................................. 1,983 1750 1,313 433 4 0 0 0 0 227 178 11 38 0 0 6 
     Total, all States and areas.................................. 31,736 26885 19,939 6,192 440 155 29 30 100 4549 3,583 138 828    125 17 160
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
2 The States are grouped according to the method used by the Bureau of Census, U.S. Department of Commerce. 
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Unfair labor practice cases Representation cases Union 
deauthor-
ization 
cases 
Amend-
ment of 
certifica-
tion cases 
Unit clari-
fication 
cases 
 
 
Standard Federal Regions2
 
 
 
All cases All C 
cases 
CA        
   
CB CC CD CE CG CP All R 
cases 
RC RM RD
UD AC UC
Connecticut..........................................................                510 451 350 97 3 0 0 0 1 57 49 4 4 2 0 0
Massachusetts......................................................                 842 715 556 123 23 12 0 1 0 118 93 5 20 1 1 7
Maine....................................................................                 112 102 96 6 0 0 0 0 0 10 9 0 1 0 0 0
New Hampshire....................................................                 51 42 37 5 0 0 0 0 0 8 7 0 1 1 0 0
Rhode Island........................................................                 159 122 99 15 6 2 0 0 0 33 28 0 5 1 0 3
Vermont................................................................                 60 51 45 6 0 0 0 0 0 9 6 1 2 0 0 0
     Region I.......................................................... 1,734 1483 1,183 252 32 14 0 1 1 235 192 10 33 5 1 10 
Delaware..............................................................                 120 99 79 18 2 0 0 0 0 19 10 1 8 1 0 1
New Jersey............................................................                 1,334 1101 813 235 27 21 0 0 5 221 181 4 36 4 0 8
New York............................................................                 3,488 2951 1,923 920 49 23 9 6 21 505 434 11 60 14 0 18
Puerto Rico..........................................................                 346 270 227 41 0 0 0 2 0 69 61 0 8 1 0 6
Virgin Islands......................................................                 17 13 11 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 1 1 0 0
     Region II.......................................................... 5,305 4434 3,053 1,216 78 44 9 8 26 817 688 16 113 21 0  33
District  of Columbia............................................                192 148 87 54 4 0 0 1 2 41 32 7 2 1 0 2
Maryland..............................................................                 465 372 297 65 5 1 0 1 3 87 72 2 13 5 0 1
Pennsylvania........................................................                 1,776 1477 1,178 261 17 14 2 2 3 272 220 5 47 8 2 17
Virginia................................................................                 393 335 284 51 0 0 0 0 0 58 45 1 12 0 0 0
West Virginia........................................................                 397 347 292 49 5 0 0 0 1 47 41 2 4 1 1 1
     Region III........................................................ 3,223 2679 2,138 480 31 15 2 4 9 505 410 17 78 15 3 21 
Alabama................................................................                 400 353 310 40 0 0 0 0 3 47 42 1 4 0 0 0
Florida..................................................................                 995 848 680 152 9 0 1 6 0 143 117 0 26 0 1 3
Georgia................................................................                 433 370 287 79 3 1 0 0 0 54 46 0 8 0 1 8
Kentucky..............................................................                 464 401 347 53 0 0 1 0 0 62 42 2 18 1 0 0
Mississippi............................................................                 161 136 114 22 0 0 0 0 0 25 20 0 5 0 0 0
North Carolina......................................................                 275 242 193 49 0 0 0 0 0 32 25 0 7 0 0 1
South Carolina......................................................                 114 104 78 26 0 0 0 0 0 10 6 0 4 0 0 0
Tennessee............................................................                 378 342 251 91 0 0 0 0 0 34 22 1 11 1 0 1
     Region IV........................................................ 3,220 2796 2,260 512 12 1 2 6 3 407 320 4 83 2 2 13 
Illinois..................................................................                 1,988 1628 1,091 393 73 40 3 0 28 340 280 12 48 15 0 5
Indiana..................................................................                 698 609 483 112 8 5 0 0 1 83 66 2 15 2 0 4
Michigan..............................................................                 2,191 1859 1,280 553 16 3 1 2 4 317 248 17 52 3 1 11
Minnesota............................................................                 417 297 230 61 4 0 0 1 1 108 76 2 30 3 1 8
Ohio......................................................................                 1,731 1506 1,148 341 8 3 1 2 3 207 168 6 33 7 3 8
Wisconsin............................................................                 678 557 425 128 1 2 0 1 0 99 46 4 49 12 0 10
     Region V.......................................................... 7,703 6456 4,657 1,588 110 53 5 6 37 1154 884 43 227 42   5 46
 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
2 The States are grouped according to the method used by the Bureau of Census, U.S. Department of Commerce. 
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Unfair labor practice cases Representation cases Union 
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Unit clari-
fication 
cases 
 
 
Standard Federal Regions2
 
 
 
All cases All C 
cases 
CA        
   
CB CC CD CE CG CP All R 
cases 
RC RM RD
UD AC UC
Arkansas..............................................................                 231 204 167 37 0 0 0 0 0 26 18 2 6 0 0 1
Louisiana..............................................................                 343 287 192 95 0 0 0 0 0 55 40 2 13 0 0 1
New Mexico........................................................                 192 142 129 13 0 0 0 0 0 46 38 0 8 3 1 0
Oklahoma............................................................                 215 185 148 34 3 0 0 0 0 29 21 4 4 0 0 1
Texas....................................................................                 1,194 1074 806 267 1 0 0 0 0 117 99 3 15 0 0 3
     Region VI........................................................ 2,175 1892 1,442 446 4 0 0 0 0 273 216 11 46 3 1 6 
Iowa......................................................................                 247 204 172 31 0 0 0 0 1 42 37 2 3 0 0 1
Kansas..................................................................                 179 155 110 44 1 0 0 0 0 23 17 1 5 0 0 1
Missouri................................................................                 698 603 459 131 9 2 0 0 2 93 61 5 27 1 0 1
Nebraska..............................................................                 87 72 66 6 0 0 0 0 0 15 12 1 2 0 0 0
     Region VII...................................................... 1,211 1034 807 212 10 2 0 0 3 173 127 9 37 1 0 3 
Colorado..............................................................                 425 371 321 46 4 0 0 0 0 52 36 1 15 1 0 1
Montana................................................................                 96 72 63 7 0 1 0 0 1 23 15 2 6 0 0 1
North Dakota........................................................                 15 9 7 2 0 0 0 0 0 6 6 0 0 0 0 0
South Dakota........................................................                 30 20 16 4 0 0 0 0 0 8 6 0 2 0 0 2
Utah......................................................................                 150 134 48 23 61 0 0 1 1 15 10 0 5 0 0 1
Wyoming..............................................................                 56 48 45 3 0 0 0 0 0 8 7 0 1 0 0 0
     Region VIII...................................................... 772 654 500 85 65 1 0 1 2 112 80 3 29 1 0 5 
American Samoa..................................................                 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Arizona................................................................                 450 407 315 61 27 0 0 0 4 41 32 2 7 1 0 1
California..............................................................                3,928 3397 2,319 987 50 20 3 4 14 498 393 14 91 21 0 12 
Federated States of Micronesia............................                 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Guam....................................................................                 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Hawaii..................................................................                 328 278 222 56 0 0 0 0 0 45 30 0 15 0 5 0
Marshall Islands....................................................                 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Northern Mariana Islands....................................                 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nevada..................................................................                 478 432 316 96 12 4 3 0 1 45 29 1 15 0 0 1
Palau....................................................................                 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
     Region IX........................................................ 5,185 4514 3,172 1,200 89 24 6 4 19 630 485 17 128 22 5 14 
Alaska..................................................................                73 49 30 19 0 0 0 0 0 23 14 2 7 1 0 0
Idaho....................................................................                 74 59 55 4 0 0 0 0 0 13 13 0 0 0 0 2
Oregon..................................................................                 324 251 201 45 3 0 2 0 0 66 45 5 16 2 0 5
Washington..........................................................                 737 584 441 133 6 1 3 0 0 141 109 1 31 10 0 2
     Region X.......................................................... 1,208 943 727 201 9 1 5 0 0 243 181 8 54 13 0 9 
     Total, all States and areas................................ 31,736 26885 19,939 6,192 440 155 29 30 100 4549 3,583 138 828    125 17 160
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
2 The States are grouped according to the method used by the Bureau of Census, U.S. Department of Commerce. 
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All C cases CA cases CB cases CC cases CD cases2 CE cases CG cases CP cases  
 
 
Method and stage of disposition Num-
ber 
Per-
cent of 
total 
closed 
Per-
cent of 
total 
method 
Num-
ber 
Per-
cent 
of 
total 
closed 
Num-
ber 
Per-
cent 
of 
total 
closed 
Num-
ber 
Per-
cent 
of 
total 
closed 
Num-
ber 
Per-
cent 
of 
total 
closed 
Num-
ber 
Per-
cent 
of 
total 
closed 
Num-
ber 
Per-
cent 
of 
total 
closed 
Num-
ber 
Per-
cent 
of 
total 
closed 
Total number of cases closed............................... 29,804                 100.0 -- 22,748 100.0 6,299 100.0 421 100.0 153 100.0 39 100.0 27 100.0 117 100.0
Agreement of the parties...................................... 10,632 35.7  100.0 9,261 40.7             1,088 17.3 190 45.1 25 16.3 10 25.6 12 44.4 46 39.3
     Informal settlement.......................................... 10,621 35.6  99.9 9,250 40.7             1,088 17.3 190 45.1 25 16.3 10 25.6 12 44.4 46 39.3
         Before issuance of complaint...................... 8,466  28.4 79.6 7,305              32.1 929 14.7 155 36.8 25 16.3 9 23.1 9 33.3 34 29.1
         After issuance of complaint, before 
         opening of hearing....................................... 2,047                 6.9 19.3 1,840 8.1 156 2.5 35 8.3 0 0.0 1 2.6 3 11.1 12 10.3
After hearing opened, before issuance of 
administrative law judge’s decision............ 108 0.4 1.0 105 0.5             3 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
     Formal settlement............................................ 11                 0.0 0.1 11 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
          Before opening of hearing.......................... 7                 0.0 0.1 7 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
               Stipulated decision................................. 0                 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
               Consent decree....................................... 7                 0.0 0.1 7 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
          After hearing opened.................................. 4                 0.0 0.0 4 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
               Stipulated decision................................. 0                 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
               Consent decree....................................... 4                 0.0 0.0 4 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Compliance with................................................... 819                 2.7 100.0 736 3.2 51 0.8 20 4.8 2 1.3 3 7.7 0 0.0 7 6.0
Administrative law judge’s decision..........                  7 0.0 0.9 7 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Board decision............................................                  412 1.4 50.3 376 1.7 29 0.5 3 0.7 2 1.3 2 5.1 0 0.0 0 0.0
Adopting administrative law judge’s 
decision (no exceptions filed)................ 166                 0.6 20.3 149 0.7 14 0.2 1 0.2 1 0.7 1 2.6 0 0.0 0 0.0
               Contested............................................... 246 0.8 30.0 227 1.0 15 0.2 2 0.5 1 0.7 1 2.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Circuit court of appeals decree.................... 399 1.3 48.7 352 1.5 22 0.3 17 4.0 0 0.0 1 2.6 0 0.0 7  6.0
Supreme Court action..................................             1 0.0 0.1 1 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
 
 
1 See Table 8 for summary of disposition of stage.  See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
2 CD cases closed in this stage are processed as jurisdictional disputes under Sec. 10(k) of the Act.  See Table 7A. 
               Table 7.—Analysis of Methods of Disposition of Unfair Labor Practice Cases Closed, Fiscal Year 20041—Page 2 of 2 
 
All C cases CA cases CB cases CC cases CD cases2 CE cases CG cases CP cases  
 
 
Method and stage of disposition Num-
ber 
Per-
cent of 
total 
closed 
Per-
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Withdrawal...........................................................             8,779 29.5 100.0 6,626 29.1 1,916 30.4 132 31.4 43 28.1 20 51.3 7 25.9 35 29.9
Before issuance of complaint......................... 8,623 28.9 98.2 6,478 28.5 1,908 30.3 132 31.4 43 28.1 20 51.3 7 25.9 35  29.9
After issuance of complaint, before 
opening of hearing..........................................             98 0.3 1.1 94 0.4 4 0.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
After hearing opened, before 
administrative law judge’s decision............... 5            0.0 0.1 5 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
After administrative law judge's decision, 
before Board decision.....................................             44 0.1 0.5 40 0.2 4 0.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
After Board or court decision......................... 9 0.0 0.1 9 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0
Dismissal .............................................................             9,327 31.3 100.0 5,941 26.1 3,236 51.4 78 18.5 31 20.3 6 15.4 7 25.9 28 23.9
Before issuance of complaint......................... 9,183 30.8 98.5 5,815 25.6 3,220 51.1 77 18.3 31 20.3 6 15.4 7 25.9 27  23.1
After issuance of complaint, before 
opening  of hearing......................................... 47 0.2 0.5 38 0.2 8 0.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1  0.9
After hearing opened, before 
administrative law judge’s decision............... 1 0.0 0.0 1 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0
By administrative law judge’s decision.......... 6 0.0 0.1 4 0.0 2 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0
By Board decision..........................................             87 0.3 0.9 82 0.4 5 0.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Adopting administrative law judge’s 
decision  (no exceptions filed).................. 51 0.2 0.5 47 0.2 4 0.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0
Contested..................................................             36 0.1 0.4 35 0.2 1 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
By circuit court of appeals decree............ 3 0.0 0.0 1 0.0 1 0.0 1 0.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0
By Supreme Court action......................... 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0  0.0
10(k) actions (see Table 7A for details of  dis- 
positions)..............................................................             51 0.2 -- 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 51 33.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Otherwise (compliance with order of 
administrative law judge or Board not 
achieved—firm went out of business).................. 196 0.7 -- 184 0.8 8 0.1 1 0.2 1 0.7 0 0.0 1 3.7 1  0.9
 
1 See Table 8 for summary of disposition of stage.  See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
2 CD cases closed in this stage are processed as jurisdictional disputes under Sec. 10(k) of the Act.  See Table 7A. 
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Table 7A.—Analysis of Methods of Disposition of Jurisdictional Dispute 
Cases Closed Prior to Unfair Labor Practice Proceedings, Fiscal Year 20041
 
Method and stage of disposition Number of cases 
Percent of 
total closed 
     Total number of cases closed before issuance of complaint........................................................ 51 100.0 
Agreement of the parties-informal settlement................................................................................... 24 47.1 
Before 10(k) notice....................................................................................................................... 17 33.3 
After 10(k) notice, before opening of 10(k) hearing.................................................................... 5 9.8 
After opening of 10(k) hearing, before issuance of Board decision and determination of 
dispute........................................................................................................................................... 2 3.9 
     After Board decision and determination of dispute..................................................................... 0 0.0 
Compliance with Board decision and determination of dispute....................................................... 4 7.8 
Withdrawal........................................................................................................................................ 13 25.5 
Before 10(k) notice....................................................................................................................... 7 13.7 
After 10(k) notice, before opening of 10(k) hearing.................................................................... 3 5.9 
After opening of 10(k) hearing, before issuance of Board decision and determination of 
dispute........................................................................................................................................... 2 3.9 
After Board decision and determination of dispute...................................................................... 1 2.0 
Dismissal........................................................................................................................................... 10 19.6 
Before 10(k) notice....................................................................................................................... 4 7.8 
After 10(k) notice, before opening of 10(k) hearing.................................................................... 6 11.8 
After opening of 10(k) hearing, before issuance of Board decision and determination of 
dispute........................................................................................................................................... 0 0.0 
By Board decision and determination of dispute......................................................................... 0 0.0 
 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
                                      Table 8.—Disposition by Stage of Unfair Labor Practice Cases Closed, Fiscal Year 20041
 
All C cases CA cases CB cases CC cases CD cases CE cases CG cases CP cases  
 
Stage of disposition Num-
ber 
Per-
cent of 
cases 
closed 
Num-
ber 
Per-
cent of 
cases 
closed 
Num-
ber 
Per-
cent of 
cases 
closed 
Num-
ber 
Per-
cent of 
cases 
closed 
Num-
ber 
Per-
cent of 
cases 
closed 
Num-
ber 
Per-
cent of 
cases 
closed 
Num-
ber 
Per-
cent of 
cases 
closed 
Num-
ber 
Per-
cent of 
cases 
closed 
     Total number of cases closed............................. 29,966 100.0 22,885 100.0 6,318 100.0 423 100.0 157 100.0 39 100.0     27 100.0 117 100.0
Before issuance of complaint.................................. 26,346 87.9 19,633              85.8 6,062 95.9 365 86.3 130 82.8 35 89.7 24 88.9 97 82.9
After issuance of complaint, before opening of 
hearing.....................................................................                 2,258 7.5 2,015 8.8 177 2.8 35 8.3 14 8.9 1 2.6 3 11.1 13 11.1
After hearing opened, before issuance of 
administrative law judge’s decision........................ 181 0.6 171 0.7             6 0.1 0 0.0 4 2.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
After administrative law judge’s decision, before 
issuance of Board decision......................................                 60 0.2 52 0.2 8 0.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
After Board order adopting administrative law  
judge’s decision in absence of exceptions...............                 265 0.9 240 1.0 18 0.3 1 0.2 5 3.2 1 2.6 0 0.0 0 0.0
After Board decision, before circuit court decree...                 342 1.1 315 1.4 20 0.3 2 0.5 4 2.5 1 2.6 0 0.0 0 0.0
After circuit court decree, before Supreme Court 
action....................................................................... 512                1.7 457 2.0 27 0.4 20 4.7 0 0.0 1 2.6 0 0.0 7 6.0
After Supreme Court action.....................................                 2 0.0 2 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
                 Table 9.—Disposition by Stage of Representation and Union Deauthorization Cases Closed, Fiscal Year 20041
 
All R cases RC cases RM cases RD cases UD cases  
 
Stage of disposition Number of cases 
Percent of 
cases 
closed 
Number of 
cases 
Percent of 
cases 
closed 
Number of 
cases 
Percent of 
cases 
closed 
Number of 
cases 
Percent of 
cases 
closed 
Number of 
cases 
Percent of 
cases 
closed 
     Total number of cases closed............................................ 4,604 100.0 3,619 100.0 132 100.0 853 100.0 125 100.0 
Before issuance of notice of hearing...................................... 618 13.4 388 10.7 39 29.5 191 22.4 63 50.4 
After issuance of notice, before close of hearing...................           3,394 73.7 2,722 75.2 77 58.3 595 69.8 34 27.2
After hearing closed, before issuance of decision.................. 34 0.7 30 0.8 1 0.8 3 0.4 0 0.0 
After issuance of Regional Director’s decision...................... 368 8.0 317 8.8 11 8.3 40 4.7 25 20.0 
After issuance of Board decision2..........................................           190 4.1 162 4.5 4 3.0 24 2.8 3 2.4
 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
2 Cases closed after Board decision includes all cases where the Board has granted review in a preelection case, or exceptions have been filed in a postelection proceeding. 
      Table 10—Analysis of Methods of Disposition of Representation and Union Deauthorization Cases Closed, Fiscal Year 20041
 
All R cases RC cases RM cases RD cases UD cases 
Method and stage of disposition Number Percent     Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number  Percent
     Total, all............................................................................ 4,545 100.0 3,573 100.0 131 100.0 841 100.0 110 100.0 
Certification issued, total.......................................................          2,654 58.4 2,204 61.7 37 28.2 413 49.1 59 53.6 
     After:           
          Consent election........................................................... 58 1.3 58 1.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
                Before notice of hearing......................................... 19 0.4 19 0.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
                After notice of hearing, before hearing closed…... 39 0.9 39 1.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
                After hearing closed, before decision.................... 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
          Stipulated election........................................................ 2,200 48.4 1,807 50.6 30 22.9 363 43.2 41 37.3 
 Before notice of hearing......................................... 256 5.6 198 5.5 4 3.1 54 6.4 20 18.2 
 After notice of hearing, before hearing closed.......           1,934 42.6 1,601 44.8 26 19.8 307 36.5 21 19.1
 After hearing closed, before decision.................... 10 0.2 8 0.2 0 0.0 2 0.2 0 0.0 
 Expedited election..................................................           1 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.8 0 0.0 0 0.0
 Regional Director-directed election.......................           236 5.2 202 5.7 4 3.1 30 3.6 15 13.6
 Board-directed election..........................................           159 3.5 137 3.8 2 1.5 20 2.4 3 2.7
By withdrawal, total...............................................................          1,677 36.9 1,297 36.3 60 45.8 320 38.0 43 39.1 
Before notice of hearing................................................... 277 6.1 160 4.5 18 13.7 99 11.8 31 28.2 
After notice of hearing, before hearing closed................. 1,282 28.2 1,023 28.6 40 30.5 219 26.0 11 10.0 
After hearing closed, before decision..............................           22 0.5 21 0.6 1 0.8 0 0.0 0 0.0
After Regional Director’s decision and direction of 
election............................................................................. 77          1.7 75 2.1 1 0.8 1 0.1 1 0.9
After Board decision and direction of election................ 19 0.4 18 0.5 0 0.0 1 0.1 0 0.0 
By dismissal, total..................................................................           214 4.7 72 2.0 34 26.0 108 12.8 8 7.3
Before notice of hearing...................................................           64 1.4 9 0.3 17 13.0 38 4.5 7 6.4
After notice of hearing, before hearing closed................. 88 1.9 19 0.5 10 7.6 59 7.0 1 0.9 
After hearing closed, before decision..............................           1 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.1 0 0.0
By Regional Director’s decision......................................           49 1.1 37 1.0 5 3.8 7 0.8 0 0.0
By Board decision............................................................           12 0.3 7 0.2 2 1.5 3 0.4 0 0.0
 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
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 Table 10A.—Analysis of Methods of Disposition of Amendment of Certification 
                        and Unit Clarification Cases Closed, Fiscal Year 20041
 
 AC UC 
      Total, all............................................................................................................................. 12 155 
Certification amended or unit clarified.................................................................................... 4 14 
Before hearing.................................................................................................................... 4 7 
By Regional Director’s decision.................................................................................. 4 7 
By Board decision........................................................................................................ 0 0 
After hearing...................................................................................................................... 0 7 
By Regional Director’s decision.................................................................................. 0 7 
By Board decision........................................................................................................ 0 0 
Dismissed................................................................................................................................. 1 38 
Before hearing.................................................................................................................... 0 17 
By Regional Director’s decision.................................................................................. 0 14 
By Board decision........................................................................................................ 0 3 
After hearing...................................................................................................................... 1 21 
By Regional Director’s decision.................................................................................. 0 17 
By Board decision........................................................................................................ 1 4 
Withdrawn................................................................................................................................ 7 103 
Before hearing.................................................................................................................... 7 100 
After hearing...................................................................................................................... 0 3 
 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
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       Table 11.—Types of Elections Resulting in Certification in Cases Closed, 
                                                           Fiscal Year 20041
 
Type of election  
 
Type of case 
Total Consent Stipulated 
Board-
directed 
Regional 
Director-
directed2
Expedited 
elections 
under 
8(b)(7)(C) 
All types, total:       
Elections.................................... 32,764 58 2,290 0 415 1 
Eligible voters............................ 197,105 6,551 144,005 0 46,534 15 
Valid votes................................. 162,950 4,898 120,092 0 37,946 14 
RC cases:       
Elections.................................... 2,240 58 1,841 0 341 0 
Eligible voters............................ 159,806 6,551 115,566 0 37,689 0 
Valid votes................................. 131,253 4,898 95,709 0 30,646 0 
RM cases:       
Elections.................................... 37 0 30 0 6 1 
Eligible voters............................ 2,392 0 1,684 0 693 15 
Valid votes................................. 2,178 0 1,509 0 655 14 
RD cases:       
Elections.................................... 421 0 371 0 50 0 
Eligible voters............................ 28,513 0 22,610 0 5,903 0 
Valid votes................................. 24,935 0 19,809 0 5,126 0 
UD cases:       
Elections.................................... 66 0 48 0 18 -- 
Eligible voters............................ 6,394 0 4,145 0 2,249 -- 
Valid votes................................. 4,584 0 3,065 0 1,519 -- 
 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
2 Cases where election is held pursuant to a decision and direction by the Board. 
3 Due to technical difficulties, data discrepancies exceed 1 percent but are less than 3 percent in case totals for Tables 11, 15B, 15C, 
and 16. 
                          Table 11A.—Analysis of Elections Conducted in Representation Cases Closed, Fiscal Year 20041
 
All R elections RC elections RM elections RD elections 
Elections conducted Elections conducted Elections conducted Elections conducted 
 
 
 
 
Type of election 
 
 
Total 
elec-
tions 
With-
drawn 
or dis-
missed 
before 
certifi-
cation 
 
Result-
ing in a 
rerun 
or 
runoff 
 
 
Result-
ing in 
certifi-
cation 
 
 
Total 
elec-
tions 
With-
drawn 
or dis-
missed 
before 
certifi-
cation 
 
Result-
ing in a 
rerun 
or 
runoff 
 
 
Result-
ing in 
certifi-
cation 
 
 
Total 
elec-
tions 
With-
drawn 
or dis-
missed 
before 
certifi-
cation 
 
Result-
ing in a 
rerun 
or 
runoff 
 
 
Result-
ing in 
certifi-
cation 
 
 
Total 
elec-
tions 
With-
drawn 
or dis-
missed 
before 
certifi-
cation 
 
Result-
ing in a 
rerun 
or 
runoff 
 
 
Result-
ing in 
certifi-
cation 
All representation elections....................... 2,826 71          54 2,701 2,356 67 46 2,243 39 2 0 37 431 2 8 421
Rerun required..................................... -- --               52 -- -- -- 44 -- -- -- 0 -- -- -- 8 --
Runoff required................................... -- -- 2 -- --            -- 2 -- -- -- 0 -- -- -- 0 --
Consent elections......................................                 60 2 0 58 60 2 0 58 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rerun required..................................... -- --               0 -- -- -- 0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Runoff required................................... -- -- 0 -- --            -- 0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Stipulated elections...................................               2,321 42 38 2,241 1,912 41 31 1,840 30 0 0 30 379 1 7 371
Rerun required..................................... -- --               36 -- -- -- 29 -- -- -- 0 -- -- -- 7 --
Runoff required................................... -- -- 2 -- --            -- 2 -- -- -- 0 -- -- -- 0 --
Regional Director–directed.......................                 444 27 16 401 384 24 15 345 8 2 0 6 52 1 1 50
Rerun required..................................... -- --               16 -- -- -- 15 -- -- -- 0 -- -- -- 1 --
Runoff required................................... -- -- 0 -- --            -- 0 -- -- -- 0 -- -- -- 0 --
Board-directed........................................... 0                0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rerun required..................................... -- --               0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Runoff required................................... -- -- 0 -- --            -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Expedited–Sec. 8(b)(7)(C)........................                 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Rerun required..................................... -- --               0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0 -- -- -- -- --
Runoff required................................... -- -- 0 -- --            -- -- -- -- -- 0 -- -- -- -- --
 
 
1 The total of representation elections resulting in certification excludes election held in UD cases which are included in the total in Table 11. 
              Table 11B.—Representation Elections in Which Objections and/or Determinative Challenges Were Ruled On 
                                                                                    in Cases Closed Fiscal Year 2004 
 
Objections only Challenges only Objections and challenges Total objections
1 Total challenges2Type of election/case 
 
Total 
elections Number         Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
All representation elections................................            2,832 136 4.8 27 1.0 8 0.3 144 5.1 35 1.2
By type of cases:            
In RC cases................................................... 2,362           116 4.9 25 1.1 6 0.3 122 5.2 31 1.3
In RM cases.................................................. 39           1 2.6 0 0.0 1 2.6 2 5.1 1 2.6
In RD cases................................................... 431           19 4.4 2 0.5 1 0.2 20 4.6 3 0.7
By type of election:            
Consent elections.......................................... 60           1 1.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 1.7 0 0.0
Stipulated elections....................................... 2,330           33 1.4 14 0.6 5 0.2 38 1.6 19 0.8
Expedited elections....................................... 1           1 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 100.0 0 0.0
Regional Director-directed elections............ 441           101 22.9 13 2.9 3 0.7 104 23.6 16 3.6
Board-directed elections............................... 0           0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
 
 
1 Number of elections in which objections were ruled on, regardless of number of allegations in each election. 
2 Number of elections in which challenges were ruled on, regardless of individual ballots challenged in each election. 
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      Table 11C.—Objections Filed in Representation Cases Closed, by Party Filing 
                                                          Fiscal Year 20041
 
Total By employer By union By both parties2Type of election/case 
Number 
Percent 
by type Number 
Percent 
by type Number 
Percent 
by type Number 
Percent 
by type 
All representation elections............................ 242 100.0 91 37.6 148 61.2 3 1.2 
By type of case:         
RC cases................................................... 208 100.0 82 39.4 123 59.1 3 1.4 
RM cases.................................................. 4 100.0 1 25.0 3 75.0 0 0.0 
RD cases................................................... 30 100.0 8 26.7 22 73.3 0 0.0 
By type of election:         
Consent elections..................................... 1 100.0 0 0.0 1 100.0 0 0.0 
Stipulated elections.................................. 112 100.0 27 24.1 82 73.2 3 2.7 
Expedited elections.................................. 1 100.0 0 0.0 1 100.0 0 0.0 
Regional Director-directed elections....... 128 100.0 64 50.0 64 50.0 0 0.0 
Board-directed elections.......................... 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
2 Objections filed by more than one party in the same cases are counted as one. 
 
 
 
 
 
            Table 11D.—Disposition of Objections in Representation Cases Closed, 
                                                           Fiscal Year 20041
 
Overruled Sustained Type of election/case 
Objec-
tions 
filed 
Objec-
tions 
with-
drawn 
Objec-
tions 
ruled 
upon Number 
Percent 
of total 
ruled 
upon 
Number 
Percent 
of total 
ruled 
upon 
All representation elections.............................................. 242 98 144 132 91.7 12 8.3 
By type of case:        
RC cases..................................................................... 208 86 122 112 91.8 10 8.2 
RM cases.................................................................... 4 2 2 2 100.0 0 0.0 
RD cases..................................................................... 30 10 20 18 90.0 2 10.0 
By type of election:        
Consent elections....................................................... 1 0 1 0 0.0 1 100.0 
Stipulated elections.................................................... 112 74 38 30 78.9 8 21.1 
Expedited elections.................................................... 1 0 1 1 100.0 0 0.0 
Regional Director-directed elections.......................... 128 24 104 101 97.1 3 2.9 
Board-directed elections............................................. 0 0 0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
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       Table 11E.—Results of Rerun Elections Held in Representation Cases Closed, 
                                                           Fiscal Year 20041
 
 
Total rerun 
elections 
 
Union certified 
 
No Union chosen 
Outcome of 
original election 
reversed 
 
Type of election/case 
 
Number 
Percent 
by type 
 
Number 
Percent 
by type 
 
Number 
Percent 
by type 
 
Number 
Percent 
by type 
All representation elections............................ 31 100.0 12 38.7 19 61.3 11 35.5 
By type of case:         
RC cases................................................... 26 100.0 9 34.6 17 65.4 9 34.6 
RM cases.................................................. 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
RD cases................................................... 5 100.0 3 60.0 2 40.0 2 40.0 
By type of election:         
Consent elections..................................... 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Stipulated elections.................................. 25 100.0 11 44.0 14 56.0 10 40.0 
Expedited elections.................................. 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Regional Director-directed elections....... 6 100.0 1 16.7 5 83.3 1 16.7 
Board-directed elections.......................... 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
 
 
1 Includes only final rerun elections, i.e., those resulting in certification.  See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
                                      Table 12.—Results of Union-Shop Deauthorization Polls in Cases Closed, Fiscal Year 20041
 
 
Number of polls Employees involved  (number eligible to vote) 
 
Valid votes cast 
In polls Cast for deauthorization Resulting in 
deauthorization 
Resulting in 
continued 
authorization Resulting in 
deauthorization 
Resulting in 
continued 
authorization 
 
 
 
 
Affiliation of union holding union-shop contract 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total 
Number Percent of total Number 
Percent 
of total 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total 
eligible
Number Percent of total 
 
Number 
Percent 
of total 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total 
 
 
 
 
 
Percent 
of total 
eligible
 
Number 
 
 
Percent 
of total 
eligible 
       Total.................................................................................. 67 30 44.8 37 55.2 6,353 2,687 42.3       3,666 57.7 4,559 71.8 2,035 32.0
AFL–CIO unions......................................................................               59 25 42.4 34 57.6 5,309 1,955 36.8 3,354 63.2 3,899 73.4 1,525 28.7
Other national unions.............................................................. 3 2 66.7 1 33.3 307 239 77.9 68 22.1 208 67.8   163 53.1
Other local unions....................................................................               5 3 60.0 2 40.0 737 493 66.9 244 33.1 452 61.3 347 47.1
 
 
1 Sec. 8(a)(3) of the Act requires that to revoke a union-shop agreement a majority of the employees eligible to vote must vote in favor of deauthorization. 
                  Table 13.—Final Outcome of Representation Elections in Cases Closed, Fiscal Year 20041—Page 1 of 3 
 
Elections won by unions Employees eligible to vote 
In units won by 
 
 
 
Participating unions 
 
 
Total 
elections2
 
 
Percent 
won 
 
 
Total 
won 
 
 
AFL–
CIO 
unions 
 
 
Other 
national 
unions 
 
 
Other 
local 
unions 
Elec-
tions in 
which 
no rep-
resenta-
tive 
chosen 
 
 
Total 
 
In 
elections 
won 
AFL–
CIO 
unions 
Other 
national 
unions 
Other 
local 
unions 
 
In elections 
where no 
representa-
tive chosen 
 A.  All representation elections 
AFL–CIO...............................................             2,343 50.8 1,190 1,188 2 -- 1,153 162,706 74,166 74,085 81 -- 88,540
Other local unions..................................             119 58.8 70 -- 1 69 49 5,948 3,293 -- 90 3,203 2,655
Other national unions............................              103 65.0 67 -- 67 -- 36 7,068 4,205 -- 4,205 -- 2,863
    1-union elections............................... 2,565 51.7 1,327 1,188 70 69 1,238 175,722 81,664 74,085 4,376 3,203 94,058 
AFL–CIO v. AFL–CIO.........................              80 71.3 57 57 -- -- 23 6,265 4,447 4,447 -- -- 1,818
AFL–CIO v. Local................................              25 96.0 24 12 -- 12 1 2,437 2,381 1,525 -- 856 56
AFL–CIO v. National............................              21 81.0 17 5 12 -- 4 2,451 2,331 418 1,913 -- 120
Local v. Local........................................              6 100.0 6 -- -- 6 0 887 887 -- -- 887 0
National v. Local...................................             5 100.0 5 -- 3 2 0 1,933 1,933 -- 1,834 99 0
National v. National...............................              8 75.0 6 -- 6 -- 2 714 552 -- 552 -- 162
    2-union elections............................... 145 79.3 115 74 21 20 30 14,687 12,531 6,390 4,299 1,842 2,156 
AFL–CIO v. AFL–CIO v. AFL–CIO…              1 0.0 0 0 -- -- 1 216 0 0 -- -- 216
AFL–CIO v. AFL–CIO v. AFL–CIO v. 
AFL–CIO............................................... 
2             0.0 0 0 -- -- 2 946 0 0 -- -- 946
AFL–CIO v. AFL–CIO v. National…..              2 50.0 1 0 1 -- 1 79 56 0 56 -- 23
AFL–CIO v. Local v. Local..................              2 100.0 2 1 -- 1 0 220 220 110 -- 110 0
Local v. Local v. Local..........................              2 100.0 2 -- -- 2 0 94 94 -- -- 94 0
    3 (or more)-union elections............... 9 55.6 5 1 1 3 4 1,555 370 110 56 204 1,185 
    Total representation elections............ 2,719 53.2 1,447 1,263 92 92 1,272 191,964 94,565 80,585 8,731 5,249 97,399 
 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
2 Includes each unit in which a choice regarding collective-bargaining agent was made, for example, there may have been more than one election in a single case, or several cases may have been involved. 
                  Table 13.—Final Outcome of Representation Elections in Cases Closed, Fiscal Year 20041—Page 2 of 3 
 
Elections won by unions Employees eligible to vote 
In units won by 
 
 
 
Participating unions 
 
 
Total 
elections2
 
 
Percent 
won 
 
 
Total 
won 
 
 
AFL–
CIO 
unions 
 
 
Other 
national 
unions 
 
 
Other 
local 
unions 
Elec-
tions in 
which 
no rep-
resenta-
tive 
chosen 
 
 
Total 
 
In 
elections 
won 
AFL–
CIO 
unions 
Other 
national 
unions 
Other 
local 
unions 
 
In elections 
where no 
representa-
tive chosen 
B.  Elections in RC cases 
Other national unions…………………    89 66.3 59 -- 59 -- 30 5,393 2,787 -- 2,787 -- 2,606 
AFL–CIO...............................................             1,918 54.6 1,047 1,045 2 -- 871 134,085 60,598 60,517 81 -- 73,487
Other local unions..................................             108 62.0 67 -- 1 66 41 5,597 3,069 -- 90 2,979 2,528
    1-union elections............................... 2,115 55.5 1,173 1,045 62 66 942 145,075 66,454 60,517 2,958 2,979 78,621 
National v. Local...................................            5 100.0 5 -- 3 2 0 1,933 1,933 -- 1,834 99 0
National v. National...............................              8 75.0 6 -- 6 -- 2 714 552 -- 552 -- 162
Local v. Local........................................              6 100.0 6 -- -- 6 0 887 887 -- -- 887 0
AFL–CIO v. National............................              20 85.0 17 5 12 -- 3 2,445 2,331 418 1,913 -- 114
AFL–CIO v. AFL–CIO.........................              78 71.8 56 56 -- -- 22 6,128 4,318 4,318 -- -- 1,810
AFL–CIO v. Local.................................              22 95.5 21 12 -- 9 1 2,343 2,287 1,525 -- 762 56
    2-union elections............................... 139 79.9 111 73 21 17 28 14,450 12,308 6,261 4,299 1,748 2,142 
AFL–CIO v. AFL–CIO v. AFL–CIO…              1 0.0 0 0 -- -- 1 216 0 0 -- -- 216
AFL–CIO v. AFL–CIO v. AFL–CIO v. 
AFL–CIO............................................... 
1             0.0 0 0 -- -- 1 939 0 0 -- -- 939
AFL–CIO v. AFL–CIO v. National......              2 50.0 1 0 1 -- 1 79 56 0 56 -- 23
AFL–CIO v. Local v. Local..................              2 100.0 2 1 -- 1 0 220 220 110 -- 110 0
Local v. Local v. Local..........................              2 100.0 2 -- -- 2 0 94 94 -- -- 94 0
    3 (or more)-union elections............... 8 62.5 5 1 1 3 3 1,548 370 110 56 204 1,178 
    Total RC elections............................. 2,262 57.0 1,289 1,119 84 86 973 161,073 79,132 66,888 7,313 4,931 81,941 
 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
2 Includes each unit in which a choice regarding collective-bargaining agent was made, for example, there may have been more than one election in a single case, or several cases may have been involved. 
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Elections won by unions Employees eligible to vote 
In units won by 
 
 
 
Participating unions 
 
 
Total 
elections2
 
 
Percent 
won 
 
 
Total 
won 
 
 
AFL–
CIO 
unions 
 
 
Other 
national 
unions 
 
 
Other 
local 
unions 
Elec-
tions in 
which 
no rep-
resenta-
tive 
chosen 
 
 
Total 
 
In 
elections 
won 
AFL–
CIO 
unions 
Other 
national 
unions 
Other 
local 
unions 
 
In elections 
where no 
representa-
tive chosen 
C.  Elections in RM cases 
AFL–CIO……………………………...                34 29.4 10 10 -- -- 24 2,226 410 410 -- -- 1,816
Other national unions............................              1 100.0 1 -- 1 -- 0 45 45 -- 45 -- 0
    1-union elections............................... 35 31.4 11 10 1 0 24 2,271 455 410 45 0 1,816 
AFL–CIO v. AFL–CIO.........................              1 100.0 1 1 -- -- 0 129 129 129 -- -- 0
AFL–CIO v. National............................              1 0.0 0 0 0 -- 1 6 0 0 0 -- 6
    2-union elections...............................              2 50.0 1 1 0 0 1 135 129 129 0 0 6
    Total RM elections............................ 37 32.4 12 11 1 0 25 2,406 584 539 45 0 1,822 
D.  Elections in RD cases 
Other national unions                                13 53.8 7 -- 7 -- 6 1,630 1,373 -- 1,373 -- 257 
Other local unions..................................              11 27.3 3 -- -- 3 8 351 224 -- -- 224 127
AFL–CIO...............................................           391 34.0 133 133 -- -- 258 26,395 13,158 13,158 -- -- 13,237
    1-union elections............................... 415 34.5 143 133 7 3 272 28,376 14,755 13,158 1,373 224 13,621 
AFL–CIO v. AFL–CIO.........................              1 0.0 0 0 -- -- 1 8 0 0 -- -- 8
AFL–CIO v. Local...............................              3 100.0 3 0 -- 3 0 94 94 0 -- 94 0
    2-union elections...............................              4 75.0 3 0 0 3 1 102 94 0 0 94 8
AFL–CIO v. AFL–CIO v. AFL–CIO 
v. AFL–CIO........................................... 
1             0.0 0 0 -- -- 1 7 0 0 -- -- 7
    3 (or more)-union elections...............              1 0.0 0 0 0 0 1 7 0 0 0 0 7
    Total RD elections............................ 420 34.8 146 133 7 6 274 28,485 14,849 13,158 1,373 318 13,636 
 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
2 Includes each unit in which a choice regarding collective-bargaining agent was made, for example, there may have been more than one election in a single case, or several cases may have been involved. 
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Valid votes cast in elections won Valid votes cast in elections lost 
Votes for unions Votes for unions 
 
 
 
Participating unions 
 
 
Total 
valid 
votes cast 
 
 
Total 
 
AFL–CIO 
unions 
Other 
national 
unions 
 
Other local 
unions 
 
 
Total votes 
for no union 
 
 
Total 
 
AFL–CIO 
unions 
Other 
national 
unions 
 
Other local 
unions 
 
 
Total votes 
for no union 
A.  All representation elections 
AFL–CIO.................................................. 138,319 41,422          41,422 -- -- 19,211 27,137 27,137 -- -- 50,549
Other local unions.....................................           4,392 1,732 -- -- 1,732 652 558 -- -- 558 1,450
Other national unions................................           5,125 2,176 -- 2,176 -- 937 708 -- 708 -- 1,304
    1-union elections................................... 147,836 45,330 41,422 2,176 1,732 20,800 28,403 27,137 708 558 53,303 
AFL–CIO v. AFL–CIO.............................           4,750 2,968 2,968 -- -- 273 597 597 -- -- 912
AFL–CIO v. Local....................................           1,908 1,750 1,027 -- 723 113 12 8 -- 4 33
AFL–CIO v. National............................... 1,763 1,618 498 1,120 -- 66 26 12 14 -- 53 
Local v. Local...........................................            472 469 -- -- 469 3 0 -- -- 0 0
National v. Local.......................................            1,014 936 -- 701 235 78 0 -- 0 0 0
National v. National..................................            459 341 -- 341 -- 9 32 -- 32 -- 77
    2-union elections................................... 10,366 8,082 4,493 2,162 1,427 542 667 617 46 4 1,075 
AFL–CIO v. AFL–CIO v. AFL–CIO....... 182 0 0 -- -- 0 55 55 -- -- 127 
AFL–CIO v. AFL–CIO v. AFL–CIO v. 
AFL–CIO.................................................. 
1,811           0 0 -- -- 0 1,388 1,388 -- -- 423
AFL–CIO v. AFL–CIO v. National.......... 73 38 7 31 -- 15 20 20 0 -- 0 
AFL–CIO v. Local v. Local...................... 143 142 52 -- 90 1 0 0 -- 0 0 
Local v. Local v. Local.............................            13 13 -- -- 13 0 0 -- -- 0 0
    3 (or more)-union elections................... 2,222 193 59 31 103 16 1,463 1,463 0 0 550 
    Total representation elections............... 160,424 53,605 45,974 4,369 3,262 21,358 30,533 29,217 754 562 54,928 
B.  Elections in RC cases 
Other national unions................................           3,773 1,535 -- 1,535 -- 457 635 -- 635 -- 1,146
AFL–CIO.................................................. 113,020 33,787          33,787 -- -- 14,781 22,937 22,937 -- -- 41,515
Other local unions.....................................           4,080 1,565 -- -- 1,565 621 516 -- -- 516 1,378
    1-union elections................................... 120,873 36,887 33,787 1,535 1,565 15,859 24,088 22,937 635 516 44,039 
National v. Local.......................................            1,014 936 0 701 235 78 0 -- -- -- --
National v. National..................................            459 341 -- 341 -- 9 32 -- 32 -- 77
Local v. Local...........................................            472 469 0 0 469 3 0 -- -- -- --
 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definition. 
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Valid votes cast in elections won Valid votes cast in elections lost 
Votes for unions Votes for unions 
 
 
 
Participating unions 
 
 
Total 
valid 
votes cast 
 
 
Total 
 
AFL–CIO 
unions 
Other 
national 
unions 
 
Other local 
unions 
 
 
Total votes 
for no union 
 
 
Total 
 
AFL–CIO 
unions 
Other 
national 
unions 
 
Other local 
unions 
 
 
Total votes 
for no union 
AFL–CIO v. National............................... 1,757 1,618 498 1,120 -- 66 20 12 8 -- 53 
AFL–CIO v. AFL–CIO.............................           4,622 2,851 2,851 -- -- 273 591 591 -- -- 907
AFL–CIO v. Local....................................           1,846 1,689 1,015 -- 674 112 12 8 -- 4 33
    2-union elections................................... 10,170 7,904 4,364 2,162 1,378 541 655 611 40 4 1,070 
AFL–CIO v. AFL–CIO v. AFL–CIO....... 182 0 -- -- -- -- 55 55 0 0 127 
AFL–CIO v. AFL–CIO v. AFL–CIO v. 
AFL–CIO.................................................. 
1,805           0 -- -- -- -- 1,388 1,388 0 0 417
AFL–CIO v. AFL–CIO v. National.......... 73 38 7 31 -- 15 20 20 0 -- 0 
AFL–CIO v. Local v. Local......................            143 142 52 0 90 1 0 -- -- -- --
Local v. Local v. Local.............................            13 13 0 0 13 0 0 -- -- -- --
    3 (or more)-union elections................... 2,216 193 59 31 103 16 1,463 1,463 0 0 544 
    Total RC elections................................. 133,259 44,984 38,210 3,728 3,046 16,416 26,206 25,011 675 520 45,653 
C.  Elections in RM cases 
AFL–CIO..................................................          2,037 212 212  -- -- 157 639 639 -- -- 1,029
Other national unions................................            33 17 0 17 0 16 0 -- -- -- --
    1-union elections................................... 2,070 229 212 17 0 173 639 639 0 0 1,029 
AFL–CIO v. AFL–CIO.............................            117 117 117 0 0 0 0 -- -- -- --
AFL–CIO v. National...............................            6 0 -- -- -- -- 6 0 6 0 0
    2-union elections................................... 123 117 117 0 0 0 6 0 6 0 0 
    Total RM elections................................ 2,193 346 329 17 0 173 645 639 6 0 1,029 
D.  Elections in RD cases 
Other national unions................................          1,319 624 --  624 -- 464 73 -- 73 -- 158
Other local unions.....................................            312 167 -- -- 167 31 42 -- -- 42 72
AFL–CIO..................................................           23,262 7,423 7,423 -- -- 4,273 3,561 3,561 -- -- 8,005
    1-union elections................................... 24,893 8,214 7,423 624 167 4,768 3,676 3,561 73 42 8,235 
AFL–CIO v. AFL–CIO.............................            11 0 -- -- -- -- 6 6 0 0 5
AFL–CIO v. Local....................................            62 61 12 0 49 1 0 -- -- -- --
 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definition. 
                      Table 14.—Valid Votes Cast in Representation Elections, by Final Results of Election, in Cases Closed, 
                                                                                      Fiscal Year 20041—Page 3 of 3 
 
Valid votes cast in elections won Valid votes cast in elections lost 
Votes for unions Votes for unions 
 
 
 
Participating unions 
 
 
Total 
valid 
votes cast 
 
 
Total 
 
AFL–CIO 
unions 
Other 
national 
unions 
 
Other local 
unions 
 
 
Total votes 
for no union 
 
 
Total 
 
AFL–CIO 
unions 
Other 
national 
unions 
 
Other local 
unions 
 
 
Total votes 
for no union 
    2-union elections.................................. 73 61 12 0 49 1 6 6 0 0 5 
AFL–CIO v. AFL–CIO v. AFL–CIO v. 
AFL–CIO.................................................. 
6           0 -- -- -- -- 0 0 0 0 6
    3 (or more)-union elections.................. 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 
    Total RD elections.............................. 24,972 8,275 7,435 624 216 4,769 3,682 3,567 73 42 8,246 
 
 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definition. 
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Number of elections in which 
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Valid votes cast for unions   
 
 
 
 
Division and State1
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CIO 
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Other 
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Number 
of elec-
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which 
no rep-
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of em-
ployees 
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Total 
valid 
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Total 
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CIO 
unions 
 
 
Other 
national 
unions 
 
 
Other 
local 
unions 
 
 
 
Total 
votes 
for no 
union 
 
Eligible 
employ-
ees in 
units 
choos-
ing rep-
resentati
on 
Illinois......................................................             199 116 104 8 4 83 11840 10,113 5,918 4,875 757 286 4,195 6403
Indiana......................................................              44 20 19 0 1 24 2468 2,249 1,045 1,031 0 14 1,204 864
Michigan..................................................              170 86 76 7 3 84 11935 9,772 5,292 4,256 814 222 4,480 6949
Ohio..........................................................               129 64 59 4 1 65 7079 6,300 2,844 2,790 47 7 3,456 2443
Wisconsin..................................................               51 24 21 2 1 27 1749 1,609 808 665 89 54 801 1034
     East North Central................................ 593 310 279 21 10 283 35071 30,043 15,907 13,617 1,707 583 14,136 17693 
Alabama....................................................               23 11 11 0 0 12 1819 1,669 797 797 0 0 872 669
Kentucky..................................................               37 12 12 0 0 25 5014 4,505 1,813 1,790 0 23 2,692 520
Mississippi................................................              15 6 4 1 1 9 1245 1,108 405 305 23 77 703 391
Tennessee..................................................               28 11 11 0 0 17 2572 2,246 965 965 0 0 1,281 1001
     East South Central................................ 103 40 38 1 1 63 10650 9,528 3,980 3,857 23 100 5,548 2581 
New Jersey................................................             146 53 49 2 2 93 13510 11,122 5,302 4,974 99 229 5,820 4058
New York..................................................             294 177 139 15 23 117 24165 17,903 10,457 9,606 194 657 7,446 15256
Pennsylvania............................................            193 91 78 9 4 102 11757 11,049 5,979 5,441 255 283 5,070 5714
     Middle Atlantic.................................... 633 321 266 26 29 312 49432 40,074 21,738 20,021 548 1,169 18,336 25028 
Arizona......................................................               31 19 16 2 1 12 1723 1,419 791 441 334 16 628 861
Colorado....................................................               36 18 18 0 0 18 1310 1,003 388 388 0 0 615 493
Idaho..........................................................               8 6 6 0 0 2 73 68 43 43 0 0 25 59
Montana....................................................               11 7 7 0 0 4 301 254 141 141 0 0 113 231
Nevada......................................................               32 24 22 1 1 8 914 828 523 458 0 65 305 737
New Mexico..............................................               29 11 8 2 1 18 1389 1,219 527 471 47 9 692 462
Utah..........................................................               8 3 3 0 0 5 495 432 185 185 0 0 247 48
Wyoming..................................................               5 4 4 0 0 1 335 305 147 147 0 0 158 186
     Mountain.............................................. 160 92 84 5 3 68 6540 5,528 2,745 2,274 381 90 2,783 3077 
Connecticut..............................................               39 21 18 2 1 18 1842 1,536 853 705 131 17 683 916
Maine........................................................               5 1 0 1 0 4 163 142 62 53 9 0 80 16
Massachusetts............................................               58 32 27 1 4 26 2755 2,539 1,263 1,196 24 43 1,276 1381
 
 
1 The States are grouped according to the method used by the Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce. 
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Number of elections in which 
representation rights were won by unions 
Valid votes cast for unions   
 
 
 
 
Division and State1
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no rep-
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CIO 
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Other 
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unions 
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for no 
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Eligible 
employ-
ees in 
units 
choos-
ing rep-
resentati
on 
New Hampshire........................................              3 1 1 0 0 2 113 101 48 48 0 0 53 39
Rhode Island............................................              26 18 16 0 2 8 1666 1,516 747 709 0 38 769 619
Vermont....................................................               5 3 1 2 0 2 113 103 54 29 25 0 49 42
     New England........................................ 136 76 63 6 7 60 6652 5,937 3,027 2,740 189 98 2,910 3013 
Puerto Rico................................................               42 25 15 4 6 17 2741 2,283 1,312 1,054 24 234 971 1628
Virgin Islands............................................               3 1 1 0 0 2 228 90 70 70 0 0 20 202
     Outlying Areas..................................... 45 26 16 4 6 19 2969 2,373 1,382 1,124 24 234 991 1830 
Alaska........................................................               12 5 5 0 0 7 523 402 184 184 0 0 218 94
American Samoa.......................................               0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
California..................................................          291 165 149 6 10 126 27731 22,234 12,207 10,683 741 783 10,027 17806 
Federated States of Micronesia.................          0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Guam........................................................               1 1 1 0 0 0 21 15 12 12 0 0 3 21
Hawaii.......................................................               26 9 4 4 1 17 1510 1,206 509 304 198 7 697 380
Marshall Islands........................................               0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Northern Mariana Islands..........................               0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Oregon.......................................................               46 21 19 0 2 25 1690 1,533 707 637 27 43 826 629
Palau..........................................................               0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Washington...............................................               79 51 48 3 0 28 4347 3,527 2,244 2,210 24 10 1,283 3163
     Pacific.................................................. 455 252 226 13 13 203 35822 28,917 15,863 14,030 990 843 13,054 22093 
Delaware...................................................               10 4 4 0 0 6 883 747 366 366 0 0 381 590
District Of Columbia................................ 21 18 6 6 6 3 1736 1,186 1,033 385 142 506 153 1538 
Florida.......................................................               86 55 47 6 2 31 6759 5,850 3,430 3,159 232 39 2,420 4267
Georgia......................................................               39 19 17 2 0 20 3697 3,097 1,430 1,343 87 0 1,667 1138
Maryland...................................................               52 30 24 2 4 22 3327 2,700 1,421 1,223 87 111 1,279 1851
North Carolina...........................................               20 14 13 0 1 6 1536 1,368 942 936 0 6 426 977
 
 
1 The States are grouped according to the method used by the Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce. 
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no rep-
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CIO 
unions 
 
 
Other 
national 
unions 
 
 
Other 
local 
unions 
 
 
 
Total 
votes 
for no 
union 
 
Eligible 
employ-
ees in 
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choos-
ing rep-
resentati
on 
South Carolina...........................................              6 4 2 2 0 2 473 389 215 159 56 0 174 119
Virginia.....................................................               33 23 17 1 5 10 1485 1,209 745 624 60 61 464 843
West Virginia............................................               29 19 17 2 0 10 2413 2,161 1,285 1,274 0 11 876 1670
     South Atlantic...................................... 296 186 147 21 18 110 22309 18,707 10,867 9,469 664 734 7,840 12993 
Iowa..........................................................              27 19 16 1 2 8 1524 1,328 765 742 0 23 563 1058
Kansas.......................................................              13 4 3 1 0 9 1671 1,499 536 523 13 0 963 100
Minnesota..................................................               64 24 23 0 1 40 3227 2,948 1,346 1,337 0 9 1,602 940
Missouri....................................................               64 25 24 1 0 39 6144 5,379 2,133 1,843 276 14 3,246 650
Nebraska....................................................               9 6 5 1 0 3 754 678 401 388 13 0 277 652
North Dakota.............................................               4 2 2 0 0 2 257 233 118 115 3 0 115 176
South Dakota.............................................               3 1 1 0 0 2 380 347 81 81 0 0 266 28
     West North Central.............................. 184 81 74 4 3 103 13957 12,412 5,380 5,029 305 46 7,032 3604 
Arkansas....................................................               17 13 11 1 1 4 1544 1,442 678 626 42 10 764 411
Louisiana...................................................               36 20 19 1 0 16 2412 1,848 1,032 1,019 12 1 816 1080
Oklahoma..................................................               17 8 8 0 0 9 677 608 306 306 0 0 302 304
Texas.........................................................               64 33 30 2 1 31 4923 4,478 2,088 1,861 208 19 2,390 2443
     West South Central.............................. 134 74 68 4 2 60 9556 8,376 4,104 3,812 262 30 4,272 4238 
     Total, all States and areas.................... 2,739 1,458 1,261 105 92 1,281 192958 161,895 84,993 75,973 5,093 3,927 76,902  96150
 
1 The States are grouped according to the method used by the Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce. 
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no rep-
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ees in 
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choos-
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on 
Illinois.......................................................               168 105 95 7 3 63 10244 8,673 5,100 4,238 662 200 3,573 5387
Indiana......................................................               34 17 16 0 1 17 1868 1,687 649 635 0 14 1,038 361
Michigan...................................................               141 69 59 7 3 72 8757 6,887 3,693 2,657 814 222 3,194 4672
Ohio...........................................................               115 58 54 4 0 57 6628 5,916 2,583 2,536 47 0 3,333 2138
Wisconsin..................................................               33 21 19 1 1 12 1251 1,154 627 524 61 42 527 960
     East North Central................................ 491 270 243 19 8 221 28748 24,317 12,652 10,590 1,584 478 11,665 13518 
Alabama....................................................               20 10 10 0 0 10 1382 1,265 546 546 0 0 719 319
Kentucky...................................................               28 11 11 0 0 17 4487 4,044 1,679 1,656 0 23 2,365 505
Mississippi................................................               12 3 1 1 1 9 928 838 236 136 23 77 602 74
Tennessee..................................................             22 8 8 0 0 14 2373 2,059 862 862 0 0 1,197 867
     East South Central................................ 82 32 30 1 1 50 9170 8,206 3,323 3,200 23 100 4,883 1765 
New Jersey................................................             137 50 46 2 2 87 13132 10,788 5,123 4,796 99 228 5,665 3751
New York..................................................             273 169 131 15 23 104 23173 17,054 10,091 9,250 190 651 6,963 14891
Pennsylvania.............................................             162 84 72 8 4 78 9716 9,285 5,173 4,637 255 281 4,112 4526
     Middle Atlantic.................................... 572 303 249 25 29 269 46021 37,127 20,387 18,683 544 1,160 16,740 23168 
Arizona......................................................               25 15 14 1 0 10 1273 1,063 582 432 150 0 481 432
Colorado....................................................               27 13 13 0 0 14 676 528 239 239 0 0 289 297
Idaho..........................................................               8 6 6 0 0 2 73 68 43 43 0 0 25 59
Montana....................................................               7 5 5 0 0 2 140 123 71 71 0 0 52 123
Nevada......................................................               25 21 20 1 0 4 604 549 345 345 0 0 204 458
New Mexico..............................................               25 10 7 2 1 15 1168 1,019 424 368 47 9 595 304
Utah...........................................................               5 2 2 0 0 3 438 378 161 161 0 0 217 9
Wyoming...................................................               5 4 4 0 0 1 335 305 147 147 0 0 158 186
     Mountain.............................................. 127 76 71 4 1 51 4707 4,033 2,012 1,806 197 9 2,021 1868 
Connecticut...............................................               35 18 15 2 1 17 1543 1,274 670 522 131 17 604 627
Maine........................................................               4 0 0 0 0 4 147 127 53 53 0 0 74 0
 
 
1 Does not include decertification (RD) elections. 
2 The States are grouped according to the method used by the Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce. 
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Massachusetts............................................              48 27 22 1 4 21 2404 2,213 1,114 1,047 24 43 1,099 1198
New Hampshire.........................................               2 1 1 0 0 1 63 53 32 32 0 0 21 39
Rhode Island.............................................              22 16 14 0 2 6 1395 1,269 612 574 0 38 657 452
Vermont....................................................               4 3 1 2 0 1 99 91 54 29 25 0 37 42
     New England........................................ 115 65 53 5 7 50 5651 5,027 2,535 2,257 180 98 2,492 2358 
Puerto Rico................................................               41 25 15 4 6 16 2725 2,268 1,308 1,054 24 230 960 1628
Virgin Islands............................................               2 1 1 0 0 1 222 84 70 70 0 0 14 202
     Outlying Areas..................................... 43 26 16 4 6 17 2947 2,352 1,378 1,124 24 230 974 1830 
Alaska........................................................               9 4 4 0 0 5 323 295 138 138 0 0 157 58
American Samoa.......................................               0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
California..................................................             241 148 134 5 9 93 21353 16,882 10,074 8,860 474 740 6,808 15747
Federated States of Micronesia.................            0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Guam.........................................................               1 1 1 0 0 0 21 15 12 12 0 0 3 21
Hawaii.......................................................               18 7 3 3 1 11 1095 858 374 193 174 7 484 273
Marshall Islands........................................               0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Northern Mariana Islands..........................               0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Oregon.......................................................               34 19 17 0 2 15 989 889 432 362 27 43 457 413
Palau..........................................................               0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Washington...............................................               62 47 44 3 0 15 3490 2,758 1,863 1,829 24 10 895 2825
     Pacific.................................................. 365 226 203 11 12 139 27271 21,697 12,893 11,394 699 800 8,804 19337 
Delaware...................................................               6 2 2 0 0 4 158 145 59 59 0 0 86 75
District Of Columbia................................ 21 18 6 6 6 3 1736 1,186 1,033 385 142 506 153 1538 
Florida.......................................................               75 51 43 6 2 24 6021 5,232 3,176 2,929 208 39 2,056 4065
Georgia......................................................               33 16 14 2 0 17 3426 2,845 1,295 1,208 87 0 1,550 918
Maryland...................................................               46 28 23 2 3 18 3105 2,503 1,323 1,141 87 95 1,180 1729
 
 
1 Does not include decertification (RD) elections. 
2 The States are grouped according to the method used by the Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce. 
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North Carolina..........................................             18 14 13 0 1 4 1501 1,335 930 924 0 6 405 977
South Carolina...........................................               5 3 2 1 0 2 400 332 173 159 14 0 159 46
Virginia.....................................................               30 22 16 1 5 8 1413 1,153 729 608 60 61 424 813
West Virginia............................................            27 18 16 2 0 9 2345 2,095 1,258 1,247 0 11 837 1644
     South Atlantic...................................... 261 172 135 20 17 89 20105 16,826 9,976 8,660 598 718 6,850 11805 
Iowa...........................................................              26 19 16 1 2 7 1519 1,323 765 742 0 23 558 1058
Kansas.......................................................              11 4 3 1 0 7 1605 1,434 511 498 13 0 923 100
Minnesota..................................................               48 21 20 0 1 27 2614 2,409 1,143 1,134 0 9 1,266 829
Missouri....................................................               45 22 21 1 0 23 5231 4,533 1,808 1,518 276 14 2,725 483
Nebraska....................................................               9 6 5 1 0 3 754 678 401 388 13 0 277 652
North Dakota.............................................               4 2 2 0 0 2 257 233 118 115 3 0 115 176
South Dakota.............................................               2 0 0 0 0 2 352 321 65 65 0 0 256 0
     West North Central.............................. 145 74 67 4 3 71 12332 10,931 4,811 4,460 305 46 6,120 3298 
Arkansas....................................................               14 12 10 1 1 2 1181 1,097 529 477 42 10 568 301
Louisiana...................................................               30 18 17 1 0 12 2187 1,635 951 938 12 1 684 1032
Oklahoma..................................................               12 5 5 0 0 7 454 404 184 184 0 0 220 124
Texas.........................................................               59 32 29 2 1 27 3520 3,194 1,405 1,198 188 19 1,789 1288
     West South Central.............................. 115 67 61 4 2 48 7342 6,330 3,069 2,797 242 30 3,261 2745 
     Total, all States and areas.................... 2,316 1,311 1,128 97 86 1,005 164294 136,846 73,036 64,971 4,396 3,669 63,810  81692
 
 
 
1 Does not include decertification (RD) elections. 
2 The States are grouped according to the method used by the Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce. 
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Illinois.......................................................              31 11 9 1 1 20 1596 1,440 818 637 95 86 622 1016
Indiana......................................................               10 3 3 0 0 7 600 562 396 396 0 0 166 503
Michigan...................................................               29 17 17 0 0 12 3178 2,885 1,599 1,599 0 0 1,286 2277
Ohio...........................................................               14 6 5 0 1 8 451 384 261 254 0 7 123 305
Wisconsin..................................................               18 3 2 1 0 15 498 455 181 141 28 12 274 74
     East North Central................................ 102 40 36 2 2 62 6323 5,726 3,255 3,027 123 105 2,471 4175 
Alabama....................................................               3 1 1 0 0 2 437 404 251 251 0 0 153 350
Kentucky...................................................               9 1 1 0 0 8 527 461 134 134 0 0 327 15
Mississippi................................................               3 3 3 0 0 0 317 270 169 169 0 0 101 317
Tennessee..................................................               6 3 3 0 0 3 199 187 103 103 0 0 84 134
     East South Central................................ 21 8 8 0 0 13 1480 1,322 657 657 0 0 665 816 
New Jersey................................................               9 3 3 0 0 6 378 334 179 178 0 1 155 307
New York..................................................               21 8 8 0 0 13 992 849 366 356 4 6 483 365
Pennsylvania.............................................              31 7 6 1 0 24 2041 1,764 806 804 0 2 958 1188
     Middle Atlantic.................................... 61 18 17 1 0 43 3411 2,947 1,351 1,338 4 9 1,596 1860 
Arizona......................................................               6 4 2 1 1 2 450 356 209 9 184 16 147 429
Colorado....................................................               9 5 5 0 0 4 634 475 149 149 0 0 326 196
Idaho..........................................................               0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Montana....................................................               4 2 2 0 0 2 161 131 70 70 0 0 61 108
Nevada......................................................               7 3 2 0 1 4 310 279 178 113 0 65 101 279
New Mexico..............................................               4 1 1 0 0 3 221 200 103 103 0 0 97 158
Utah...........................................................               3 1 1 0 0 2 57 54 24 24 0 0 30 39
Wyoming..................................................               0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
     Mountain.............................................. 33 16 13 1 2 17 1833 1,495 733 468 184 81 762 1209 
Connecticut...............................................               4 3 3 0 0 1 299 262 183 183 0 0 79 289
Maine........................................................               1 1 0 1 0 0 16 15 9 0 9 0 6 16
 
 
1 The States are grouped according to the method used by the Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce. 
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Massachusetts............................................              10 5 5 0 0 5 351 326 149 149 0 0 177 183
New Hampshire........................................               1 0 0 0 0 1 50 48 16 16 0 0 32 0
Rhode Island.............................................               4 2 2 0 0 2 271 247 135 135 0 0 112 167
Vermont....................................................               1 0 0 0 0 1 14 12 0 0 0 0 12 0
     New England........................................ 21 11 10 1 0 10 1001 910 492 483 9 0 418 655 
Puerto Rico................................................               1 0 0 0 0 1 16 15 4 0 0 4 11 0
Virgin Islands............................................               1 0 0 0 0 1 6 6 0 0 0 0 6 0
     Outlying Areas..................................... 2 0 0 0 0 2 22 21 4 0 0 4 17 0 
Alaska........................................................               3 1 1 0 0 2 200 107 46 46 0 0 61 36
American Samoa.......................................               0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
California..................................................               50 17 15 1 1 33 6378 5,352 2,133 1,823 267 43 3,219 2059
Federated States of Micronesia.................               0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Guam.........................................................               0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hawaii.......................................................               8 2 1 1 0 6 415 348 135 111 24 0 213 107
Marshall Islands........................................               0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Northern Mariana Islands..........................               0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Oregon.......................................................               12 2 2 0 0 10 701 644 275 275 0 0 369 216
Palau..........................................................               0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Washington...............................................               17 4 4 0 0 13 857 769 381 381 0 0 388 338
     Pacific.................................................. 90 26 23 2 1 64 8551 7,220 2,970 2,636 291 43 4,250 2756 
Delaware...................................................               4 2 2 0 0 2 725 602 307 307 0 0 295 515
District Of Columbia.................................               0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Florida.......................................................               11 4 4 0 0 7 738 618 254 230 24 0 364 202
Georgia......................................................               6 3 3 0 0 3 271 252 135 135 0 0 117 220
Maryland...................................................               6 2 1 0 1 4 222 197 98 82 0 16 99 122
 
 
1 The States are grouped according to the method used by the Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce. 
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North Carolina...........................................              2 0 0 0 0 2 35 33 12 12 0 0 21 0
South Carolina...........................................               1 1 0 1 0 0 73 57 42 0 42 0 15 73
Virginia.....................................................               3 1 1 0 0 2 72 56 16 16 0 0 40 30
West Virginia............................................               2 1 1 0 0 1 68 66 27 27 0 0 39 26
     South Atlantic 35 14 12 1 1 21 2204 1881 891 809 66 16 990 1188 
Iowa..........................................................               1 0 0 0 0 1 5 5 0 0 0 0 5 0
Kansas.......................................................               2 0 0 0 0 2 66 65 25 25 0 0 40 0
Minnesota..................................................               16 3 3 0 0 13 613 539 203 203 0 0 336 111
Missouri....................................................               19 3 3 0 0 16 913 846 325 325 0 0 521 167
Nebraska....................................................               0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
North Dakota.............................................               0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
South Dakota.............................................               1 1 1 0 0 0 28 26 16 16 0 0 10 28
     West North Central.............................. 39 7 7 0 0 32 1625 1,481 569 569 0 0 912 306 
Arkansas....................................................               3 1 1 0 0 2 363 345 149 149 0 0 196 110
Louisiana...................................................               6 2 2 0 0 4 225 213 81 81 0 0 132 48
Oklahoma..................................................               5 3 3 0 0 2 223 204 122 122 0 0 82 180
Texas.........................................................              5 1 1 0 0 4 1403 1,284 683 663 20 0 601 1155
     West South Central.............................. 19 7 7 0 0 12 2214 2,046 1,035 1,015 20 0 1,011 1493 
     Total, all States and areas.................... 423 147 133 8 6 276 28664 25,049 11,957 11,002 697 258 13,092 14458 
 
 
 
1 The States are grouped according to the method used by the Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce. 
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Crop Production........................................              5 4 4 0 0 1 248 221 115 115 0 0 106 148
Animal Production....................................             7 2 2 0 0 5 3755 3,201 929 929 0 0 2,272 144
Support Activities for Agriculture and 
Forestry..................................................... 1              1 1 0 0 0 7 7 7 7 0 0 0 7
     Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and 
     Hunting................................................. 13 7 7 0 0 6 4010 3,429 1,051 1,051 0 0 2,378 299 
Oil and Gas Extraction.............................. 6 4 3 0 1 2 181 169 120 74 0 46 49 124 
Mining (except Oil and Gas)..................... 9 4 4 0 0 5 568 547 201 201 0 0 346 40 
Support Activities for Mining................... 3 1 1 0 0 2 49 43 24 24 0 0 19 34 
     Mining.................................................. 18 9 8 0 1 9 798 759 345 299 0 46 414 198 
     Utilities................................................. 65 37 35 1 1 28 3452 3,217 1,836 1,785 30 21 1,381 2113 
Building, Developing and General 
Contracting................................................               22 13 13 0 0 9 644 512 211 209 0 2 301 244
Heavy Construction...................................               21 11 9 0 2 10 623 578 323 316 0 7 255 290
Special Trade Contractors......................... 259 151 135 1 15 108 7703 5,624 3,468 3,171 12 285 2,156 4318 
     Construction......................................... 302 175 157 1 17 127 8970 6,714 4,002 3,696 12 294 2,712 4852 
Food Manufacturing..................................             95 38 34 3 1 57 10114 9,781 4,975 4,792 91 92 4,806 2987
Beverage and Tobacco Product 
Manufacturing...........................................               26 5 3 2 0 21 1009 908 311 237 74 0 597 109
Textile Mills..............................................               5 4 4 0 0 1 631 593 306 306 0 0 287 228
Textile Product Mills................................               4 1 1 0 0 3 227 218 97 97 0 0 121 8
Apparel Manufacturing.............................               3 1 1 0 0 2 256 224 85 29 0 56 139 28
Leather and Allied Product  
Manufacturing........................................... 3              0 0 0 0 3 498 501 119 103 16 0 382 0
     31-Manufacturing................................. 136 49 43 5 1 87 12735 12,225 5,893 5,564 181 148 6,332 3360 
Wood Product Manufacturing................... 19 8 7 1 0 11 1158 1,111 486 463 0 23 625 311 
 
 
1 Source: Standard Classification, Statistical Policy Division, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, D.C. 
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Paper Manufacturing.................................             19 12 12 0 0 7 1125 1,107 559 509 0 50 548 574
Printing and Related Support Activities.... 15 2 1 1 0 13 1240 1,118 349 321 28 0 769 47 
Petroleum and Coal Products 
Manufacturing........................................... 12              7 6 0 1 5 399 389 230 152 38 40 159 163
Chemical Manufacturing...........................              40 14 14 0 0 26 2598 2,428 1,125 1,124 0 1 1,303 1022
Plastics and Rubber Products 
Manufacturing...........................................           27 8 6 2 0 19 3888 3,447 1,712 1,268 400 44 1,735 1438
Nonmetallic Mineral Product 
Manufacturing...........................................               26 9 8 1 0 17 1004 926 459 456 3 0 467 494
     32-Manufacturing................................. 158 60 54 5 1 98 11412 10,526 4,920 4,293 469 158 5,606 4049 
Primary Metal Manufacturing................... 30 15 15 0 0 15 1948 1,904 1,103 1,092 6 5 801 1012 
Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing.              47 15 14 1 0 32 4307 3,980 1,574 1,506 61 7 2,406 959
Machinery Manufacturing.........................              27 12 12 0 0 15 2253 2,155 905 905 0 0 1,250 459
Computer and Electronic Product 
Manufacturing...........................................              10 4 4 0 0 6 1797 1,635 720 703 0 17 915 161
Electrical Equipment, Appliance and 
Component Manufacturing....................... 21          8 8 0 0 13 2965 2,733 1,209 1,142 67 0 1,524 946
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 69 41 38 3 0 28 6778 6,209 3,222 2,886 336 0 2,987 3682 
Furniture and Related Product 
Manufacturing...........................................               10 6 5 0 1 4 768 702 342 256 0 86 360 347
Miscellaneous Manufacturing...................              55 15 14 1 0 40 4453 4,106 1,757 1,609 35 113 2,349 1037
     33-Manufacturing................................. 269 116 110 5 1 153 25269 23,424 10,832 10,099 505 228 12,592 8603 
Wholesale Trade, Durable Goods............. 46 20 19 1 0 26 1559 1,448 651 558 89 4 797 539 
Wholesale Trade, Nondurable Goods....... 58 17 17 0 0 41 2927 2,561 1,457 1,364 7 86 1,104 1359 
     Wholesale Trade.................................. 104 37 36 1 0 67 4486 4,009 2,108 1,922 96 90 1,901 1898 
Motor Vehicle and Parts Dealers.............. 52 29 27 2 0 23 924 837 387 387 0 0 450 397 
 
 
1 Source: Standard Classification, Statistical Policy Division, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, D.C. 
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Furniture and Home Furnishings Stores...              4 2 2 0 0 2 39 36 20 20 0 0 16 25
Electronics and Appliance Stores............. 2 1 1 0 0 1 58 52 29 29 0 0 23 45 
Building Material and Garden Equipment 
and Supplies Dealers................................. 7              3 3 0 0 4 320 282 89 89 0 0 193 37
Food and Beverage Stores.........................               59 30 28 1 1 29 1699 1,415 588 553 26 9 827 772
Health and Personal Care Stores...............               9 6 6 0 0 3 175 139 78 78 0 0 61 107
Gasoline Stations.......................................               2 1 1 0 0 1 23 19 11 11 0 0 8 14
Clothing and Clothing Accessories Stores 5 1 1 0 0 4 402 356 146 146 0 0 210 6 
     44-Retail Trade.................................... 140 73 69 3 1 67 3640 3,136 1,348 1,313 26 9 1,788 1403 
Sporting Goods, Hobby, Book and Music 
Stores......................................................... 1              1 1 0 0 0 12 9 7 7 0 0 2 12
General Merchandise Stores..................... 16            7 7 0 0 9 2305 2,018 975 975 0 0 1,043 1354
Miscellaneous Store Retailers...................              6 3 3 0 0 3 141 126 49 47 0 2 77 40
Nonstore Retailers.....................................               3 1 1 0 0 2 73 68 22 22 0 0 46 6
     45-Retail Trade.................................... 26 12 12 0 0 14 2531 2,221 1,053 1,051 0 2 1,168 1412 
Air Transportation.....................................               1 1 1 0 0 0 21 15 12 12 0 0 3 21
Rail Transportation...................................               2 2 2 0 0 0 94 87 83 83 0 0 4 94
Water Transportation................................               9 2 2 0 0 7 97 76 25 23 0 2 51 27
Truck Transportation.................................              80 42 41 0 1 38 2605 2,193 1,123 1,120 0 3 1,070 1368
Transit and Ground Passenger 
Transportation...........................................              82 39 36 0 3 43 7422 6,035 3,138 2,994 11 133 2,897 3457
Pipeline Transportation.............................              3 1 1 0 0 2 87 71 42 42 0 0 29 39
Scenic and Sightseeing Transportation..... 1 0 0 0 0 1 145 128 45 45 0 0 83 0 
Support Activities for Transportation....... 40 20 19 0 1 20 1373 1,211 703 671 3 29 508 977 
     48-Transportation................................. 218 107 102 0 5 111 11844 9,816 5,171 4,990 14 167 4,645 5983 
 
 
1 Source: Standard Classification, Statistical Policy Division, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, D.C. 
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Couriers and Messengers.......................... 18 12 12 0 0 6 784 600 349 336 13 0 251 534 
Warehousing and Storage Facilities.......... 65 27 25 0 2 38 4937 4,476 1,793 1,657 0 136 2,683 1345 
     49-Transportation................................. 83 39 37 0 2 44 5721 5,076 2,142 1,993 13 136 2,934 1879 
Publishing Industries.................................               23 9 9 0 0 14 672 604 282 282 0 0 322 363
Motion Picture and Sound Recording 
Industries...................................................               2 1 1 0 0 1 39 36 15 15 0 0 21 3
Broadcasting and Telecommunications.... 74 28 27 0 1 46 4560 4,122 1,494 1,486 0 8 2,628 993 
Information Services and Data 
Processing Services................................... 6              4 4 0 0 2 150 138 57 53 0 4 81 42
     Information........................................... 105 42 41 0 1 63 5421 4,900 1,848 1,836 0 12 3,052 1401 
Monetary Authorities–Central Bank........               2 1 1 0 0 1 97 80 37 37 0 0 43 48
Credit Intermediation and Related 
Activities...................................................               4 2 2 0 0 2 232 219 78 78 0 0 141 65
Securities, Commodity Contracts and 
Other Intermediation and Related 
Activities...................................................               2 2 0 2 0 0 63 55 54 0 54 0 1 63
Insurance Carriers and Related Activities.           3 0 0 0 0 3 4944 3,886 2,113 2,113 0 0 1,773 964
     Finance and Insurance.......................... 11 5 3 2 0 6 5336 4,240 2,282 2,228 54 0 1,958 1140 
Real Estate.................................................               13 8 5 2 1 5 136 122 70 44 19 7 52 62
Rental and Leasing Services..................... 26 10 10 0 0 16 803 730 367 367 0 0 363 252 
Owners and Lessors of Other Non-
Financial Assets........................................               1 1 1 0 0 0 13 11 8 8 0 0 3 13
     Real Estate and Rental and Leasing..... 40 19 16 2 1 21 952 863 445 419 19 7 418 327 
     Professional, Scientific and Technical 
     Services................................................ 39 22 18 1 3 17 1369 1,195 573 463 11 99 622 450 
 
 
1 Source: Standard Classification, Statistical Policy Division, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, D.C. 
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     Management of Companies and 
     Enterprises............................................ 7              5 3 1 1 2 379 334 184 127 21 36 150 229
Administrative and Support Services........ 169 114 47 44 23 55 10276 6,952 4,677 1,626 2,140 911 2,275 7591 
Waste Management and Remediation 
Services.....................................................              85 38 38 0 0 47 3860 3,504 1,678 1,649 19 10 1,826 1743
     Administrative and Support, Waste 
     Management and Remediation 
      Services……………………………... 254             152 85 44 23 102 14136 10,456 6,355 3,275 2,159 921 4,101 9334
     Educational Services............................ 54 46 36 2 8 8 5933 4,363 2,823 2,464 70 289 1,540 5508 
Ambulatory Health Care Services............. 52 31 27 1 3 21 4282 3,687 2,386 2,175 78 133 1,301 2957 
Hospitals....................................................           145 104 84 7 13 41 27767 21,948 12,403 10,997 563 843 9,545 18072 
Nursing and Residential Care Facilities....              190 120 114 5 1 70 16240 12,219 7,933 7,806 110 17 4,286 12069
Social Assistance.......................................              56 34 29 2 3 22 3890 3,058 1,739 1,514 58 167 1,319 2039
     Health Care and Social Assistance.......           443 289 254 15 20 154 52179 40,912 24,461 22,492 809 1,160 16,451 35137
Performing Arts, Spectator Sports and 
Related Industries......................................               9 5 5 0 0 4 395 312 86 86 0 0 226 110
Museums, Historical Sites and Similar 
Institutions................................................. 1              1 1 0 0 0 28 26 15 15 0 0 11 28
Amusement, Gambling and Recreation 
Industries...................................................               14 7 5 2 0 7 1150 989 461 461 0 0 528 475
     Arts, Entertainment and Recreation..... 24 13 11 2 0 11 1573 1,327 562 562 0 0 765 613 
Accommodation........................................               33 19 18 0 1 14 1676 1,332 705 646 0 59 627 865
Foodservices and Drinking Places............ 26 18 16 2 0 8 1314 1,049 668 598 70 0 381 1003 
     Accommodation and Foodservices...... 59 37 34 2 1 22 2990 2,381 1,373 1,244 70 59 1,008 1868 
Repair and Maintenance............................ 33 18            18 0 0 15 1208 1,114 607 602 0 5 507 652
 
 
1 Source: Standard Classification, Statistical Policy Division, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, D.C. 
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Personal and Laundry Services................. 36 21 19 1 1 15 1467 1,265 645 619 13 13 620 664 
Religious, Grantmaking, Civic, and 
Professional and Similar Organizations....               24 19 16 2 1 5 1390 1,298 619 596 18 5 679 575
     Other Services (except Public 
     Administration).................................... 93             58 53 3 2 35 4065 3,677 1,871 1,817 31 23 1,806 1891
Justice, Public Order, and Safety.............. 11 8 3 5 0 3 1043 750 502 116 386 0 248 779 
Administration of Human Resource 
Programs................................................... 2              1 1 0 0 1 88 85 58 58 0 0 27 56
Administration of Environmental Quality 
Programs................................................... 1              1 1 0 0 0 50 43 28 28 0 0 15 50
Administration of Housing Programs, 
Urban Planning, and Community 
Development.............................................               3 1 1 0 0 2 171 156 87 87 0 0 69 73
Administration of Economic Programs.....               2 0 0 0 0 2 78 65 31 31 0 0 34 0
National Security and International 
Affairs....................................................... 4              4 1 3 0 0 234 191 148 11 137 0 43 234
     Public Administration.......................... 23 15 7 8 0 8 1664 1,290 854 331 523 0 436 1192 
     Unclassified Establishments................ 51 29 26 1 2 22 1672 1,481 753 721 10 22 728 639 
     Total, all industrial groups................... 2,735 1,453 1,257 104 92 1,282 192537 161,971 85,085 76,035 5,123 3,927 76,886  95778
 
 
1 Source: Standard Classification, Statistical Policy Division, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, D.C. 
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Elections in which representation rights were won by 
 
AFL–CIO unions 
 
Other national unions 
 
Other local unions 
Elections in which no 
representative was 
chosen 
 
 
 
Size of unit (number of employees) 
 
 
Number 
eligible to 
vote 
 
 
 
Total 
elections 
 
 
 
Percent of 
total 
 
 
Cumu-
lative 
percent of 
total 
 
Number 
Percent 
by size 
class 
 
Number 
Percent 
by size 
class 
 
Number 
Percent 
by size 
class 
 
Number 
Percent 
by size 
class 
 A.  Certification elections (RC and RM) 
                Total RC and RM elections................ 161,711 2,283 100.0 -- 1,098 100.0 106 100.0 85 100.0 994 100.0 
Under 10............................................................             3,005 464 20.3 20.3 280 25.5 16 15.1 15 17.6 153 15.4
10 to 19..............................................................             6,626 442 19.4 39.7 223 20.3 20 18.9 26 30.6 173 17.4
20 to 29..............................................................             7,281 277 12.1 51.8 115 10.5 12 11.3 9 10.6 141 14.2
30 to 39..............................................................             6,735 199 8.7 60.5 93 8.5 9 8.5 6 7.1 91 9.2
40 to 49..............................................................             5,457 123 5.4 65.9 59 5.4 3 2.8 5 5.9 56 5.6
50 to 59..............................................................             6,415 117 5.1 71.0 47 4.3 4 3.8 3 3.5 63 6.3
60 to 69..............................................................             6,017 89 3.9 74.9 43 3.9 6 5.7 2 2.4 38 3.8
70 to 79..............................................................             5,546 69 3.0 78.0 34 3.1 4 3.8 2 2.4 29 2.9
80 to 89..............................................................             4,533 55 2.4 80.4 24 2.2 10 9.4 4 4.7 17 1.7
90 to 99..............................................................             4,879 51 2.2 82.6 25 2.3 2 1.9 1 1.2 23 2.3
100 to 109..........................................................             4,641 44 1.9 84.5 19 1.7 2 1.9 2 2.4 21 2.1
110 to 119..........................................................             3,645 34 1.5 86.0 17 1.5 4 3.8 1 1.2 12 1.2
120 to 129..........................................................             4,065 31 1.4 87.4 14 1.3 2 1.9 0 0.0 15 1.5
130 to 139..........................................................             2,891 21 0.9 88.3 8 0.7 1 0.9 1 1.2 11 1.1
140 to 149..........................................................             3,213 21 0.9 89.2 8 0.7 1 0.9 0 0.0 12 1.2
150 to 159..........................................................             3,213 20 0.9 90.1 4 0.4 1 0.9 1 1.2 14 1.4
160 to 169..........................................................             2,509 17 0.7 90.8 5 0.5 2 1.9 1 1.2 9 0.9
170 to 179..........................................................             1,253 7 0.3 91.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 1.2 6 0.6
180 to 189..........................................................             1,901 10 0.4 91.6 4 0.4 1 0.9 0 0.0 5 0.5
190 to 199..........................................................             1,510 8 0.4 91.9 2 0.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 6 0.6
200 to 299..........................................................             17,241 75 3.3 95.2 29 2.6 2 1.9 2 2.4 42 4.2
300 to 399..........................................................             14,148 43 1.9 97.1 18 1.6 1 0.9 2 2.4 22 2.2
400 to 499..........................................................             7,892 19 0.8 97.9 9 0.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 10 1.0
500 to 599..........................................................             7,205 13 0.6 98.5 5 0.5 2 1.9 1 1.2 5 0.5
600 to 799..........................................................             8,125 13 0.6 99.1 4 0.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 9 0.9
800 to 999..........................................................             7,001 9 0.4 99.5 2 0.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 7 0.7
1,000 to 1,999....................................................             6,327 8 0.4 99.8 5 0.5 1 0.9 0 0.0 2 0.2
 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definition. 
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Elections in which representation rights were won by 
 
AFL–CIO unions 
 
Other national unions 
 
Other local unions 
Elections in which no 
representative was 
chosen 
 
 
 
Size of unit (number of employees) 
 
 
Number 
eligible to 
vote 
 
 
 
Total 
elections 
 
 
 
Percent of 
total 
 
 
Cumu-
lative 
percent of 
total 
 
Number 
Percent 
by size 
class 
 
Number 
Percent 
by size 
class 
 
Number 
Percent 
by size 
class 
 
Number 
Percent 
by size 
class 
2,000 to 2,999....................................................         8,437 4 0.2 100.0 2 0.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 0.2
3,000 to 9,999.....................................................             0 0 0.0 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Over 9,999..........................................................             0 0 0.0 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
 B.  Decertification elections (RD) 
                        Total RD elections...................... 28,594 422 100.0 -- 133 100.0 8 100.0 6 100.0 275 100.0 
Under 10.............................................................             428 73 17.3 17.3 9 6.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 64 23.3
10 to 19...............................................................             1,163 84 19.9 37.2 15 11.3 1 12.5 1 16.7 67 24.4
20 to 29...............................................................             1,514 61 14.5 51.7 15 11.3 0 0.0 2 33.3 44 16.0
30 to 39...............................................................             807 26 6.2 57.8 9 6.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 17 6.2
40 to 49...............................................................             1,121 25 5.9 63.7 9 6.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 16 5.8
50 to 59...............................................................             1,408 28 6.6 70.4 12 9.0 1 12.5 1 16.7 14 5.1
60 to 69...............................................................             1,144 18 4.3 74.6 7 5.3 2 25.0 0 0.0 9 3.3
70 to 79...............................................................             944 12 2.8 77.5 4 3.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 8 2.9
80 to 89...............................................................             1,068 13 3.1 80.6 8 6.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 5 1.8
90 to 99...............................................................             675 7 1.7 82.2 2 1.5 0 0.0 2 33.3 3 1.1
100 to 109...........................................................             467 5 1.2 83.4 3 2.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 0.7
110 to 119...........................................................             1,209 11 2.6 86.0 6 4.5 1 12.5 0 0.0 4 1.5
120 to 129...........................................................             1,207 9 2.1 88.2 4 3.0 1 12.5 0 0.0 4 1.5
130 to 139...........................................................             521 4 0.9 89.1 2 1.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 0.7
140 to 149...........................................................             698 5 1.2 90.3 4 3.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.4
150 to 159...........................................................             880 6 1.4 91.7 4 3.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 0.7
160 to 169...........................................................             514 3 0.7 92.4 1 0.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 0.7
170 to 199...........................................................             716 4 0.9 93.4 2 1.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 0.7
200 to 299...........................................................             3,340 14 3.3 96.7 8 6.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 6 2.2
300 to 499...........................................................             2,942 8 1.9 98.6 6 4.5 1 12.5 0 0.0 1 0.4
500 to 799...........................................................             2,188 4 0.9 99.5 2 1.5 1 12.5 0 0.0 1 0.4
800 and Over .....................................................             3,640 2 0.5 100.0 1 0.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.4
 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definition. 
                                                    Table 18.—Distribution of Unfair Labor Practice Situations Received, 
                                                            by Number of Employees in Establishments, Fiscal Year 20041
 
Total Type of situations 
 
CA 
 
CB 
 
CC 
 
CD 
 
CE 
 
CG 
 
CP 
CA-CB 
combinations 
Other C 
combinations 
 
 
 
Size of 
establishment 
(number of 
employees) 
 
 
 
 
 
Total 
number 
of situ-
ations 
 
 
Percent 
of all 
situa-
tions 
Cumu-
lative 
percent 
of all 
situa-
tions 
Num-
ber of 
situa-
tions 
 
Percent 
by size 
class 
Num-
ber of 
situa-
tions 
 
Percent 
by size 
class 
Num-
ber of 
situa-
tions 
 
Percent 
by size 
class 
Num-
ber of 
situa-
tions 
 
Percent 
by size 
class 
Num-
ber of 
situa-
tions 
 
Percent 
by size 
class 
Num-
ber of 
situa-
tions 
 
Percent 
by size 
class 
Num-
ber of 
situa-
tions 
 
Percent 
by size 
class 
Num-
ber of 
situa-
tions 
 
Percent 
by size 
class 
Num-
ber of 
situa-
tions 
 
Percent 
by size 
class 
Totals..........       25,000 100.0 -- 18,264 100.0 5,656 100.0 330 100.0 127 100.0 25 100.0 24 100.0 85 100.0 434 100.0 55 100.0
Under 10................ 1,715      6.9 6.9 1,239 6.8 325 5.7 55 16.7 31 24.4 7 28.0 0 0.0 15 17.6 29 6.7 14 25.5
10-19....................         2,136 8.5 15.4 1,651 9.0 367 6.5 36 10.9 34 26.8 5 20.0 0 0.0 9 10.6 28 6.5 6 10.9
20-29....................         2,037 8.1 23.6 1,541 8.4 376 6.6 39 11.8 15 11.8 1 4.0 0 0.0 19 22.4 40 9.2 6 10.9
30-39....................         1,029 4.1 27.7 802 4.4 166 2.9 33 10.0 4 3.1 1 4.0 0 0.0 6 7.1 14 3.2 3 5.5
40-49....................          843 3.4 31.0 659 3.6 158 2.8 7 2.1 2 1.6 1 4.0 0 0.0 4 4.7 11 2.5 1 1.8
50-59....................         1,866 7.5 38.5 1,301 7.1 454 8.0 44 13.3 15 11.8 5 20.0 6 25.0 7 8.2 29 6.7 5 9.1
60-69....................         746 3.0 41.5 593 3.2 141 2.5 2 0.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 4.2 2 2.4 5 1.2 2 3.6
70-79....................          621 2.5 44.0 501 2.7 101 1.8 7 2.1 1 0.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 1.2 7 1.6 3 5.5
80-89....................          522 2.1 46.1 421 2.3 86 1.5 6 1.8 3 2.4 0 0.0 1 4.2 0 0.0 5 1.2 0 0.0
90-99....................          320 1.3 47.3 264 1.4 48 0.8 2 0.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 1.2 5 1.2 0 0.0
100-109................         2,230 8.9 56.3 1,432 7.8 691 12.2 39 11.8 5 3.9 1 4.0 2 8.3 4 4.7 54 12.4 2 3.6
110-119................         178 0.7 57.0 144 0.8 31 0.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 0.7 0 0.0
120-129................          441 1.8 58.7 356 1.9 57 1.0 7 2.1 1 0.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 1.2 17 3.9 2 3.6
130-139................          232 0.9 59.7 185 1.0 36 0.6 3 0.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 3.5 5 1.2 0 0.0
140-149................          151 0.6 60.3 125 0.7 25 0.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 1.8
150-159................          621 2.5 62.8 430 2.4 155 2.7 12 3.6 5 3.9 0 0.0 3 12.5 1 1.2 12 2.8 3 5.5
160-169................          178 0.7 63.5 151 0.8 25 0.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 0.5 0 0.0
170-179................          163 0.7 64.1 128 0.7 29 0.5 1 0.3 2 1.6 1 4.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 0.5 0 0.0
180-189................          147 0.6 64.7 112 0.6 31 0.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 3.5 1 0.2 0 0.0
190-199................          49 0.2 64.9 39 0.2 8 0.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.2 1 1.8
200-299................         1,923 7.7 72.6 1,423 7.8 451 8.0 8 2.4 1 0.8 0 0.0 1 4.2 3 3.5 35 8.1 1 1.8
300-399................         986 3.9 76.5 698 3.8 259 4.6 5 1.5 8 6.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 2.4 13 3.0 1 1.8
400-499................          629 2.5 79.1 474 2.6 139 2.5 3 0.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 1.2 10 2.3 2 3.6
500-599................          842 3.4 82.4 573 3.1 247 4.4 3 0.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 4.2 0 0.0 18 4.1 0 0.0
600-699................          330 1.3 83.7 249 1.4 75 1.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 1.2 5 1.2 0 0.0
700-799................          262 1.0 84.8 213 1.2 45 0.8 1 0.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 0.7 0 0.0
800-899................          228 0.9 85.7 162 0.9 54 1.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 4.2 0 0.0 11 2.5 0 0.0
900-999................          109 0.4 86.1 83 0.5 24 0.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 0.5 0 0.0
1,000-1,999..........         1,728 6.9 93.0 1,123 6.1 542 9.6 8 2.4 0 0.0 2 8.0 5 20.8 2 2.4 44 10.1 2 3.6
2,000-2,999..........         600 2.4 95.4 407 2.2 178 3.1 4 1.2 0 0.0 1 4.0 1 4.2 0 0.0 9 2.1 0 0.0
3,000-3,999..........          233 0.9 96.4 137 0.8 89 1.6 2 0.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 5 1.2 0 0.0
4,000-4,999..........          119 0.5 96.9 64 0.4 49 0.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 8.3 0 0.0 4 0.9 0 0.0
5,000-9,999..........          340 1.4 98.2 230 1.3 106 1.9 2 0.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 0.5 0 0.0
Over 9,999............         446 1.8 100.0 354 1.9 88 1.6 1 0.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 0.7 0 0.0
 
 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
Table 19.—Litigation for Enforcement and/or Review of Board Orders, Fiscal Year 2004; and Cumulative Totals, 
Fiscal Years 1936 through 2004
 
Fiscal Year 2004 
Number of proceedings1 Percentages 
 
July 5, 1936  
Sept. 30, 2004 
 
 
 
Total 
 
vs. em-
ployers 
only 
 
vs. 
unions 
only 
vs. both 
employ-
ers and 
unions 
 
Board 
dismis-
sal2
 
vs. em-
ployers 
only 
 
vs. 
unions 
only 
vs. both 
employ-
ers and 
unions 
 
Board 
dismis-
sal2
 
 
Number 
 
 
Percent 
Proceedings decided by U.S. courts of appeals and other courts……….. 74 66 6 0 2 89.2 8.1 -- 2.7 -- -- 
On proceedings for review and/or enforcement………...………....... 62 57 3 0 2 77.4 4.8 -- 3.2 11,754 100.0 
Board orders affirmed in full …………………………………... 46 42 2 0 2 91.3 4.3 -- 4.3 7769 66.1 
Board orders affirmed with modification ……………………….           3 3 0 0 0 100.0 -- -- -- 1545 13.1
Remanded to the Board …………………………………………           3 3 0 0 0 100.0 -- -- -- 588 5.0
Board orders partially affirmed and partially remanded ………..           0 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 -- -- 262 2.2
Board orders set aside ………………………………………….. 10 9 1 0 0 90.0 10.0 -- -- 1590 13.5 
On petitions for contempt …………………………………………… 12 9 3 0 0 75.0 25.0 -- -- -- -- 
Ancillary proceedings in district courts and/or bankruptcy courts 29           28 1 0 0 96.6 3.4 -- -- -- --
Total Court Orders …………………………………………………..            40 36 4 0 0 90.0 10.0 -- -- -- --
Compliance after filing of petition, before court order …..…......            29 27 2 0 0 93.1 6.9 -- -- -- --
Court orders holding respondent in contempt ………………......            3 2 1 0 0 66.7 33.3 -- -- -- --
Court orders denying petition or discontinuing proceedings at 
CLCB request…………………………………………………… 
4           4 0 0 0 100.0 -- -- -- -- --
Court orders directing compliance without contempt 
adjudication …………..………………………………………… 4           3 1 0 0 75.0 25.0 -- -- -- --
Proceedings decided by U.S. Supreme Court3 ………………………….           0 0 0 0 0 -- -- -- -- 259 100.0
Board orders affirmed in full ……………………………..………...           0 0 0 0 0 -- -- -- -- 155 59.8
Board orders affirmed with modification …………………………...            0 0 0 0 0 -- -- -- -- 18 6.9
Board orders set aside …………………………………………….... 0 0 0 0 0 -- -- -- -- 46 17.8 
Remanded to the Board ………………………….………………….            0 0 0 0 0 -- -- -- -- 20 7.7
Remanded to court of appeals ………………………………...……. 0 0 0 0 0 -- -- -- -- 17 6.6 
Board’s request for remand or modification of enforcement order 
denied ………….…………………………...…………………….… 0           0 0 0 0 -- -- -- -- 1 0.4
Contempt cases remanded to court of appeals ……………………... 0 0 0 0 0 -- -- -- -- 1 0.4 
Contempt cases enforced ……………………..…………………….            0 0 0 0 0 -- -- -- -- 1 0.4
 
1 “Proceedings” are comparable to “cases” reported in annual reports prior to fiscal 1964.  This term more accurately describes the data inasmuch as a single “proceeding” often includes more than one 
“case.”  See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
2 A proceeding in which the Board had entered an order dismissing the complaint and the charging party appealed such dismissal in the courts of appeals. 
3 The Board appeared as “amicus curiae” in 0 cases.
 
Table 19A.—Proceedings Decided by Circuit Courts of Appeals on Petitions for Enforcement and/or Review of Board Orders, 
Fiscal Year 2004, Compared With 5-Year Cumulative Totals, 1999 Through 20031 
 
 
Affirmed in full 
 
Modified 
 
Remanded in full 
 
Affirmed in part and 
remanded in part 
 
 
Set aside 
 
Fiscal Year 
2004 
Cumulative 
fiscal years 
1999–2003 
 
Fiscal Year 
2004 
Cumulative 
fiscal years 
1999–2003 
 
Fiscal Year 
2004 
Cumulative 
fiscal years 
1999–2003 
 
Fiscal Year 
2004 
Cumulative 
fiscal years 
1999–2003 
 
Fiscal Year 
2004 
Cumulative 
fiscal years 
1999–2003 
 
 
 
 
Circuit courts of 
appeals 
(headquarters) 
 
 
 
Total 
fiscal 
year 
2004 
 
 
 
Total 
fiscal 
years 
1998-
2003 Num-ber 
Per-
cent 
Num
-ber 
Per-
cent 
Num
-ber 
Per-
cent 
Num
-ber 
Per-
cent 
Num
-ber 
Per-
cent 
Num
-ber 
Per-
cent 
Num
-ber 
Per-
cent 
Num
-ber 
Per-
cent 
Num
-ber 
Per-
cent 
Num 
ber 
Per-
cent 
Total all circuits                    62 451 46 74.2 306 67.8 3 4.8 31 6.9 3 4.8 37 8.2 0 0.0 26 5.8 10 16.1 51 11.3
Boston, MA……..                     1 12 1 100.0 8 66.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 8.3 0 0.0 3 25.0
New York, NY….                     2 25 1 50.0 21 84.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 8.0 0 0.0 1 4.0 1 50.0 1 4.0
Philadelphia, PA..                   4 30 2 50.0 25 83.3 0 0.0 3 10.0 1 25.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 3.3 1 25.3 1 3.3
Richmond, VA….                    3 35 1 33.3 20 57.1 1 33.3 3 8.6 0 0.0 3 8.6 0 0.0 3 8.6 1 33.3 6 17.1
New Orleans, LA.                    3 15 2 66.7 9 60.0 0 0.0 3 20.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 6.7 1 33.3 2 13.3
Cincinnati, OH…..                     11 73 8 72.7 53 72.6 1 9.1 6 8.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 6 8.2 2 18.2 8 11.0
Chicago, IL……...                  9 33 7 77.8 21 63.6 1 11.1 1 3.0 0 0.0 1 3.0 0 0.0 4 12.1 1 11.1 6 18.2
St. Louis, MO…...                     5 22 4 80.0 16 72.7 0 0.0 2 9.1 1 20.0 1 4.5 0 0.0 1 4.5 0 0.0 2 9.1
San Francisco, CA                   3 20 3 100.0 14 70.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 10.0 0 0.0 3 15.0 0 0.0 1 5.0
Denver, CO…..…                    3 18 3 100.0 12 66.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 16.7 0 0.0 3 16.7
Atlanta, GA..……                     2 25 2 100.0 20 80.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 4.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 4 16.0
Washington, DC...                    16 143 12 75.0 87 60.8 0 0.0 13 9.1 1 6.3 27 18.9 0 0.0 2 1.4 3 18.8 14 9.8
 
1 Percentages are computed horizontally by current fiscal year and total fiscal years.
 
 
 
                   Table 20.—Injunction Litigation Under Sections 10(e), 10(j), and 10(l), Fiscal Year 2004 
 
Injunction proceedings Disposition of injunctions  
Total pro-
ceedings 
Pending 
in 
appelate 
court Oct. 
01, 2003 
Filed in 
appellate 
court 
fiscal year  
2004 
Total dis-
positions Granted     Denied Settled Withdrawn Pending
Under Sec. 10(e) total……………          3 0 3 3 3 0 0 0 0
 
Injunction proceedings Disposition of injunctions  
Total pro-
ceedings 
Pending 
in district 
court Oct. 
01, 20031
Filed in 
district 
court 
fiscal year  
2004 
Total dis-
positions Granted     Denied Settled Withdrawn Pending
Under Sec. 10(j) total……………. 13 2 11 12 9 0 2 1 1 
8(a)(1)………………………          0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
8(a)(1)(2)(3)(5)……………..          0 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0
8(a)(1)(3)(5)………………..           0 2 8 10 7 0 2 1 0
8(a)(1)(2)(3)(5), 8(b)(1)(A), 
8(b)(2)……………………… 0         0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Under Sec. 10(l) total…………….          7 1 6 7 3 2 3 0 0
8(b)4)(A)…………………...          0 0 2 2 0 1 2 0 0
8(b)(4)(B)…………………..          0 1 3 4 2 1 1 0 0
8(b)(7)(C)…………………..          0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
 
 
 
  1 Totals for cases identified in this table as pending on October 1, 2003, differ from the FY 2003 Annual Report due to postreport adjustments to last year’s “on docket”  
  and/or “closed figures.” 
Table 21.—Special Litigation Involving NLRB; Outcome of Proceedings in Which Court Decisions 
Issued in Fiscal Year 2004—Page 1 of 2 
 
Number of Proceedings 
Total—all courts In courts of appeals In district courts In bankruptcy courts In state courts 
 
 
Court 
Determination 
 
 
Court 
Determination 
 
 
Court 
Determination 
 
 
Court 
Determination 
 
 
Court 
Determination 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of Litigation Num-
ber 
decid-
ed 
Uphold
-ing 
Board 
posi-
tion 
Con-
trary 
to 
Board 
posi-
tion 
Num-
ber 
decid-
ed 
Uphold
-ing 
Board 
posi-
tion 
Con-
trary 
to 
Board 
posi-
tion 
Num-
ber 
decid-
ed 
Uphold
-ing 
Board 
posi-
tion 
Con-
trary 
to 
Board 
posi-
tion 
Num-
ber 
decid-
ed 
Uphold
-ing 
Board 
posi-
tion 
Con-
trary 
to 
Board 
posi-
tion 
Num-
ber 
decid-
ed 
Uphold
-ing 
Board 
posi-
tion 
Con-
trary 
to 
Board 
posi-
tion 
     Totals—all types .................................................................                12 9 3 5 4 1 4 3 1 3 2 1 0 0 0
NLRB—initiated actions or interventions ...............................                2 2 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Motion to file Board’s late proof of claim…………….....                0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
To stay district court § 301 action……………..................                1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
To lift stay in subpoena enforcement action……………..                0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
To enjoin local ordinance as preempted ………………...                1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Action by other parties ............................................................                10 7 3 4 3 1 3 2 1 3 2 1 0 0 0
To review: .........................................................................                0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Prosecutorial discretion ...............................................                0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nonfinal/representation orders.....................................                0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
To restrain NLRB from: ....................................................                2 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
Enforcing Board subpoenas ........................................                0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Proceeding in R case ...................................................                0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Proceeding in unfair labor practice case .....................                2 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
To compel NLRB to: .........................................................                1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
Issue complaint …………………................................                0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Take action in R case ...…….......................................                1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
Vacate election/decertify rep…………………………                0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
To issue decision or take specific action .....................                0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 
Table 21.—Special Litigation Involving NLRB; Outcome of Proceedings in Which Court Decisions 
Issued in Fiscal Year 2004—Page 2 of 2 
 
Number of Proceedings 
Total—all courts In courts of appeals In district courts In bankruptcy courts In state courts 
 
 
Court 
Determination 
 
 
Court 
Determination 
 
 
Court 
Determination 
 
 
Court 
Determination 
 
 
Court 
Determination 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of Litigation Num-
ber 
decid-
ed 
Uphold
-ing 
Board 
posi-
tion 
Con-
trary 
to 
Board 
posi-
tion 
Num-
ber 
decid-
ed 
Uphold
-ing 
Board 
posi-
tion 
Con-
trary 
to 
Board 
posi-
tion 
Num-
ber 
decid-
ed 
Uphold
-ing 
Board 
posi-
tion 
Con-
trary 
to 
Board 
posi-
tion 
Num-
ber 
decid-
ed 
Uphold
-ing 
Board 
posi-
tion 
Con-
trary 
to 
Board 
posi-
tion 
Num-
ber 
decid-
ed 
Uphold
-ing 
Board 
posi-
tion 
Con-
trary 
to 
Board 
posi-
tion 
Other.……………………........................................................ 7               4 3 4 3 1 2 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
Motion to classify Board’s claim...........…………........... 1               0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Intervention to argue collateral estoppal of prior Board 
decision ............................……….................................... 
0               0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Suit alleging fraudulent and corrupt conduct by Board 
agents………………………………………………….... 
1               1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EAJA…………………………………………………….                4 2 2 3 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Suit for violation of constitutional rights………………..                1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Federal Tort Claims Act…………………………………                0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
State claims preempted by §§ 8(b)(4) & 303……………                0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table 22.—Advisory Opinion Cases Received, Closed, and Pending, 
Fiscal Year 20041 
 
Number of cases 
Identification of petitioner 
 
 
 
 
Total 
Employer Union Courts 
State 
board 
Pending October 1, 2003 ……………….………… 0 0 0 0 0 
Received fiscal 2004 ……………………...……….. 0 0 0 0 0 
On docket fiscal 2004 ……...……………………… 0 0 0 0 0 
Closed fiscal 2004 …………………….…………… 0 0 0 0 0 
Pending September 30, 2004……………………... 0 0 0 0 0 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 22A.—Disposition of Advisory Opinion Cases, Fiscal Year 20041
 
 
Action taken Total cases 
closed 
Total Cases …………………………….…………………………………………………………………………. 0 
Board would assert jurisdiction ………………………………………………………………………………….. 0 
Board would not assert jurisdiction ……………………………………………………………………………… 0 
Unresolved because of insufficient evidence submitted …………………………………………………………. 0 
Dismissed ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 0 
Withdrawn …………………………….………………………………………………………………………….. 0 
Denied ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 0 
1 See Glossary of terms for definitions. 
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Table 23–Time Elapsed for Major Case Processing Stages Completed, 
Fiscal Year 2004; and Age of Cases Pending Decision,  
September 30, 2004 
 
Stage Median days 
I. Unfair Labor Practice Cases: 
 A.  Major Stages Completed— 
 1.  Filing of charge to issuance of complaint........................................................................ 87
 2.  Complaint to close of hearing.......................................................................................... 114
 3.  Close of hearing to administrative law judge’s decision.................................................. 78
 4.  Receipt of briefs or submissions to issuance of administrative law judge’s decision...... 27
 5.  Administrative law judge’s decision to issuance of Board decision................................ 392
 6.  Originating document to Board decision.......................................................................... 206
 7.  Assignment to Board decision.......................................................................................... 154
 8.  Filing of charge to issuance of Board decision................................................................ 690
 B.  Age of cases pending administrative law judge's decision, September 30, 2004 
 1.  From filing of charge........................................................................................................ 332
 2.  From close of hearing....................................................................................................... 70
 C.  Age of cases pending Board decision, September 30, 2004 
 1.  From filing of charge........................................................................................................ 1159
 2.  From originating document.............................................................................................. 583
 3.  From assignment.............................................................................................................. 521
II. Representation cases: 
 A.  Major stages completed— 
 1.  Filing of petition to notice of hearing issued.................................................................... 1
 2.  Notice of hearing to close of hearing............................................................................... 14
 3.  Close of hearing to Regional Director’s decision issued................................................. 21
 4.  Close of pre-election hearing to Board’s decision issued1............................................... 485
 5.  Close of post-election hearing to Board’s decision issued............................................... 133
 6.  Filing of petition to— 
   a.  Board decision issued.................................................................................................. 304
   b.  Regional Director’s decision issued............................................................................ 38
 7.  Originating document to Board decision.......................................................................... 129
 8.  Assignment to Board’s decision....................................................................................... 94
 B.  Age of cases pending Board decision, September 30, 2004 
 1.  From filing of petition....................................................................................................... 576
 2.  From originating document.............................................................................................. 336
 3.  From assignment............................................................................................................... 426
 C.  Age of cases pending Regional Director’s decision, September 30, 2004............................ 135
 
1 This median does not include cases in which the Board denied requests for review. 
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Table 24.—NLRB Activity Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 
FY 2004 
Action taken Cases/ Amount 
I. Applications for fees and expenses filed with the Board under 5 U.S.C. § 504 during this fiscal year: 
 A.  Number of applications filed:................................................................................................................. 5
 B.  Decisions in EAJA cases ruled on by the Board during this fiscal year (includes ALJ awards
       adopted by the Board, and settlements): 
                  Granting fees:……………………………………………………………………………………. 1
    Denying fees:…………………………………………………………………………………….                5
 C.  Amount of fees and expenses in cases listed in B, above: 
   Claimed:………….……………………………………………………………………………… $355,204.05
   Recovered:……………….……………………………………………………………………… $  35,000.00
II. Petitions for Review of Board Orders denying fees under 5 U.S.C. § 504: 
 A.  Awards granting fees (includes settlements):………………………………………………………..                  0
 B.  Awards denying fees:…………………………………………………………………………………                  0
 C.  Amount of fees and expenses recovered pursuant to court award or settlement (includes fees
recovered in cases in which court finds merit to claim but remands to Board for determination
of fee amount):………………………………………………………………………………………                0
III. Applications for fees and expenses before Circuit Courts of Appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 2412: 
 A.  Awards granting fees (includes settlements):………………………………………………………..                3
 B.  Awards denying fees:………………………………………………………………………………...                  1
 C.  Amount of fees and expenses recovered:……………………………………………………………. $140,631.22
IV. Applications for fees and expenses before District Courts under 28 U.S.C. § 2412: 
 A.  Awards granting fees (includes settlements):………………………………………………………...                1
 B.  Awards denying fees:…………………………………………………………………………………                  0
 C.  Amount of fees and expenses recovered:……………………………………………….……………. $225,000.00  
 
